The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin

Volume 32

The Theory of Governance and Other Miscellaneous Papers
1921–1938

Translated from the German by
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Edited with an Introduction by
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THE THEORY OF GOVERNANCE
AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS, 1921–1938
Editors’ Introduction

Although the last text included here was written in 1932, as the volume’s title indicates it includes all of the previously unpublished texts written before Voegelin’s forced emigration from Austria in 1938. It should be read in relation to Voegelin’s work as a whole. The focus of this work is stated in the quotation introducing Order and History: “In the study of creatures one should not exercise a vain and perishing curiosity, but ascend to what is immortal and everlasting.”

At the beginning of his academic career Voegelin had to contend with the various methodological controversies that dominated the “human sciences” in Germany in the period following World War I, but from the start his larger theoretical works were concerned with the core of the human person and with the human being’s relationship to the ground of being. Depending on the immediate theme upon which Voegelin is focusing, there may be shifts in perspective, but the orientation to the mystical ground of human life, and therefore to the source of individual and social order, remains constant.

The eight texts of this first volume may be grouped around two broad themes. The first three, centered on Voegelin’s 1922

2. For a discussion of Voegelin’s place in the context of German “Geisteswissenschaft” in the 1920s and 1930s see Eric Voegelin, introduction to On the Form of the American Mind, ed. Jürgen Gebhardt and Barry Cooper (1990; available Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), ix–xxxv, vol. 1, CW.
editors’ introduction

dissertation, “Interaction and Spiritual Community,” deal with sociological theory; the five texts that follow are concerned with political science and the theory of law and are centered on “The Theory of Governance” (c. 1930–1932), an inquiry into politics that has as its starting point an understanding of the human being as imago Dei.

Although in some cases only an approximate date for the piece can be given, we have attempted to arrange the eight texts chronologically.

1. “Interaction and Spiritual Community” is Voegelin’s dissertation in sociology, completed at the University of Vienna in 1922 under the direction of Hans Kelsen and Othmar Spann. A few words on Voegelin’s relationship to his university teachers may be appropriate at this point. Whereas Kelsen has become famous as a legal theorist, both in Europe and in the United States, Othmar Spann has generally been forgotten. Nevertheless, as early as 1924 Voegelin’s writings on law reveal the distance he had placed between himself and Kelsen, while Othmar Spann, aside from the central place his thought takes in Voegelin’s dissertation, continues to play an important part in Voegelin’s writings for more than a decade, and his references to the Viennese sociologist are always in connection with core issues. In “The Theory of Governance,” conceived ten years after his dissertation, Voegelin writes: “In the field of sociology it is Othmar Spann who has considered the constitution of human existence with the utmost clarity and rigor. [. . . ] The human being is a spiritual being open to a super-personal spiritual reality.” And in Voegelin’s Race and State (1933), it is Spann who is credited with undertaking “the only major philosophical attempt to get to the heart of the race problem.”

Although we never find an uncritical acceptance of Spann’s
work, as, indeed, from his earliest writings we find Voegelin a critical thinker, Spann’s theme of the spiritual nature of the human being is a central concern of Voegelin’s throughout his career. In the Autobiographical Reflections, Voegelin relates that it was in Spann’s private seminars that he was introduced to the writings of Plato. It is also worthy of note that in addition to passages in his main theoretical work on sociology, acknowledging the role of mystical thought in the creation of social order, Spann also devoted a book to Meister Eckhart.

Voegelin did not share Spann’s political interest in the corporate state (Ständestaat), but as a scholar, his early contact with Spann proved fruitful for his further growth. The main points of Othmar Spann’s teachings, the moral dignity of social science, the model character of Greek philosophy and German idealistic philosophy for the task of developing modern social science, the human being’s roots in divinity—and thus society’s roots—and the importance of mystical experience in individual and community life were lasting gifts Voegelin received from him.

The contemporary reader may be surprised to find so many references to philosophers in a sociological dissertation. Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson are amply quoted, and next to six references to Georg Simmel in the work’s bibliography, we find five references to the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The importance of philosophy for the social sciences in German-speaking countries in the period between the world wars was generally acknowledged. Eulogizing Max Weber at the memorial service in 1920 at the University of Heidelberg, Karl Jaspers

refers to sociology as the “scientific form of self-knowledge in our time” and emphasizes its “philosophical character,” a view shared by Othmar Spann. It is not an issue whether Spann’s specific understanding of the philosophical nature of sociology was shared by Voegelin, or to what extent, but it should not surprise the reader that a student of social science at the University of Vienna in the first years following World War I should develop into a philosopher. Not only did personal motivation play a role here, but the scholarly milieu that supported such a calling.

The German title of Voegelin’s dissertation, “Wechselwirkung und Gezweiung,” contains two central concepts, “interaction” (Wechselwirkung), a fundamental term in Simmel’s sociology, and “spiritual community” (Gezweiung), the main concept of Spann’s social thought. “Interaction” refers to a causal psychic relationship between individuals; “Gezweiung” contains the German word for two (zwei) and was chosen by Spann to underline the fact that spiritual life is never a matter of the solitary individual. The human being is open to a higher spiritual reality in God, and human beings are joined to one another through their mutual openness to spirit. According to Spann each individual is involved in spiritual relationships with other individuals because spirit is first awakened in contact with spirit. In the mystic’s relationship to God we have an example of the most fundamental type of Gezweiung.

With reference to Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas Voegelin’s dissertation attempts to cleanse Simmel’s interaction theory of its psychological elements and, thus purified, harmonize it with the “theoretical complex of the spiritual community [. . .]. The critique of the theory of interaction and the analysis of the theory of spiritual community reveals

these theories to be elements of an eidetic science. They are the material ontologies of a science which we will call ‘sociology.’”

The finished text of Voegelin’s dissertation has not been located. The surviving typescript seems to be the penultimate version and contains handwritten emendations and corrections, which we have incorporated into our text without editorial comment.

2. “Wedekind: A Contribution to the Sociology of Contemporary Society” is a work that belongs to Voegelin’s earliest period.

The paper is not a literary investigation into the work of the German dramatist Frank Wedekind (1864–1918) but examines it as a response to a contemporary social problem. Voegelin shares Wedekind’s diagnosis: A society’s transcendental orientation (“vertical value”) needs a rich field of “horizontal values,” i.e., the values that animate the different social spheres, in order for all aspects of the vertical value to be able to develop. Voegelin’s example of a transcendental value is love. And he agrees with Wedekind (and Nietzsche) that the destruction of all horizontal values in modern German society and their absorption in the self-alienated person (called in this essay the “external personality”) creates a situation that the more sensitive experience as a heavy spiritual burden. Wedekind’s literary works express this situation and articulate a new notion of the vertical value of love as the problem’s solution and the beginning of a badly needed social renewal. Here Voegelin parts ways with Wedekind, for he can neither agree with Wedekind’s simple notion of the new vertical value nor accept the dramatist’s naïve faith in how to solve social problems. The German dramatist is an early example of the type of individual we find in later works of Voegelin—for instance, Comte and Nietzsche—who penetrates to the depth
of a spiritual crisis but who makes the very human error of thinking that one individual can solve a central problem of an entire civilization by an act of personal will.

This essay’s focus on a transcendental value that orders society remains a constant in Voegelin’s writings. We find the vertical value of a society expressed “where the meaning of life is formulated, for the sake of which we live in society, in the concept of salvation or love.” The structure of such a value can of course be analyzed, but “its ultimate meaning lies in the experience and not in the conceptualization of the experience.”

Where Voegelin deals with the symbol of love that is less naïvely formulated than Wedekind’s notion, the spiritual order is more finely analyzed, but this early investigation into a “problem of contemporary society” is the first example of Voegelin’s spiritual approach to social phenomena.

Behind the evaluation of the central importance of love, we again find the work of Georg Simmel. In his dissertation Voegelin wrote that Simmel’s method was not adequate to become the basis for sociological theory, but he also maintained that Simmel’s insights into concrete social phenomena had an

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17. In The Political Religions Voegelin focuses on caritas and examines the various idols that occur when a person finds the ens realissimum, not in divinity, but in world-immanent spheres of being such as “nation,” “class,” “race,” “humanity,” etc. Because the problem of “inner-worldly religions” is the problem of an inadequate opening of the soul to the love of the divine ground, Voegelin quotes the anonymous fourteenth-century mystic of Frankfurt: “If the human creature attributes something good to itself, such as being, essence, life, knowledge, skill, in short, all that one must deem good, as if he were that or had that, as if it belonged to him or came from him, then he goes astray” (Voegelin, The Political Religions, in Modernity without Restraint: The Political Religions; The New Science of Politics, and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, ed. with an intro. by Manfred Henningsen [Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000], 71, vol. 5, CW.
importance that would endure. This essay and other writings in the 1920s testify to the continued importance that Simmel’s concrete analyses played in Voegelin’s thinking.

3. “The Basic Forms,” also dating from the 1920s, is a substantial fragment of a planned larger work, exploring the problems of “form” and “content” in sociological analysis. The background to the discussion is a renewed comparison between Simmel and Spann, this time focusing on Simmel’s theme of spiritual “form” and spiritual “content.” While criticizing Simmel’s concept of life as “immanent transcendence” and the neo-Kantian methodology of the human sciences as expounded by Heinrich Rickert, Voegelin emphasizes the fundamental importance of German idealistic philosophy, especially that of Kant and Schelling, for the efforts of modern social science to understand the human being in his “immanence” and “transcendence.”

In addition to the value of the argument itself, the essay gives insight into the philosophical orientation Voegelin gained at the University of Vienna, which was decisive in his effort to get beyond the neo-Kantian methodological conflicts of the 1920s.

4. “The Theory of Governance” and the essay that follows it, “The Theory of Law,” written between 1930 and 1932, are mentioned by Voegelin in his 1933 book Race and State. Voegelin points out that the book “grew out of my work on a system of the ‘theory of the state’ [Staatslehre].” “Systematically speaking, the Herrschaftslehre [‘theory of governance’] [. . . ] serves to delimit the specific action by which the community constitutes itself as having political existence (Carl Schmitt). Sociology offers significant contributions to a Herrschaftslehre (for example, Alfred Vierkandt, Hans Freyer, Max Weber), but a complete restoration of this great theme, it seems to me, is possible only by returning to Nietzsche and Fichte and especially to the Herrschaftslehre of antiquity.”


20. Race and State, 1, 3.
“The Theory of Governance” consists of three chapters with two tables of contents. The first gives a plan of the whole work; the second, written later and placed at the beginning of chapter 3, is confined to that chapter.

The first chapter explores the concept of the person and discusses Saint Augustine, René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, and Max Scheler. The typescript that has survived includes the passages devoted to Saint Augustine and Descartes and most of the discussion concerning Husserl, but it breaks off near the end of the section devoted to Husserl, and the pages devoted to Scheler have not been found. Voegelin’s reference in Race and State to the need to return to the “Herrschaftslehre of antiquity” finds consideration in this first chapter in the discussion of Saint Augustine. Here we find the essence of the concrete moral human being: “The determination of that which a person essentially is takes place when the attempt is made with adequate means in a fundamental form of philosophical thinking that, following the name given it by Descartes, we will call meditation.”

To illustrate the essential characteristics of meditation, Voegelin turns to books 10 and 11 of Saint Augustine’s Confessions. The meditation does not give us information about the human being “in general”; what it gives can “only be seen by the one who follows the whole movement of the confession, who has himself enacted the confession to God.”

In the passage quoted above from Race and State, Voegelin speaks of the “significant contributions to a Herrschaftslehre” that sociology can make. Originally chapter 2 contained Voegelin’s discussion of this contribution. The opening section devoted to Max Weber was later moved to chapter 3. The remaining sociological discussion centers on the work of Alfred Vierkandt and concludes with the criticism that Vierkandt’s sociology is unable to deal with the moral aspect of relationships of command and obedience. The material the sociologist

22. Ibid., 227 below.
examines brings him to the core of the human person, but it does not sound the depth of this reality. The chapter continues with discussions of Eduard Spranger and Max Scheler that probe the moral nature of the governing relationship, ending with reflections on the problem of evil that prepare the ground for chapter 3.

Chapter 3 takes the problem of governance into the realm of the concrete meditative experience of the ground of being and, with the problem of evil, into the theme of religious orientation.

Voegelin’s remarks in Race and State indicate the investigative direction: “a complete restoration of this great theme, it seems to me, is possible only by returning to Nietzsche and Fichte and especially to the Herrschaftslehre of antiquity.”

The third chapter is complete in the sense that all 113 pages of the text have been preserved and the author has brought his argument to the conclusion he planned. It is incomplete, however, in the sense that we find a note in §7 indicating that Voegelin intended to add material on Husserl, which has not been included.

Chapter 3 begins with the section on Weber that was moved from its original place in chapter 2. The contributions made to the theory of governance by Weber’s sociological and legal point of view are weighed and criticized: “In the sphere of legal concepts we find the phenomenon of the extinguishing of a person’s moral center through a chain of responsibility going back from the action of the person performing it to a center transcending that person.” But “in the sphere where human beings really exist, there is no ‘extinguishing’ [of the moral person].” Thus Voegelin returns to the theme of meditation, which was the substance of chapter 1. Only in the fullness of the concrete individual’s experience of the meditation, a

23. Here Voegelin refers to I. H. Fichte and not to the latter’s more famous father.
25. Ibid., 276 below.
unique event in the life of the person, does human nature attain optimal clarity about itself.\textsuperscript{26} Since the problem of governance with its relationships of command and obedience includes the human being’s spiritual existence, all the moral problems of the individual enter into the theory of governance. This in turn raises a complex of metaphysical and epistemological issues, which do not come into view when the human being is not understood in his concrete relationship to the transcendent ground of being. The problems emerge from the fact that real knowledge of the human being only comes in such concrete experiences of transcendence and that our notions of what human reality is, when we are not in this intense mode of being, are rationalizations that cannot be demonstrated in terms of sciences oriented to the world of space and time. Such rationalizations have to be judged by their success or failure to give plausible accounts of the reality of the human being in the world who is only really known to us through the experiences in which he transcends the world.\textsuperscript{27}

The opening of political theory to such deep layers of the human soul is the reason “The Theory of Governance” discusses the philosophy of antiquity and not just contemporary political theory and topics raised by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The political thought of antiquity, Plato’s in particular, is examined, both in thinkers who lived before the modern era and in contemporary thinkers who attempt to get back beyond the break in Western civilization to regain the insights of Greek philosophy. Among thinkers before the modern crises, Voegelin discusses Sir Thomas Elyot; for the newer literature he turns to Friedrich Wolters, who in his \textit{Governance and Service} develops the theme as it was understood by Stefan George and his circle. This is an important aspect of Voegelin’s own thought, for if he was introduced to Plato’s philosophy in the seminars of Othmar Spann, his understanding of the

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 239–40 below.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Race and State}, 19–36, esp. 19, 33–36.
philosopher was decisively informed by the scholarship of the group of researchers influenced by Stefan George.28

Throughout chapter 3 the problem of Good and Evil, broached in the discussion of Max Scheler in chapter 2, is an important theme. Among other passages it accounts for the remarkable section on Dostoevsky’s “Grand Inquisitor.” “The Theory of Governance” is a major attempt to restore political science to first principles.29

We have translated the German word Herrschaft primarily as “governance.” But it is a richly nuanced word, and depending on the context, we have also rendered it as “domination” and with various cognates of the term rule.30

Because of the importance of Augustine’s meditation for Voegelin’s understanding of the science of politics,31 we have retained Augustine’s text and have provided an English translation.

5. The “Theory of Law” is the section of Voegelin’s Staatslehre that directly follows upon “The Theory of Governance” as the second part of the systematic exploration of law and the state. In this text Voegelin deepens the problem of “form” and “content” that he had sketched out in “The Basic Forms.” Voegelin’s analysis begins with the “conflict” between natural law and positive law in regard to the genesis of law.

With this comparison of the two fundamental scientific approaches to the phenomenon of law we have merely touched


upon the problem of the thematic connections between the theory of law content and the theory of acts that establish law. We have merely reached the point of departure for the investigation into this area with its multifarious complications. We can advance a step further by insisting on a more precise listing of the contents of the two spheres that we have presented as being mutually exclusive. Is it really the systematic theory of natural law and the theory of positive law [which are mutually exclusive], or is it perhaps only the natural system of law as developed by natural law theorists, and the systems of positive law as they have been presented in positive legal science? The second view predominated during the golden age of natural law. The natural system confronted the positive system, the theorist of legal reason confronted the systematizers of positive law. The two areas were clearly distinguished, and Fries, whom we just quoted, leaves no doubt as to how irrelevant the system of natural law is to the jurist of positive law exclusively concerned with [positive jurisprudence].

In this statement, two fundamental aspects of political theory emerge that will engage Voegelin’s interest in these early years and throughout his academic career: the nature of man and the process of history. When a theory of the state and law systematically explores the deeper layers of their foundations, it necessarily encounters the problems of philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of history. Although the anamnetic bond between the process of history and the nature of the human being manifest in Voegelin’s later work—*the field of history is the soul of man*—is not yet clearly articulated in this early phase, the basis for it is clearly laid in “The Theory of Governance” and “The Theory of Law.”

In the latter text Voegelin investigates these issues along thematic lines opened by Hobbes, Kant, and Schelling. Of particular interest to him are the existential layers of fear and freedom as sources of action and the question of the *sumnum bonum* and *sumnum malum* as formative forces in the constitution.

of order, familiar themes in Voegelin's later works. They are particularly underlined in the latter part of the text in which Voegelin evaluates the contributions of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Bergson to the problem of determining the layers of existence that constitute personal and interpersonal reality—the reality of law (Rechtswirklichkeit).

The manuscript breaks off after these philosophical discussions. The table of contents reveals that this section was intended to be the beginning of investigations into questions of legislation, implementation, and the unity of the legal order.

6. “Political Theory as Human Science” is the fragment of a book planned by Voegelin in 1932 in which he intended to broaden and deepen the themes of contemporary Staatslehre by approaching them with the methods of human science (Geisteswissenschaft). The abstract and table of contents show that four chapters were planned, proceeding from problems associated with the theme of domination, through those of norms and decisions, to the question of the spiritual unity of the political entity.

The typescript that has come down to us includes Voegelin's note to the publisher and the first part of the introduction, dealing with the philosophical horizon of the “turn in German political theory to the human sciences.” Like other texts included in this volume, the starting point for Voegelin's reflections are provided by the work of Georg Simmel: here, the latter's handling of the relationship of spirit and organic life. For Simmel, spiritual worlds, operating according to their own laws, free themselves from their vital foundations but remain rooted in them, for they are only transformations of organic life's teleological processes. Voegelin relates this theme to Kant and Schiller, for whom the transition from instinct to reason and from nature to freedom marks the crucial step in the development of human morality. However, instinct and nature cannot be “overcome” entirely and are only “ennobled” by the spirit. It is the tension between spirit and “the layers of its
vital depth” that Voegelin sees as the subject that the classical German philosophy of the spirit dealt with so successfully.

According to Voegelin, the concepts of this philosophy were just coming to be understood and therefore to play an increasingly important role in the human sciences. Max Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is mentioned as “the most significant sign” that this reception is taking place and being “infused with new life.” In the last part of the text Voegelin follows the opposition between the spiritual life of freedom and the organic life of determinate forms into the “tragic mood” resulting from the human being having to live between these two poles. Finally, Voegelin introduces Husserl’s Phenomenology as a method of identifying levels of objectivity in the emergence of spirit. Through the concept of intentionality the Cartesian divisio mundi—the split between a subjective-psychological sphere and an objective-logical sphere—is transcended, bringing into view the social forms of spiritual being most relevant to political science: community, law, and faith in God.

7. “National Types of Mind and the Limits to Interstate Relations” is a series of four lectures Voegelin delivered in English at Geneva in 1930. Methodologically the text is closely related to On the Form of the American Mind.33 Both theme and method are indebted to the new science of cultural sociology and to the pioneering work of Oswald Spengler, a non-academic whose achievements and errors are discussed in the first lecture.

The investigation is guided by two epistemological principles: The “Platonic postulate” assumes substantial homogeneity between the object under investigation—a national type of mind—and the subject conducting the research—the scholar whose spirit is also structured by a type of national mind, not

necessarily the same as his object. The second principle is the "morphological postulate," which assumes that every detail of the structural unit under investigation reveals the character of that unit; its style is visible in even the smallest detail of everyday life. Nevertheless the focus of the investigation is on the central sphere of mind, where the mind expresses itself in reflection on the meaning of life and the human being's place in society and the cosmos. Here the mind of a nation can be best understood because, technically, the material already has the form of the rational discourse of scientific investigation; the distance between subject and object is thus smallest in this sphere. The central sphere is of interest to the cultural sociologist because it contains the specific self-expression of a nation's mind, either in reflected or unreflected form. What is it we want to know when we try to understand a national mind? "We want to know the nation's attitude toward the essential questions of life [. . .]. We want to know . . . its attitude toward death and God, its ideal of humanity, its ideas about social relations within the body politic, about relations to other national units, its belief in its mission in history, what it thinks about itself."

In these lectures Voegelin discusses such issues as the political forms of state and empire, sovereignty, democracy, the role of political ideas, and the scholarly and political role of the discipline of political science.

The editors have, in general, revised Voegelin's English in accordance with modern American usage while trying to preserve the style of the lectures.

8. The typescript for "Notes on Augustine" [c. 1931–1932] consists of notes that form the background to chapter 1 of "The Theory of Governance." They have been included in this collection because of the importance of Augustine's meditation for Voegelin's philosophy and because they contain references and comparisons to Kant and other philosophers that did not enter Voegelin's "Theory of Governance." While dealing with
the same material as in that larger work, the notes constitute an independent treatment of it that is valuable in its own right.

This first volume of Eric Voegelin’s unpublished writings provides the reader with insight into how the theme of transcendence was approached and expressed during the early stages of his scholarly life. The variations on this theme provide perspectives on the core of Voegelin’s work, which from the very beginning followed the admonition of Saint Augustine not to remain with that which is merely creature, but to ascend to what is eternal in the human being.

Technical notes:
1. We have taken the liberty of putting more German words in square brackets than will be found in some other volumes of Eric Voegelin’s Collected Works because we are quoting from unpublished manuscripts that the reader cannot readily compare with the German originals. Othmar Spann’s terminology especially has been recorded because his thought played an important role in Voegelin’s early years and because his major theoretical works are unavailable in English.
2. None of our texts was prepared by Voegelin for publication; some are incomplete. In a few instances references and footnotes have been lost. The unfinished state of the manuscripts means that occasionally a sentence is not as clearly formulated as we are accustomed to finding in Voegelin’s published writings.
3. In the eight pieces that follow this introduction the footnotes in square brackets have been added by the editors; the others are Voegelin’s.

William Petropoulos
Gilbert Weiss
THE THEORY OF GOVERNANCE
AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS, 1921–1938
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In hardly any other area of research that lays claim to being a science is this claim so bitterly contested as it is in sociology. Here everything is disputed: the nature of the object, the method, indeed the possibility of sociology itself. Almost all leading sociologists differ from one another in their understanding of the science. These differences exceed those normally found within a scholarly field. The various Neo-Kantian schools may interpret Immanuel Kant’s teachings differently, yet they are united in accepting the critical method. But, from the start, the various branches of sociology take off in very different directions, leaving little in common with one another but the term sociology itself.

The logical course of development within the individual branches of sociology has now reached a point from which it has become comparatively easy to survey the reasons for the science’s extraordinary lack of unity. We find them primarily in the inadequate scholarly character of the sociological schools. Understanding the reasons for the problem may also help us to find a solution. The problem can be formulated by asking two questions: What is the object and method of sociology? To what type of science does it belong?

In order to answer these questions we must briefly sketch our basic epistemological orientation which provides us with...
the foundation and tools for our critique. This is not the place
to examine the correctness of the position itself; that task be-
longs to the field of epistemology. Of course it goes without
saying that the truth or falseness of these premises also governs
the truth or falseness of the sentences deduced from them.

The standpoint we have adopted is that of Critical Ideal-
ism; specifically Husserl’s formulation of the problems of tran-
scendental philosophy. There are two sources of cognition: the
originarily given and the seeing of an essence. The division of
science into sciences of matters of fact and sciences of essence
corresponds to these two sources of cognition. Every fact fits
into a connexion of facts with its set of eidetic laws. Or, ex-
pressed another way, each fact has an essence which deter-
mines its mode of being. Every science of matters of fact has
a material ontology which is determined by the unity of its
object. The unity of the object is expressed in the possibility of
synthetic a priori judgments. Above all material ontologies is
formal ontology in its most comprehensive form as mathesis
universalis. It is not determined by the unity of a particular
object and thus is not related to matters of fact, rather it is the
theory of any object whatever, whereby object is understood
in the broadest sense as the “subject of possible true predi-
cations” (Husserl). Every science of matters of fact is doubly
anchored: to the extent that it is the science of a particular
matter of fact, it is anchored in a material ontology; to the
extent that it deals with objects universally, it is anchored in
formal ontology.

With the division of science into sciences of matters of fact,
the theory of sciences of matters of fact (material ontology),
and the theory of science universally (pure logic), our problem
is reduced to assigning sociology to one of these three types.

In order to do this we first eliminate all directions of soci-
ology that cannot be assigned to one of these three types of
science. These include, for example, the sociology of Herbert
Spencer. Spencer begins with the notion of a physical law of
interaction and spiritual community
development which progresses in the direction of least resistance; a law at work in inorganic and organic nature as well as in social life. Were this law not connected to an ethical postulate, it would be a natural science theory, the truth or falsity of which could be discussed. But natural evolution, with progressive differentiation and integration, is also conceived to be an ethically willed development, and the postulate addressed to the human being is: support natural evolution. Because it turns the course of a historical development into an ethical process (something typical of English pragmatism), Spencer’s system must be ruled out here.

For similar reasons we must reject the types of sociology found in the systems of Hegel and Comte. What we view as typical of these systems is the continuous progressive evolution from the beginning of world history to the present day. The idea of justifying the present is so obvious in these systems that it cannot but destroy, from the start, every notion of scientific objectivity. The self-justificatory nature of such an approach is even more clear when it is connected with the theory of the chosen people, as found in Fichte. And the same approach is found in the sociology of historical materialism as formulated, for example, by Max Adler.¹

Wundt’s system belongs to this group too, insofar as it contains a philosophy of history element and understands history as a development in the direction of humanity. Völkerpsychologie, which is also in this category, is still so vague that it is not yet possible to judge it. However Kelsen’s detailed critique of Wundt’s idea of the state shows clearly that it needs a thorough investigation and reformulation in transcendental logical terms.² The beginnings of an attempt at a development away from psychology can be found in Levy-Bruhl.³ A brief reference to how a Völkerpsychologie problem can be understood as a

1. Max Adler, Marxistische Probleme.
2. Hans Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff.
transcendental problem can be found in my paper concerning “The social determination of sociological thought.”

Due to the inclusion of psychological elements the theory of interaction in its current form cannot be called a science in the sense of Husserl’s division of the sciences. However, with a more thorough analysis of its problems, which is the task of this study, it is possible to bring out the elements of truth present in the theory. They prove to be identical to those contained in the social theory of Othmar Spann, specifically to the theoretical complex of the spiritual community [Gezweigung]. Between the theory of interaction and the theory of spiritual community, but closer to the latter, we find the theory of Litt.

The critique of the theory of interaction and the analysis of the theory of spiritual community reveals these theories to be elements of an eidetic science. They are the material ontologies of a science which we will call “sociology.” This science has already found expression in various studies. Among the most valuable are Nadler’s, Die Berliner Romantik, Wölflin’s Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe and Duhem’s study of the character of English and French physics. The present study is a preliminary investigation undertaken with the intention of preparing the ground for the principal study of the material ontology of sociology. We call this material ontology “sociological method.” The task of sociology is to grasp the phenomenon [it studies] in its social nature. For example, sociology must be able to tell us why a particular painting is a Dutch painting, why a particular philosophical system is French, etc. The sociological method provides us with the means of undertaking such an investigation.

In this work we formulate the principle of sociological method and the concepts of “value” and “form.” A discussion

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of value and content cannot be taken up and included here. It would be too extensive and requires a separate investigation. A formulation of the categories of sociology and their first conscious practical application to a sociological problem (defining what is meant by the concept of the English nation) can be found in my paper referred to above.

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§5. Theodor Litt  

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Chapter One [The Analysis of] Spiritual Community

§1. [The social phenomenon]

Sociology has concerned itself with a considerable number of phenomena, including forms of government, economic systems, works of art, and systems of religion and philosophy. Science can take such phenomena as given, register and describe them completely. But such registering of the [empirically] given amounts to a mere collection of material. We can also take a specific historical point as our point of reference—generally some state of affairs in the present is chosen—and
interaction and spiritual community

explain the phenomena in terms of their meaning for that state of affairs and their role in bringing it about. In this case the specific historical point yields the principle for selecting the materials. By relating the empirical data to this point, the phenomena in their entirety are divided into the historically meaningful and the historically irrelevant. Rickert calls this approach the historical or value-related method. It is the method of empirical historical science. Finally, the phenomena can also serve as the starting point for an investigation into a priori forms. Every phenomenon, whether it is a work of art, philosophical system, the state, etc., has its own essential characteristics, which relate it to an essential form, i.e., work of art, etc. In turn each of these essences can also be the object of a science specifically devoted to it.

These three types of investigation, or ways of dealing with empirical phenomena, are the ones that so far have been most commonly used. But none of them provides us with the means of recognizing social phenomena as social phenomena. Sociology adds a fourth method to these three.

We speak of societies, and even if not exactly defined, the term at least suggests something real to us. We speak of differences between the French “mentality” and the German; we know that human beings living in the Renaissance understood life differently than the members of modern societies. And we explain such phenomena in terms of the Zeitgeist; indeed, keen observers provide us with characteristics that lend content to these rather vague terms. If we proceed on the assumption—the correctness of which will have to be demonstrated later—that society is something real and not just a collective term for a loose aggregate of human beings, then a society must somehow be recognizable in the creations and actions of the human beings who belong to it.

If we do not content ourselves with merely registering phenomena, nor merely relating them to other phenomena, thereby treating them as historical phenomena, if we do not merely investigate phenomena with the intention of discovering their
a priori forms, thereby comprehending them in relationship to their essential determinants and validators, but rather relate phenomena to the creative spirit [schaffender Geist] that produces them, then, and only then, do we approach phenomena as social phenomena.

The term creative spirit must be more precisely defined. The essences are also forms that we find in consciousness, and it makes good sense to speak of a spirit which, in the process of cognition, creates a phenomenon that corresponds to its nature. But [in a sociological investigation] the phenomenon is not related to the essence in a form of descriptive eidetic analysis; when we speak [here] of the relationship between the phenomenon and the essence we do not mean this type of relationship. An inquiry into essences, for example, studies and describes the essence of melody, or of sculpture, or of emotions, etc. It is concerned with enduring, absolute forms, valid at all times and in all places because they are forms found in consciousness. The relationship to a creative spirit should allow us to recognize the social element of the phenomena whose essences are already known to us. The prerequisite and basis for the sociological investigation is the phenomenon whose essence has already been established. To arrive at the creative spirit we first suspend the sphere of essences and then try to positively determine what remains as the place where the phenomena are constituted as social phenomena, i.e., where they receive the specific quality that marks their belonging to a society. Insofar as a phenomenon is identified as having this quality, it shall be called a “social phenomenon.” The objects of sociology are social phenomena.

§2. [The social relationship]

Sociologists agree on only a very few points. One of these is that social phenomena, whatever we understand by that term, are found where human beings are in contact with one another. What is important for the identification of the “so-
cial” aspect of a phenomenon is the presence of a plurality of human beings, or the relationship of one human being to another, whether it be a one-sided or an interactive relationship. All of these concepts are used here in an inexact fashion and merely serve to underline the problem under discussion. The relationship to the creative spirit means the relationship to the sociated spirit. The question raised by the presence of the phenomenon is: What constitutes the social aspect of the phenomenon? For example, apart from documentary evidence, how do we know whether a particular philosophical system was produced in ancient Greece or in Germany? The question raised by the presence of spirit is: What is “sociated spiritual being” [“Vergesellschaftet-Sein des Geistes”] and what is the “social relationship”? In the last instance we find that the social quality of the phenomenon is inherent in the relationship one creating spirit has to another. Or, put another way: A very specific characteristic of the phenomenon results from the fact that the generating spirit is in society. This constitutes the “social” aspect [das “Soziale”] of the phenomenon.

What is essential is the creating spirit and its social nature; the phenomenon’s relationship to this external point is what constitutes the phenomenon as a social phenomenon. Before we can investigate the social quality of a phenomenon we must determine the essential nature of spirit itself and its essential relationship to other spirits. We will call the sociated spirit the “social ego.” Our next task is to investigate the nature [Wesen] of the social relationship and the nature of the social ego. This investigation must begin by determining the place of the social ego in, and its relationship to, the human being as a whole, as well as its relationship to other social egos.

§3. [The relationships of individuals]

With the exception of Othmar Spann, no sociologist has achieved valid results that could be adopted as a foundation
on which to build. To be precise, sociology today is equally helpless in the face of all social problems. At the outset of our investigation we can adopt no other position but that of complete skepticism. Before us lies a chaos of facts too immense for an overview, which together are ready to be brought into conceptual form. “To see a problem in particular matters of fact means that instead of ‘grasping’ or ‘knowing’ them, either for reasons due to changes within our concepts or changes within our experience of facts, they must now be viewed as ‘unknown.’”

The only thing we must concede, despite our skepticism, is that a body of facts is present at all.

We assume therefore that a body of facts, called “society,” exists. This formal assumption in no way prejudices its material content. Society is placed before us as a problem to be thoroughly described and defined. Given the extreme generality of this premise it cannot be ruled out that in the course of our investigation society may prove to be a complex of individual states of fact for which we can find no real or conceptual ground to account for their relationship to one another. The investigation into the assumption that “society” exists can indeed lead to the concept disintegrating into a series of unconnected phenomena.

The complex state of fact [komplexer Tatbestand], society, is the object of our study. It is familiar to us in the pre-scientific notion of human beings, in cultural products, in the relationships of human beings to one another, and in their relationships to cultural products. This factual situation is problematical because the nature of these relationships is unclear. When we speak of society we mean something different from individuals. The obvious way to start is to assert that society consists of a “multiplicity” of human beings. We could perhaps define these individuals more precisely in terms of their spatial or temporal relations and say that a multiplicity of human be-

ings constitutes a society if they exist in a particular spatial and temporal relation to one another. According to this definition, the relationships would be explained as spatiotemporal relations—for example, human beings found at the same time in the same area of the earth’s surface—and logically society would in no way differ from a pile of “stones” or a heap of “sand.” It would just be a “human” heap that had been thrown together. But surely no theoretician would be any more interested in a “human” heap than he would be in a pile of inorganic objects.

The interpretation of human relationships in society as spatiotemporal relations cannot explain such phenomena as the “state.” The relationships between human beings are something quite different from the accidents of contiguity and synchronicity. Society is a supra-individual entity and continues to exist when the individual human beings who comprise it at any particular point in time have passed away. We speak of the “continuation” or the “sameness” of a society long after particular members have given way to others. Society exists in and for itself, independent of particular human beings. With this observation we have identified an essential difference between society and such collectiva as a pile of stones or a heap of sand. We do not say that a heap of sand is the “same” when one day it is carried away and the next day replaced by a new heap. The identity of a pile of sand is defined by the individual grains that compose it. The identity of the “English nation” is not defined by the individuals who are its members at any one time.

Society is therefore independent of specific human beings. Consequently, when we speak metaphorically, it is not very useful to say that society consists of relationships between human beings like those of stones in a pile. For we do not want to imply that the relationship of human beings to one another, which we call society, depends on particular human beings. It would be better, as long as we are speaking metaphorically, to call it a supra-individual relationship.
That may sound paradoxical: a relationship of elements that is not between them, but over and independent of them. Indeed it appears absurd. But the absurdity is caused by the fact that societies exist independently of particular human beings, but only independently of particular ones and not of human beings altogether. Human beings of necessity belong to our idea of society. Only through human beings is society possible. The paradoxical formula of the supra-individual relationship has its foundation in the antinominal state of affairs that can be formulated in two propositions:

1) Society is *independent* of individuals, it *transcends* them and is logically *prior* to them.

2) Society is *dependent* on individuals and exists *in* and *through* them.

The basic problem of sociology is expressed in the antinomy concerning the relationship of the individual to society. It is our task to resolve this antinomy.

§4. *[The spatial-temporal relation]*

But before we can approach this problem we must first look carefully at another peculiarity of society.

Everything we have said up to this point in order to characterize the collectivum, society, holds true for other collectiva as well.

Certain collective-concepts have a *causal relationship* as the basis of their unity (whether dependent on a cause, or on interaction), which joins the discrete individual units to one another, independent of whether, at the same time, the whole is spatially defined or not. For example, the collective concept of the solar system slowly progressed from merely referring to the unity of the sun and the planets to gradually expressing the underlying causal unity itself. Similarly, the merely genealogical concept of the family is founded on the causal relationship of direct lineal descent from a common patriarch. Thus in the collective concept of the forest, the element of causality may become sepa-
The example of the forest is particularly instructive. The forest is also constituted in a supra-individual relationship. The identity of any particular forest, for example the Bohemian Forest, is independent of the growth and decay of its individual elements. In addition to causality as the unifying element, which Sigwart emphasizes, there is no doubt that the identity of the space in which the causal process “forest” takes place also helps us to grasp it as a unit. The logical difference between society and a forest can be illustrated as follows: Members of a society—the “European society” or the “German nation”—are Europeans or Germans, even when they have physically left their society. However, when we remove a tree from the forest and plant it in a different place, although we can say that the tree comes from this or that forest, we cannot say that it still belongs to it. Membership in a society appears to be something that stays with the human being. It continues to exist, even when an integral aspect of the human being—the individual’s spatio-causal relationship to fellow human beings—undergoes a decisive change. It is similar to the fact that, for example, after we have crushed a piece of phosphorus the resulting small particles are still phosphorus. A member of one society is not a member in another society, but an “alien.”

On the other hand, the following course of events is also conceivable. A European or German in an alien society has undergone the transformation called “Anglicization” or “Americanization.” If this transformed individual returns to his former society, he is now regarded as an alien. Thus the spatial relationship to other human beings does not in itself reinstate membership in a society when this has been lost.

The parallels to the collective concept of the forest clearly reveal particular characteristics of society, because there are broad similarities between them in that both are organisms.

What Sigwart maintains for the forest concerning the presence of elements causally dependent on one another (i.e., the forest is dependent on the components of its vegetation) is true of both types of collectiva. But even if we assume that the same causal element is at work in society, it is clear that the elements found in a spatio-causal relationship are not society’s essential elements.

§5. [Interaction]

This knowledge forces us to try out another type of relationship. “Society” is more than a collective noun for a plurality of human beings. Since it is concerned with human beings we might start with the assumption that its essence is to be found in a psychic relationship.

This theoretical account has already been put forward, and the psychic relationship between individuals has been termed interaction [Wechselwirkung]. The concept of interaction refers to the double chain of causal reactions that originates in the psychic act of an individual when he becomes visible at a particular time and place and his appearance is registered by another individual, thus inducing a psychic act in the second individual and vice versa. Some scholars insist that the essence of society may be found in this type of interaction. Societies differ from one another and boundaries are drawn between them by the number and intimacy of the interactions among individuals. The individuals in one society have more intimate interactions with one another than they do with individuals from outside that society. Society is thus quantitatively determined by the number of interactions that take place within it; indeed, we should be able to count them. But the purely causal nature of interactions between individuals does not permit qualitative differentiation. If we want to discuss the qualitative differences between societies, say the “Greek” and the “Roman,” we must, in the final analysis, transform quantity into quality. But this is always a dubious procedure.
The incurable weakness of this theoretical account is obvious. The context in which interactions take place is a causal nexus from which an individual can, to a large extent, remove himself, for example by emigration. Contact can perhaps be partially maintained through the exchange of books, gifts, letters, etc.; but in general, the same thing occurs as with the spatial relationship. When an individual is removed from the interaction context he does not immediately cease to be a member of that society. After an individual has been assimilated into a different society and then returns to the former one he does not become a member of that society again, despite the renewal of former connections.

We must therefore conclude that the essence of society is not found in the psycho-causal relationship of interaction.

§6. [Substance, interaction, and the social relationship]

Nevertheless the notion of interaction comes very close to solving our problem. When an individual is taken from a system of coordinates of consciousness [Bewußtseinspunkten] and enters into another one, this means, of necessity, that the individual engages in more numerous interactions with the new individuals and has fewer interactive relations with the individuals of the former system, these having been reduced to visits, letters, gifts, etc. Strictly speaking, according to the theory of interaction, such an individual should immediately be assimilated into the new society. In actual fact this does not happen, and the theory of interaction is, at least in this regard, proved wrong. Those who support the theory would argue that sometimes the individual does become assimilated to the new society and that this is a result of the new interactive relationships. It must be acknowledged that this argument is partly right. Assimilation does not necessarily take place where interaction is found, but without interaction it could not take place at all.
This state of affairs leads to a new hypothesis. Unless we want to assume that there are spiritual-material influences acting over a distance, we find no further physical relationship beyond the causal mechanism of interaction. If we rule out the possibility of such effects over a distance, a possible solution to our problem may be formulated in the following manner: Interaction provides the means of communicating or conveying a substance, and it is this substance that constitutes the society-building element. With the term \textit{substance} we do not wish to imply a material hypostasis. We will leave the word undefined for the present; it merely serves as a marker for the problem we are considering.

To stick to our example: When a German is assimilated into the English context of interactive relations, then undoubtedly he interacts with English individuals, whether he chooses to or not. It is equally beyond doubt that these interactive relations are more numerous than those which connect him to his former society. If, despite all this, he remains an “alien” in the English society, then it is because in his spiritual essence, which we have termed \textit{substance}, there is something that has made him more or less immune to the English substance.

Thus, interactive relations take place between individuals, but they occur blindly and do not produce sociation. If we want to call the relationship that generates or produces sociation the “social relationship,” then not every interaction can be a social relationship. Social relationships create a different type of relationship from that of interaction. Interaction is a purely causal-mechanical relationship; the social relationship communicates the element that we termed \textit{substance}.

Sigwart defined the collective concept of the forest in terms of the “causal element of the dependence of various component parts of vegetation on one another.” An analogous construction is possible for the collective concept of society. The context in which the interactive relationships take place would be the causal element involving the dependence of individuals on one another, which contributes to the unity of society.
INTERACTION AND SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY

This element is necessary in order for society to exist, but it is not itself society. By contrast with the social relationship we can subsume all spatiotemporal relations—psychophysical interactions—under the term psychophysical relations. We can say that the psychophysical-relations complex provides the basis for, or supports, the social relationship. Where social relationships exist this complex must be present, but social relationships do not necessarily exist where this support is found.

§7. [Apperception]

We have used the words support and basis. With the help of Husserl’s discussion of the problem involved in such relations, we can now replace this rather mystical-sounding terminology with a full presentation of the matter.

I am conscious of my ego and of the external world. The external world consists of everything of a material nature, that which appears to the senses and that which appears in the form of higher levels of knowledge grounded in things of a physical nature. These living beings in the world also include human beings. These do not appear merely as part of the external world, but are characterized by the idea of [a familiar other, or a] “Thou.” In other human beings we recognize an “ego” that is formed exactly like ours and from which we assume that its consciousness of the external world is exactly like ours. Therefore, when we speak of the entire world we do not mean just physical being but psychophysical being as well.8 “It must—who can deny it?—include all the streams

8. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Halle, 1913), 103 [Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 1st bk., General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 124]. Husserl applies the term psychic in the usual sense of the word, meaning everything that is spiritual (Geist) as opposed to physical nature. For our purpose it was necessary to apply the term psychophysical to the processes governed by the law of causality and thus to clearly distinguish the spiritual relationship from the interactive relationship.
of consciousness connected with animated organisms. Thus, on the one hand consciousness is said to be the absolute in which everything transcendent, and, therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and, on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate, real event within the world. How can these statements be reconciled?"

Husserl is faced with the problem: How can the absolute, the immanent, become the transcendent; how is it possible that an ego appears to me as a familiar other, as “Thou”? The similarity to our problem is clear; for us the problem is: How is a relationship possible between individuals that is not a psychophysical causal relation? Expressed more positively: How is it possible that an alien spiritual reality appears in my consciousness?

Husserl writes:

Let us make clear to ourselves how consciousness, so to speak, can enter into the real world, how that which in itself is absolute can relinquish its immanence and take on the characteristic of transcendence. We immediately see that it can only do so by a certain participation in transcendence in the first, the originary.

Of course the term interaction is not a clear concept. Simmel uses the term just as often to designate a natural-causal relation as he does to designate a social relationship in the sense in which we use the concept. In what follows we will adhere strictly to the meaning of interaction as a causal relation. This procedure has the further advantage of enabling us to draw a clear demarcation line against all experimental psychology, which we view as an exact natural science concerned with physiological phenomena. Such a science can offer nothing to sociology. However, since this science already has the name “psychology” and relationships between human beings are potential objects of investigation, it is necessary to group psychophysical relations together in their entirety and distinguish them from the social relationships that belong to the spiritual sphere. How other sciences that also bear the name “psychology” relate to our problem—for example, Natorp’s “General Psychology”—cannot be dealt with here and must be reserved for the object of a separate investigation.

Thus our use or the term psychophysical is not to be confused with Husserl’s use of the same term.

9. Husserl, Ideen, 103 [Ideas, 124].
sense; and this is obviously the transcendence belonging to Na-
ture. Only by virtue of its experienced relation to the organism
does consciousness become real human or brute consciousness,
and only thereby does it acquire a place in the space belonging
to Nature and the time belonging to Nature—the time which is
physically measured. We also recall that only by virtue of the
connection joining a consciousness and an organism to make up
an empirically intuited unity within Nature is any such thing as
mutual understanding between animate beings pertaining to a
world possible; and that only thereby can any cognizing subject
find the complete world and at the same time know it as one and
the same surrounding world belonging in common to him and to
all other subjects.\footnote{Ibid. [ibid., 124–25].}

Thus the participation of immanent consciousness in nat-
ural transcendence—and the empirical relation to the body—
makes knowledge of the other subject possible, makes it possible
that this subject can become an object of cognition. It must
be assumed that a particular kind of apperception brings about
the reification \cite{Realisierung} of consciousness. But despite its
psychophysical relation to something corporeal, this appercep-
tion in no way alters the essence of consciousness.\footnote{Ibid. [ibid., 125].\footnote{Husserl uses the words \textit{immanent} and \textit{transcendent} in a sense best explained in his own words:}

\begin{quote}
Of essential necessity there belongs to any “all-sided,” continuously,
unitarily, and self-confirming experimental consciousness \cite{Erfahrungs-
bewusstsein} of the same physical thing a multifarious system of con-
tinuous multiplicities of appearances and adumbrations in which all
objective moments falling within perception with the characteristic
of being themselves given “in person” are adumbrated by determined
continuities. \cite{74–75 [87]}\footnote{It must be borne clearly in mind that the Data of sensation which exerci-
cise the function of adumbrations of color, of smoothness, of shape, etc.
(the functions of “presentation”) are, of essential necessity, entirely dif-
ferent from color simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape simpliciter,
and, in short, from all kinds of moments belonging to physical things.
The adumbration, though called by the same name, of essential ne-
cessity is not of the same genus as the one to which the adumbrated
belongs. The adumbrating is a mental process. But a mental process
possible only as a mental process. \cite{75 [88]}}
Consciousness apperceived as part of Nature [naturhaft apperzierte Bewußtsein], the stream of consciousness, given as a stream of human or brute consciousness, thus experienced in connection with corporeality, naturally does not become, by virtue of this apperception, itself something presented by virtue of sensuous adumbration.

And still it has become something other, a component part of Nature. In itself, it is what it is by its absolute essence. But it is not seized upon in this flowing thinness; it is instead “appréhended as something”; and in this specifically peculiar apprehending a transcendence of a peculiar kind becomes constituted: there now appears a sequence of conscious states of an identical real Ego-subject which manifests in them its individual real properties and who now—as this unity of properties becoming manifest in states—is intended to as united with the appearing organism. Thus, as something which appears, the psychophysical unity in Nature, a human or a beast, becomes constituted as a somatically founded unity corresponding to the founding involved in apperception.  

Husserl’s expositions have been given so much space here because the construction of the relationship between individuals and the definition of the relationships of individuals to society that results from the relationship of individuals to one another constitutes the problem of modern sociology. Only Othmar Spann’s sociology has successfully dealt with it. The entirely clear [illegible] and, it seems to me, in no way complicated fact, that the sensual phenomenon, “the psychophysical natural unity” of the “human being,” constitutes itself in apperception as a somatically founded unity, is the key to the relationship problem and resolves our antinomy.

To the physical thing as a physical thing, to any reality in the genuine sense, the sense of which we have yet to clarify and fix, there belongs essentially and quite “universally” the incapacity of being immanently perceived and accordingly of being found at all in the concatenation of mental processes. Thus the physical thing is said to be, in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent. Precisely in that the essentially necessary diversity among modes of being, the most cardinal of them all, becomes manifest: the diversity between consciousness and reality. (77 [90])

12. Ibid., 103–4 [ibid., 125–26].
§8. [The solution to the problem of relationship]

We return now to our own terminology in which the psychophysical relationship refers to the causal relationship in space and time.

The psychophysical relationship takes place in the [ontological] region of corporeality. In the most comprehensive sense of the word corporeality includes the structure of the brain and all of the psychic laws and rules that have, for example, been established in the works of Fechner, Lipps, and Wundt.

Just as the human being can be conceptually resolved into an object of natural science, and into that other human being Cohen defines as an ethical postulate, so we can also resolve all human relationships into the psychophysical and into the specific social relationship.

The second sentence of the antinomy reads: “Society is dependent on individuals and exists in and through them.” This sentence is correct for the psychophysical relationship. Without human beings as psychophysical individuals society could not exist. Human beings as objects of natural science constitute the necessary basis—or, if one prefers, are the bearers of society. The effect these human beings have on one another is parallel to the causal unity of vegetation [which “produces”] the collective concept “forest.” This is the meaning of the assertion that society is indeed dependent on human beings, not, however, on particular ones. The psychophysical individuals represent society, but society does not cease to exist when, with the death of the members of one generation, a new generation takes its place.

The region of corporeality is the basis of the “social” element [das Gesellschaftliche]. This specific social element we have termed substance. Therefore, if in the first sentence of the antinomy—“Society is independent of individuals, it transcends them and is logically prior to them”—we understand the term humans to mean psychophysical individuals, then the first sentence is also correct. For substance does not belong
to the region of the psychophysical that is explored by the methods of causal natural science. The sense of the antinomy can be so formulated: The antinomy is resolved when terms that seem to be equivocal, but which actually lie in different logical spheres, are replaced by words with differentiated meanings. In our case the word *society* had to be analyzed into the meanings “psychophysical-interaction-context [Psychophysischer-Wechselwirkungszusammenhang] and “social relationship between substances.” Each of these meanings had to be correlated to predicates appropriate to their sphere.

The resolution of our antinomy is:

1. The social substance relationship *transcends* and exists *prior* to the psychophysical individuals.
2. The social substance relationship is founded in the context of psychophysical interactive relations.

§9. *The antinomy: Individual-community*

The resolution of the antinomy that is caused by the foundation relationship of spirit and body is expanded by a second antinomy to which the first is a necessary preliminary stage: the problem of how the individual relates to society.

Society must be understood as a whole [*Ganzes*]. Individuals are also wholes, complete in themselves. But how can a whole be composed of other wholes?

The formation of society, which lays the foundation for both its incomparable success as well as its unsolved internal problems, is essentially the creation of a new unity from unities which are complete in themselves, as human personalities basically are. After all, one cannot produce a painting out of other paintings, nor is a tree put together out of other trees. That which is itself an independent whole does not grow out of other wholes, but consists of dependent components. Only society can render that which is itself a whole, organized and centered in itself, into a mere organ of an all-encompassing whole. In the last instance every single event in the ceaseless evolution of social forms reflects the continually renewed attempt on the part of the individual, a
interaction and spiritual community

self-organizing unity and totality centered in itself, to harmonize itself with its social role in which it functions as a part; reflects the attempt to prevent the unity and totality of society from being exploded by independent parts.13

The problem can be formulated in the following antinomy:

1) Society is a whole that can only be made up of parts.
2) Individuals themselves are wholes that cannot enter into a relationship in which they are parts of a supra-individual whole.

The two different types of relationship—the psychophysical and the social—correspond to different parts of the bodily-spiritual unity that we call the human being. The psychophysical relationship exists between psychophysical individuals and is fully explained by the causal nexus of the natural world. To explain the social relationship we must assume the existence of another ego sphere, which we referred to above as the social ego. The social ego, if not itself the “substance”—the term we chose to denote the social essence [Gesellschaftswesentliche]—is at least the locus where this substance can be found. The essential reason why the problem of the individual and his or her relationship to society has not been satisfactorily solved is that the two ego components that appear in the “human being” have not been carefully distinguished from one another.

As with the first antinomy, it can also be shown that the second is merely apparent. The first proposition is satisfied when we substitute the term social ego. Society is a whole that can only consist of parts. This proposition is correct if, for part, we substitute the term social ego. The second proposition—Individuals are wholes that can never be part of a supra-individual whole—is also correct if, for individuals, we substitute the term psychophysical ego. No new psychophysical individual will ever be created from other psychophysical individuals. But, potentially, a whole can be created out of social egos. We deliberately formulate this assertion tentatively, since up to

this point the results of our investigation have in no way solved the problem of the individual and society. We have narrowed it down, however, to the sphere of the social ego, although at this point we still do not know exactly what the social ego is. Therefore our next task will be to investigate and describe the phenomena in the region of the social ego. We will probably find that the social ego is not an individual in the literal sense of the word, that it is not something indivisible. Indeed, perhaps it is not something to which the category of divisibility [Teilbarkeit] can be meaningfully applied at all.

The resolved antinomy reads:

1) Society is a whole composed of social egos.
2) Psychophysical individuals are themselves wholes and cannot be parts in a supra-individual whole.

Our theoretical problem now is to interpret the first proposition of our solution to the antinomy.

§10. [Spann’s theory]

The most essential and relevant formulation of our problem is found in Spann. For him the task is not that one must put a whole together out of parts, but rather that the “whole,” the “totality” [“Gesamtzustand”], is primary and the elements of the whole are related to it as its properties.

No totality [composite thing, whole] consists of elements which in themselves are “real.” Strictly speaking the totality is not a collection of independent things, but is a thing [Ding] itself. To the extent that we grasp the whole as a unity, we see that it has only properties, pure and simple and not thing-like [dinghafte] component parts, which would be something in themselves. It does not contain proper parts in the sense that they are independent and therewith constitute something real in themselves. These ‘properties’ may look like thing-like components to us because they can turn up in other totalities [i.e., the same human being we find in the religious community is also found in the economic community], and each can appear to be a thing “in itself.”
For example, the individual member of the economic community can appear as the biological individual. Were it not for this fact, we would not think of them as independent individuals.\textsuperscript{14}

This explanation corrects an error that has been made again and again in sociological literature. The properties belonging to one whole only seem to turn up in another one. In reality they are not the same properties. The ego as a legal subject is not identical with the ego that creates art, has a religious experience, or performs economic acts. This erroneous assumption arises when the psychophysical ego is taken to be the basis of all these types of ego. Caution must be exercised here, however, to avoid burdening our investigation with a severe error from the outset. The above types of ego designate a series of possible syntheses. That is to say that we can make laws to govern human conduct and we can judge conduct, we can grasp the world scientifically, observe and shape it artistically, comprehend it in a religious system, and, lastly, view actions and goods in economic terms. In short, we can approach the world via various a priori forms. But the locus of all these syntheses, which we have described as types of ego, is the one social ego. They are encompassed by this ego and are mere sections, spheres, or regions of it, all equally legitimized by membership in this one social ego. For its part, the social ego is also a synthetic principle; it unites the above-mentioned types of ego.

The passage quoted above addresses the general question of the relationship of wholes to parts. However, the underlined distinction between the social ego and its regions has yet to be addressed. The concept of the system of objectifications gives us what we require.

By virtue of their psychic content, the logical, aesthetical, religious, and ethical spiritual systems . . . represent and objectify themselves and become objects. The creation of logical concepts and the experience of aesthetic feeling only come about

\textsuperscript{14} Othmar Spann, \textit{Kurzgefaßtes System der Gesellschaftslehre}, 13–14.
as part of systems of spiritual acts. . . . Such acts realize themselves, structure themselves into systems, and so gain objective reality. The systems are thus called “objectification systems” [“Vergegenständlichungs- oder Objektivikationssysteme”]. If on the other hand one starts either with the totality of an extreme individualism (Robinson Crusoe), or later from social life as a totality, these systems appear as sub-systems [Teilgestalten] within a whole which is either the individual or society.15

In another passage we read: “Where an independent and unique objective context of spiritual contents or acts is found, we also find a particular type of social phenomenon, i.e., a social sub-system, a system of objectification.”16

The objectification system is the correlate of the concept of the world synthesis [Weltsynthese]. All types of syntheses are contained in the all-encompassing social ego. Or, to use Spann’s concepts: The contexts [Zusammenhänge] of spiritual contents are sub-systems of the totality of life itself [Lebens-totalität]. In sum we are dealing with two ego-analyses: The first is the psychophysical ego in relation to the social ego, the second is the social ego and its various regions. The relation can be pictured in a diagram:

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Human being : { ⊗ social ego with its regions
                  ○ psychophysical ego
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In the past, the analysis of the social ego was a greater and more immediate sociological problem. The fact that the analysis was not undertaken is the real reason why the independence of the individual as a separate thing has been asserted. The human being, for example, as a legal subject who is part of a legal order is at the same time a psychophysical ego. We can examine the individual’s physis by holding and touching it. This human being is always visible and remains the same individual even when present in other “wholes.” And one must admit that it is easy to succumb to the temptation, which Spann criticizes,

15. Ibid., 48.
16. Ibid., 55.
of substituting the tangible thing-like psychophysical ego for the social ego, which constantly appears in new forms, forever fluctuating in endless variation. The correct wording must read: “When we look at a totality it is always the whole which is primary, the properties of which and the laws of which are revealed in its structure. It is permissible to view these properties as real components, but only when we recognize that they are not independent things which react on their own, but are merely members within a unified whole.” These sentences postulate the inclusive and overriding unity of the totality, and we fulfill the postulate when we isolate the sphere of the social ego from the whole, the human being. As a social ego the human being can potentially be the property of a totality. We construct the concept of this ego sphere in order to have a subject of which all the qualities can be predicated that are necessary in order to explain social phenomena. At this point in our investigation we can only say with certainty that the psychophysical ego is always an individual and never a component of society. The thing-like section of the human being is never part of a totality.

§ 11. [The psychophysical foundation]

The totality “human being” reveals itself to be the combination of a principal duality: psychophysical ego and social ego. As psychophysical ego the human being is an individual; as social ego the human is potentially the member of a totality.

Fichte’s dictum “If there are to be human beings at all, then there must be a plurality of them” is correct if for the term human being we substitute social ego. It is also correct if by the term human being we understand “spiritual being” and contrast this being with the “natural” human being who corresponds to our psychophysical ego. To the extent that the human being is a spiritual being, he is a social being, or, expressed more comprehensively, spirit [Geist] is social.

17. Ibid., 14.
The concept of the human being as a coherent whole, encompassing a duality that consists, on the one hand, of an individual as a totality complete in itself \([\text{Ganzheit}]\) and, on the other hand, of a content that by its nature \([\text{Wesen}]\) is a part (i.e., it has the quality of being a property), is the first in a series of concepts called \textit{dichotomic concepts}. In formal universality this type of concept may be characterized as concepts of objects that are founded in two separate types of content. Of these the one is an individual; the other, by its nature \([\text{wesensmäßig}]\), points beyond itself to find its meaning in some overriding and encompassing unity that complements and completes it. Thus the closed nature of the individuality of the one component is only apparent, and not in the sense that, as a factor shaping the human being, it participates indirectly in the making of society. For even if it were to remain entirely isolated, it would reveal itself to be an incomplete \(\text{[unclosed]}\) quantity.

We may characterize the nature of the parts and their foundation in the following manner.

Husserl has defined founding relationships in general:

If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which associates it with an M, we say that an A as such \textit{requires foundation by an M} or also that an A as such \textit{needs to be supplemented by an M}. If accordingly \(A_0\), \(M_0\) are determinate instances of the pure kinds A or M, actualized in a single whole, and standing in the relations mentioned, we say that \(A_0\) \textit{is founded upon} \(M_0\), and that it is \textit{exclusively} founded on \(M_0\), if \(A_0\)'s need for supplementation is satisfied by \(M_0\) alone. . . . We say further, more indefinitely, that the two \textit{contents} or two pure Species, stand in a \textit{foundational relationship} or in a relationship of \textit{necessary association}. This indeed leaves it open which of the two possible but not mutually exclusive relationships is meant. The indefinite expression: \(A_0\) \textit{requires supplementation by}, is \textit{founded upon a certain moment}, plainly means the same as the expression: “\(A_0\) \textit{is non-independent}.”\textsuperscript{18}

With this concept of foundation Husserl constructs a theory of wholes and parts. For our purposes it is not necessary to analyze it in detail. But in order to illustrate it, let us look at one example: In the unity of that which is visually intuited, color and extension mutually provide one another with a foundation, for there is no color without some extension, and extension is unthinkable without some color.\(^\text{19}\)

The whole of the visual intuition is primary. Only in relationship to this whole can a foundational relationship among its contents be asserted. In reciprocal foundation, color and extension constitute themselves as the object of visual intuition; but, for example, color and sound cannot enter into a foundational relationship. Every analysis of a whole into its foundational contents or parts must be carried out in relation to the synthetic power that makes it a whole. For only in relation to this whole do the parts attain meaning as parts.\(^\text{20}\)

The difficulty with the body-soul foundation for our theory lies “in the assumed heterogeneity of the object of inner sense (the soul) and the objects of the outer senses, the formal condition of their intuition being, in the case of the former, time only, and in the case of the latter, also space.”\(^\text{21}\) This psychological difficulty (which according to Kant no longer belongs in the field of rational psychology, because although it deals with an object of experience [the soul], yet only to the extent that it ceases to be an object of experience) finds its solution in the

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\(^{19}\) Ibid., 265 [ibid., 466].

\(^{20}\) “The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which [as a characteristic] can be found in something, or can be combined with other representations; that is, only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to different representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something different. Consequently it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other [though, it may be, only possible] representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a concept communis” [Immanuel Kant, \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft}/\textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: MacMillan, 1991], B 133–34].

\(^{21}\) Ibid., B 247.
thought that these two types of object do not differ internally, “but only insofar as one appears outwardly to the other.”

That which underlies the phenomenon of matter as a thing in itself is perhaps not essentially different from this relationship.

In the Critique of Practical Reason the problem reappears with the concept of the personality. The question is raised concerning the sine qua non of the value which only the human being can accord to himself. And the answer is:

It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself [as a part of the world of sense], a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all ends [which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the moral]. This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality.

The personality appears as an imperative, and the problem raised here is how to show the foundational relationship of an imperative with a mass of whirling atoms. The meaningful content [Sinngehalt] of the foundation relationship must be related to the whole, which has caused the parts to become parts in a foundation relationship. The whole is the concept of the human being, in whose intentional scope lies the possibility of creating society. The individual part of the whole, “human being” [the psychophysical ego], attains meaning only to the extent that it contributes to the realization of the purpose pursued by the part that is not closed [the social ego]. The capacity for realizing meaning [Sinnerfüllung] is not given

to the individual insofar as he is a whirling mass of atoms, but only to the individual as an organism. The characteristic properties and imperative character of the organism have been clearly explained in recent biological studies.

There is an essential difference between a machine and a living being. When a machine wears out or is damaged, it cannot repair itself. The living being has a function-rule involving material in its protoplasm that enables it to repair damage itself. “We were confirmed in this opinion by the behavior of the unicellular protoplasmic animals, which form for themselves the necessary framework, and destroy it again in accordance with the function-rule controlling the action. In this way, the rule of digestion of Paramecium caused mouth, stomach, and anus to appear, and then to disappear again, one after the other.”24 A duality of rules—the creation-rules and function-rules—can be separated from the material phenomena, which are ruled by the laws of chemistry and mechanics. “The material basis is probably a ferment, which in a latent form lies waiting in the chromosomes. But in addition, the gene consists of the nonmaterial impulse, and this it is which activates the ferment.”25 “We may say that the genes are ‘impulsive,’ but by that term we must not presume a physical energy, following the rule of causality; rather, we must understand the power to convert an extra-spatial and extra-temporal plan into a physical phenomenon.”26 The autonomy of the rule creates the subject. “To be a subject means continuous control of a structure by means of an autonomous rule instead of a heteronomous rule, which, with every disturbance of the structure, loses its effectiveness.”27 The assumption of this rule is a theoretical necessity. Without it, the essential problems of biology cannot be explained. “On the one side are the

25. Ibid., 156–57 [ibid., 214].
26. Ibid., 157–58 [ibid., 216].
27. Ibid., 163 [ibid., 225].
properties of the external world, which exercise no direction-giving influence; and on the other is the living germ, which possesses no organs that could give it knowledge of these properties. And yet we see how the embryo unerringly produces definite counterproperties, which fit into a definite group of properties in the external world.\textsuperscript{28} All nonmaterial actions, in contrast to merely mechanical compulsion, may be compared to an impulse system involving a “thou shalt!”\textsuperscript{29} “This way of considering things permits us to say of the impulse-systems that they are ‘imperative’ in respect of form, which they always relate to the development or maintenance of the individual. This individual is always a subject, because it always forms a new world-centre.”\textsuperscript{30}

Everyone familiar with the subject matter will sense the exceptional problematic of this state of affairs, even though it is partly hidden by the logical construction. Naturally it is not the intention of this work to try to reach a conclusion in this matter, or indeed to try to offer solutions to problems that, with some justification, may be said to be among the most difficult imaginable.

With this in mind, let us summarize the outcome of our discussion, that the contents we find in the foundation of the object, “human being,” are imperatives. We said above that one of these contents, namely, the psychophysical, is only an apparent individual. The question concerning the ability of an organism to adapt itself to the external world, and related problems, clearly show that in reality organic individuality must be understood as part of a whole \textit{[Ganzheit]}. The impulse-system, to the imperative of which the individual owes its development, must, from one aspect, be described as a subject, because it creates a world-centre. But from the other aspect, it is arranged as an objective factor in the plan of the world

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 228 [ibid., 317].
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 254 [ibid., 353].
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. [ibid., 354].
as a whole, in order that the new world-centre may become part of the framework of the whole.

We get a survey of these difficult and complicated relations most easily, if we proceed from a universal conformity with plan, in which the subjective impulse-systems are woven in as objective factors along with the other objective factors of Nature. For the conformity with the plan of life embraces both inorganic and organic forces, even if it directly influences only the organic shaping.31

The psychophysical individuality has an ambiguous position in that it appears on the one hand as a subjective factor and on the other as an objective factor in an overriding and encompassing whole. Thus even in the part-contents [Teilinhalte] making up the human being we find the dichotomic structure that is constitutive of the human being’s nature as a whole. The other part-content, the social ego, about which at present we know too little, is also so constructed that it must be understood as part of a totality. Thus, when we consider the human being, we find the interlinking of a part-whole relationship in two directions, which, in principle, can continue into infinity. From this property of the contents of dichotomic concepts we gain an important insight into the technique of sociological theory. The dichotomic concepts themselves contain antinomies. Antinomies can be interpreted. To the extent that they are contradictions created by equivocations, they reveal themselves to be merely apparent. The possibility of the equivocation is provided by the principal ambiguity of the contents characterized above, an ambiguity that comes about because they are simultaneously wholes and parts. The solution to this latent antinomy is not the “solution” to the theoretical problem itself. Indeed, the opposite is true: As the “solution” to the antinomies demonstrates, the matter itself is insolvable. The descriptive analysis of an antinomy as it is found in concepts with dichotomic content does not explain how the contents of the parts are connected but merely demonstrates that they are

31. Ibid. [ibid.].
present. Unless we want to indulge in metaphysical speculation, we cannot go further than this demonstration. We will show that the further links in the chain of speculation concerning the human being, which, as we have already indicated, develop in two directions, consist of concepts whose nature involves principal problems; and that all these problems are concerned with immediate problems of life [Lebensprobleme], such as the problem of the “human being” itself.

In general, sociological theory has not confined itself to this dispassionate registration of facts. We saw above that the partial contents of the human being involve imperatives, and the connecting links will also reveal themselves to involve imperatives. An author may feel tempted to select one or the other link in these imperatives and proclaim it to be something ultimate. Insofar as it is a whole or a part he will choose a content commensurate with his personal affinities. And this choice forms the basis of the significant conflict between individual and collective theory. This is the principal opposition within which the most diverse variations take place. For example, in general the interaction theorists opt for the spiritual unity of the individual, but for the relationship between spiritual wholes [Ganzheiten], they reify the causal relationship between the partial contents of the physical individual. But even here causality is not a necessary assumption. According to the theory of conformity, as put forth by Üxküll, the relationship between organisms is not “material” but takes place according to a plan. The interaction theorists have concentrated on those relationships in a subrealm of the bodily sphere involving the merely quantitative and mechanical. The analysis of the concept of interaction shows what insights into the technique of sociological theorizing would be possible if the investigation we have sketched here were to be pursued along the same lines.

The reason the chain of spheres with imperative content is interrupted and one of its links made absolute is to be found in the world-view and political position of the author who in-
introduces the interruption. The author's Weltanschauung tends more to one or other of the concept's components. One of the scale's pans that hold the contents of the concept in equilibrium is filled by the author's commitment to his own worldview, thus imparting to it the weightiness of the "absolute." At this stage of the investigation the "absolute" is actually the relative. The nature of most sociological theories as bearers of absolute world-views is reflected and symbolized by the bitter struggles among their representatives. Since these battles take place in the region of the unprovable and thus incontestable, it should be clear by now that they cannot be resolved.

The science of sociology is neither individualistic nor collectivist; rather, it is concerned with dichotomic objects. This explanation does not contradict the one given earlier, that sociology is concerned with social phenomena, which, as we shall demonstrate below, are dichotomic.

§ 12. [The principle of sociological method]

These explanations have prepared the ground for an examination of the dichotomic construction of the ego spheres.

Our fictional example of assimilation into an alien society occasioned the introduction of the concept of "substance." The analysis was necessary in order to account for the circumstance that psychophysical relations do not directly bring about socialization, neither in society nor in small groups. Despite the most intimate interactions with others, an individual can remain an alien, something that would not occur if the concept of society were truly and adequately accounted for by interactive relationships. With the term substance we wish to designate the particular quality of spirit by means of which an individual is recognized as belonging to a particular society and which

32. Even if it could be shown that there is no such thing as assimilation, and that the process is only apparent, the results of our investigation would not be affected. The assumption that the process takes place was made only for demonstration purposes. The investigation could just as easily have been based on the fact that there are different societies at all.

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renders him, and others like him, immune to alien influence. The relationship between substances—substance-relationship or social-relationship—is what makes it possible to construct relationships that exist prior to and transcend psychophysical individuals. These relationships constitute the unity of society. Thus social relationships are relationships between ego points of the same substance, between points of the same social quality. Ego points that are not of the same quality can form no social relationship or society. The process of assimilation demonstrates the possibility of a change of substance. With assimilation into a new society substance does not disappear and leave mere psychophysical egos, but a new substance takes its place.

With this sentence we posit the principle of sociological method. In terms of their substance (i.e., that which is specifically social) the human beings who belong to a society are the same. The sentence is to be understood in the full light of its consequences. It means that members of a society think and feel the same with respect to works of art, business mores, political and religious goals, family forms, communal administration, fashion, and philosophical systems. Despite the most obvious bitter struggles and glaring contradictions, these human beings articulate the same thing. In view of the sheer endless variety of the phenomena this statement may sound paradoxical. But it is the necessary conclusion of our investigation. If society is anything at all, it must be revealed in the productions of its members. The task of sociological method is to find the exact criteria that account for the ultimate sameness [Gleichheit] of all of a society’s phenomena. Social theory is also confronted with new tasks, if it is to explain what “currents,” “relations,” and “influences” are within a society. All of these words refer to changes and differences in social structure, which would seem to contradict our principle concerning the sameness of social phenomena. These words, which enjoy widespread use and are applied to other spheres without anyone considering their metaphorical nature, must
be defined and their apparent variety analyzed and referred back to a common ground.

We divided the “human being” into a psychophysical ego and a social ego. Here we should consider the limited meaning of the concept “social ego,” a fact we emphasized at the beginning of our investigation. Societies and hence their members are, with respect to their substance, separated from one another in principle. In other respects, however, they are entirely the same. Human beings use the same forms of thought, though they express different things with them. Universally we find that they have legal and philosophical systems, works of art, and economic structures; but the concrete legal orders etc. are essentially different, varying according to their social spiritual substance. Up to this point, the enumerated universal phenomena, as determined by the social substance (i.e., in terms of essence, or pure form, as well as in their concrete phenomena), have been related to the productive unity of the social ego without any differentiation. Now we will refer to the relationship in which the unity of essence is constituted [Einheitsbeziehung] as “the ego of pure forms” and distinguish it from the social ego, which refers to the pure forms when they are modified and concretized by the social substance. For objective reasons, which will become clear in what follows, we can also refer to the social substance as “value” [“Wert”], and we can use the words social ego and value ego synonymously. But we must take care to distinguish both of these terms from the pure form ego.

§13. [The ego sphere. Substance as value.]

Human beings belong to a particular society insofar as they share the same “value.” They are members of society as artists, government officials, economic agents, religious individuals, etc. In every one of these forms of phenomena they are members of a particular society through a value. The value lends the whole ensemble of pure forms a particular coloring, which
differentiates societies from one another. Within the sphere of the spiritual ego, the individual as pure form ego is delimited, and constitutes a whole in itself. The totality \([\text{Gesamtheit}]\) of all pure forms can be approached in the descriptive analysis of consciousness. The forms do not exist side by side with no connection between them, but as a priori act-forms of a stream of consciousness, of an ego. The synthetic unity, which makes it possible that the unity of the spiritual ego is constituted in the pure forms, is grounded in the ego stream.

On the other hand, the value ego points naturally \([\text{wesensmäßig}]\) beyond the holistic unity of the spiritual ego. Because of the ego sphere the human being cannot be characterized as a self-contained individual, but rather must be viewed as part of a social whole. If we may put it this way, as a value ego, the human being is recognized as being a member of a whole and not viewed as an ego. Just as the pure-ego form, through its activity, unifies the individual, so the value ego lends society its unity \([\text{Einheitsbezug}]\).

With the help of these additions to our principal explication of dichotomic concepts, the relationships of the ego spheres to one another can be demonstrated by the following diagram:

```
Human being
     \[\begin{cases}
\text{spiritual ego (part)} \\
\text{psychophysical ego (whole)}
\end{cases}\]
```

1. value ego (part)
2. pure form ego (whole)
3. im[eratives] impulse system (whole)
4. objective [illegible] factor (part)

With the help of this schematic presentation we can see how intimately entwined the whole-part relations are. If these relationships are not adequately differentiated it is very likely that something will be taken for a whole that is in fact a dichotomic structure and can itself be differentiated into a part and a whole. Here we also see clearly that, as we alluded to above, within the laws of combination and variation an endless variety of sociological theories are possible. If all of these theories speak of the human being and by that term mean any one of the ego spheres in its various combinations, or, as the case may
be, exclude one or the other combination, it will not always prove easy to identify the type of selection and combination used in the various theories.

§ 14. [Ego-form and ego-content]
The above diagram by no means completes our analysis of the interlinking ego spheres, but with the knowledge of their double nature we have succeeded in illuminating one of the most difficult problems of a universalistic theory of society. For if not correctly understood, the assertion that the “ego is a part of society” can easily lead to conclusions reminiscent of certain aspects of milieu theory.

The purely logical statement that society as a whole exists prior to its parts is then falsely taken to mean that society as a whole is the empirical cause of the specific individual. However, this would deprive the individual of his independence and bring his essential nature completely into the realm of causality, thus destroying his freedom. But it is this freedom which, in the final analysis, separates one personality from another and indeed which creates the independent personality in the first place. This view takes no account of the idea that the individual is a causa causans of the social process and consigns the primary cause to some type of supra-individual quantity. In Hegel it is spirit, in Marx, the immanent development of the economy, but the result is the same. Nevertheless, such doctrines produce a fatalistic ethic only if, at deeper levels of the system, the analysis of the dichotomic contents is inadequate.

The specific problem confronting a universalistic theory is: What happens to the individual if society is taken to be primary and considered the only entity that participates in reality? “If one now asks what remains of the individual, the answer can only be the egoicity [Ichheit], the ego form of all spiritual processes that take place within and by means of community.”

This statement implicitly contains the argument we have

33. Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, 263.
adopted. The concrete reality of the phenomenon is socially determined, it is a specifically social phenomenon; but the pure form of the phenomenon, form itself, is determined by its relationship to the self-contained, productive egoicity. It is the ego form of the phenomena that allows it to transcend social determination and gives it objective meaning. The processes of society do not take place in a transcendent mythical consciousness of which the individual would only be an unimportant dependent emanation. “It is the individual who must think. Thinking is based on grasping and retaining what is the same in things. Logically correct thinking must be strengthened and practiced, and false thinking must be corrected, but the individual cannot be relieved of doing his own thinking, even if his thoughts come to him from a source outside himself.”

In principle this sentence is in agreement with our theory. The ego-form is not the ego of psychology. We speak of the thought ego [Denk-ich], and it can only become the object of psychology if we abstract from its specific quality of being a logical-ego and limit our investigation to the physical reality of its logical connections in the brain. With the cognitive act [Denkakt], to the extent that it is a logical act—and when we apply the categories of “true” and “false” we are in the sphere of the logical ego—we find ourselves in a sphere that is completely different from that which is investigated by natural science. This is the sphere, not of the psychophysical ego, but of the ego of pure forms. This special ego sphere, as Spann emphasizes, has a far-reaching significance: “Since the ego-form remains the only existential value [Daseinswert] of spiritual processes in society, it completely dominates the theory as well as society. It makes possible or, more accurately, produces an autonomous ethic, an ethic of reason in the manner of Kant’s ethics. For indeed the ego form is equivalent to reason, and reason is the same as autonomy.”

34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 264.
We will subsequently discuss the significance of the ego form for ethics in greater detail. Here we merely wish to point again to the importance of the dichotomic construction.

§ 15. [Value as context of meaning. The ego process of realizing postulates.]

The investigation into the dichotomic quality of the object and the delimitation of the ego spheres has now reached the point that, with some hope of success, we can try to demonstrate the essence of the social relationship and the means by which the ego component is integrated into the society that is over and above it.

It is a principle of sociological knowledge that, in essence, all members of a society think, feel, and desire the same, that in fact it is this substantial identity of all spiritual functions which, despite apparent differences, constitutes a society and marks it off from other societies. Because the members of different societies do not fill their spiritual activities with the same substantial content, and because they do not have the same value ego, they remain ultimately alien to one another. In order to enter into the core of the societal formation process based on the similarity of the value egos, we must analyze an act of sociation into its component parts.

Let us look at the example of “spiritual awakening” [“geistige Anregung”]. One human being utters a sentence, and a second individual, listening to it, attaches a meaning to the sentence and gains a new insight he can meaningfully integrate into his previous knowledge or experience. Three elements are present in this process: 1) the words spoken by A, 2) the meaning A attaches to the spoken words, 3) the meaning that the words have for B, which by no means must be the same as for A. What can be identified in principle and objectively analyzed are the sounds and the grammatical structure of the spoken words. But the meanings attributed to the language structures cannot be objectively determined. The meanings
attributed to the sentences are dependent on the meanings created on the basis of the entire life experiences [Erlebnis-Totalität] of the individuals A and B. No absolute meaning can be attributed to words. Various meanings can be attributed to the same discourse, the same meaning to dissimilar discourses. The specific meaning attributed to a discourse is dependent on the context of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang] of the person making the attribution. If, for example, individual A attributes to individual B’s discourse a meaning taken from his own context of meaning, which however differs greatly from that of individual B’s context of meaning, we have an instance of “misunderstanding.” If, during a dialog, both speakers continually attribute meanings to their discourse that are derived from different contexts, we have an instance of people talking at cross purposes.

[In discourse], something that we by no means have a right to expect actually does take place. The contexts of meaning of human beings, at least those who belong to the same society, are similar to such an extent that, generally speaking, in concrete cases only minor, rapidly made alignments of the contexts of meaning are required in order to almost completely rule out misunderstandings.

Let us assume for our case of “spiritual awakening” contexts of meaning that are so attuned to one another that misunderstandings are ruled out and ask ourselves: What purpose does the act of sociation fulfill?

A makes a statement that is correctly understood by B. This means: From A's communication B experiences an enrichment of his own context of meaning. For this to take place, the contexts of meaning have to be the same [gleich sein]; otherwise the meaning could not be correctly understood. That is to say that B's context of meaning must contain the meaning that A attributed to his statement. But with this state of affairs it is not clear what constitutes the enrichment of meaning or the spiritual awakening B received from A. If the act of sociation is not to be completely without purpose or meaning, one context
of meaning must by its very nature be similarly constructed to a second one and at the same time, somehow, differ from it essentially [wesensmäßig]. In this respect we spoke of the sameness [Gleichheit] of both phenomena and spiritual states, despite apparent differences. It can perhaps be explained with the help of a metaphor. The totality of an individual’s context of meaning may be compared to the view obtained of a landscape from a certain height. This provides a meaningful and complete picture in which the position of each detail is determined by its relation to the whole. It is worth noting that all the details are present with a specific degree of precision and that the entire picture would be destroyed if, at any one point, pieces with a greater degree of precision were to be inserted. The details of such an inserted piece would only have meaning within a smaller circumference. The piece would appear meaningless within the context of the larger whole, though of course it would also be included in the larger circumference. We can compare spiritual awakening to a shift in the degree of precision of a particular area and thus to a similar shift in the precision of the whole. Within a particular area of concern, details are sharpened by means of a more universal perspective. This can take place because, in principle, every context of meaning is open to a process of broadening and deepening. Thus, when we speak of the sameness [Gleichheit] of contexts of meaning we mean that, in terms of the subject matter, the extent of the individual experience is the same; but differences are possible in terms of organization, abstraction, and understanding. We can perhaps say that potentially the contexts of meaning are the same and that the act of sociation is essentially the deepening and organizing [durch-Organisierung] of meaning. To put it briefly, the differences in contexts of meaning lie in the various intensities of their organization.

Thus “spiritual awakening” is understood as a value to be pursued. That is, the intensification and deepening of meaning is acknowledged as a value. The task of maximizing the meaning of our experiences presents itself to us as a postulate
or an imperative to be fulfilled through continuous effort. Ultimately this effort is the reason why acts of sociation take place. What sociation means is the realization of a postulate. *Insofar as this postulate is fulfilled in interactive sociation, without misunderstanding, it can also be seen as transcending both partners.* We can detach the postulate from the concrete case of sociation, call it “society,” and insert individuals into it as dynamic factors involved in the realization of the postulate. *Thus society is a postulate, and the relationship between society and the individual reveals itself as the relationship of a postulate to the process of its realization.* The dissolution of the individual in a process is a thoroughly logical consequence in the context of a theory that avoids, as far as possible, reifying substances. “Bearers” of meaning and members of society as sensually perceivable human beings are unknown to sociology. Sociology recognizes only meanings, imperatives, and processes in which postulates are realized.

§16. *[Elucidation with the help of a theory of Bergson]*

We have given a brief sketch of a theory of the essence and meaning of the social relationship and of the relationship between individuals and society. This can be illustrated with Bergson’s views on metaphysics.

Metaphysical knowledge is gained through an act of intuition. The intuition, once gained, must be applied and given a mode of expression suitable to our patterns of thought and capable of being expressed in known concepts, which provide us with the secure standpoints we need. “The work of logical perfection may continue for centuries, but the act that creates the method lasts but a moment. That is why we so often mistake the logical apparatus of science for science itself and forget the metaphysical intuition upon which everything else depends.”

According to Bergson there is a sharp contrast between intuition and the logical formulation of that which was intuitively grasped. It is the task of the logically formulated words to render the meaning of the intuition with the greatest possible fidelity. Everyone who has ever expressed a meaning in words knows that words are not a variable merely dependent upon the meaning to be expressed, but that they also depend, at least as much, on our assessment of the mental capacity or knowledge of the person we are addressing. We explain a problem differently according to whether we are talking to an expert or a layman. When, however, the meaning is fixed in words and these are all we have connecting us to the meaning, it can happen that if the person receiving the communication does not understand it the way the person imparting it does, i.e., because the two do not share the same intuition, that thinking in terms of words takes the place of thinking in terms of meaning. The intuitive grasp of meaning, which can always return to the original intuition, is replaced by logical operations with a series of propositions.

By its very nature, meaning transcends conceptual formulation. By looking at meaning from various aspects, by continually circling and trying to approach the essential center, which however can never be grasped entirely, the capacity of language to express meaning is exhausted [sich erschöpft]. We should never forget the mere relative validity and symbolic nature of logical formulation. “When one forgets this intuition, all that has been said by philosophers and scholars about the ‘relativity’ of scientific knowledge comes true: What is relative is the symbolic knowledge present in preexisting concepts, which proceeds from the fixed to the moving, and not the intuitive knowledge which establishes itself in that which is moving and adopts the life of things themselves. This intuition attains the absolute.”

Intuition may be compared to the plumbing of the ocean floor. “The more alive the reality that is touched,
the deeper the sounding.” Thus the criterion of value is not found in logic; we do not say “true” or “false” in regard to value; the difference is rather one of intensity. The context of meaning knows only totality and the meaningful correlation of all elements within it. On the other hand, the objective logical formulation transcends, and is entirely separate from, this value; it is to be understood merely as a symbol. All intuitions penetrate to the same ground and bring the same thing to the light of day, but in various degrees of intensity.

The differences between schools, i.e., between the groups of disciples who have formed around a few great masters, are striking. But perhaps we would find them as pronounced among the masters themselves. Something rules the diversity of systems, something, we repeat, that is simple and definite like a sounding, about which one feels that it has touched the bottom of the same ocean at approximately the same depth, even if it brings very different materials up to the surface. The disciples usually work on these materials; here we find the place and function of analysis. But the master, to the extent that he formulates, develops, and translates into abstract ideas what he brings up to the surface, is also, in a way, his own disciple, since the simple act that started the analysis, and remains hidden behind it, proceeds from a skill entirely different from the analytical one. This act, as the concept reveals, is intuition.

We can perhaps complete the partial truth—that the master can in some sense also be his own disciple—with the true statement that in the formulation of meaning the master in no way differs from the disciple, except for the fact that the formulation of meaning takes place in the same subject who had the original intuition. But this difference is not absolute. After all, in order for the disciple to formulate meaning, he too must have experienced it, i.e., he must also have had the intuition. The difference lies only in the intensity of the experience of meaning [Sinnerlebnis]. To use a metaphor: The self-reliant thinker is a personality who has so deeply penetrated

38. Ibid., 47.
39. Ibid., 55–56.
the philosophical maze that we can no longer recognize the gate through which he entered; the disciples are those who remain within sight of the gate, i.e., with whom a particular preexisting formulation remains recognizable as their point of entry.

Intuition is something altogether different from the formulation of the thought in words. It meditatively penetrates to the meaning of the world itself, where, in the most “intimate fellowship with the world as it also manifests itself outwardly,” it grasps reality. “This is by no means merely a question of understanding the most conspicuous facts; such an immense mass of facts must also be gathered and fused together in such a way that in the fusion all the preconceived and premature ideas that observers may unintentionally have put into their observations will be certain to neutralize one another.”\textsuperscript{40} Formally this meditation [\textit{Sinnversenkung}] is a submerging of the self into the essence of things where it becomes one [\textit{Einswerden}] with them by means of continuous contemplation. Intuition itself is not a cognitive act, but a condition of becoming one with nature, which can later be reported on. But the act of reporting is no longer intuition. “Metaphysical intuition, though it can only be attained through material knowledge, is something entirely different from the mere summary or synthesis of that knowledge. It differs from these—we repeat—in the same way as the motor impulse differs from the path covered by the moving body, and as the tension of the clock spring differs from the visible movements of the hands.”\textsuperscript{41}

This presentation of Bergson’s views has been undertaken with the intention of clarifying one of our own basic positions. The social relationship, i.e., the interactive attempt to fulfill a postulate, is itself a value. In sociology we move entirely within a world of postulates, imperatives, and values; objectifications such as scientific works or artistic creations, governments and economic systems—all of which belong to the

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 57–58.
sphere of dichotomic objects—have, in one sense, no meaning in themselves. They acquire meaning as points of passage, as components in a process of realizing postulates. Sociology does not view the objectifications as wholes, existing for themselves subject only to judgments based on the criteria of their own internal system of norms. Rather, sociology views them as signs of contexts of meaning and as ways to ideas. Although they are created by individuals, yet they are only created through activities belonging to the sphere of social relationships. We can view these products of individuals as products of society, for society—as we have defined it—is the postulate, which, in acts of sociation, produces the common bond [Gemeinsamkeit].

We may add that the social relationship is not confined to acts that take place between human beings in immediate contact with one another. The conditions for social acts are also found where objective formulations of meaning are indirectly received. Reading a book and contemplating a work of art also constitute social relationships.

§ 17. [The concept of spiritual community]
In all essential points the results of our investigation agree with Spann’s sociology. We will now try to show the points of agreement and, as far as possible, to harmonize the terminology.

Othmar Spann describes his sociology as a universalistic theory. This term was chosen in order to underline its opposition to individualistic theories. Individualism asserts the primacy of the individual and—in one of its typical forms—interprets society as an association that has many advantages for the individual and for this reason is to be cultivated. Universalism, on the other hand, locates the primary, original reality from which everything else is derived, not in the individual but in the whole, in society. According to this view, the individual is no longer self-determined and self-created [autark], and is no longer based exclusively and entirely in its own egoicity [Ichheit]. Thus, the primary reality is no longer found in the
interaction and spiritual community

individual but in the whole, in society. There are two aspects to this: a) The whole, society, is that which is endowed with true reality, and b) the whole is primary, and the individual is really only present as a component of the whole. Thus the individual is that which is derivative.42

The individual is entirely determined by the whole, and the formulation and understanding of the relationship between these two quantities depends on how the whole is defined. Spann contrasts his notion to Plato’s. The platonic whole is something finished and unchanging, and the individual exists insofar as he participates in the idea of the whole. Spann’s notion of the whole is that of something never finished but always in a state of flux. “It is something that creates and builds itself. It is entirely a becoming, pure movement, a foaming-over [Überschaumung] that continuously transcends each finished form. Were it to cease to move, it would cease to be, for it is entirely subordinate to the law of life.”43 What exactly this whole is, which comes under the law of life, is not explicitly stated here, nor is the relationship between the whole and the law of life precisely defined. Nevertheless, when the above quoted description is followed to its logical conclusion, it is easy to see that the whole is identical to the law of life. For the whole is “pure movement and a foaming over”; movement is its reality. Were movement to cease, the whole would also cease to exist. This whole has some similarities to the Fichtean ego, which is not a substance to which “Pure-Act” [“Tätigsein”] could be attributed, but is itself pure activity, pure process or a free act [freie Tathandlung]. We may assume Spann’s whole is the same, an expression of pure movement and of that which creates and structures itself. The whole is a hypostasis of the idea of totality [Totalität], which is to be realized in an infinite process. If we assume that the idea of the totality, or, as we have called it, the postulate, is identical

42. Spann, Der Wahre Staat, 29.
43. Ibid., 33.
with Spann’s law of life, then the whole is not subsumed under
the law of life but is identical with it. If our interpretation is
correct, then, in this respect there is no difference between
Spann’s position and our own.

The movement that, according to Spann, is produced by the
whole accounts for the fact

that all spiritual reality present in the individual is only there
and only comes into being as something that has been awakened.
Only by creating a spark, by kindling a flame, by stimulation on
the part of another spirit, does spirituality [Geistigkeit] become
real in an individual; not by means of a pure autonomous, self-
induced journey into the depth of one’s soul. The original, pri-
mary condition for the realization of spirituality in an individual
is the state of being beamed upon and enkindled by another
spirit. Therefore, the spirituality that comes into being in an
individual [whether directly or mediated] is always in some sense
a reverberation of that which another spirit has called out to the
individual [zuruft].

This means that human spirituality exists only in community,
never in spiritual isolation. It is never just for me alone, but
at the same time for another (however far away); it is always,
and essentially, a relationship to another spirituality, to another
human being. Spirituality is therefore always found in contact
with another spirit, never in pure being-for-itself.44

In this connection the whole is used synonymously with the
“spiritual reality present in the individual.” We established
above that the fundamental meaning of Spann’s exposition is
that the whole is identical with the postulate. If we continue
the logical deduction we see that ultimately individual spiri-
tuality is also one with the postulate. In this case, at least here
in their intention, our two theories agree that society, or the
whole, is the regulative idea of the process that we call the
individual. We were able to separate the idea of the totality
of a process that takes place in the growing intensification
of meaning through sociation from the process itself and set
it above the process as a totality [of its own]. This intimate

44. Ibid., 29.
connection between totality and realization renders absurd any assertion that the individual, insofar as he is a process, is also an independent substance. The individual as process, the value ego, is a part and nothing but a part. Here there is a difference between Spann’s theory and our own, which we will examine more closely below. But first we want to define another basic concept.

The basic process of sociation [Vergesellschaftung], which up to now we have called the social relationship, or the act of socialization [Vergemeinschaftung], was recognized by Spann as the constitutive element of society. He described the process and designated it with a new term:

The beautiful German word: “community” [“Gemeinschaft”] wonderfully expresses the fact of mutuality, of the reciprocity of all that is spiritual in the individual. However, since besides denoting the purely spiritual, this term is also used to express action in the world [Tun und Handeln] . . . it is necessary to have a purely scientific, technical term as well. Here we have chosen the artificial term [Kunstausdruck] “spiritual community” (“Gezweiung”) to express the opposite of dividing into two [or breaking into two pieces—“Entzweiung”]. Our term refers to the fact that it takes two individuals to form a unity, that in truth two individuals constitute [bilden] a whole—the exact opposite of the notion that individuals are only whole outside a unity [when they are individual selves again]. Some examples of [Gezweiung] would be a fork in a road or branch in a tree [Gabel, Gabelung] where two individual elements only exist because they are parts of a whole. We can say that individual spirituality only exists in community [Gemeinschaft] or [better], in “spiritual community” [“Gezweiung”]. All spiritual essence and reality exists as “spiritual community” [“Gezweiung”] and only in “communal spirituality” [“Gezweitheit”]. This means that spirituality only exists when awakened and called forth. It only exists in some form of community with another spirit. This spirit may be a distant friend, a long-deceased writer or philosopher whose books we read, a dialog between two human beings, or the mere indirect “interest” on the part of an individual or group in whatever concrete or abstract form the interest is manifested. Whatever direction our investigation takes, we
will always discover the elementary fact of social life, that spirituality takes place in community ["Gezweiung"], and only in community.\textsuperscript{45}

In the further course of our investigation the term social relationship will be replaced by the term spiritual community ["Gezweiung"] because this term expresses the unity of this unique process so well. We only need to add a few sentences to Spann’s clear description in order to incorporate it into our own theory. At the same time the earlier explanations will be summarized and completed. For us spiritual community means the process of realizing a postulate. Formally the postulate may be defined as the intensifying and broadening of an individual context of meaning. The postulate is realized by the “reception” ["Aufnahme"] or “understanding” ["Verstehen"] of an objectively formulated similar context of meaning of a different degree of intensity. Spiritual community is the primary element of society. Society is a multiplicity of spiritual communities that are unified by virtue of the fact that the material content of their postulates, i.e., the concrete contexts of meaning, are the same.

With the concept of spiritual community the fundamental elements of sociology have been explained and only the detailed question of the individual remains to be investigated. We have already suggested that the basic problem of the universalist theory is the question of what becomes of the individual when society is the only reality. Spann answers that what remains of the individual is “the egoicity, the ego-form of all spiritual processes.”\textsuperscript{46} Ultimately this egoicity proves to be identical with the pure form ego. According to Spann, however, something of individual nature remains, namely, “the talents and abilities in this ego form—therefore the natural content of the ego itself [das inhaltlich angelegte Ich].”\textsuperscript{47} Here our theory differs from Spann’s. Society is supposed to be an act or a series

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 34. 
\textsuperscript{46} Spann, Gesellschaftslehre, 263. 
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
of acts of reciprocal spiritual awakening. This can only mean that it is imperative that contexts of meaning be intensified and realized. To the extent that concrete realizations are made by individuals, they act as points of passage for the fulfillment of the postulate, society. All talents, abilities, and powers \([\text{Potenzen}]\) are merely stages in the process of realizing a postulate. They are all components, and there is nothing in them of the character of an independent whole. On the other hand, if we were to attribute the talents to the holistic individual himself, there would be nothing left to participate in society. If the ego form and the ego content are removed from the sphere of society and viewed as independent ego spheres, there is hardly anything left in this ego to allow it to be a component of society.

The difficulty revealed by this situation also appears at other points in Spann’s investigation. At one point, concerning the problem of the individual’s ability, we read: “In each individual there is only a limited area of ability \([\text{Fähigkeit, Potenz}]\). Not everyone can become everything, but each is engaged in the realization of a specific aspect of that which is universally possible.”\(^{48}\) Here we must note that the use of the words \textit{ability} \([\text{Fähigkeit}]\) and \textit{power} \([\text{Potenz}]\) as synonyms is questionable. For the sociologist the term \textit{power} \([\text{Potenz}]\) refers to the immanent possibility of intensifying a context of meaning. \textit{Power} is therefore an ethical category. \textit{Ability}, however, as the following example concerning musical ability makes clear, is a psychological concept: “An unmusical person will never become a Mozart, no matter how musical his community and education are.”\(^{49}\) Spann continues: “The spiritual communities surrounding the individual can only awaken the specific abilities \([\text{powers}]\) that are in him. In this way we see that an irreplaceable uniqueness and a qualitative individuality are essential attributes of the individual. This leads us to a fundamental conclusion that is important for assessing the theory

\(^{48}\) Spann, \textit{Der Wahre Staat}, 44.  
\(^{49}\) Ibid.
of the whole [Ganzheitslehre]. If universalism designates the individual as a mere link in the total spirituality [Gesamtgeistigkeit] of the community or spiritual community, this does not mean that the individual is destroyed. Rather the individual is given what belongs to the individual, uniqueness [Einzigkeit], or individuality itself [Individualität].”

According to this completely psychologistic view, the individual possesses a series of abilities that are developed in society. Since it may be assumed that each individual has different abilities, however, it is impossible to discover how the common substance of society should develop out of these completely isolated [auf sich selbst gestellt] individuals. Indeed it is entirely inexplicable how the abilities are awakened. For as our analysis has shown, spiritual community is only possible when individuals have similar contexts of meaning. Thus, the account of individuality that Spann offers here is not within the framework of universalism.

Somewhat later, however, we read the opposite: “The individual is indeed merely ability [and not ability realized] [Wirklichkeit]. He has the ability to become various things, ability to achieve a wide range of accomplishments. The influences of the spiritual community will determine which of these abilities will be awakened and realized.” Here the individual is a tabula rasa with the power to become everything that society puts into him. The ego is nothing; it is completely expunged in the social process. Accordingly the words ability and power are no longer used psychologistically, i.e., to mark the content of particular talents or gifts, such as technical or musical talent, but are used as ethical form concepts, which assert no more than the fact that the individual is part of a social process.

It is our view that the ego sphere, included in the dichotomic spiritual ego, which represents the individual as a whole, is the pure form ego, but that the contents of the value ego must be

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 46.
understood to be part of a process. Spann does not decide between the self-contradictory positions we have discussed here. The reason for this obvious contradiction, which is of some import for the technique of structuring theory, can only be guessed. Our basic sociological principle asserts the similarity of the contexts of meaning between individuals. One of Spann’s basic sociological principles says the exact opposite: “The uniqueness (i.e., of the individual) is a result of the community’s essence, which indeed, as a spiritual organism, requires parts, partial organs [Teilorgane], i.e., specialization, differentiation, separation, in order to make a whole out of parts. An organism is not formed of elements of the same kind [homogeneous], but by harmonizing dissimilar [heterogeneous] elements.”52 This assertion must be emphatically denied. Society is neither a spiritual organism nor an organism of any other kind, but a postulate, and all further propositions concerning it may be deduced from its character as a postulate. This construction by analogy is entirely superfluous. As long as it cannot be shown that the factor which accounts for certain similarities between two analogous objects is exactly the same in both, the argument by analogy is not logically compelling. On the other hand, if it is known that it is the same factor in both objects, i.e., one knows the factor, then the argument by analogy is superfluous. Society is not an organism, and it is very dangerous to use the analogy of an organism to construct its details. Presumably Spann’s construction of the “individual’s uniqueness” is motivated by the desire to account for the dissimilar components of the totality, society, which is conceived in analogy to an organism. But such a model is incompatible with universalism. The members of a society are not dissimilar [heterogeneous] but in principle the same [homogeneous]; the differences between them are found in the degree of intensity with which they grasp contexts of meaning.

52. Ibid., 45.
Chapter Two: From Interaction to Spiritual Community

§1. [Preliminary remarks]

We have presented the deduction of our basic concepts and their propositions. We will now supplement this with an account of their origins. Our purpose is to explain and enlarge on the preceding, often rather brief exposition. It is also useful to examine the positions others have taken in order to see how well our own ideas stand up under criticism, for the number of objections to any theory corresponds to the number of different positions on the same subject. Although our propositions will not be proven true if we discover errors and gaps in other systems and are able to remedy them, nevertheless the persuasiveness of our position will be strengthened, and our ideas will become more complete and independent, if we are able to draw a line of demarcation between them and other theories. Drawing boundaries also creates relationships. What previously existed in limbo, open in all directions, with no clear relationship in any direction, will now have the same foundation as other theories. Demarcation lines also reveal points of agreement. They show to what extent our own ideas have grown out of the position of others and thus are partially dependent on them. By working within traditional lines, we hope to motivate and facilitate criticism of our position. Thinking through other attempts to solve the same problems should lead to a deeper understanding of the problems and enable a constant opening up of new approaches to the work that must be continually renewed—which does not mean presenting solutions to problems, but discovering their characteristic essence.

This is the intention of the present critical discussion and the basis for our choice of objects to be criticized within the framework of this investigation. It was not our intention, nor is it basically of any value, to examine the entire literature dealing with our problem. We will examine a few typical ex-
amples of possible theoretical structures and state our position. We are not interested in a theory because this or that scholar is the author; we are interested in the theory itself. Objective interest of this nature is adequately served when the typical characteristics of a theoretical structure are explained with the help of a few examples.

§2. *Georg Simmel, Soziologie*53

Simmel’s point of departure is similar to ours. The goal of sociology—albeit a distant one—is to demonstrate the social determination of phenomena. “The realization that the human being’s nature, and all the forms of its expression, is determined by the fact that he lives in interactive relationship with other human beings, must inevitably lead to a new way of thinking in all the so-called human sciences” (3). The similarity to our basic position is clear. Objects to be researched can be registered and related to a goal and their formal determination can be investigated. By relating these objects to the spirit that created them we generate a new method of investigation and, with this method, constitute a new kind of phenomenon. “If sociology is to be constituted as a special science, the concept of society, as such, aside from the external collection of phenomena, must subject socio-historical data to a new abstraction and coordination. This means recognizing certain peculiarities of the data already observed in other relations should be recognized as belonging together and consequently as constituting the subject matter of a science” (5). The objects of the humanities are legal systems, works of art, languages, philosophical systems, religions, etc. All of these objects must be taken out of the context in which they are constituted as art phenomena, religious phenomena, etc., and placed in a new context in which they appear purely as social phenomena. That appears to me to be the correct interpretation of Simmel’s view, for he himself says: “Sociology . . . in relationship to existing

The term \textit{auxiliary to research} is too modest. It is one thing when a science chooses to make religion itself the object of its investigation, it is quite another when the social determination of religion is the object. The latter study adds nothing to the knowledge of religion as religion, but creates a new object, the \textquotedblleft social phenomenon.\textquotedblright{} In this case we cannot say that the sociological investigation is an auxiliary method to other disciplines, rather the opposite. The investigation of the object in terms of its formal definition, for example as a work of art, only provides the basis for the sociological investigation. In any case, it is an established fact that for Simmel, sociology is a method for attaining knowledge of objects.

Elsewhere he expresses this view of sociology: \textquotedblleft So long as the lines we draw through historical reality in order to divide it into separate areas of research only connect those points where the contents are similar, this reality will leave no room for a special sociology. What is needed is a line that, intersecting the existing ones, detaches the pure fact of sociation, in all its manifold forms, from its connection with all the various contents, and constitutes this fact in its own sphere\textquotedblright{} (9). These thoughts seem consistent with the investigative lines he has mapped out; but in fact they indicate a very serious conceptual change. The new method of sociology was supposed to explain the social aspect of phenomena, but now, suddenly, the focus has shifted to sociation in all its multifarious forms. Here sociology is no longer a methodology with the help of which the social aspect of phenomena can be discovered, but has become the science of the manifold forms of sociation. Sociology has been transformed from a methodology into a science dealing with a particular type of object.

This change has been brought about through the concept of \textquoteright\textquoteright interaction.\textquoteright{} Simmel writes:

Erotic, religious, or merely social impulses, for purposes of attack or defense, play, gain, aid or instruction, and countless other
things, bring human beings into new forms of contact with one another—relationships in which they act, for, with, or against one another under conditions of reciprocity; that is, human beings exercise an influence on these conditions of sociation and are also influenced by them. These interactions signify that the individual bearers of the impulses that occasion interactions, generate a purpose and unity, in other words “a society.” For in the empirical sense, unity is nothing but the interaction of elements. An organic body is a unity because the energies of its organs interact more intimately with one another than they do with any external being. A state is one because of the corresponding interactive relationships between its citizens. We could not call the world one if each of its parts did not somehow influence all the others, if the interaction of the influences, however indirect, were in any way interrupted. There are many different degrees of unity or sociation, depending on the kind of interaction; from the ephemeral combination of people who take a walk together, to the family; from all relationships that are deliberately entered into and can be deliberately terminated, to membership in a state; from the temporary society of hotel guests to the intimate bond of a mediaeval guild. (5)

A basic change of position has taken place here. If sociology is not differentiated from other forms of historical and social study “by its object, but rather by means of its theoretical perspective, especially by its method of abstraction” (10), then sociology becomes the method by which we explore the social essence of cultural phenomena. But if we want to be precise, we must say that sociology as a method is also differentiated from other disciplines by its object. For every method constitutes its own object. “Object” is nothing more than the form in which phenomena appear and are known by the method corresponding to that form, and by no other method. Thus when works of art are the objects of art history because of their aesthetic quality, then, to be precise, it is the aesthetic quality that is the object of art history. The sociological method focuses not on the

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54. This extensive quotation is inserted here because it is the basis for the arguments we find in most of the theories we examine. In particular the phrase “act[ing], for, with, or against one another” is one of the most frequently used by interaction theorists.
aesthetic value of the work of art but on its social essence. The social essence is the object of the sociological method. With the term work of art we can perhaps understand the “real” work of art as it stands before us as a physical object, as an art object in our apartment. The fact that this point remains vague in Simmel makes it easier for him to change the standpoint of his investigation. Simmel always speaks of a method that focuses on the objects of other disciplines. In the process he passes over the fact that the object of sociology remains one that is only accessible to sociology and that the nature of this object must be precisely determined. Instead he changes from focusing on the object to focusing on the cause of both the object and the method: the social relationship between individuals. To put it more precisely, he describes this relationship as human beings “acting for, with, or against one another,” a definition that includes warlike as well as peaceful relations. That was Simmel’s starting point: Individuals interact with one another and the phenomena resulting from interaction bear traces of the individuals’ sociated-being [Vergesellschaftet-Sein]. It is these traces that were to be investigated. Now, instead, the causes of the traces are to be investigated.

It is only through Simmel’s skillful use of words that he succeeds in covering the severe gaps in his chain of reasoning: “Sociology as the theory of the sociality [Gesellschaft-Sein] of humanity, which [humanity] in countless other respects may also be an object of science, is related to the other special sciences as geometry is to the physio-chemical sciences of matter: Geometry universally considers the form through which matter becomes empirical bodies—the form which, of course, exists only in abstraction, exactly like forms of sociation” (12). “Humanity” is the concept through which, by a sleight of hand, the change from considering the cultural phenomena to considering the concept of sociation is made. There are other reasons why it is very doubtful whether humanity is actually the object of scholarly disciplines. Their objects are human beings and their products, but not humanity. This col-
lective concept does not exist until the relationship between human beings is established, namely, only when sociation has already taken place.

The inconsistency of the argument is particularly clear in the relationship between content and form. In the same way as geometry is related to the physio-chemical sciences so, supposedly, is sociology related to the other sciences. The actual content of these sciences is left open; presumably it is humanity. Simmel’s precise definition of the terms *form* and *content* clearly contradicts what he has just said here: “Everything which is now present in individuals—the immediate concrete locations of all historical actuality—in the nature of impulse, interest, purpose, inclination, psychic adaptability, and processes that result in influencing and being influenced by others—all this I call the content or the material, so to speak, of sociation” (6). But impulses, interests, etc., are not the unmediated contents of sociation, but only become sociation through the individuals in which the acts are to be found. “Sociation is the form, actualizing itself in countless various types, in which the individuals, on the basis of sensuous or ideal, momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious interests, causally driven or teleologically led, grow together into a unity, and within which these interests are realized” (6). Here the relationship becomes a mystical one. No longer are the interests the contents of sociation, but the individuals are the substratum which, first under the effect of the forms, is transformed into a unity, into society. Surprisingly it is not even the form of sociation that is empirically at work in the unity, but the interests. This peculiarity is the result of Simmel’s change of standpoint. At this juncture the various investigative lines cross. From the first standpoint, we may assume that the various psychic states remain. Out of these the various cultural

55. The comparison with the relationship between geometry and physics is a frequently recurring element in the theory of interaction. The relationship between physics and physiology is also used. [Kistiakowski employs this comparison.]
products are supposed to develop. The idea that they exist merely as the empty machinery of relationships is not a notion we need take seriously enough to refute. We are supposed to be able to see how the product emerges from society as the formally determined cultural product. The second standpoint involves the unity of individuals. From this point of view the interests, impulses, etc., no longer have any meaning in terms of content. They serve only to make the relationship itself credible, and in Simmel’s construction have the same function as, in our theory, the social quality of the spiritual ego. But if the formal “social” quality were not already an aspect of their existence, none of the elements and psychic states listed by Simmel could ever serve as a substratum for the process in which relationships come into being.

It is not the content of impulses, interests, etc., that is relevant to the relationships or sociation of individuals. In fact the exact opposite is true: Sociation enables cultural phenomena to be produced from content that is already socially determined. Simmel, who does not focus on the contents of the contexts of meaning, must therefore confine the concept of sociation to the purely formal realm. This self-imposed constraint finds expression in the change of meaning that the concept of the social phenomena undergoes. Simmel says: “In any given social situation, content and societary form constitute a unified reality. A social form cannot exist detached from all content, any more than a spatial form can exist without the material of which it is the form. The truly inseparable elements of every social entity and occurrence are an interest, purpose, motive, and a form or manner of interaction between individuals through which that content attains social reality” [6]. It would have been useful if Simmel had not been so sparing with examples in this passage so that we could see just what his idea of a social phenomenon is. His ambiguous argumentation conceals the possibility of the thoughts being developed in a number of different directions. Sociology will increasingly become less of a method and more of a science of the forms of sociation.
The obscure terminology masking this transition is found in a definition of sociology: “The subject of social science . . . is the forces, relationships, and forms through which human beings arrange themselves in sociation and thus constitute ‘society’ sensu strictissimo” [10]. “Forces” cannot be anything other than what was earlier called the contents of the social phenomena: “sensuous or ideal, momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious, causally driven or teleologically led” [6]. Thus content and form are objects of sociology in the same way.

Another remark of Simmel’s further complicates the matter: “On the whole, sociology has virtually confined itself to those social phenomena where the interacting forces are formed, at least into conceptual unities, by crystallization of their immediate bearers. States and labor unions, priesthhoods and types of families, economic and military organizations, guilds and parishes, class stratification and the division of labor, these and similar major organs and systems seem to constitute society and to fill out the scope of the science of society. It is obvious that the greater, the more significant, and the more dominant a range of social interest and action is, the more readily such raising of the immediate inter-individual living and working to the character of an objective structure, to an abstract existence over and above the various primary processes, will take place” [18].

Thus not only contents and forms, but also social phenomena themselves, are the object of sociology. Such a broad foundation now permits a wide range of types of investigation, and is what Simmel embarks on. All of them can be classified as “sociology.” But it is questionable whether a field of study that is so broadly conceived really has any value, and the manner of Simmel’s concrete explications fully confirm this doubt. The passage just quoted contains a further obscurity. Objects that in other passages were called forms—states, forms of the family, and economic orders—are called social phenomena here.

The reason for this further complication lies in the many facets of Simmel's concept of interaction. Interaction is the
correlation between the psychic states of individuals, that is, they effect each other reciprocally. However, the double chain of effects between individuals is only conducive to creating unity among them to a limited extent. In our analysis of spiritual community we established that spiritual relationships between individuals can, so to speak, take place blindly, i.e., the receiving individual can be immune to the spiritual gift that the giving individual is trying to impart. We could say there must be a formal disposition present on the part of the receiving individual to open himself to spiritual effects directed toward him. Simmel’s assertion, that because of the close connection of interactions between members of the same society a unity is created that cannot be found between individuals belonging to two different societies, is incorrect. The close connection of interactive relationships does not create social unity. In fact the example Simmel offers in support of this assertion clearly reveals his error. He writes that an organic body is unified “because its organs are related to one another in such a way that their energies interact more closely with one another than they do with any entity outside [the organism]” (5). The accidental plays an essential role in Simmel’s notion of organic unity. He offers no reason why the organs, which together make up a body, actually should constitute a body. Simmel’s concept allows the possibility of a body integrating an object of the external world into its intimate network of interactions, “organ-izing” it. This notion is purely mechanical.

Modern biology views the matter quite differently:

The essence of a framework consists in its being made of parts fitted together; and when one tears it asunder, it is a framework no longer. If there is an invisible framework present in the germ, then, when the germ is cut up, the framework must be cut up with it. Now, a halved germ, if it develops further, yields, not two half-animals, but two animals of half the normal size. This fundamental experiment of Driesch’s has been performed with all possible variations, with every possible precaution, and on all suitable species of animals.
While an anatomical framework must be destroyed by an anatomical interference, since it is expanded in space, a rule, which in its very nature is non-spatial, cannot be severed by the knife. Either the possibility of embodiment is taken from it by destruction of the material, or, if that does not happen, still it must come to expression even with reduced material.\[56\]

Thus the germ of an organism is not a spatial structure, so that its development would involve merely an unfolding and enlargement of what is already present. Instead, what is given is the germ plasma [\textit{Keimsubstanz}], on which, attempts at dissection have shown, the subsequent structure of the organism does not depend. Further, what is given is the nonspatial, ideal generative-rule [\textit{Erzeugungsregel}], as it were, the organism’s synthetic principle. From the standpoint of this knowledge we must reject Simmel’s argument. The organism is not a unity because its component parts interact closely with one another, nor is it so superficially and accidentally unified that indeed even things in the external world could be integrated into it. Rather the parts of an organism constitute a unity because they are connected by a rule that acts in accordance with a law. When we accept the universal principle of a rule, the structural unity is no longer accidental and it cannot be arbitrarily extended.

Applying the above to society, we can say that the capacity to be open to interactive relationships is the prerequisite for social unity. But the mere interactive relationship does not produce this unity by itself; it must also be filled with the content we called substance, value, or meaning.

The importance of our assumption will become obvious when we examine more closely the way Simmel attempts to construct the relationship between psychology and sociology. Simmel believes he must concede that at every point sociology must be able to deal with and apply psychological laws. He says:

\[56. \text{von Üxküll, Theoretische Biologie, 133 [Theoretical Biology, 181].}\]
Moreover there is no doubt that whatever of historico-social existence is within our means of comprehension, it is nothing else than psychic concatenations that we reconstruct with either instinctive or methodological psychology and bring to subjective plausibility, to a feeling of the psychic necessity of the developments in question. To that extent every history, every depicting of a social condition, is an exercise in psychological cognition. But it is a matter of strict methodological necessity, and decisive for the principles of the psychic sciences in general, to understand that the scientific treatment of psychic facts by no means needs to be psychology. Even where we continually employ psychological rules and perceptions, where the explanation of each separate fact is possible only in the psychological way, as is the case in sociology, the sense and intention of this procedure by no means needs to lead to psychology, i.e., not to the law of the psychic process, a process which alone, to be sure, can carry a definite content; but the procedure leads only to this content and its configuration. ([21–22])

It is extremely doubtful whether the psychic concatenations, which are not described in any detail, are anything that could be grasped by any other science besides sociology. Laws governing psychic processes, to the extent that we can speak of them at all, are established by experimental psychology with reference to the course of psychic events within the individual. Their particular nature can perhaps best be expressed if we eschew the misleading terminology psychological and instead call them laws of the process of consciousness. They are laws governing the way in which the contents of consciousness are connected. The modes of connection are determined by the physical nature of the particular individual. The moment we focus on the contents of psychic processes experimental psychology can no longer help us. Simmel assumes that sociology concerns itself with the contents of psychic processes. Let us adopt this interpretation—even if it contradicts the earlier one, that the forms are the object of sociology. And let us assume that the connecting laws are psychological and have nothing to do with the psychic content. Even then Simmel’s view is self-contradictory and incomprehensible. For it is not true that
“historico-social existence is [. . .] nothing else than psychic concatenations that we reconstruct with either instinctive or methodological psychology and bring to subjective plausibility” (21). It is highly unlikely that this means that one should imitate and make plausible to oneself the Weberian and related laws. Apart from these laws, however, we have nothing but contents, so that the notion that sociology has its foundation in psychological knowledge must be seen as incorrect. If psychic contents and their configurations are held to be the essential goal of sociological investigations, then it logically follows that psychology can provide no knowledge of socio-historical phenomena at all.

The investigation of the relationship between sociology and psychology once again leads us to the problem of contents. Simmel’s treatment of the problem proceeds as follows: Contents are the interests and the forces found in the individual that take shape [Gestalt] in the forms. The point where content and form meet is the social phenomenon. The transition from form to content takes place in such concepts as the “family.” Sometimes it appears as a form of sociation and sometimes as a social phenomenon, which of course includes content. In both instances it is the object of sociology. The state is treated in the same manner. However, here we can observe an additional process.

It develops from being a form of socialization to become the content itself, a social phenomenon determined by individuals. It then develops further to become a supra-individual structure: “The will of the state, the community, the church . . . , and the group united by a purpose [Zweckverband], exists beyond any opposition between the individual wills it encompasses; in the same way the will’s existence transcends the change of the actual members over time” (191). This new entity

57. At this point it is important to note that the problem of content [Inhaltsproblem] is the key problem of sociology. It is identical to the problem of value. With the single exception of Spann’s theory, sociologists have failed to solve it, thereby manifesting the failure of their theories in general.
[Wesenheit] and object of sociology, beyond form and content, Simmel again calls content (22), and even spiritual content (558). As we have indicated, this new structure is occasioned by the psychological problem, made more complicated by the introduction of the “socio-psychological” aspect. As a spiritual phenomenon, the supra-individual structure, for example the state, is also supposed to be carried by a supra-individual psyche. This is the usual argument of Völkerpsychologie, which therefore constructs a “spirit of the people” [Volksgeist].

We eliminate the mysticism that would place psychic events, which by their nature are individual, outside the soul by differentiating and separating the concrete spiritual acts that produce the framework for justice, mores, language and culture, religion and the forms of life, from the ideal content of these acts that we then consider in their own right. Vocabulary and the combinatorial forms of language, which we find in dictionaries and grammars, legal norms, which we find in law books, and the dogmatic content of religion can be said to have their own inner dignity, independent of their concrete application by individuals. But the validity of their content does not depend on a psychic experience, which would require an empirical agent, . . . any more than the validity of the Pythagorean proof does. (557–58)

When we separate cultural structures from the processes in which they are realized by individuals, they do not thereby become the products of another subject, the social soul. “Instead a third element comes into play, the objective spiritual content, which is no longer something psychological, no more than the logical meaning of a judgment is something psychological, despite the fact that it can only attain reality in consciousness by means, and within, the psyche’s dynamic [processes]” (559).

Here Simmel takes the “social” [das Gesellschaftliche]—the term is intentionally chosen for its lack of precision—out of the sphere of the forms of relationship between individuals and places it in the sphere of supra-individual spiritual reality. Although it is not explicitly addressed, this new approach implicitly includes what was previously omitted, the synthetic
principle of society's unity. In general Simmel does not speak of this principle, but he assumes that the state is a supra-individual structure, and in introducing the comparison with the axiom of Pythagoras he expresses the need for a form of validation [Geltungsform] that lends reality to social phenomena, but only at a point beyond the interactive relationship. In certain passages he tries to demonstrate the independent existence of such a validating form.

Similarly the data of sociology are psychic occurrences whose immediate actuality presents itself to the psychological categories first. The latter, however, though indispensable for a description of the facts, remain outside the purpose of sociological investigation. This is concerned rather with the phenomena of sociation, which, to be sure, are borne by the psychic occurrences and are often to be described only by means of them—somewhat as a drama, which contains, from beginning to end, only psychic events and can be understood only psychologically, but has as its purpose not psychological knowledge but the syntheses that constitute the contents of the psychic occurrences, seen in terms of tragedy, or artistic form, or symbols of life. (24)

We must be grateful that, like Simmel, all sociologists who deal with this problem try to clarify what they mean by using analogies with encompassing syntheses found in other areas. Kistiakowski and Durkheim use the same analogies. But outside the synthesis the analogies are inappropriate, because the phenomena are not the same phenomena outside the synthesis as they are within it. If we examine a painting in terms of its physical structure, we are investigating, not the work of art, but natural phenomena; and such an investigation of the natural aspects of the painting, however carefully made, does not increase our knowledge of it as a work of art. For the same reason Simmel's conclusion must be rejected. To the extent that psychic phenomena are observed in other syntheses, as psychological phenomena or phenomena of everyday life, they are not dramatic. It is an error to believe that through “the study of character” or “individual psychology” or “psychoanalysis” or by any other contrived means we can better under-
stand a drama. We must be logically consistent and recognize the particular sociological synthesis that we have referred to as a context of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang], or value, or substance, or postulate. We must cease to expect that some other synthetic form, taken from outside sociology, can enrich, or provide a foundation for, the specifically sociological investigation.

For Simmel there are psychic phenomena and, beyond these, sociological phenomena. A very similar argument is found in Rickert, where its untenableness is more obvious, however. For Simmel this dualism has the consequence that, despite all sociology, a last vestige of an individual standpoint remains. The individual,

whose being is centered in himself, is to become a member of a whole, the center of which lies outside the individual. The problem here is not one of harmonizing two claims made on the human being, or of a collision between such claims, but the fact that the human being is essentially subject to two norms, which are in conflict with one another. The focus on one’s own center, which is something quite different from egoism, is definitive and lays claim to occupying the main sphere of meaning in the individual; the focus on the social center makes the same demand. (196)

Simmel expresses this view more precisely when he says: “In practice this dualism can often be harmonized, but in principle it remains a tragic irreconcilable dualism between the individual’s own life and the life of the social whole” (196). Thus Simmel’s last word on the matter is that the relationship between the individual and society is inexplicable. Each represents a principle that exists in and for itself, and there is no region in which they might be harmonized and joined together. It hardly needs to be emphasized that this admission fails to demonstrate constructively the relationship between the individual and society that so obviously exists, and thus adds nothing to the solution of our problem.
§3. [Theodor] Kistiakowski [Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen]

The structure of Kistiakowski’s sociology is very similar to Simmel’s. In his attempt to solve problems, we find the same technical devices [Kunstgriffe] that Simmel uses, and sometimes the examples are taken verbatim. Nevertheless, an examination of Kistiakowski’s thought is instructive. The structural inconsistencies of Simmel, the sensitive philosopher, are often hidden by his fine sense of intellectual tact. In Kistiakowski they come into full view; we could almost say they are put vulgarly on display. The arguments have little of the magic of Simmel’s dialectic and, soberly stated, the chain of conclusions reveals their weaknesses.

Like Simmel, Kistiakowski begins by describing the world as divided into distinct parts. Corporeality is investigated by a wide variety of sciences. Sociology examines those aspects of social processes that transcend mere corporeality. “The fact that society contains nothing corporeal that has not already been examined from many sides by such various sciences as physics, chemistry, or physiology in no way affects society’s quality of having its own particular essence. Social processes and events contain something more that must be investigated for its own sake, and that is reason enough to create a body of social science” (43). Before conducting its research, modern psychology does not bother to ask whether the soul differs from the body. Ignoring such problems, it investigates psychic phenomena and is not concerned about the chemical or physical structure of the body in which the psychic object is founded. “In the same way social phenomena present themselves to us as having their own particular reality; they exist in a region that must be investigated independently of the corporeal phenomena studied by natural science in the narrower sense of that term, such as physiology or biology. The organic school

58. Theodor Kistiakowski, Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen.
makes the mistake of combining these two sides of society and calling them one and the same thing, instead of, for the purpose of investigating society, separating them and analyzing them individually” (48).

This last remark shows that we are dealing here with a typical instance of the “theory of two sides.” Kistiakowski’s thoughts can perhaps be made a little more precise. A thing—in this case, society—exists in space. The researcher walks around it and looks at it from various sides and describes what he sees. From an epistemological standpoint a number of objections can be raised against such an approach. The intimate reciprocal relationship between the object and the method of cognition makes it impossible for us to speak of various sides of one and the same object. The object is constituted in the process of cognition and individualized by the process’s categories. Each process produces but one object. Expressed another way: Each object corresponds to just one method, since method itself is nothing but the object symbolized in the process of cognition. There is therefore no such entity that, as a “thing,” can be observed from two sides. If the “more” that society involves is the object of social science, this “more” is society itself. The corporeal foundation, which is supposedly the other side, is not the other side of society at all, but is separated from it entirely and is the independent object of such sciences as biology, anatomy, etc.

Kistiakowski thus defines the object of sociology as that which transcends corporeality. This transcending entity, which we could perhaps understand to be the psychic aspect, he defines more closely:

If however neither physical nor physiological laws . . . can grasp the realities of social life, it is equally false to assert that only the laws of individual psychology are operative in society.

The fact that, of necessity, all socio-psychic phenomena must be traced back to processes in the individual’s consciousness—since society has no substance other than the individual human being—is of no importance here. Society, in the sense of psychic
interaction, calls forth completely different psychic states in the consciousness of individuals. The total sum of such states constitutes a specific area of social functions that must be investigated in its own right. [49]

Social functions are also psychic states of affairs. In order to explain how they differ from the normal psychic phenomena of individuals, Kistiakowski uses the same metaphor Simmel does. “They are new and composite phenomena built on the basis of individual psychological foundations, in the same way as physiological phenomena are based on physical and chemical processes” [50]. In the last instance nothing remains but the hapless “more,” for social phenomena are “composed” of psychic phenomena. But how things that are composed of others differ from their components is completely unclear, unless the term new thing merely refers to the specific way in which the new things have been assembled. But in that case we have essentially gone beyond the sphere of the things into the sphere of their connections. And this region has nothing to do with the contents of the things. It is itself a whole, the genus of that which binds and not the genus of the parts that are bound together. Simmel and Kistiakowski’s simile reveals clearly that we have correctly interpreted the matter. Physiological processes are assumed to be founded in physical and chemical phenomena. This notion is responsible for the distorted idea that physiological processes are really the result of physical or chemical ones. It would be more to the point to say that the latter phenomena are determined by a specific type of bond, namely, the physiological one. But we do not want to make the opposite mistake. The connection of two objects—logically speaking, an object is that which can be the subject of potentially true predicates—in a relationship of whole to part is purely logical. Thus, to speak here of a chain of cause and effect, whether from parts to a whole or from a whole to its parts, is meaningless. If, however, physical and chemical processes, on the one hand, and physiological processes, on the other, stand in a relationship of whole to part, then of course it
goes without saying that a science can investigate the whole or the parts. But it cannot investigate an object that does not exist, whose “sides” are supposed to be the whole and the parts. One might hold this objection to be mere superfluous pedantry; for, one might ask, what harm can it do to speak of the sides of an object? Isn’t that just a mere logical error irrelevant for the results of our investigation? Unfortunately, this view of the matter is incorrect. From the object, which does not exist, and its nonexistent sides, of which we nevertheless speak, we all too quickly start to look for the object’s substance. Historically this has led to choosing the more “tangible” side, which is then substituted for the object. This is what happened in the case we have just examined. What we experience at first hand are the psychic phenomena. The bond that connects these phenomena (which we will see is a transcendental one) is not directly experienced. As a result such terms as the hapless more and the comparison with physiology are introduced. Physiological phenomena, though they exist in a part-to-whole relationship with chemical and physical phenomena, are apparently easier to grasp than the transcendental bond. In our discussion of Stephinger below, we will see how the “theory of two sides,” with its substitution of consciousness for the object that is seen as having two sides, forms the basis for the leading doctrine of modern sociology concerning conscious and unconscious societies or, as Tönnies differentiates them, between community [Gemeinschaft] and society [Gesellschaft]. This substitution and these reifications are by no means harmless. Because the course sociological thought took as a result has in fact blocked fruitful development, it is necessary to treat this issue in all its details with the utmost possible precision.

Kistiakowski’s reasoning concerning the difference between the psychic and the social is very interesting. “If we distinguish the human being from the rest of nature in respect to his being a conscious being, we must also see in the effects that another conscious being has on him a new and essentially different element at work than that which we find in all the
other impressions he receives” (50 f.). A “principle conceptual gap” is thus opened between individual psychic and social psychic phenomena. Both forms of phenomena are psychic, but they differ from one another by virtue of the fact that one derives from natural impressions and the other from human impressions. As we already indicated, despite the supposed principle gap, the difference is rather one of degree, because of the greater complexity of social psychic phenomena. The whole [Ganzheit], the element that binds over and above the individual psychic phenomena, has been found, but it does not completely suit the purpose. A third element is introduced: the conscious bond. This is the first real bond in the strict sense of a norm, and above all it is the legal norm [which the author has in mind]. 59

“The consciously regulated coming together of individuals, from the first vestiges of its appearance to the last clear formulation of all relationship norms [Beziehungsnormen], does not constitute the whole of social reality. The totality of human beings belongs to it as well, in whom a complicated social psychic process takes place in which purposeful activity first emerges” (71). In a manner very similar to the one in which the individual psychic process was made more complex and designated as the foundation of the social psychic process, the normative bond is produced out of the complex social psychic process. Above we underlined the inadequacy of reinterpreting a logical connection into a causal one, or indeed of narrating it as “history.”

The social psychic process is the region of interactions. They are not psychological in the sense of individual psychology, but nevertheless the object of a causal science. This new area lodged between psychology and normative disciplines is the proper field of sociology.

59. The relationship of society to the state and to the law in particular will not be investigated here, as this relationship has been dealt with in depth by Kelsen in Der Soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff, 106 ff.
On the other hand, as far as the social processes are concerned, the investigations up to this point have confined themselves to the analysis of rules and norms and their external genesis. This completely satisfied the interests of legal science. But in order to gain a broader knowledge of other social phenomena, the psychic interactions between human beings still have to be investigated. This is a separate area of knowledge not to be confused with the legal science investigation. The process of social psychic interaction is causally determined and has nothing to do with the external genesis of social forms that constitute a teleological series. By creating a conceptual unity out of the homogeneous psychic interaction phenomena we obtain another term, the social concept of community \[\text{Gemeinschaft}\].\(^71\)

Here we have the distinction that Tönnies drew between community \[\text{Gemeinschaft}\] and society \[\text{Gesellschaft}\]. What Tönnies called essential will \[\text{Wesenswille}\] and rational will \[\text{Kürwille}\] appears in Kistiakowski in the contrast between social psychic processes, which are assumed to be unconscious, and the conscious setting of goals \[\text{bewußter Zwecksetzung}\], the teleological series as opposed to the causal determined process. Above we pointed out that the contrast between these two modes is rooted in an extremely unclear notion concerning the purely logical meaning of whole-part relationships \[\text{Ganzheit-Teilverhältnisse}\]. We will show below how, as a matter of fact, the concepts Kistiakowski has distinguished from one another seem to have an irresistible tendency to flow back together. It is our view that this tendency has its roots in Kistiakowski’s poor methodological basis.\(^60\)

We will begin with the definition of society: “Society, as such, is a totality of human beings without reference to rules and norms, who, however, through a social psychic process have been brought into a unity” \[\text{72}\]. This definition is not very felicitously worded. On close examination it says that society is a bond without a binding element \[\text{bindungslose}\]

\(^{60}\). We will pass over Kistiakowski’s confusing of the social and the legal and refer the reader to Kelsen, \textit{Der Soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff}.  

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For unity through a social psychic process is also a bond, and as such it is by no means clear how it is supposed to stand in opposition to the bond produced by rules and norms. The situation becomes more suspect when the categories are increased.

This community [Gemeinschaft] includes all those who are united by a common language, who had the same education and upbringing in the same schools aided by a common literature, and who are united by common traditions and historical memory. Since the nature of this unity is purely ideal, indeed the most ideal imaginable between human beings, it cannot be of a psychic nature. It does not exist in the form of direct contact and a connection between people, but only in the consciousness of holding spiritual goods in common. Of course these can be variously reflected in the consciousness of each individual. [81 f.]

This turning of the “ideal” into a superlative is one of the most amusing passages in the whole of sociological literature. The basis for it is perhaps to be found in the slight confusion between the middle-class notion that something is “ideal” and the philosophical use of the term. Here the connection is “ideal” because it is determined by history, literature, etc., and these are very fine things over which people wax poetic. These things are obviously more “ideal” than economic connections. This is probably the basis of Kistiakowski’s use of the word, and it is much to be regretted that it has been smuggled into the region of such categories as idea or norm to express the principle of social unity. But we cannot view the appearance of this term as a mere accident. It is symptomatic of the confusion of concepts we find in Kistiakowski’s sociology. Equally characteristic is the way his concepts drift into the sphere of psychology. The most ideal connection is to be found in consciousness and, as he writes, “in the consciousness of holding spiritual goods in common.” This rhetoric is indeed uplifting and designed to stir our emotions. It also shows the

61. Underline by me [i.e., by Voegelin].
extent to which scholarly thought can be expressed in hackneyed phrases. It has very unpleasant consequences, however, for this highest ideal bond. If these things are only found in consciousness, and nowhere else, it does not look very good for them. For it follows that when human beings do not think about them, whether because they have other things to do or because they happen to be asleep, or because, aside from differences in educational levels, they are incapable of thinking about them—small children would be in this category—it is very likely that, in the majority of cases, the human beings will not be connected to one another. With the substitution of the term *psychic interaction* for *social psychic* interaction, the turn to psychology takes on concrete form.62

Immediately following this passage, however, he returns to social psychic processes when he defines the “sphere and content of the generic concept of ‘society’” in the following manner: “Its sphere includes all social structures or all social organizations created by external norms and rules. On the other hand, its contents are the human beings themselves and the interactions between them, or the causally determined social psychic processes which take place within this framework” (Kistiakowski, *Gesellschaft*, 84).

Just as Kistiakowski swings to the psychological side and then thinks about it again and swings back to the social psychic processes, so he also rises now and again to the normative. We objected to Kistiakowski’s statement that the unity of society exists only when all of its members are conscious of its unity. This objection cannot be avoided if, by *consciousness*, we are to understand *psychological consciousness*. For anything that is not present in this consciousness is not present at all, insofar as by “anything” a consciousness or experience of unity is *meant*. Kistiakowski, however, objects energetically to this view: “It would be false to conceive of social influence

62. “Our assumption is confirmed, that all social structures may be subsumed under the concept of society [Gesellschaft] as a connection of human beings joined by psychic interaction” (Kistiakowski, *Gesellschaft*, 84).
as only taking place in the individual sporadically, or to define it as a cause- and-effect relationship” (132). This last statement comes as something of a surprise. Up until now Kistiakowski has maintained that although social psychic processes arise on the basis of individual psychic ones, they nevertheless constitute a completely “different” [“heterogen”] type of connection. They have still been presented, however, as processes governed by the law of cause and effect, and having nothing in common with the normative sphere. He has said explicitly: “This process of social psychic interaction is causally determined and has nothing to do with the external generation of social forms which constitute a teleological series” (71). Thus the sociological theory of interaction tells us nothing about the form of any kind of social process, but only about the process’s content. We may add parenthetically that this comes as quite a surprise in view of the fact that Kistiakowski takes Simmel as his example and looks on him as his master, for it is Simmel’s view that formal sociology is built on interactions.

With these possible variations in the concept of interaction, encompassing the opposite poles of form and content, the concept’s uselessness becomes obvious: a uselessness rooted in the lack of methodological clarity in the concept’s foundation. Now, however, Kistiakowski maintains the exact opposite of what he has previously said: It is no longer the causal, content-filled, social-psychic process that is important but, even if he does not put it into words, the form—for this is the only alternative. First he again underlines the notion that society is nothing more than “the processes that take place between individuals and in individuals, or the social-psychic interactions” (128). He goes on, however, to say: “A causal relationship between society and the individual must be ruled out because, in that case, cause and effect would be completely identical. For the term society can only mean the same individuals who are supposed to experience society’s influence” (132). After this very pertinent and insightful remark we expect a new relationship between the individual and society. For the community
is obviously something quite different from the individuals, and is in fact the order in which the individuals find themselves. The task, of course, is to understand the relationship of that which has been brought into an order to the ideal unity of that order, a relationship formed by the ordering principle. But then we are surprised to read: “Thus the term interaction refers to the real connection between individuals, and the term society is more correctly used to designate a causal connection or the relationship of dependence on a cause.” But this is precisely what was said earlier of interaction, that it was “an effect brought about by a cause” (71). Of course now that Kistiakowski treats society as something that affects its members at all times so that they are never free of its influence, he no longer has any need for the concept of interaction as a term designating a cause-and-effect relationship. “This continuous influence of the collective essence [Kollektivwesen] on its components naturally changes and modifies their nature. The collective essence thus no longer seems to emerge from individual parts that were originally isolated. Instead the collective essence is composed of things that constantly change and in a sense are continually becoming different things” (131). With this thought Kistiakowski has swung over to the other pole of his theory. Society has nothing to do with individuals but rather with elements of an order [Ordnung]. Kistiakowski ends this train of thought with a sentence with which, aside from the questionable logic of its wording, we can agree: “This change in the nature of a previously isolated thing when it is brought into a collective essence is an essential and indeed typical characteristic of every collective essence” (132). That is the outstanding feature of any order of elements: that each element finds its place by virtue of its [logical] relationship to the principle governing the arrangement.

These passages are sufficient to characterize the type of sociology in which Kistiakowski is engaged. Compared to Simmel the problematic is essentially the same. But here, where psychological causal elements are mixed with normative ones
in the concept of interaction, the methodological syncretism is more obvious. The “sociophysical process” is a reification [Substanzialisierung] and mythologizing of the social order’s repetition of individuals’ experiences [Wiedererlebnisse]. In this respect we are dealing, not with a two-sided theory, but with a three-sided one. It appears once in the consciousness of individuals, again in the social psychic process, and at last in the normative concept of the collective essence. We can sum up the essential elements of our criticism as follows: The problem of society becomes the problem of a valid order and ultimately merges with the problems of transcendental logic, where our own analysis of the problem of spiritual community [Gezweiung] has already led us.

§4. Cologne Quarterly Journal of Social Sciences
(Journal of the Research Institute for Social Sciences, Cologne)

The Cologne Quarterly devotes particular attention to the “theory of relations” ["Beziehungslehre"]. Its intention is to continue the formal investigation begun by Simmel, develop the concepts, and make them more precise. The forms of association to be studied are “perhaps not the only problems that concern sociology in the long term, but they, along with a few others, are currently the most essential and promise to be the most fruitful for an investigation” (I, 48).63 This sentence may be taken as the declaration of the journal’s intention. Other sociological directions are tolerated with patient friendliness: “As far as we who are committed to ‘formal sociology’ are concerned, those who are interested in other types of sociology, as many of our predecessors were, will not be denounced as useless drones ["unnützer Kostgänger"] in the garden of science” [I, 48].

63. Leopold von Wiese, “Concerning the Method of the Theory of Relations,” Kölner Viertelsjahrshefte für Sozialwissenschaften, no. 1 [quoted as “I”].
The journal’s members do not completely agree on the nature of the theory of relations. We will, as far as possible in view of the short papers we have before us, take a critical look at the representatives of the theory of relations.64

a) Leopold von Wiese

Von Wiese’s starting point “is the formal principle in the sense in which Simmel uses the term” [I, 48]. In our critical examination of Simmel’s sociology above, the very disturbing ambiguity of this form principle was plain for all to see. Von Wiese concedes the ambiguity and lack of clarity in Simmel’s argumentation and replaces the unclear concept of form with the concept of relation. But he takes the same path to this concept as Simmel took to arrive at the concept of form. The basic principle is that the form of sociation can, in every region of life, be abstracted from the content of each concrete task of sociation. We must see if von Wiese is more successful in making this abstraction than Simmel.

To define relation more closely, von Wiese writes: “The general nature of our task is described as clearly as it can be, when we emphasize that from the purposes and contents of social life we will be abstracting only the types and essences of the interactive relationships involved” [I, 48 f.]. “Relation” is used synonymously with “interactive relation,” and this reminds us of Simmel’s concept of interaction. Von Wiese’s further remarks show that this similarity is not accidental but is based on the fact that the concepts’ meanings are related. In a relation “two or more quantities can be connected with one another in such a manner that, while each remains an independent quantity, nevertheless a partial agreement and certain shared details emerge” [I, 49]. The attempt here to word the definition precisely, which is reminiscent of mathematical definitions, is to be applauded. Von Wiese, however, is regrettably less

64. von Wiese, “The Psychic Aspect of Social Relation,” Kölner Vierteljahrshefte, ser. A, vol. 1, no. 3 [Cologne, 1921] [quoted as “II”].
precise in the second part of his definition. The meaning of the definition can be explained as follows: First we have two quantities independent of one another, then these quantities connect with one other but somehow remain as independent as they were before. It must be conceded that this is a somewhat “mystical” process. Nor is it clear how two quantities can be both connected and independent at the same time. Only the description of the connection sheds some light on the matter. The two quantities are recognized as being connected to the extent that they demonstrate a “partial agreement in sharing particular details.” We can create a concept that includes the identical characteristics of both quantities, and these quantities can then be viewed as individual representations of the concept. Of course the quantities are individual and as such independent. The bond that joins them constitutes their subsumption under one concept. Quantities that exist in relationship to one another are specimens of a genus. We would like to note—in contrast to later deviations in von Wiese’s exposition—that the connection of these quantities is only revealed in states of these quantities.

In the special case of sociology the quantities that enter into a relationship with one another are “human beings or collective human structures that affect one another either psychically or physically” (I, 49). We can accept this if, in what follows, it is rigorously maintained that relationships exist between human beings if they conduct themselves in a like manner and that this similar conduct can be defined in a concept. But we could also maintain that such a logical meeting of separate quantities within the generic concept is not really a connection at all. The following exposition is well within the framework of our quoted definition: “Our task is now to describe, analyze, arrange into groups, measure, and systematize social relationships” (I, 49). The task is confined to the realm of experience and is of a purely empirical nature. “The theory of relations belongs to the theory of being, not the theory of value” (I, 50). “The phenomenological nature of the theory is
In the course of the exposition, however, this standpoint is dropped. In reply to Spann’s objections that by starting with the analysis of psychic states such as “sympathy,” “suggestion,” or “resentment,” “it will never be possible to arrive at such institutions as the ‘state,’ the ‘economy’ or ‘sociability,’” von Wiese argues that “the essence of social institutions [such as class, state, church, family, etc.] can only be explained by an analysis of the sociation processes” (I, 52).

Thus the task of measuring, analyzing, and grouping social relationships is extended to provide an explanation of social institutions. Von Wiese says, half contemptuously, “If one is unwilling to penetrate to these phenomena, one restricts oneself to the rapidly completed task of generalizing and grouping phenomena, i.e., either into historical types or, as we have already pointed out, into normative and ethical types, which is not a sociological procedure” (I, 52). This sentence is the logical consequence of the irreparable weakness inherent in the concept of interaction that also led Simmel to change his position. Indeed the theory of relations does not confine itself to the classification of psychic states—for which sociology is not necessary. Human relationships are something more than that. They take place between individuals and are also supra-individual. As Spann maintains in his argument against those who would confine sociology to the analysis of psychic phenomena, human relationships are by their very nature normative and ethical, something von Wiese refuses to accept.

The untenable situation in which the theory of relations finds itself is revealed by the manner in which von Wiese tries to effect a change of standpoint: “The theory of relations is not properly [eigentlich] concerned with states of the soul, but with actions that produce more or less perceptible changes in

It should be noted here that the proponents of the theory of relations have very curious notions regarding phenomenology. We will look at this more closely later on when we discuss Vierkandt.

the association of living beings (humans)” [II, 69]. Apparently at an earlier date the theory did deal with states of the soul, but improperly [uneigentlich]. In any case now, and it is quite a surprise to learn this, the theory no longer has anything to do with relationships of the earlier type, but only deals with actions. Of course it must be noted that these actions are such that produce perceptible changes in the association of living beings (humans). The theory of relations is concerned with actions that have this characteristic. It acknowledges action to the extent that it is related to groups and group change.

But what are actions and groups? Von Wiese’s explanations are most curious. “An action, as such, is an externally perceptible event and thus dependent on space, time, and the laws of physics and inorganic and organic matter. It can always be viewed as something that is not psychic and be explained in terms of non-psychic perspectives. If we are to understand social life, we should be mindful of its non-psychic side” [II, 69]. Sociology looks like it has suddenly turned into a mathematical natural science. But the passage is not to be taken too seriously, for he continues: “If our goal is to understand the human being, it can of course be asked whether this type of perspective is of much use to us. In the end, what we mean by understanding the human being is primarily his feelings, thoughts, will, and intentions, and hence his actions” [II, 69]. Let us ignore the issue of whether the task of sociology is really to understand human actions and not rather to understand social life, or society, or however we wish to define that “something” the negative criterium of which is that it can be anything but individual human psychic states. More remarkable are von Wiese’s notions of the concept of “understanding.” According to von Wiese we understand the actions of a human being if we understand his feelings, thoughts, will, and intentions. In general it may be said that “understanding” is only relative. Understanding means finding the rule that explains the generation of a given phenomenon. It means that for any state of affairs we find a reason that accounts for it. If
by action we understand the “physical” act itself, when, for example, a human being stamps his foot in anger, then the muscle contractions, etc., are explained if I can attribute them to a psychic state. If we try to look for some direction in von Wiese’s exposition, which meanders along, shifting from one side to the other, it seems to be that, within the context of the theory of relations, he holds physical action to be of no importance. But in that case the psychic actions consist of no more than thoughts, feelings, intention, and will. When these psychic acts and states have been described, the action itself has been “described.” But this type of description does not explain action, or make it understandable. Action can only be understood in terms of the earlier criterion for action: its effect on the process in which living beings are formed into groups.

In order to understand what the relationship of action to the group is, we must recall von Wiese’s notion of the group. Von Wiese “divides the theory of relations into two parts: A. The doctrine of the relations of the first order, such as are found between individuals and between individuals and social structures. B. The doctrine of the social structures, insofar as they are the result of relationships, and of the relationships between institutions themselves” [II, 69]. Thus structures [and institutions] are the result of relationships. The parallel to the shift in Simmel’s conceptual framework is obvious and, with their common basis, quite understandable. Simmel comes to a very similar conclusion in his discussion of the crystallization and objectification of interactions [Soziologie, 18]. Von Wiese follows Simmel so closely that he even adopts the latter’s metaphor. He writes that the analysis of the relationships prepares the way for “the understanding of institutions [the frozen substances to which the relations lead]” [II, 71]. “For these institutions are nothing more than the abstract objectifications of the innumerable effects of human beings on one another” [I, 52]. If we turn from this picturesque metaphor back to the sphere of conceptual logic and ask what these “frozen
substances” might possibly be, we realize that they must be based on “forms of the state” and “economic forms.” etc. Von Wiese’s own explanations support this assumption. “I differentiate between three types of structure [Gebilde]: Masses, groups, and collective unities. The degree of sociation is at its lowest in the mass and highest in the collective unities. The degree of abstraction is commensurate with the degree of socialization” (II, 68). It is the same notion that we encountered in Simmel. The group acquires more structure and grows more abstract until it forms the abstract collective unities of class, state, and family. (A logical process is implied here, not a historical one.) But the state is a normative institution and it does not belong to the sphere of being. Thus, insofar as the theory of relations is concerned with institutions that grow out of relationships, von Wiese’s assertion that the theory of relations is a science of being and not of value is false. At the very least it is also a science of the normative-ethical institutions that it otherwise holds in contempt.

If the characteristic of action on which the theory of relations focuses is the relationship of action to the group, then of course the relations to normative-ethical structures must also be included in the theory. But von Wiese asserts that a science that took the normative aspect into account would lead to the “danger of speculation” and encourage the tendency to “interpret history with the help of sociological research” (I, 53). If von Wiese holds this danger to be so great that it threatens the scientific character of the theory of relations, he should look elsewhere for the foundations of this science, or at the very least revise them. As it is, the system’s immanent logic leads the theory unerringly from an empirical science to a science of normative and transcendental character.

Our criticism has shown that von Wiese’s reasoning keeps strictly to the path trodden by Simmel, including the places where Simmel’s theory is logically inadequate. In our exposition of the theory of relations we have not found a single point where Simmel’s system has been advanced or improved.
b) Ludwig Stephinger, “On the Foundations of Social Science”

Stephinger lays the foundation for a social science—which incidentally does not yet exist—in a very thorough manner. He starts with the division of sciences in general. With the exception of philosophy, the sciences can be divided into natural sciences and social sciences; philosophy itself is “different in principle” (16). Stephinger classifies the social sciences by distinguishing between two meanings of the word *nature*.

First, in contrast to purposeful human action, or culture, the term *nature* designates the type of event that does not point beyond itself. Second, in contrast to individual concrete events in space and time in the real world, by the term *nature* we also understand the universal essence of things and the center of abstract laws that govern events at all times and at all places. Physical, chemistry, biology, botany, zoology, and other natural sciences are concerned with events in nature that do not point to a purpose beyond themselves and thus deal with nature in the first sense. On the other hand, economics and law, for example, are cultural or social sciences because they deal with purposeful human action. (16)

The first concept of nature is a material definition [*Sachbegriiff*], and all sciences that deal with “events that have no meaning beyond themselves” are called natural sciences. From a logical standpoint this concept is very extensive and heterogeneous; it includes sciences ranging from theoretical physics to zoology. The second concept is based on the term *the nature of things* and defines nature as the law governing phenomena. Arguing from this basis Stephinger asserts that every science is a natural science and, in the second sense of his use of the word *nature*, speaks of a “nature of culture, that is, of laws governing cultural phenomena” (16). It is this law that must be scientifically demonstrated.

Stephinger then elaborates on these observations. He reminds us that the subject of natural events remains unidentified, or, if it is identified, then it is nature itself, reality, chance, or God, but in no case a human individual. On the other hand, as far as cultural events are concerned, the human being is the “subject and occasionally also the object. In any case the human being strives to give such an occurrence a goal and a purpose” (17). Here Stephinger differentiates as follows between nature and culture: “We attempt to understand natural events in terms of the causal connection of things, their causal interactions, or their relationship to one another as cause and effect. The causal nexus is also the starting point for understanding purposeful activity, or culture. But here a distinction is made between productive and counterproductive causes. Productive causes are means toward ends and are integrated into the series of temporal or spatial causes in the service of further goals. Counterproductive causes are ignored” (17 f.). “The cause-and-effect series is thus the basic concept of the natural sciences, the notion of cause in a series of means-to-ends relationships, or the doctrine of value [Wertlehre], is the basic concept of social science [Kulturwissenschaft]” (18). Here Stephinger is obviously following Rickert’s division of the sciences. By adopting Rickert’s position, however, Stephinger has also adopted its methodological inadequacies. In Rickert the contrast between natural and cultural sciences is essentially identical to the one between nomothetical and historical sciences. Just as the basic concept of a law is at the heart of natural science, so, from the material that presents itself to the historian, the latter chooses those parts that, combined into a series of causes and effects, lead to the goal or value, on which the historian’s principle of selection is based. Unfortunately, in addition to natural sciences and history, there are other sciences that, since we are not informed concerning their nature, lead an ambiguous existence, claimed sometimes by natural scientists, at other times by historians.
Thus, although Stephinger assigns sciences that use the means-ends relationship to the sphere of social science, this by no means covers the whole of social science, which in Stephinger’s vague and confused definition includes everything that is not a mathematical science of nature. He himself mentions economics as a social science (16) and presumably means economic theory—even though he does not explicitly say so. Let us take for a moment Spann’s definition of economy. “Economy is the attribution of means to ends based on the weighing of costs and savings in a context of an overabundance of goals with limited means for achieving them.” 68 From this standpoint it would, at first, seem that Stephinger is correct in assuming that social science is concerned with purposeful human activity. After all, “attributing” and “weighing costs and savings” are obviously elements of purposeful human activity. If, however, we consider that the above-quoted sentence is a sentence of economic science, which is in no way meant to describe human action, but rather to describe the method or the laws of economic activity, then the fallacy of Stephinger’s argument becomes clear. He does not see the basic difference between “natural” and “social” sciences, namely, that there is only one science of nature but as many social sciences as there are cultures [so viele Kulturwissenschaften wie Kulturen]. We have the sciences of Roman law, German law, French law, etc., of the English, Greek, and Chinese languages, of the German, ancient Egyptian, and many other economies, but we only have one science to describe universal natural phenomena. The social sciences I have listed have cultural phenomena as their objects. But whether these involve causal connections in the service of purposes originating in human beings, in the sense in which Stephinger has used these terms, remains doubtful because Stephinger has so vaguely defined the concept of causality that it can mean everything and nothing. But we can say with certainty that these sciences do not have the “nature

68. Othmar Spann, [source unidentified].
of culture” itself as their object; this activity is reserved for other sciences, such as the theory of economics, legal theory, and language theory. These latter theories exist at the same level of abstraction as the “theory of physics” and that is the level of transcendental logic. The natural sciences Stephinger is talking about, those that investigate the nature of culture, in fact belong to the theory of science and are generally classified as philosophy. According to Stephinger, however, philosophy is something “completely different” from science.

Thus, before Stephinger even comes to the question of social science a serious error is revealed that grows larger as his explanations proceed. Before we look at this error more closely let us identify its root. It is found in the difference between the terms cultural occurrence and natural occurrence. The natural event involves no human consciousness, while the cultural event is identified by it. Human beings consciously work toward goals, and this purposefulness is the essence of culture. Now that we have established the fact that the nature of culture is no different from the nature investigated by natural science and that nature is the object of epistemological investigation, the use of such concepts as “human consciousness” reveals itself to be a hypostasis of the crudest kind. If such a hypostasis is taken as the starting point for an investigation, as Stephinger takes it, the way to a valid logical understanding of relationships is blocked. Instead we get questionable definitions of social science that clearly bear the stamp of anthropomorphic logic such as the following: “Sociology is the science of relations, connections, and interactions between human beings” (18). That has been said by every representative of formal sociology, and just like Stephinger, they have added that even the conflict and the breakdown of relationships are relationships and interactions. This notion, equally lacking in originality (indeed it is analogous to what we find in Tönnies), is nevertheless instructive because what lies behind it is the distinction between natural relationships between human beings, which occur on their own, and consciously intended relationships. “Human
relationships are both natural, when they arise of their own accord, as well as cultural, when they are consciously chosen and intended. Social science is thus, according to its object, both a science of nature and a science of culture. Social science is the basic science of the laws that explain natural and cultural human interaction” (18). “The objects of sociology are the social mass phenomena of organisms, as well as society itself and its forms, whereby the organic character of society can be neither affirmed nor denied. It also includes natural as well as purposefully initiated processes, both those that take place within a society and those that transpire between societies” (19). These statements are extremely valuable because they reveal the otherwise hidden techniques that have contributed to the development of social theory. In no other sociologist’s writings do we see so clearly what has gone wrong. Ultimately the distinction between natural and intended relationships goes back to the distinction between the material ontologies [Sachgebiete] of nature and culture. (Nature is seen as that activity which has no purpose beyond itself.) Since nature is viewed as being without consciousness, as something unconscious, it soon comes to be seen as factually “unconscious nature.” This is the equivalent of saying that human beings think “naturally” because they are not aware that their thoughts are accompanied by the consciousness of the cogito. There is no distinction here between a psychological point of view and consciousness as such. And it is on this basis, though it is not always obvious, that the concepts of formal sociology of “community” [Gemeinschaft] and “society” [Gesellschaft] are constructed.

“Methodologically of course sociology must proceed like every other nomothetic science [Gesetzeswissenschaft], since its task is to analyze the relationships between real human beings into their simplest forms as the typical forms that contain all the others” (19). This is an assertion that is very easily refuted, especially when we compare it to some of the author's
earlier statements. From the earlier assertions concerning the object of sociology, we can forget for a moment that it is the “social mass phenomena of organisms” since we do not really know what Stephinger means by “social” or by “mass phenomena” or what kind of “organisms” he is speaking of. We are still left with the statement that the object of sociology is society and its “forms.” These, we are told, can only be described and no statements can be made about their laws in the way that statements can be made about the laws of natural science. However, Stephinger understands laws in social science in precisely the same way as he understands them in natural science. In an analogy to natural science he constructs the social science atom. “In social science the human being is the real, empirical, or historically understood atom. This science provides us with a basic law that demonstrates the relationships of human beings to one another. These are found in natural causal relations as well as in conscious relationships of purpose and value, given that the human being is capable of intentional acts” (31). Let us try to see what can be salvaged from Stephinger in the way of objects of social science. We must say that society is a complex structure of laws made up of “simple” atomic laws. The relationships—that is to say, the laws governing the atoms—are described in one passage as being both “natural and intended processes in and between societies” (19). Thus ephemeral processes are also included. But society is obviously something that endures; it has specific forms, and this suggests, even if he does not expressly say so, that [Stephinger] is thinking of that famous “crystallization.” Before we examine this “crystallization,” we should give Stephinger’s definition of society. “Society is the for, against, and with one another of human beings” (20). This is Simmel’s definition of interaction. Here again we find Simmel’s basic sociological concepts—interaction, crystallization—this time with their fundamental errors clearly visible. And here too we find not a single step has been taken beyond Simmel.
On their way through life, human beings meet . . . and continually find that their lives and purposes are both alike and different, that they help and hinder one another, and that they form and dissolve relationships. Relations, connections, conflicts, and interactions arise and in turn produce either action or abstention from action. They lead to changing forms of relationships, etc. Occasionally shorter, longer, or enduring relationships also arise that take the form of either natural communities or purposefully organized groups. These unities, which are created out of a feeling of solidarity, are meaningful in terms of both their inner structure and their external interactions. (22)

Thus there are communities and associations [Vereinigungen], unities that grow out of feelings of solidarity. Solidarity can be thought of in terms of a group of human beings imbued with the same contents of consciousness [Bewußtseinsinhalte], the well-known “wills with the same intention” [“gleichgerichteten Willen”]. But this possibility of individuals imbued with the same states of consciousness is expressly rejected. “Social science . . . has as its particular object the forms of natural and cultural relationships that can only take place between human beings. It is not concerned with causal relationships that take place within individual human beings or in nonhuman reality” (20).

The negative determination [i.e., what social science is not concerned with] only speaks of the causal relationships within human beings and not of the intentional ones. But the positive formulation states clearly that processes which take place within individuals, of whatever kind, are irrelevant for the science of society. Social unities transcend psychological consciousness, whatever its form, and such unities are held to be objectively valid. Thus, from this perspective as well, we arrive at the transcendental sphere.

This becomes very clear when we look at a few types of social unity. There are four main ones: communities, associations, cooperatives, and societies. There are a variety of communities: spiritual ones, the supporters of a Weltanschauung, scientific schools, etc. There are communities created by con-
sanguinity: family, clan, gens, and Volk. “Law, the professions, and social conditions also create communities. The latter are formed especially among those who have no chance of improving their lot” (22). “Organizations are consciously and intentionally created as economic, political, social, artistic, ethical, or religious associations” (22–23). When their interests require it, communities can also strive to become organizations. For example, an ethnic group dispersed through several states may strive for political unity in a new state of its own. But with this example Stephinger concedes that the state is an “objective normative order” (Kelsen) and not merely an accumulation [Anhäufung] of relationships. Thus, again the sociological theory of relations leads directly into the transcendental problematic.

c) Alfred Vierkandt, “Program for a Formal Theory of Society”

Since our critique has already demonstrated the techniques and inadequacies of the theory of relations, we can be brief in our discussion of Vierkandt and concentrate on specific details.

Formal sociology is “concerned with relationships and conditions within the human group . . . that retain formal constancy through all historical change of content” (56). In addition to himself Vierkandt names Simmel, Tönnies, Tarde, Durkheim, McDougall, Ludwig [Stephinger], and Leopold [von Wiese] as representatives of this type of sociology. Vierkandt divides human relationships into two basic types (59). Relationships are first distinguished according to the “close-ness or distance of the relationship” (59), which results in “the community, the recognition relationship [Anerkennungsverhältnis], which is also termed the legal relationship [Rechtsverhältnis], and the conflict and power relationship. These last two differ insofar as in the former both sides contend for power,

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while in the latter both accept an existing, one-sided distribution of power.” In our opinion this is not a very felicitous distinction. If we accept that the “recognition relationship” may also be called the “legal relationship,” then we have only three basic types, the community, the legal, and perhaps the conflict relationship. For this last relationship is constrained by “certain internalized ethical norms [even if they are not adhered to at all times and in all places].” This relationship is thus closely connected to the recognition relationship, and for this reason it cannot be strictly separated from the legal relationship. We must also object to the mixing of legal with ethical norms. The recognition relationship is a legal relationship, and the conflict relationship is supposedly impure since it acknowledges certain ethical norms, even if they are not always followed. The works of Kelsen and his school, especially Sander,70 have shown clearly why this failure to distinguish between the norms must be rejected.

The reason it takes place, as we have already noted in our discussion of Stephinger, is that psychological consciousness is taken for consciousness per se. But the power relationship is not an independent type of relationship. Vierkandt himself says that both parties “accept” the unequal distribution of power. This can only mean that it is a legal relationship, the content of which is an agreement concerning the distribution of power. At the very least we would have to refer to it as a legally regulated power relationship. But a relationship of this kind hardly constitutes a generic type. After all, the concept of the legal relationship says nothing about content, and it is not permissible to select a specific legal relationship and treat it as the logical equivalent of the legal relationship as a universal concept. It is particularly unacceptable when this classification is called “grasping the state of affairs phenomenologically.” “The phenomenological apprehension of a state of

affairs is the most radical possible and [its phenomenon] cannot be reduced to any more simple form. It cannot be defined, merely experienced. In turn, by pointing to the phenomenon, the experience can be made clear to others. Thus, the specific manner in which a community is joined into a community, the specific manner in which respect and acceptance in the recognition relationship take place, and the nature of unity in the conflict and power relationships must be [phenomenologically] grasped” (59). As we have clearly seen, the power relationship, at the least, can certainly be analyzed in terms of other relationships. And we cannot say that it merely looks like it can because Vierkandt has expressed himself so carelessly. It might be argued that, applied to the power relationship, the word recognition cannot really be said to include the meaning of recognition within the “legal relationship.” It could perhaps be doubted that this word has that meaning for Vierkandt; after all, his entire presentation reveals that he does not have a clear notion of what constitutes a legal relationship. But when he writes that the power relationship governs some of the relationships within the state, namely, class relations, and then later says that classes make up the essential nature of the state itself, we see that the power relationship has come very close to the legal relationship. Even taking Vierkandt’s imprecise terminology into account, the state and law have turned out to be one and the same thing.

As soon as it is recognized that the state is also a unified normative order it can no longer be treated as a mere “association” [“Verband”] and contrasted with the legal order as the

71. “In relation to the external world, the state is a part of a power relationship . . . ; internally, as far as the relations between classes are concerned, it is also a relationship of power and conflict. Otherwise it is primarily a legal relationship and partially a community relationship” (Vierkandt, “Programm,” 63).

72. Power relationships correspond to “a stage of the state. We use this term in its main and restricted sense, i.e., to designate the state divided by classes [Klassenstaat] in which all areas of life are pervaded by the nature of class and existence is structured by relationships of domination and subordination” (ibid., 60).
normative element; both the law and the state come under the same category of normative order. Equally, in accordance with the dominant view in the matter, if we look at the legal norm in terms of its coercive character then both the law and the state are equally part of an order involved in the use of force. They are components in a system of norms compelling obedience. The identity of the state with the legal order is clear: “The definition of the state ends in the definition of the law.”\textsuperscript{73} Vierkandt’s second classificatory division is in terms of relationships of cooperation and of domination. We do not want to examine it here, since Vierkandt’s remarks in this matter are very sketchy and he obviously plans to discuss it at length elsewhere.\textsuperscript{74} The remarks concerning a “we consciousness” \textit{[Wirbewußtsein]} are instructive. A phenomenological examination of our experiences shows that just as we have an ego consciousness, we also have a “we” consciousness that is experienced in community. An overall-will or [illegible] is therefore something completely real, namely, the unified experience of all the participants in the community, united because the individual experiences are causally joined through interaction. We can easily overlook the meaning of these collective experiences because we are not sufficiently used to distinguishing between the foreground and background in the life of the psyche and because we pay too little attention to the latent dispositions and inclinations that arise from the psyche’s unobserved and unrecorded contents. \textsuperscript{[62]}

Thus the sense of a “we” \textit{[Wirbewußtsein]} forms the background to the life of the soul. It is a new type of unconsciousness \textit{[Art von Unbewußtem]}, and its existence is assumed by Vierkandt because without it such phenomena as, for example, a unified national character would remain inexplicable. The contrast between the individual and the community is here reduced to the contrast between individuals, i.e., between their

\textsuperscript{73} Kelsen, \textit{Der Soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff}, 36 ff.
\textsuperscript{74} “From the essence of the recognition relationship it can be shown that it presupposes a community relationship, indeed the latter is implied by the former” \textit{[ibid., 61]}. We will wait for the proof of this statement.
ego consciousness and their “we” consciousness. This assumption reflects our own formulations in which the context of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang] is the same as the postulate “society,” and the individual is the process in which the postulate is realized. We traced this into the sphere of transcendental logic. Vierkandt has misinterpreted it as belonging to the sphere of psychology.

In a like manner he misinterprets the “theory of social instincts” [62]. This theory is supposed to be part of sociology, “at least in its current state of development.” (Vierkandt concedes that the theory “lies on the border between psychology and sociology”) [62]. Here we do not wish to embark on a critique of instinct psychology as such, but merely to record that the “subordination instinct discovered by McDougall” does not merit the towering significance Vierkandt attributes to it.

“His phenomenological analysis shows that true obedience is a disposition to voluntary subordination and devotion to a leader or an authority. As a source of conduct it differs greatly from fear and external pressure” [63]. We encounter the same problem when, for example, we think of the enduring structure of society. The principle that holds such a society together is the faith of the lower classes, expressed in a value judgment, that the other classes truly are superior. This is also reflected in the relationship between the leader and the masses who believe that the leader is superior and that he therefore deserves to rule over them. They would not follow a leader to whom they did not ascribe such superiority. The transition from an old order of values to a new one—both in the life of society and in the relationship between leaders and masses—is called “revolution.” In our terminology we would say: The leader is the one who is believed to fulfill the postulate “society” more completely than any other member of society. Here [Spann’s] universalist theory clearly shows its merit. It solves a problem that had previously been thought to belong to psychology: the relationship between leaders and followers. The “instinct of subordination” is shown to be nothing more
than a value relationship put into psychological terms. A value judgment is falsely interpreted as an expression of the subordination instinct.

Vierkandt calls his method “phenomenological” and by this term presumably means phenomenology in the sense in which it is understood by Edmund Husserl. But we cannot agree with his interpretation of phenomenology. He says “the basic facts of life in society are known to us all because, by nature, we are immersed in them, experience them directly, and therefore find them in the depths of our intuition [innere Anschauung]. Even earlier research, as we have demonstrated above with individual examples, followed this path to some extent, though without explicit knowledge of what it was doing and therefore planlessly. The conscious, intentional application of this method is a recent achievement made possible by the development of [formal] phenomenology” (65). These sentences make us seriously suspect that psychology is being confused with phenomenology. Obviously phenomenology is used to justify the statement that social facts are empirically experienced and, for this reason, can be grasped phenomenologically. But this is a serious error. Phenomenology is not concerned with the content of [empirical] experiences. Yet it is precisely this content, the basic social facts, that interests Vierkandt. Phenomenology “deals exclusively with experiences that can be intuitively apprehended and analyzed in eidetic universality and not with the experiences of real human beings or animals, or with the facts of empirical apperception as they are found in the phenomenal world that we posit as real.”

Let us also recall that Vierkandt spoke of a phenomenological analysis of the “instinct of subordination” but offered no “descriptive eidetic analysis” to demonstrate how he arrived at instinct. Yet this is precisely what he should have done. When we introduce an unanalyzed concept we create a potential source of permanent error and forgo all the advantages

75. Husserl, [source unidentified].

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a phenomenological analysis might otherwise have given us. Husserl has outlined these advantages in the following terms: “We want to return to the things themselves. In fully developed intuitions we want to experience the evidence that that which is given in actually performed abstraction is truly that which the word significations, in normative expressions, designate them to be. We want to awaken in ourselves the practical disposition to hold on to the indelible identities of these meanings, either by repeating the reproducible intuitions frequently enough, or by intuitively reenacting the abstraction.”76

First of all, Vierkandt has misunderstood the nature of phenomenology and, in keeping with his entire approach, has interpreted it psychologically. Second, in the case of the “instinct of subordination,” where he neglected to try to understand and clarify the nature of this basic concept, he even failed to apply his false notion of phenomenology.

In order to complete our picture of [Vierkandt’s sociology], let us look at one last remark of his. “Science is something more than an accumulation of experiences. Mere careful observation and diligently collected data did not create modern mechanics that is the basis of today’s natural science research. Can it be that the encyclopedic school has overlooked the fact that the science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has become the basis of today’s science of nature? Those with an interest in sociology expect a similar achievement. Shouldn’t sociology’s general method follow the lead of mechanics [and go beyond the mere observation and collection of data]?” [65].

The childlike innocence of this question renders criticism superfluous. We can only note that sociological method is seen here as a compromise between phenomenology and mechanics. This is all the more disturbing because Vierkandt’s assertion that mechanics is the basis of modern science is completely false. It is rather electrodynamics and optics that constitute the basis of modern science. The brilliant achieve-

76. Husserl, [source unidentified].
ment of the theory of relativity was to reduce mechanics to the principles of these disciplines.

To sum up, we can say that Vierkandt’s formal theory of society is a psychologistical theory suspended somewhere between misunderstood natural science and misunderstood phenomenology. Its structure cannot be more precisely determined.

In his programmatic introduction von Wiese was generously tolerant of other theories of society. Our criticism has demonstrated that it would perhaps be a good idea if more of an effort was made to lay a solid foundation for the theory of relations. To this end it would benefit greatly by making more use of the knowledge gained by other sciences, especially that gained by the science of logic.

§5. Theodor Litt, Individual and Community: Fundamental Questions of Social Theory and Ethics

At the end of our critical discussion we turn to the work of Theodor Litt. It deserves this honored place because it is just about the only work that, despite being strongly indebted to Simmel’s ideas, largely transcends them and moves in the direction of understanding the normative and postulatory character of society much as we have presented it in the first part of this study. The surprising parallels in the formulation of the basic problem show clearly that when the interaction theory is consistently developed, it advances toward the concept of spiritual community [Gezweigung]. It is therefore unfortunate that the outstanding qualities of Litt’s presentation are obscured by psychological elements. His brilliant grasp of the essence of society is presented with a rare eloquence that awakens the reader’s sympathy in a way that other works do not. But the presence of psychological elements taken from the theory of interaction, which Litt has already overcome in principle,

prevent him from fully developing the logic of his ideas. At
decisive points his explications plunge from the high level
of transcendental criticism into the confused terminology of
conscious and unconscious society. We have already discussed
this problem. In the end, the lack of clarity about the
relationship between such concepts as “rational,” “purpose-
ful,” “conscious,” “ordered,” “valid,” and “normative” pre-
vents him from successfully completing a work that begins so
promisingly.

By comparison with most sociological works, Litt’s book has
the particular advantage of having developed out of practical
experience and a profound insight into the structure of con-
temporary society. On almost every page we feel the powerful
and lasting experience of the war years and the problems of
community that came to light during the war. Litt himself says
that the ideas in his work did not “germinate in the ground of
pure theory” but originated “in the needs and experiences of
every day life” (iii). The importance of this fact cannot be over-
estimated, as the basic weakness of modern sociology is that it
works without an empirical basis. It is not yet generally recog-
nized that sociology is an *eidetic* science in Husserl’s meaning
of the term (even if it has nothing to do with phenomenology in
the sense in which it is understood by Vierkandt). If, however,
it is an eidetic science, as we tried to show with analysis and
criticism, then theoretical sociology is related to applied soci-
ology in the same way that legal philosophy is related to the
positive science of law. It is obvious that, historically, a science
must precede a theory that reflects upon it. Natorp says:

In the beginning was the deed. That is also true of the act of
knowledge that is called science. *Synthetic thought*, in accor-
dance with the norms of thought, has to have been at work for a
long time, and produced a sufficient quantity of results, before
the question can even arise concerning the laws of synthetic
thought without which science would be impossible. Logic can
only demonstrate the laws that science [or scholarship] [*Wiss-
senschaften*] uses; they must already exist in the “fact” of sci-
ence. Only when we look at science itself can we see the laws
of which logic speaks at work and observe their effectiveness and reality, i.e., their ability to lay the foundation for objective meaning and thus bring about the act [Tat] of knowledge.\(^7\)

Only a regrettable lack of epistemological schooling leads to the desire to provide a “foundation” for, or an “introduction” to, a social science before it even exists. It takes a continual interplay of empirical experience with a theory of empirical experience for progress to take place in both. Currently we could be excused for thinking that the phrase “prior to all experience” is being confused with the foundations of a house. First the foundations must be laid, and only then can we build on them. But this completely disregards the difference between logical and historical priority. It also overlooks a number of other points, of which we will comment on one. An a priori never leads to a material proposition. The a priori is not the a priori of a content, as many social scientists take it to be when, for example, they see the forms of society as “community” \([\text{Gemeinschaft}]\) or “society” \([\text{Gesellschaft}]\). Rather it is the a priori of the science of those contents.

Litt’s work is by no means directly related to a science contained in a book to be consulted at will. He begins with undifferentiated experience. This gives him an incomparable advantage over theoreticians like Stephinger, who begin with a fixed division of the sciences that will in all probability result in investigations leading nowhere because the a priori divisions are almost certain to be false. The ability to recognize the characteristics of the concrete social phenomenon also lent Simmel’s work its unique charm and an importance that will endure, even if, one day, his propositions concerning the method of social science should be proven false. The intimate connection between observation of phenomena and a critical attitude toward observation gives Simmel’s and Litt’s works an advantage over those of the theorists who proceed in a more rig-

\(^7\) Paul Natorp, \textit{Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften}, [no page cited].
orously systematic manner and, for that very reason, produce more systematic errors.

[Litt’s] formulation of the problem shows that his investigation is based on experience. The war required the individual to be strictly subordinate to the goals of the community. Nevertheless there were moments when subordination, far from being suffered as coercion, was experienced as the voluntary realization of individual purposes. The root of the opposition between the individual and the community lies in the antithesis between freedom and coercion. With this observation the sociological problem is recognized as belonging by principle to the normative disciplines and therefore not open to the methods of the causal sciences. “Despite the fact that in the exercise of personal power some subjective arbitrariness is unavoidable, nevertheless, in spite of the irritation and impatience that this occasioned, an instinctive feeling remained with those [taking orders] that they were not the victims of the sovereign will of a particular individual or group. Rather they felt that their subordination was required by a type of necessity that transcended individuals [Überpersonal]” (4). The heteronomy of the order that came from “another,” who in principle was their equal, vanished behind the autonomous law that transcended individuals and made subordination feel like a voluntary act. “This describes the psychic state of all those who had not completely broken with the state. It was a strange mixture of feeling constraint and at the same time being conscious of spontaneity. It was not possible to find the source of one’s will and action entirely in one’s ego, nor was it possible to find it entirely outside the ego” (4). The essential duality of the experience of the will, which arises from the fact that something must be willed, cannot be described better than it is here in this empirical description of the experience of the will during the war.

The necessity that transcends individuals is separated from the order emanating from “the other.” This makes it possible for us to remove necessity from the realm of the transindividual
and place it within the personal realm. This is the true meaning of autonomy. As Simmel eloquently put it in chapter four of his Lebensanschauung, the law transcending individuals is transformed into an “individual law.”\textsuperscript{79} As we demonstrated in our analysis of spiritual community, this is the point where individual and social ethics meet. The context of meaning, which it is our obligation to deepen and intensify, is always to be thought of as filled with a content. This is what constitutes the duality of the will divided between freedom and necessity; the will must always be directed to “a” content.

We have separated the context of meaning, considered as a postulate, from the process in which it is realized and termed the process the individual and the postulate society.

We must not be misled by this logical distinction. The fact is that in the human being [Einzelwesen], whom we commonly call “the individual” [“das Individuum”], both parts of the social process are intimately connected and indeed inseparable from one another. Litt accounts for this by describing the essence of the individual as a “unity within a multiplicity.” The unity of the psyche’s activities is generally treated separately from the activities themselves and contrasted with the individual experiences and their contents. “In the process the latter become the expressions, activities, forms of appearance, or aspects of a simple substratum, a psychic substance” (14 f.). The contrast between inside and outside is theoretically justified if it is intended to distinguish between the psychic experience itself and the “form in which it manifests itself to the outside world.” We are not justified, however, in assuming that this contrast implies a “plurality of psychic experiences” and “a unity of psychic substance.” “The essential point about this ‘inside’ is rather that, by means of its particular form of existence and the way it operates, it overcomes the numerical opposition between unity and multiplic-

\textsuperscript{79} [Georg] Simmel, Lebensanschauung: Vier metaphysische Kapitel [Berlin: Dunker and Humblot, 1918]. [Voegelin refers here to the last chapter of this work.]
interaction and spiritual community

...unity. It is the one within the many. Because the individual psyche does not have the unity within multiplicity next to it or above it, attempts to conceptually grasp the essence of a ‘concrete’ individuality will, of necessity, be highly unsatisfactory” (15). We agree in part with this view. According to Litt the “inside” can very well refer to something we normally see as external, for example a concrete work of art. Here we can distinguish between “individual elements” [“Einzlele”] and the “one” [“Eine”], which lends each individual element its value as a stage [Erfüllungspunkt] in the fulfillment of the purpose of the “one,” i.e., the context of meaning. But to describe this “one” as an invisible hand over the whole bringing the various individual elements of the phenomenon into one phenomenon of value [Werterscheinung], and the idea that it cannot be conceptually grasped, is going too far. We suspect here, as we noted above, that Litt is obscuring a purely logical investigation with psychological elements. By translating the relationship between the context of meaning and the multiplicity of its appearance into the sphere of its self-awareness, Litt falls into the trap of applying categories that are valid in psychology but that in a logical context only create confusion. In this case we are again confronted with the all-too-familiar categories “conscious” and “unconscious.”

Very often we hear of the metaphysical roots of our experiences or of an irrational [level of being] out of which rational being grows. As a result of this supposed growth and its roots, phenomena are presumed to partake of a mysterious magic that carries them far beyond the realm of individual existence in space and time into the realm of eternal values. Simmel in particular is a master in the technique of letting all the sparkling brilliance of the metaphysical realm surge up to illuminate each everyday phenomenon with the meaning suffusing the

80. Natorp identifies the transcendent sphere as the sphere of the unconscious. “Scientific thought proceeds according to specific laws of synthesis. However, in large part it does so without being consciously aware of the law” [Die logischen Grundlagen, 10].

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entire realm of being. Here too, in the formulation of his views concerning the individual, Litt is perhaps under the influence of Simmel’s technique, which we otherwise find throughout his book. In general Litt’s view seems to have developed in an approach similar to Simmel’s that touches on the border areas of logic, psychology, and metaphysics. But interesting as such an approach may be, it does not produce solid scientific results.

If we remove the whole [Ganzheit] or unity of multiplicities from its context of “irrational experiences,” the “creative level” of being or “unconscious production,” etc., there should be no reason why it will be harder to understand the unity, or, to use our term, the context of meaning, than the elements in their multiplicity. We do not deny that a phenomenon is experienced without conscious reflection, that we feel that a painting is beautiful without knowing why it is. But the transcendental constitution of the phenomenon has nothing whatever to do with the question of the consciousness or unconsciousness of the experience. Some of the best natural scientists have the most indefensible notions concerning the methods of science.

The essence of the individual lies in his irreplaceable uniqueness that is equally present in all of his expressions. This raises the question of how the separate individuals, existing alongside one another, can be capable of joining together to form any type of association. Litt answers: “A social group that is to be more than a mere aggregate of external relations can only be created from a multitude of human beings by the concrete spiritual relationships that exist between them. The nature of the spiritual relationship thus determines the nature and intensity of the group’s unity” (17). Individuals exist as separate beings. It is therefore impossible for spirits to touch directly. Every type of social relationship must pass through an external medium. The relationship is thus divided into two parts. The social phenomenon must manifest itself [Kundgebung] and it must be understood. The act of self-manifestation is not the same as giving a purely external sign of an internal experience.
There is no fixed code with ready-made expressions for each psychic content. Language “is in no way a complete system of finished forms of expression; it does not have a perfect equivalent at hand for every psychic content. Language provides us rather with a very limited amount of raw material that the individual must use advisedly. It is only to be applied after careful reflection in order that living experience can be given adequate symbolical representation. The self-manifestation of psychic content, which goes beyond the mere primitive expression or communication of undifferentiated matter, is a personal act of creative spontaneity” (20). The converse of the act of self-manifestation is the act of understanding that which has manifested itself. The deeper the manifested content is rooted in the experience, the deeper the act of understanding must penetrate so that the full meaning can be grasped, for meaning is by no means exhausted by mere factual content. In its most intense form the act of understanding goes beyond merely understanding the individual act of self-manifestation to understanding the human being himself. “The act of understanding is thus internally related to the act of self-manifestation to which it corresponds. Although it is oriented to an external act, it is by no means a mechanical act but creates from its own depth and raises its psychic life to a high state of activity” (21). Because of these mutually creative acts [self-manifestation and understanding] spiritual relationships are important for cultivating society as well as for developing individuality. The intermediate layer of the nonspiritual encloses the individual like a protective cover so that the individual is not excluded or threatened by the process in which spirits are joined. The individual rather is awakened to self-activity, indeed forced into it. There is no difference between this concept of relationships and our concept of spiritual community that emerged from the analysis in our first chapter.

The concept of the individual gives rise to the polarity of multiplicity and unity within the individual soul; the spiritual relationship encompasses the duality of the joining and the
separating of individuals. A new concept, that of “joining (or weaving) into a social whole” [soziale Verschränkung] encompasses the dualism of individual and community. This recurring terminology has the same characteristics as those we referred to in our analysis as the basic dichotomy of sociological concepts. Litt opposes the notion that the individual spirit and the communal spirit exist side by side [without closer contact]. “Communal spirit can only exist, be effective, and undergo change insofar as it is formed spontaneously by individuals. It does not exist by eliminating the individual personality, rather it exists, and can only exist, through the activity of the individual personality. To assume that the communal spirit and the individual spirit are the same thing would be to destroy the truth of their relationship” (32). Even the idea of “interaction” between them does not stand up, for it implies that each would have too large a degree of autonomy. The reciprocal relationship between them is demonstrated by the fact that all statements that can be made of the one pole, can, with equal justice, be made of the other. With the many differences between society's form and content, ends and means, etc., the intimate interlocking relationship between individual and community is obscured. We have referred to the reciprocal relationship between the association and the individual as the joining (or weaving) into a social whole. “Within this to and fro movement of the reciprocal relationship the essence of both of these intimately connected structures is formed, is strengthened, and undergoes change. In this process life in all its dimensions takes shape. We therefore call it the ‘community of essence’ ['Wesensgemeinschaft']. With this term we denote a structural whole of both social and individual moments gathered into two focal points” (35).

The concept of “objective spirit” [“objektiver Geist”] is particularly interesting. It refers to “a minimal stock of habits, propositions, and valuations that are universally accepted and that no one would even think to question. No one can say what its origins are and how it acquired its specific content.
And this is the way it must be, for the objective spirit was not consciously created by anyone, nor did a ‘subject’ invent it” (37). The most important aspect of the objective spirit is its material content. It is an objective order, but not an empty, mere formal validity like “the law” per se, or “art” per se, etc. It is a valid order with concrete contents. When we encountered such objective validities above we found them to be moral orders that, by their very nature, require a response from us. The problem of content cannot be examined here in detail. But it should be emphasized that the problem of content must be formulated as the problem of the content of the social phenomenon per se [das Problem des Inhaltes der sozialen Erscheinung schlechtweg]. Litt’s solution of “a minimal stock of habits, propositions, and valuations,” however, contains a psychological element, which a more rigorous investigation would have to eliminate.

Litt’s overcoming of the distinction between “community” and “society” [“Gemeinschaft” und “Gesellschaft”] marks a principal advance over other theories. The “artificially created” and the “natural” associations, as he calls them, are no longer defined as those that develop organically and those intentionally created with a purpose in mind. Rather Litt correctly recognizes “that the minute we rigorously apply the analogy of organic life we falsify our picture of reality” (56). “Individual spontaneity cannot be eliminated from the process whereby a living social unity [Lebenseinheit] develops, as it would have to be were the comparison between society and an organism completely applicable. The spontaneity of individuals is an essential part in the process in which a society grows through gradually developing connections that draw now this, now that individual into a circle that strengthens as it grows. This process could not take place without the individuals involved willing it” (56). The only difference is that in the “natural” associations the members are not conscious of the unity of the whole, for the individuals’ activities are directed to partial activities within it. On the other hand, in the “artificial"
associations the spirit “first develops an overall plan and then consciously places the will in the service of realizing it.” It is a characteristic of social life that “the rational procedure of setting purposes does not eliminate ‘natural’ activity, nor can ‘natural’ activity completely dispense with the help of intentional acts of the will” (57). Starting from his critique of the conflicting opposites of consciously created and naturally created associations, Litt comes to the realization that the essence of the association can consist in only one thing, order itself. He does not explore the conscious creation of this order, nor indeed the question of how consciously its members are aware of the order at all. Nevertheless Litt classifies associations in terms of whether there are more “natural” or more intentional elements present in their structure. But that does not undermine his position in the fundamental question. What is much more important is his view that an individual only takes conscious note of an association of which he is a member “when developments have led to the creation of a broader collective that encompasses the first” (89 f.).

The analogy to our concept of the “context of meaning” [Sinnzusammenhang] is found in Litt’s concept of the “model” [“Leitbild”]. The activity of “understanding” is greatly intensified when it is involved in common action. Litt terms the intimate interweaving of the reciprocal experiences of understanding an experience of the whole [Gesamterlebnis]. Of course this experience cannot be thought of in terms of a superhuman consciousness. Rather it is the experience of individuals’ reciprocal acts of understanding directed to and interpenetrating one another. Individuals do not experience the whole in the same way. “The collective’s consciousness of itself would be falsely interpreted if the contents of the individual processes of consciousness that take place in order to produce it were

81. “The experience in which everyone receives particular impressions from everyone else and in turn communicates impressions to others results in each participant attaining a clear consciousness of the whole process” (Litt, Individuum, 93).
thought to be similar to, or indeed identical with, it. This is the hidden meaning in such terms as ‘collective soul’ or ‘consciousness of the whole’” (94). The experience of the whole has nothing to do with supposed parallel experiences in individuals. At most, the factual content of a common action, present in the external world of the senses, is the same for all participants. But this content is fused entirely with the internal life of the individual’s experiences, absorbed and modified by the individual’s experiential context. “It is the nature of experiences of the whole that they are present in each individual participant in a fully unique and untranslatable form” (94).

The spontaneity of the experiences of the ego [Ich-erlebnisse] is also at work here, as it is in the acts of self-manifestation and understanding. It is constitutive, both for the uniqueness of spiritual relationships and for the essence of association and does not allow an experience of the whole to become a mere copy. When an individual has an experience of the whole the image of the experience, “in all its parts,” takes on the “form of the one who created it” [Schöpfer]. It becomes part of the spirit of its creator [Geist von seinem Geist]. Here we must correct an undertone found in the term image. Without thinking about it we place the one creating the image in the position of an observer. This is false. In the case of images of experiences of the whole, the whole is filled “with all the vitality of the inner life that the will to act gives to the individual soul’s activity. This, in turn, lends the image a teleological character. It becomes a ‘model’ [Leitbild], that is to say, an image involving not just the immediate goals of an action, but also, under certain circumstances, the last orientations and values guiding the individual’s life. If in each act of understanding we find the process of self-formation [Selbstgestaltung], how much more so will it be found in the processes of the soul in which the individual grasps an experience of the whole” (94). With these words Litt gives the “model” the characteristics that describe our context of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang]; and what he calls the process’s “teleological character”
The model is “dynamic,” that is, as we have already emphasized, it is not simply a copy of an experience of the whole. Instead it takes up acts of self-manifestation and acts of understanding and spontaneously develops them. We have also underlined the fact that what is called the “whole” of the experiences does not consist of the similarity or identity of contents held by individual souls; the whole is not the result of “parallel” experiences taking place in a multiplicity of individuals. This insight raises the questions of just what connects the experiences and where in society we find the common elements in actions of collective participation. The answers Litt gives to these questions are not entirely satisfactory; but they go so far beyond all that has previously been said concerning the unity of society that the gulf between interaction theories and Litt’s theory becomes clear. His idea of the unity of society can best be understood as a continuum. “It is not the identity of content but the functional connection of the models that gives the activity of the whole its uniformity” (95).

We cannot look all too critically into what Litt understands by the term functional. But he cannot mean a mathematical function, nor would it make sense to speak of a physiological function in this context. At bottom it is probably some vague notion in which the term function is associated with the notion of something dynamic [Bewegliches]. And there is certainly a dynamic element here. The experience of the whole changes constantly in the process of spiritual relationships. If we could find the laws of this movement it would even make sense to speak of a function in the mathematical sense. The model would be the dependent variable continuously correlated with the independent variables of individuals in the continuous process of re-forming themselves. The continuity of the individual’s process would be guaranteed by the fact that the effectiveness of the spontaneous activity of each individual is qualified by the last stage the dependent variable of the
model has attained. Litt describes this interdependence of the models:

Each stage of individual A’s inner life is reflected by an objectified expression that in turn becomes the basis for an act of interpretation on the part of individual B. Each psychic act of B manifests itself in the same way and calls forth in individual A an act of interpretation, etc. This takes place between all individuals participating in the overall process [Gesamtvorgang]. The lightning-quick exchange of acts of self-manifestation and understanding among those participating in the experience of the whole guarantees the unity of the whole activity with the same degree of certainty that would obtain if all the individual spirits identically mirrored an externally given object. (94)

Litt’s description here is identical to the way Cohen describes the meaning of the mathematical concept of function:

The meaning of the formula of the function is that Y does not remain y, but rather is transformed in f(x). Thus the claim to difference is negated. Y is not simply y, in which case it would remain utterly different from x, so that the intervention of x in y could only appear as an infringement on the part of a mysterious external power. But this is not the case since y can be thought of as f(x). Thus, for the purpose of the calculation, it renounces its claim to difference and submits to similarity with x. This submission is a much more precise expression of dependence than the idea that we refuted. For the submission is the emanation of the sovereignty of pure thought [reines Denken] that must be as purely active in y as it is in x. Thus in its pure submission to x, which lies in f(x), y maintains the sovereignty of pure thought that otherwise, in x, would have an alien force with which it would have to contend. At the same time y maintains its justified claim to difference. For is it not a difference to x that raises itself against x in f(x)?82

If we replace the y in this equation with model and the x with individual, we come to the following conclusion:

The model does not remain a model but is dependent for its formation on the individual’s spontaneity. Thus the claim to difference on the part of both [i.e., of individual and model] is negated.

82. Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, [no page cited].
The model is not merely a model, something that would remain completely different from the individual, so that the individual's intervention would appear as an interference with the model on the part of a mysterious external force. No, the model can be thought of as being formed by the individual. Therefore in order that the process may continue, the model renounces its claim to difference and submits to homogeneity with the individual. This subjugation is a more precise expression of dependence than the idea we have refuted. The subjugation is the emanation of society's sovereignty, which is as purely active in the model as it is in the individual. Thus the model, subject to the individual, to the extent that it is shaped by the individual's spontaneity, nevertheless maintains the sovereignty of society, which would resist an alien force were it to emanate from the individual alone. It also maintains its claim to represent a difference. For doesn't the process in which the model is ‘shaped by the spontaneity of the individual’ also show that the model is different from the individual?

We have drawn an analogy between the sovereignty of society and the sovereignty of pure thought. By this we mean the unity of the process, as distinct from the process itself, to which the categories of whole and part are applied. [We draw this analogy] in order to make the correlation between model and individual as clear as possible, or, to use our own terminology, to show the correlation between the context of meaning and the process of realizing [the postulates contained in the context of meaning]. This example shows how valuable it can be for sociology to orient itself to the fundamental logical categories, which have proven themselves in other sciences, insofar as these fundamental logical categories belong to the mathesis universalis and are not, in Husserl’s sense of the term, the concepts of a particular material ontology. Here we can easily distinguish between the unity of society, and society itself. The problem of logical priority is also illustrated, for as a unity society is logically prior to the “real” society. The actual society, however, is the existing for-one-another [Füreinander] of the individual and the context of meaning that finds its precise logical expression in the concept of the function.
At this point it is necessary to be clear about the extent to which our interpretation goes beyond the formulation of the problem in Litt’s theory and to point out that by taking it further we are in no way falsifying the problem; indeed this is a logical development of the theory. Litt speaks of a functional connection, but as we have pointed out, this cannot be the meaning of the term *function* as it is used in mathematics. For Litt the functional connection means the connection between models, but in the mathematical sense of the word *function* refers to the connection of the for-one-another [*Für einander*] of two continua, an interpretation we tried to illustrate above. What Litt tried to express was the unity of the action of the whole [*Gesamthandlung*]. But in so doing, in principle, he removed the problem from the sphere of sociology and put it into that of mass psychology. This is one of the places where Litt’s genial intuition fails; it does so because he remains loyal to the traditional connection between interaction theories and natural science and *psychologistic* tendencies. Here, however, the problem was broadened to include the question of the continuity of the process of society. We differentiated between the unity, the model (context of meaning), and the individual (process of fulfilling the postulate). We must emphasize that all of these basic concepts are purely formal, i.e., they determine the form of society universally but do not answer the question of why we have a multiplicity of societies [with their individual contents]. In our discussion of spiritual community we indicated the principles concerning content. They account for the postulatory character of the context of meaning that must always be the meaning “of something.” This idea is not present in Litt, and it must be left to future investigations to establish a complete system of sociology’s fundamental categories, to which the concept of content clearly belongs.

Litt’s further remarks concerning the limits of the consciousness of solidarity show that there is a basic weakness in his theory here, and it is not just a momentary lapse. He writes: “The action of the whole, which was the starting point for our
investigation, created very favorable conditions for the emergence of a collective self-consciousness [kollektive Selbstfassung]. The limited number of participants and circumscribed scope of the action allowed the individual the most extensive external view of the action of the whole. The model could thus be developed from a very rich material basis gained from practical experience” (107). Here the model is conceived in an entirely psychologisitical manner. Litt focuses, not on the context of meaning with which, of necessity, the individual enters into a relationship, but on the content of consciousness [Bewußtseinsinhalt] that facilitates the communication of content even more when the individuals involved are linked over an extended period of time. “For where the human circle remains the same size, over time the number of impressions, experiences, and relationships naturally increases. These give life and shades of meaning to the picture of the whole [Gesamtbild]. Thus when an individual understands a single action of the whole he also internalizes a context of life [Lebenszusammenhang] that lies at a deeper level” (107). Here Litt is not very far from the notion of “parallel” acts of consciousness, or the notion that the contents of individual experiences are very similar.

None of these digressions, however, prevent the truth of Litt’s central idea from prevailing and leading to new and valuable knowledge. Society extends between the two poles of the individual and community. Litt understands the poles as the means by which interactions are increased and society’s purposes thereby fulfilled. “The community and the individual are not two rivals, so that one must always lose when the other wins; their opposition does not imply the struggle for a territory or for possession of something that each seeks to have for itself. Instead, both sides are enriched in struggling with each other” (104). The meaning of the polarity between individual and community is the common struggle to fulfill a purpose. The purpose is a value concept [Wertbegriff].
a number of associations are partly contained within one another, however—for example, family, class, professional group, community, nation, humanity—a conflict of values or, as Litt prefers to call it, a conflict of models arises. These remarks are important to the extent that they make us aware of the fact that as we become conscious of values we weigh them against one another. But they also distract us from what, in our view, is the basic problem of sociology, the need to create methodological tools for sociological investigations. Litt’s formulations concerning the conflict of models will not enable us, for example, without additional help, to demonstrate what is individual, what is Dutch, what is conditioned by the times, and what is European in a painting of Hobbema’s, as Wölfflin does. We also understand why Litt cannot furnish us with these methodological tools: It is because he confines himself to formal principles and does not address the problem of content. It is not important that the models are clearly outlined in our consciousness but that they become effective in the actions of individual human beings, without the individuals being aware of them. The problem that remains is why, when we become conscious of the models that otherwise work together, they suddenly enter into conflict with one another. Here again we see how bringing in the question of the consciousness of society falsifies the investigation. For future investigations it will be important to make certain that the problem of consciousness is rigorously separated from the fundamental sociological questions.

A more detailed examination of Litt’s theories would yield valuable knowledge and fundamental insights. His investigation into the relationship of the state to society, for example, is far superior to most other sociological studies on this subject;

83. The observations are strongly influenced by Simmel, who has devoted particular attention to the conflict of values. See Soziologie and Hauptprobleme der Philosophie.
84. Wölfflin, Grundbegriffe, 6.
but this investigation and others that could be cited are not relevant to the main question we have addressed in our investigation.

It was not our intention to present Litt’s work in full, but merely to examine his treatment of the problem of interaction. Here Litt’s contribution is extremely important. It shows how, out of the imminent logic of the theory of interaction itself, it must develop in the direction of the concept of spiritual community, a concept that Spann, who approached it from the very different direction of idealistic philosophy, has put forward and elaborated.
I. Preliminary Remarks

The subtitle of this essay, "A Contribution to the Sociology of Contemporary Society," is meant to emphasize the modesty of our intentions. This investigation does not try to offer a complete solution to the exceptionally complicated problems of modern society, but only touches upon one modest segment of the questions involved. We feel justified in concentrating on one problem, and treating it independently of others, because it is a central problem. Following its analysis, other problems can be taken up, for which the solution to our problem is the prerequisite.

An analysis of Wedekind’s work leads to the solution of our central problem. But here another limitation of our study must be mentioned: It is not our intention to comprehensively present and examine Wedekind’s doctrine. It is only considered
to the extent that it helps us find the solution to our problem. The sociology of contemporary society is the criterion of selection. In its light certain portions of Wedekind's views may be characterized as significant, and it is these that we will examine here.

The following remarks should be read with these two restrictions in mind.

II. The Task

In many ways, recognition of Wedekind's significance is hampered by the contradictory opinions and the variety of judgments about him. It would seem an almost hopeless task to find anything approaching reality in the contradictory images we have of him. Praised by one for liberating us to a higher conception of life, cursed by another as the incarnation of all things immoral, he is rejected by a third because he is thought to be a Jew. To approach him from the outside is to view him continually through the biased spectacles of some party or group championing and spreading the propaganda of the day. But [the same] information on the life of an individual can of course be given without prejudice. A life can be understood in terms of its immanent laws, which mock attempts to grasp it with external criteria.

An analysis of a work's significance must be conducted on the work itself, not by examining its effects on others. Before trying to relate [Wedekind's work] to the work of others, thereby attributing to it relationships that point beyond its own immanent laws, these laws must be presented in the integrity of their own structure. Having explored it to the limits of its individuality, one can then proceed to the work's external relationships. The first requirement of an attempt to express that which has not yet been conceptualized is the absence of prejudicial assumptions. Perhaps it is this that has been missing in previous attempts to conceptualize the work. The result has been to inappropriately categorize it. It may
be objected that every investigation begins with some notion of its goal, and the objection is justified. Yet one must demand that this notion be formulated at such a high level of abstraction that it can skillfully move in generalities so far from their object that they do not prejudice the understanding of details. In our case, the basic assumption is general enough to leave the details intact. We merely seek to look at Wedekind’s work as a meaningful whole whose positive qualities are as yet undefined. We will not use techniques that assume such qualities. The work, therefore, will not be regarded in terms of how it fits into a historical environment. And we will not approach it with concepts taken from the history of literature or ask whether Wedekind is a naturalist or a decadent, or indeed if he is moral or immoral. Procedures of this type commit the fatal error of approaching a totality with concepts that do not derive meaning from the totality itself. The course of our investigation will reveal the particular importance of dispensing with such assumptions in approaching Wedekind. For the foundation of his form of life and its consequences is so fundamentally different from that of his contemporaries—from whom the conceptual tools are generally taken—that approaches that rely on these instruments are doomed to failure.

III. Tragedy

In order to penetrate immediately to the core of these problems, we will begin with the common generalization, that Wedekind offers a “free treatment of sexual problems.” It will be seen immediately that this phrase already implies a prejudice of the type we have just rejected. Whether Wedekind’s treatment of his subject is free can only be decided by comparing it to other treatments of the same subject. The following will demonstrate that his subject is not sexual problems and, in the process, that the position that produced this phrase is unsuitable to our investigation.
The claim that Wedekind is not concerned with sexual problems may appear paradoxical. His most important works will immediately be pointed to as proof against it. Should Frühlingserwachen [Spring’s Awakening], Erdgeist [Earth Spirit], or Schloss Wetterstein [Castle Wetterstein] signify anything other than the deepest concern with sexual problems? Yet it is doubtful that even the first two works cited are concerned exclusively with sexual matters. At the very least it is worth noting that these works treat problems of individual life—and what is more individual than sexual relations?—at a level of generality that raises them far above their significance for the destiny of the individual alone. Here the basic questions of life are addressed, not in terms of individuals, but of humanity in general. It should be evident that such abstraction to the general level is only possible if the general level—in which this transformation comes to rest—is so deep that one can no longer discern spheres or elements of individual life. These individuals are not imaginative, thinking, bourgeois, artistic people on the one hand and sexual beings on the other. If they were, the juxtaposition of these qualities would render mutual influence unavoidable. The proximity of the individuals would lead to their affecting one another in some way. Setting and defining this sphere would lead to very individual destinies so that an abstraction of the type indicated would be impossible. The process of transforming individuals into the sphere of the species brings the individuals into such a deep layer [of being] that the human beings no longer appear as individual personalities integrating various qualities. Rather their whole life, their entire individuality, appears submerged in a stream of—let us still call it—sexuality. But it is certainly clear that the term sexuality here means something other than what is usually meant by the term. Wedekind’s notion of sexuality is no longer that of an aspect of a person alongside such others as understanding, feeling, reason, etc., but is itself the source of the entire human being. At the most, one concedes that what is commonly called sexuality is retained but cast in a wholly new
and special light. It is like a base note that completely defines the melody built upon it: If it is present, then certain laws of construction are present along with it. Thus Wedekind’s sexuality shines through human beings like fate, forming them right up to the last expression of their being. Its nature is that of a determination, formation, and of an inescapable power behind life—not in life.

That, approximately, is the way the figure of Lulu in *Erdgeist* has to be understood. She is there, simply there. No one knows where she comes from, her name is unknown, her descent cannot be established—but these are essential features that enable us to understand a person. Our whole life is based upon the predictability of the people around us. Although we cannot fully grasp the meaning of the living entity that another person is and cannot really understand it, we create for ourselves an approximate image of his possible conduct from certain external characteristics—occupation, family, circle of friends. As a substitute, because we do not know the people, we project a general pattern to fit their circumstances. This is the technique of social intercourse. But where we lack every possibility of developing a general pattern, the person for whom such a pattern is lacking is projected into a sphere that can only be compared to the state of the physical environment before the human being had concepts to describe it. Fear of the world and fear of chaos are perhaps at the root of all action aimed at achieving order—be it social, scientific, metaphysic, or artistic. But we cannot be certain about this. It is equally possible that the early human being, living in nature, had an inner relationship to the environment that only moved to another level when the transformation from the state of feeling to that of conceptual thought took place. Confronted by the chaotic person—permit us the expression—we lose the possibility of understanding the person.

In everyday life we do not need to conceptually reflect upon [understanding others]. We sense the people around us to be so much like us in thought, feeling, and will because they
have received the same education and upbringing that we have
and are rooted in the same society and culture. Despite the
impossibility of probing the ultimate ground of their personal-
ities, they nonetheless have something familiar about them
because they come from the world they built with others. This
world is the tie that makes the individual a social individual—
one does not only build upon this world, one is at the same
time shaped by it. People from other circles who actively en-
ter into ours are unpredictable, and we have no relationship
to them. They do not have the same spiritual structure. We
feel toward them, but more intensely, what perhaps the hu-
man being felt toward nature before he understood it: anxiety,
horror, and repulsion in the face of ineluctable fate. In
Lulu, Wedekind’s notion of sexuality, which stands behind or
encompasses all life, takes on the substance of an external
fate. The dreadful and fateful that emanates from this being
shines through the men who succumb to it. Perhaps its most
shocking expression is reached when Doctor Schön, rejecting
his bride in a letter Lulu dictates, feels that he is writing his
death sentence. The fear of death intensifies from the first
scene throughout the entire act up to selecting Alwa Schön
as the next candidate for death. Inextricably tied to the form
of the drama, and intensifying its effect upon us, is the fact
that Lulu stands outside of it, actually beyond mankind itself.
While the drama does not always diverge essentially from the
forms to which we are accustomed, it is actually not possi-
bile to speak of a plot joining the acts, though a great deal of
action takes place. A series of events are juxtaposed but only
accidentally connected to each other through the external plot.
The nature of the connection lies in the similarly structured
tragic element that is found in individual events. [In general
the nature of tragedy] has been found in the fact that an indi-
vidual life carries within it the laws of its own destruction, but
that beyond this necessity life itself, along with this necessity,
takes place in freedom. This definition of the tragic applies
to conflicts that one might call intra-individual, in which the
spheres within the human being come into conflict and the desire for fulfillment on the part of one of them threatens to destroy the whole. The individual stands beyond this struggle and decides which combination of demands should be met. With Wedekind, however, the tragic situation is utterly different. Although the men around Lulu carry the necessity of their destruction within themselves, the relativizing element of also being able to choose a different outcome is missing. We saw earlier that sexuality stands behind life and thus lacks all possibility of influencing the elements in life’s individual configuration and forming of destiny. For no matter which relations the elements [in individual lives] assume, they are all pervaded by Wedekind’s notion of sexuality in the same way and the seed of death is sown. The relativity of the tragic as it is usually defined is transformed into the absoluteness of a fate that precludes judgments [and actions] for or against it. This destiny may best be compared to that of Faust. Faust, too, does not have a choice. Behind his entire conduct, the “Faustian destiny” presides as the abstract type of a configuration of life’s elements that determines life by its own immanent law. Here emerges the inadequacy of the definition of the tragic that was introduced earlier. If in the final analysis the hero really could act otherwise, then the tragedy would be distorted to a game of whimsy. For the necessity does not lie in life at all, but stands strictly behind it, just as freedom does. One must be clear that freedom is the highest “determinacy” in accordance with the ethical laws that inescapably determine the entire personality. There is neither freedom nor non-freedom of the will; the solution lies rather in establishing a category that unites freedom and non-freedom and comprehends the relation of their effects on one another as the absolute, just as life as a whole is only to be understood as a reunification of the basic dichotomies of subject-object, form-content, or whatever other opposites one may choose. Variation within the problem of the tragic would now lie in which of the two elements of the conceptual unity the artist tends to in order to
arrive at a destiny that more or less substantially confronts the individual.

Lulu is the personification of the element of necessity that stands behind each individual; and precisely because she stands behind, not in, the life of every single one of the men, she can confront all of them quite apart from their being individuals. If we regard Lulu as the personification of a principle, we understand the meaning of the concept of the Lulu-tragedy. There is no tragedy of Lulu, but only the tragedies of the individual men. To speak of the Lulu-tragedy is to speak of something like what is intended when one speaks of the tragedy of fate. The hero is not fate, but the personalities that are subject to it, the tragic persons. Lulu is not the heroine, the doomed men are the tragical persons. A number of tragedies are placed next to one another and bound by the personification of Lulu’s law; this is the structure of the Lulu-tragedy. Yet here ornament is applied, an element of artistic depiction that is not generally regarded as being very well suited to drama.

Ornament—as we use the term here—refers to the constant recurrence of a figure that evokes a certain mood, both through its own significance and through its recurrence. The type of the recurring figure can vary: It can be a certain line in the visual arts, the refrain of a song; it can be present throughout certain situations as it is in the fertility rites of Zola’s Fécondité. Yet it had been thought hardly possible to use this artistic device in drama, the essence of which is precisely the uniqueness of phenomena, so that the form would seem to resist the possibility of repetition.

In Wedekind’s work, use of this peculiarity increases to the point where the drama verges on becoming pure ornament. In principle, the figures placed beside one another should be of equal value and [in this point] interchangeable. To a certain degree this pure form is attained. The reason behind the particular sequence of the tragedies of the men is not to be found in their tragic nature, but in a certain external device: the intensification of effect that is inherent in the progress from a stroke
through a suicide to a murder. The tragedy as such undergoes no intensification; it does not matter by what technique the figures are killed in order to achieve the result. The differences lie in the intensification of the psychological effects—a device that serves to compensate for the repetition that would perhaps otherwise make itself felt as monotony. The work’s final scene ought also to be regarded from this point of view: as translating the unsurpassed quality of the horror of fate into something quantifiable, in this way creating yet another intensification. Taken on their own, the fates of the minor characters could just as well form the first scene of the work.

Identifying the peculiar form of this drama completes the characterization of the figure of Lulu. It has already been stated that she is not the work’s heroine, a fact expressed in Wedekind’s remark that the performance of Erdgeist does not require a good actress for Lulu, but [requires] excellent actors for the male parts. Since this principle has not been observed, most performances of the work have been inadequate. Lulu is not human at all, but an empty shell for which any kind of filling can be used. The darkness of her past has already been mentioned, and the way she has been drawn is well suited to heightening the impression of the figure’s unreality. The emotional state of mind in which she goes from one man to another is only a superficial psychological cover for a principle that already finds its fulfillment in the personality of each of the men. Lulu is a power behind the lives of people who are complete personalities, a power that stands, not as one individual opposite others, but above the human being as a whole (i.e., considered as a reasonable, imaginative, sensual, and artistic being). That is the Lulu of Erdgeist. It is remarkable to see the poet now succumbing to the same spell as the figures he created. He does not free himself of Lulu, but breathes the principle of life into her character, forming her into a human being like other characters. That is the Lulu of Büchse der Pandora [Pandora’s Box], who with the Lulu of Erdgeist has no more than the name in common. She has become a person and
thus capable of human emotions. Nothing of fate remains to her character, and she is therefore unimportant for the further development of the problem posed in *Erdgeist*.

IV. Family

Up to this point, our investigation has been concerned with formal elements. What is often described as sexuality in Wedekind’s work has been shown, in accordance with its metaphysical type, to dominate all spheres of the ego (to which the instinctual drives also belong). Even if it is Lulu’s physical beauty that binds men to her, there is no justification for identifying this bond with the sensual ego, which exists along with reason and other ego forms.

*Schloss Wetterstein* offers further insight into our problem. As Wedekind himself states, the rather loosely connected scenes express his views on marriage. The scenes are connected in order to achieve the effect of intensification. In the sequence of scenes, the figure Effie and her actions stand out. She is, as it were, a Lulu who has become active. Whereas for all intents and purposes Lulu moved innocently through the tragedy that she occasioned, Effie organizes it herself. The expression is inadequate, but a malicious person would say that she sets up a brothel of which she is the sole inhabitant. Yet she does not set up a brothel, no more than Lulu represents sexuality in the normal sense of the word. The term that is mentioned once, *society whore*, should not be thought of as an ironical or cynical expression; it is literally intended. There is no word for the female type that Wedekind has created here and that, to a certain extent, expresses his ideal. She is not a prostitute in the bourgeois sense of the term, nor is she the mother of a family. It is a type not exactly rare these days. Wedekind rejects the insincerity of the type of family in which the woman no longer has the role of mother, as she did in earlier times, but in which an ambiguous situation arises, because the externals—the morality—of a family with a mother is maintained. If we
do not yet have a concept to describe this new situation, it is nonetheless characterized in the conversation between Effie and her mother. Effie’s mother reproaches her with the shamefulness of wanting to become an actress: “Acting in a theater is a profession in which one is paid for enjoying oneself; no respectable person does that.” Effie replies, “But does a woman not also do that when she gets married?” (6:12). That sounds cynical, but I believe it is meant in complete sincerity. Wedekind dedicates himself to the cause of having this condition recognized, a condition that appears to him to reflect the new form of the family that will replace the old one. With the acceptance of this condition, conclusions regarding the morality of marital life are to be drawn as well, and these perhaps point in the direction of the type described as the society whore. The childless family, the morality of free love, the striving for the emancipation of women—all these phenomena and slogans are combined here but not left in their own sphere. Instead, they are transformed into something new, something that is in accordance with shifting the standpoint from which they are considered. This is what makes them so difficult to understand. “Society whore” is the first expression coined in order to impart new life and positive content to concepts that prior to this were entirely negative. The expression lends them a new, positive content.

One statement gives the key both to their understanding and to a wider range of problems: “The flesh has its own spirit” (6:88). For Wedekind this statement is a program, which he develops in his foreword to the novellas entitled “On the Erotic.” Here, he divides human beings into two great groups:

The one group has paid homage since time immemorial to the saying, “Flesh remains flesh—in opposition to the spirit.”

Now it goes without saying that here spirit is the higher element, the absolute ruler that ruthlessly avenges and punishes each high-handed, revolutionary expression of the flesh.

1. [All parenthetical quotations in the text refer to Frank Wedekind, Gesammelte Werke, 9 vols. (Munich: Insel, 1912–1921).]
But in the long run, the flesh has never accepted this low valuation and dishonor. Over and again, the flesh has played the most fantastic pranks on those who profess that “flesh is flesh—in opposition to the spirit.”

As a result of this eternal prank, another group has formed that, after mature consideration, says: “The flesh has its own spirit.”

[1:199].

We are familiar with the distinction between the erotic and the sexual. In everyday language, the relation between the concepts changes. They become equivalents, or a separate meaning is allotted to both, or sexuality is replaced with the better-sounding word, *eroticism*. In the foreword from which we just quoted, Wedekind himself uses the concepts interchangeably. At one point—without revealing any difference in meaning to the sexual—he speaks of coarse people who took advantage of “the general shyness that existed concerning the erotic.” But that is unimportant. One cannot demand that a poet should know exactly what he wants. Nor must his wording and intentions always be the right ones: Who would claim to know the nature of the phenomenon of Romanticism from their definitions? Let us keep the word *eroticism* until we discover a better wording for the sentence “The flesh has its own spirit.”

For the term must be understood in the strict sense developed in the Lulu-tragedy. The erotic is the power that stands behind life, pervading all forms of existence, sexuality as well, with its particular nature.

Wedekind’s definition of the erotic leads him to a remarkable conclusion about the mechanism of marriage:

We know the machinery of a gas motor, of a flying apparatus. But we do not know the machinery of a marriage. In no book in the world is this mechanism explained. On the other hand, every year hundreds of thousands of books appear in which fantastical detective stories about this mechanism are recounted with gusto, stories in which humanity indulges its old passion of pulling the wool over its eyes about its most important matters.

Thousands of educated people believe their relationship is held together by their being married. They do not consider the real
reasons for staying together. No wonder the mistake leads easily to separation. \[1:203\]

For Wedekind, marriage is an absolute concept. The thought that other forms of the family actually exist—for example, polygamy—appears never to have occurred to him. Yet precisely this oversight, this limited conceptual range, is exceedingly characteristic of Wedekind’s doctrines. The “erotic” stands as the determining power behind the family and prevents a look into other possible forms. Yet on closer inspection, one notices that Wedekind does not speak of families at all, but rather of “marriages.” For him the problem lies solely in the parents’ relationship to one another. The children are only incidental appendages, a view revealed in his notion that family ties through children are irrelevant. “But the worst is when the parents imagine that they remain together on account of their children. The poor children then receive all the beatings that the parents would like to give each other” \[1:203\]. This tie is irrelevant, not for the family, but for what Wedekind smuggles into the concept—namely, his idea of marriage. Even in passages where he uses the word family, he clearly only means marriage. “The family is an alliance in which—for sheer fear that it could fail—the dangers that threaten it can be spoken of only after they have caused it to fail” \[1:202\]. What fails here is not the family, but the bond between the parents, which is indeed only one aspect of family ties. The other ties that Wedekind appears to deny, such as reproduction of the species and maintaining social position, are certainly present in the family but not in Wedekind’s notion of marriage; for this concept has already been defined to mean the “sexual relationship of the parents.” Thus marriage is only one of the family ties, but Wedekind isolates this one bond in order to prove that the entire family structure is dependent on sexuality. Indeed, it looks almost as though sexuality, in contrast to what has been said up to this point, is the power in life upon which all other ego-spheres depend. Certainly the dependence...
on this relation is extended by Wedekind’s virtuosity in juggling concepts. He has first shown that “marriage” depends on sexuality, which is not very difficult, for he has already formed the marriage concept to signify a sexual relationship. He has then substituted the word family for marriage and arrived at the dependence of the family upon sexuality. The “family,” and with it sexuality, is now predominant in the life of the human being. There can be no doubt that he has falsely used the word family for marriage. It seems to me that by excluding the other ties that belong to the family, he disguises the fact that the human being does not consist merely of a family ego but also has several other forms of existence entirely outside the family. Yet Wedekind does not speak of these, and the illusion arises that the whole of life is filled by family bonds, proving the predominance of the sexual or the erotic beside the other spheres of life. This would contradict our finding that [in Wedekind the sexual or erotic] stands above the other spheres.

As we have indicated, this situation is a result of Wedekind’s changing concepts. It is partly explained by what has already been presented. The family is a complex of ties beside other complexes; and each of these complexes can only be regarded as a whole. If just one of the elements that composes the family—the parental sexual tie—is made into its dominant one, the complex of the family takes on a specific erotic coloring. Yet the erotic—we use this noun because we lack a scientific term—stands as a force behind or above the family. Wedekind can put the spheres side by side because he broke the totality of the family down into elements and placed the leading element next to the others. But the selection or preference of one element gives us the criterion by which the complex as a whole is determined from the outside.

Wedekind goes into great detail concerning the spirit of the flesh or the erotic. Of countless examples we will mention only two: the ten grades of love in Schloss Wetterstein and a passage from Die Büchse der Pandora:
Through this dress I perceive your form like a symphony. These slender ankles, this cantabile, this charming swell, and this knee, this capriccio, and the powerful andante of lust. How peacefully the two slim rivals nestle against each other in the awareness that neither equals the other in beauty, until the capricious mistress awakes and the two rivals diverge from one another like two enemy poles. I will sing your praises, that you swoon away.

[2:143]

And what purpose does this immersion into the erotic serve? A construction that hitherto appeared extravagant is extended into an attitude toward life that is perhaps foreign to any but the spirit of Wedekind. It is perhaps alien to an outsider and will remain so after this analysis, but one cannot deny its unique, positive nature. Rabbi Ezra tells his son, Moses, of his marriage and gives him advice in the choice of his wife. His first marriage was unhappy—he had sought the woman by following his “heart” but after her death he went to the “daughters of the desert.” He explains,

I did not seek what was pleasing to my heart; I sought what was pleasing to my senses, because I had come to stifle my misery, because I had come to forget my Lea... And I found that the more she pleased my senses, the more sensibly I could speak to her, the more sensibly she spoke to me, the more friendly she became to me, the more she pleased my heart. And I found, Moses, my son, that the more she pleased my senses, the less I sensed of sin, the more righteous I felt, the closer I felt to the Almighty. Moses, if you were to offer me half a million, I would not want to take it in exchange for this knowledge. No, I would not wish to take it; for that knowledge carries interest of 20 percent, 30 percent, 100 percent, and the interest is children and children’s children. One can be unhappy with half a million, but one cannot be unhappy with the knowledge that the love of the flesh is not in the service of Satan if the human wanders the path that the Lord has shown him. For he has created two humans for one another without and within, in body and soul. (1:227)

The urgency of the language gives us an idea of the extent to which this knowledge stems from Wedekind’s own heart. The erotic leads to divinity, immersion in the flesh leads to
the spirit. Conceptually, flesh and spirit divide into two poles that come together, and find their explanation in the erotic. We are reminded of the rejection of those who assume that the spirit is divided from the flesh. Now, spirit and flesh part ways for Wedekind too. The spirit is something beyond, and flesh is only the path to it. Or, to be more precise, salvation lies in the act of finding the spirit in the flesh. But the group rejected by Wedekind does not seek anything else either. In their goal they are united; it is the ways that divide them.

Remarkably, the family is now introduced in its complete form. The interest brought by the knowledge is children and children’s children. So the family graciously takes up the tie of reproduction again. Wedekind can permit this because he is no longer struggling against a family type that has outgrown its moral framework. He has realized his family, one in which the leading tie is the parents’ sexual relationship. He thus arrives at a new family morality. The positive character of this morality is perhaps best suited to put the foolishness of the claims of Wedekind’s “immorality” in proper perspective. Rabbi Ezra continues:

And then I went, Moses, and I sought a woman with all my senses. I found Sarah, the daughter of Mardochais, magnificent to look at like the newly created earth, and she became your mother. I tested her through and through, and found that her heart is the twin of my heart. And in the marriage night, Moses, my son, in the night for which you have your life to thank, then I knew that her body is the twin of my body; and I praised the Lord, whose spirit does not lie, whose truth is revealed in his works. (1:228)

Here, the concept of the society whore seems questionable. Perhaps because it was born out of the rejection of bourgeois morality, it was defined in a purely negative manner. Rabbi Ezra shows that this opposition, which is perhaps present, is merely external. It is merely the path to Wedekind’s new, positive morality of the family in which the parents’ sexual relationship is the dominant element and thus determines its
principles. If, in other moral systems, the raising of children and the joy of family life are the highest and most valuable elements, in Wedekind’s morality they are twin bodies and hearts finding each other. Ultimately, human beings whose hearts speak to each other through the senses represent the highest principle of the new morality.

V. Eroticism of Death

Effie was denied the finding of her twin body, and this made her into a society whore. As indicated in the work, she was perhaps disposed to the new morality by her physical constitution. Yet she lives in the world of the old morality, a world that does not yet contain the men who could fulfill her.

I would never have become a prostitute, if someone like you had mastered me. [6:97]

She leads her life as a prostitute out of necessity; she cannot find the path to the happiness of a marriage of “twin bodies” and suffers the same fate that Rabbi Ezra suffered before he attained knowledge. For Effie, however, salvation, which Rabbi Ezra found in the right marriage, is detached from life and elevated from the plane of relative fulfillment to the abstract heights of death. Death, if it takes meaning from the physical twin, is the highest consecration and fulfillment of Wedekind’s moral principles:

My death is child’s play so long as its meaning transcends the meaning of my life. [6:97]

Hidden here is the psychological technique by which life’s fulfillment is driven to its climax in sacrificial death. Because Effie’s barren life has no fulfillment, she is driven to so desperately embrace salvation that she finds at last, that it is transformed into destruction. The scale of love is crowned in the extreme of sacrificial death; the physical union holds for eternity:

Ninth as contest, tenth as sacrificial celebration—may our divinity never leave us! [6:89]
When Rabbi Ezra found the wife who spoke to his senses and through his senses to his heart, he felt himself less sinful, more righteous and closer to God. When the right ones finally find each other, death marks love’s consummation by absorbing the lovers into divinity.

You are lacking the female who sacrifices everything for you. I am lacking the man to whom I might sacrifice myself. [6:97]

Here the series of the kind of tragedy that precede the encounter of the twin bodies is indicated. For Effie, too, salvation turns into tragedy because she finds the wrong partner.

VI. Wedekind—Hafiz

The preceding remarks have partially completed our examination of Wedekind’s system. If one looks through popular and perhaps even highly regarded histories of literature, one encounters opinions about Wedekind that diverge markedly from our interpretation. One critic (out of politeness we mention no names) calls Wedekind a comedian of the grotesque, another accuses his work of an obscurity only exceeded by its dullness and goes on to make the—let us call it—grotesque comic claim that Wedekind portrays character poorly. Opinions of this type, of which any number can be found, show the extent of the misunderstanding that surrounds Wedekind’s work. They also point to the following problem: What is Wedekind’s place in German literature, a literature so wholly different that its high priests have stood perplexed before this natural wonder? But perplexed is not the right word. They keep good counsel and curse.

As we noted at the beginning, one cannot approach Wedekind with the old criteria, and our discussion has shown how right our judgment was. Wedekind does not oppose the old—or at least he does not merely do that, for in that case one could indeed judge him by the old standards. Instead, he sets a new positive view that cannot be understand all at once. In
order to understand Wedekind, we turn to the teachings of another poet—the poet Hafiz. A comparison will provide almost a commentary to Wedekind and make many things that we find in him more clear and understandable. In pointing to and demonstrating the parallel concepts, Wedekind's independence will also be made more clear. To the extent that Wedekind's position was, so to speak, never there before, we can understand why he is incomprehensible to literature historians focused on "German" literature.

We begin with a description of Hafiz's values. These are summarized in the poem “Treasures”:

These are the treasures of this earth:
The sound of a stringed instrument, a glass of wine, a dance of
Slim-legged girls, a sweetheart's favor
And then a silence—yes, a deep silence.

The intoxication of wine, music, love, and then silence—these are Hafiz's supreme values. Two in particular—love and wine—are raised to new heights. Yet these are not value themselves, but only paths to the meaning of the world:

Raise the full beakers to your lips,
So do you truly attain to life!

Love yields the same depths of life. The poet has grown tired of the foolish wisdom and shallow virtue of the days of his youth:

You came here and said, “Hither to me!
With me is mirthful foolishness! Pluck
Sin from my rosy lips
And from my breasts, firm with youth!”
I came here filled with pleasure that you were
Fond of me,
And did as you commanded—and enjoyed.

A mood quite similar to Wedekind’s springs from these verses: the call to intoxication, to the attainment of spirit through flesh. To an outside observer, this pleasure may easily seem

2. [Khajeh Shamseddin Mohammad Hafiz-s Shirazi, d. 1389.]
to be entirely earthbound. Hafiz's pleasure however, points beyond this realm, to world and God:

Pleasure lifts you blissfully to the stars—
Not penitence and self-denial, which humble you.  
Only pleasure makes you at one with the earth,  
Only through pleasure do you become one with God.

The parallels to Wedekind's notion of the value of love hardly need to be emphasized. As for wine, there is the following poem:

To water I have sworn eternal hatred,  
For from it flow none of the magic arts,  
Ascending dream-heavy from the dark ground  
That I have chosen to point my way.  
It is a sensible fellow,  
It presses me straight to the temple's threshold  
And opens the dark doors to my gaze. (1:26)

Commentary is superfluous. The most remarkable thing is the parallel to two of Wedekind's most important concepts. The first corresponds to Wedekind's spirit of the flesh:

If you lackeys dare to begrudge me  
Fair sensuality—be cursed,  
For the deepest meaning of  
The senses remains closed to you.

Wedekind's second concept is contained in the doctrine of the purity of sin: “that fleshly love is not the service of Satan if the human being travels the paths that the Lord has pointed out to him.” Compare Hafiz:

Unworthy you are if vulgar sense  
And coarseness rule you in sinning,  
Yet if you sin with a pure heart,  
So is the sin a thing of radiant beauty,  
And, boldly sinful, you become a God!

These far-reaching parallels seem to me to prove the earlier claims that Wedekind's work is self-contained, and that—as far as our investigation has proceeded—we have not found it to be
rooted in the German literary tradition. Here it stands like a foreign body, a distant poetic personality echoing in each detail. Yet the parallels are not only present in a few fundamental concepts but persist into the expression of an attitude of life. (Below we will provide more evidence to support this claim.)

The sinning of a pure heart marks the transition from the desultory search for pleasure to concentration on the one object that best reveals meaning to the senses. Here we find the transition to a moral rigorism that appears in Wedekind’s work in the doctrine of the twin souls and the crowning glory of salvation in death. This same praise of the search for pleasure in fidelity can be found in Hafiz’s work:

You do not suspect how immutable and deep
Is the fidelity that dwells in my breast:
If you knew how I despise all the joys of
The world, which set me apart from you.
Whatever ill is spoken of me, the love
That burns in me is a pure flame.
I seem to you to feign? No, my being
Is devout, profoundly aroused by you alone—
Only by you!

If we possessed no other poems by Hafiz, it would not be evident what kind of love his was—whether it really issues, as claimed, from the meaning of the senses. But in a great number of lines, Hafiz has analyzed this meaning of the senses, neglecting no detail that has an important effect on the senses. He returns again and again to the hair of his beloved, her eyes, her cheeks, the hem of her gown and the sweet breath of her mouth, the steps her feet take, and above all to the splendor of her dark locks, in which he seeks the soul that he has lost in them:

Your arched brows, oh Beloved,
Are groves of paradise, smiling under them
Live the fair angels of your eyes.
The splendor spread throughout the world
Issues from these angels who brought with them
The shimmer of the fields of paradise.
This one example may suffice to indicate how Hafiz finds the meaning of the world in its objects. This is the main value of the comparison. With Hafiz we can see, into the most minute detail, how the world looks from the standpoint of a philosophy that finds meaning in the senses. But we do not find this in Wedekind. He merely points to the objects that serve as carriers of meaning and recounts the state of intoxication or fulfillment that these objects induce. Although there are exceptionally detailed analyses of the object (poem 1:115, for example), he does not say what kind of meaning the object awakens. However, that the meanings he extracts from them constitute the meaning of life as a whole is revealed in other passages. For example:

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And when the soul loses its anima
All the lights are extinguished.
For what still remains to me,
For that, I would not give a dime. (1:121)
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Here, the meaning of the senses remains confined to the poet’s experience and is not objectified into a kind of theology as it is with Hafiz. This self-enclosed element is what makes it so difficult to understand Wedekind and justifies the digression that we have taken here. Without the spirit of the flesh, there is no spirit at all. Up to now, this peculiarity of Wedekind’s doctrine has not been sufficiently emphasized. He does not acknowledge the spirit of the old morality as well as the spirit of the flesh. This latter view can only be maintained if one keeps the phrase “the flesh has its own spirit”; for in this case, there might still be spirit beyond the flesh. The meaning of the phrase is more precisely expressed as: only the flesh has spirit, or, according to Hafiz, only the senses have meaning. For both Wedekind and Hafiz, he who seeks spirit or meaning without the senses is not on the path to salvation. One can imagine Wedekind’s first phrase to have arisen in opposition to the old morality; the clarification offered here shows again
and more clearly that no relationship—not one of opposition, either—exists between the old morality and Wedekind’s.

In conclusion, both the parallels between Wedekind and Hafiz and the difference just mentioned can be demonstrated in quotations summing up their doctrines in praise of the highest power.

Hafiz:

You brightest star in the firmament of beauty,
Come, let your magic reign, bathe
The vain fools in your sea of light!
They think that they could resist—
Rob them of their composure
With laughter,
They want to learn that the power of beauty
Is more powerful than all on earth
That calls itself strong, that it upturns
Order and law and all virtue as nothing.

Wedekind:

I love love, the serious art,
It is eternal science,
Love is heaven’s sacred favor,
Which is earth’s great power. (1:96)

In Hafiz’s poem, object and meaning can be distinguished from one another, and this is what lends [the work] its wonderful clarity. Hafiz praises the power of beauty—not beauty in the abstract, but the beauty of his beloved. He is able to extract the meaning of this beauty and retain it, while the objective bearer of the meaning remains intact. Wedekind’s much more impulsive—one could perhaps say more modern—character dissolves and destroys the independent existence of meaning and the bearer of meaning, dissolving them into the unity of the beholding subject from which, in the last instance, they were derived.
VII. Positivity

At the beginning of our examination, we objected to the assertion that Wedekind was preoccupied with sexual problems, and showed that this was not the case. Indeed, one could almost say that he did not concern himself with problems at all. Nothing was problematic for him; he merely expressed his view of the world and politely requested that opposing views be dropped and the truth of his acknowledged. To express it paradoxically, it is doubtful that he ever reflected at all upon what he wrote. His understanding of the family shows an astounding ignorance of the basic problems, which is of course by no means a mistake or deficiency [of reflection], for it is not caused by mature consideration of the possible family forms but because the poet takes his own closed, unreflecting personality [as his basis], and this radically restricts his horizon. Wedekind has never reflected on the validity of any form of life but his own, has never suspected that not only the flesh, but every other thing imaginable has its own spirit and with that, its own meaning, significance, or value. The thought of the relativity of all values in the phenomenal world has perhaps never occurred to him.

The astonishing thing about Wedekind is his incredibly energetic, positive character, which is entirely contrary to the opinions that seek to ascribe destructive tendencies to him. For one thing, his view of things appears to have fallen from the sky; it undergoes no development. Beginning with his standpoint, he simply rejects the old morality and thereby distinguishes himself fundamentally from a considerable number of poets (and those who would like to be) whose activity exhausts itself in proving the rottenness of the old morality. They rummage around in the repugnant excesses of social conditions—one generally calls this kind of thing “immanent criticism.” And once they have worked their way through mountains and deserts of abomination, they stand with mournful gestures, oppressed by so much misery and depravity. Depending on
their level of energy, they demand that humanity press on to new forms of life. They opine that people will change, or dream of the coming dawn, of sunrises, of the splendor of a new era, and other very poetic things. They then assert, historico-
deterministically, that history will change people. Such rum-
maging about does not usually produce anything new. Wede-
kind is different. He has not reached his position through a critique of society. If he presents his views in opposition to the old morality (which he seldom does), he always presents them in the form of a transcendent critique made in the conviction that he has seen and knows the right path. He is so sure of his position that he does not need to examine and criticize the contradictions in his opponent's position and thus attract support for his. He simply stands up and [expects the truth of his position] to be clear to everyone on the side of truth and justice. Wedekind's standpoint has not been laboriously won; he has not struggled and found his way through a tradition that does not let one go even when one has overcome it. The old morality is not a piece of himself that he faces with the love of the teacher who wants to correct mistakes. He is not the type who, because he has overcome the old ideas in which he had lived, wishes to lovingly lead others to participation in his discovery of a new value-ideal. For Wedekind, the old morality is something closed, complete, and ultimately alien. He regards it only as a deficiency in the reality of its bearers, but he does not understand it in the least, and he opposes it with his whole being.

Here the main problem of our investigation emerges with greater clarity. On the one hand, there is the old society, on the other, Wedekind's work; and there seems to be no relationship between them. If previously the difficulty of understanding Wedekind was because of uncomprehending literary historians, we must now face the more difficult question of trying to explain how this work could have arisen at all. Here we cannot rely on the usual method which finds that, because Wedekind's doctrine is similar to that of Hafiz and many other
poets as well, he must have been influenced by them. Many and very respected scholars use this method (again, names are best left unmentioned). The works of an artist are presented and connections are shown with all forms of world literature to prove who “influenced” him. If one is fortunate enough to grasp the work of a human down to the last detail and to prove that each element has already existed before, then a certain type of literature historian rests content and is “finished” with the artist.

But actually it is at this stage that the problems begin. Every human being—certainly poets as well—who has been dissected in this way [has received] an enormous number of impressions and stimuli. Yet only a modest portion of these fall on fertile ground while the others are lost and not taken up at all. Once the preparatory work of breaking a thing down into its component parts has been completed, the problem for the researcher is: Why were just these elements and no others significant for the poet’s personality? If certain parallels between Wedekind and Hafiz have been demonstrated, this does not mean that Wedekind has been “explained.” I do not know whether Wedekind ever read Hafiz; and if he has, it does not matter. For then the question would be, Why did he let himself be influenced by Hafiz or related poets and not by others he also read? We therefore eschew every “influence,” because nothing depends upon it, and turn to a new investigative method.

VIII. The Values

In order to develop our methodological aids, we must first clarify one aspect of the social structure. Plato’s treatment of the problem in the Republic is well suited to our purpose.

The Platonic state is made up of estates. The citizens, artisans, tradesmen, and farmers form the lowest estate. Collectively, they can be viewed as the class responsible for the economic maintenance of the state. This class lives in families, owns houses and property, is rich and is allowed to enjoy
wedekind

its wealth as it wishes. The second estate comprises warriors, whose tasks are to protect the state against external enemies and to ensure internal peace. They live in poverty, do not own the goods that the lowest estate owns in plenty, and—like members of the first and highest estate—are not allowed to live in families. What binds them is a community of love for the state that has been entrusted to them and a firm will to protect it from danger. The virtues of this estate are watchfulness and courage, just as prudence and moderation distinguish the lower estate. The highest one is composed of the wise, or rulers. Their virtues are knowledge and justice and their task is to order the state and preserve its laws. The three estates of the commercial, warrior, and wise are arranged in hierarchical layers.

Our problem is found in this layering of the estates. The peculiar character of each estate consists in a primary value to which the individual lovingly devotes himself and which he wishes to realize completely. Each individual regards his value as the highest, and it is impossible to predict how these values will relate to each other. There is no reason why the entrepreneur or warrior should allow himself to be ruled by the wise. He might regard such rule as exploitation and abuse of power and reject it. If the warrior and wise estates try to establish their rule, then as history since the Middle Ages up to the present has shown with complete clarity, the commercial class will drive them out and establish its own value as the ruling and highest one. Necessary though it may be that the three Platonic values work together to the benefit of the social whole, the various values alone do not form a society. The people holding the various values may have opposing views and may struggle against one another bitterly. Since each of these values tends to construe itself as absolute, the plurality will generally tend to produce conflict.

Plato solves this difficulty in a very instructive way. The citizens of his state must be told the legend that nature has placed ore in the souls of the lowest estate, silver in those of the
warriors, and gold in those of the rulers. Here Plato presents a scale that ranks the values in order to eliminate the possibility of conflict. An important aspect of this scale must be noted here, for in itself, the quarrel could rage more intensely than before if the one prizes ore more highly, another silver, and a third gold. How are absolute value judgments to be made? Thus the important feature is not the substitution of metals for the values of the commercial, warrior, and ruling estates. If one were to take three other metals, the hierarchical relationship would not be present. But Plato’s metals are distinguished by the fact that they are also used in daily life and possess economic value. The economic judgment classifies them in terms of the strict hierarchy of their economic worth. “Value in the economy” is the relation that puts the three metals upon a scale and makes it possible to rank them in relation to the other values. It is not about the metals themselves; one could just as easily take other goods that relate even more clearly to economic values. The important point is the ranked relationship measured in terms of economic value.

If the citizens believe in the truth of the legend of the composition of their souls, then the peace, order, and unity of the state are ensured. There are no struggles, revolutions, or mutinies, because the belief in the hierarchy of the metals is absolute; it contains and overrides the belief in each separate value of the respective estate.

Plato’s procedure points to a necessary and fundamental sociological insight. It is not enough to investigate society in terms of its stratification. Such an investigation may yield a scaled order of values, but it does not explain the principle of order. We have analyzed the estates and ascertained their value, but we do not yet know the reason for their attachment to society as a whole. This relationship must be made through a value that is immanent to values of the estates; it cannot, as Plato construes it, be borrowed from a partial area of the life of the society. The value of an estate as a coordinating tie shall be called a horizontal value, and the comprehensive value
that establishes the encompassing and overriding relationship shall be called the vertical value. If we use this terminology, a complete analysis of any society will require us to discern both the horizontal and the vertical values.

Without entering into a detailed investigation, it is immediately clear that the horizontal values emerge over and over again, that the estates of priest, noble, warrior, citizen, and farmer always recur. It is the difference in vertical values that gives societies the appearance of being structured differently. The differences in vertical values produce the differences in societies. The objection that the differences among societies are attributable to different types of education and the differing arrangement of horizontal values must be rejected, for this arrangement is merely a function of the vertical value in relation to which the horizontal values are organized.

In order to make it relatively clear what such a vertical value is, let us turn to ancient Greece. Spengler describes the vertical value of the Greeks as “Euclidean,” but it is perhaps better to call it “form oriented” in order to remove it from the realm of that which is relatively accidentally realized and identify it as a value standing above all others. Let us look at several examples of Greek society’s orientation to form.

Plato’s ideas are somata, physical forms that one can apprehend: Genuine knowledge is remembrance of that which has been seen.

On the Greek concept of love, let us recall Simmel’s discussions in the “Fragment on Love.” For the Greeks, love involves turning to an object. The object, the beloved object, is something external, existing in itself, to which the spirit directs itself in a desire to become one with it. The expression of this kind of love is the state of being between having and not having, the desire for knowledge. By contrast, in Simmel’s

view, modern love is something a priori: Flowing from the loving subject, it immerses the object—which can also be subsumed under other principles of observation—in the stream of this particular a priori. (Incidentally, describing modern love as an a priori suggests that the a priori itself is “modern” or, more precisely, “German,” and that it has no validity in other types of societies. It is certainly no accident that transcendental philosophy is a closed book in Western Europe and America.)

Greek destiny is determined, not by the structure of the personality, but by an external power against the influence of which the individual is helpless. Thus one element in the concept of tragedy is given concrete substance here—the aspect of life’s predetermination.

Lastly, an observation of Jakob Üxküll should be mentioned: “While our water vessels [if they are good] reflect our human activity in every detail of the clay, with the ancient jugs, which attempted to represent the most apt containment of water, these characteristics recede into the background.” To be sure, Üxküll uses this observation to other purposes, but it clearly indicates the form-oriented value of Greek society.

From the philosophical system to the form of the water jug, the vertical value pervades the entire society and generates the relationship that Plato establishes for his state by the hierarchy of metals.

We have demonstrated the realization of a vertical value. The next question is, How [is one] to ascertain and define it unequivocally so that the investigation is not dependent on the researcher’s subjective impressions? We find its precise expression where the meaning of life is formulated, for the sake of which we live in society, in the concept of salvation or love. For the Greeks the vertical value was defined as “form-oriented” because of their understanding of love as an object with its own qualities of form. We can perhaps now understand the word form-oriented, which expresses the Greek experience of love, only incompletely or perhaps not at all. Spengler maintains that ideas cannot be expressed [in concepts]. In every society
one such inexpressible idea is the idea of love. Its structure can of course be analyzed, but the ultimate meaning lies in the experience and not in the conceptualization of the experience. The concept merely points to the life experience.

The methodological instruments of sociology—the horizontal and vertical values and the expression of the vertical value in the concept of love—are the tools with which we now proceed to investigate the question of Wedekind’s representative significance for German society.

IX. The Vertical Values

We define a social phenomenon as belonging to a particular society when it manifests that society’s vertical value.

It should now be clear why we chose Wedekind to be the focus of a sociological investigation: He formulates a vertical value, a concept of love. This concept can serve as an interpretative principle for other investigations concerned with more peripheral problems. To define the concept we will use Hafiz’s expression of the “meaning of the senses.” We use this expression because it is more general than Wedekind’s “spirit of the flesh,” and we may therefore hope that it will occasion fewer misinterpretations.

The vertical value expressed by Wedekind is essentially different from the German vertical value. This value has been very well expressed by Novalis (in principle we could choose any other German poet or philosopher up to the beginning of the nineteenth century):

All our affections appear to be nothing but applied religion. The religious organ seems to be the heart. Perhaps the highest creation of the productive heart is heaven itself. The origin of religion is found where the heart, stripped of all real, individual objects, makes itself into an ideal object. All individual affections unite into one, the wonderful object of which is a higher being, divinity. For this reason, a genuine reverence for God envelops all emotions and inclinations. . . .

To make the beloved into an individual god is applied religion.
Heaven is the higher creation of an active heart, and the object of heaven is the beloved. Here the a priori, love, is formulated with the utmost perfection; its whole essence—the affections converging and uniting—is created by the subject and then lavishly poured out upon the beloved object. The process is reminiscent of the little song, “If I love you, what does that have to do with you.” Here we have the completely closed quality of a type of love that exists within the subject and is projected onto the object.

One cannot even call Wedekind’s formulation of the concept a reversal: It is fundamentally different. “The more she spoke to the senses, the more she spoke to my heart.” One cannot say of the concept of Novalis, that “the more she spoke to my heart, the more etc.” For Novalis, the senses are omitted entirely, and it is not the heart that speaks to the heart. The affections are feelings of longing that arise in a heart and are present without having an external object. They circle blindly in the subject and lead their own existence until they are complemented by an object and find salvation. It is much more important that an object be present at all than that it be defined and possess certain qualities. One could even say that no qualities are present, that they only arise when the object is viewed in light of the affections and feelings projected onto it. This complex of feelings functions as a “rule of observation” that makes the object into the object of a world that is entirely different from other worlds—from reality, nature, or art. The transformation into another world produces the particular character of the beloved object, an object that now possesses qualities given to it by the lover. Others do not see these qualities because they see the “real” object and not the “beloved” one.

With “form-oriented” love, the qualities belong to the object and the lover seeks, by giving himself, to participate in these qualities. Wedekind’s love draws meaning from the object to itself and transforms the senses into the meaning of the world. Novalis’s love is rooted in the subject. The object is merely the
mechanism that releases it, merely the goal for feelings already “secure” in themselves. Whether it be through participating in the other, finding meaning in the senses, or finding a goal, the functions they fulfill—salvation, unity of subject and object—are the same. In view of the ultimate unity of the functions, our distinction may appear to be pedantic hair splitting. Their significance can be seen in our Greek examples. Fine differences in the expression of love—which, as love, would seem to be always and everywhere the same—amount to great differences among societies and cultures. The differences and misunderstandings that set peoples, nations, and races against one another in enmity and hate can be traced back to such differences in the concept of love. Again, there emerges—transferred to the level of life conceived more widely—the peculiarity that life’s defining categories, despite a unity of formulations, include a duality of principles. “Tragic” was the category that included the pair of opposites, “freedom—nonfreedom of will.” In the life of a society, the vertical value includes the absolute unity of a society as well as the absolute multiplicity of societies.

Excursus on method

The present discussion has sufficiently defined the character of Wedekind’s vertical value—let us call it the “new” value for short, and at the same time let us distinguish it from other values, particularly from the German “a priori.” With some reason one could object that this procedure is superficial. One would point to the seeming paradox of attempting to draw from a single social phenomenon minutely detailed conclusions about a great number of heterogeneous phenomena such as a society offers us. The objection is justified if one regards society, not as a whole, but as a chaos of individual strivings and conflicts of interest. Here is not the place to offer an extensive critique of this standpoint and to defend the opposite position of universalism, which we have taken and which we believe to be the correct one. We confine ourselves to recall-
ing the example of Hellenism and noting that such examples can be multiplied at will and the method be applied to other societies. According to this procedure, the vertical value must be clearly evident in each of a society’s phenomena—whether this be the current fashion in clothes or the legislative structure. But certain phenomena better lend themselves to exact expression than others, and the best of these is the concept of love. [Hermann Graf] Keyserling once said, “To the one who can hear them at all, a world’s key notes can be heard out of a few chords; too much music confuses the ear.” The method developed here draws the attention of the musically less talented to the dominant chords. Of course, some talent is still required to recognize the note again once it has been heard: The completely unmusical hear nothing and “identify” individual notes that seem to depart from the original key. Referring to those who cannot be improved, Joseph Nadler cites the words of Gobineau in his brilliant investigation of Romanticism:4 “Let us therefore leave these childish things and not compare persons, but rather groups of persons”; or, “Once more and a hundred times, let it be said that I do not restrict myself to the limited basis of individualities.” Perhaps by this Nadler means that an individual might also conduct himself in a way other than the manner normally manifested by members of his society. Contrary to this view, we maintain that an individual always conducts himself in a way that corresponds to his society. It is only that conditioning by the vertical value is less clearly present in the average individual than it is in the great personalities who lead lives that reflect this value in its highest intensity.

X. The Horizontal Value and Its Transformation

We have completed our analysis and explanation of the vertical values. Let us now turn to the horizontal values.

4. [Josef Nadler, Die Berliner Romantik, 1800–1814 [Berlin: Reiss, 1921].]
Without entering into a historical discourse, let us point to the medieval development of German society. Proceeding from the dual pinnacle of pope and emperor, the society is structured into an extraordinary variety of estates, down to the farmers and serfs. Although characterized by the fullness of life that exists in contrast to every [abstract] structure, it still corresponds to the image of the Platonic society with its pinnacle in the estate of wise rulers and its base in the commercial class. The various possible phenomena and realizations contained in a vertical value are polarized by society and distributed through a number of spheres existing side by side.

In the course of history, German society has undergone changes that have brought it from its most widely extended condition to its contemporary state. Because of the collapse of one horizontal value after another, there is now only one single horizontal value.

Nietzsche formulated this value in some detail as that herd animal morality that strives with all its strength for the general happiness of green pastures on earth: namely, security, absence of danger, comfort, ease of life, and lastly, “if everything goes well,” hopes to rid itself of any kind of shepherd or herd leader. Its two most frequently preached doctrines are “equal rights” and “compassion for all who suffer”—and suffering itself is understood as something that must simply be abolished.

If we supplement this list with “pacifism,” “right to a full wage,” and “securing a minimum existence,” then this description suffices for our purposes. The term external personality [äussere Persönlichkeit] describes this value well. It is the sole horizontal value of modern German society, which is divided into the subclasses—not estates—of the poor and rich. In this society, social position means possessing property; “external personality” as a class value includes citizen and worker, capitalist and socialist alike. At the level of abstraction of a sociological investigation no difference exists between them; for as was once said, socialism is capitalism in the inverted key. The capitalists are owners, deriving their social position from
their property; the fact that the workers would like to acquire that property in principle reveals that they have the same value that the capitalists do. The so-called “white-collar workers” form no special estate either: If doctors strike, artists form associations to lobby for their interests, and civil servants are paid overtime, then these groups also belong to the worshippers of the “external personality.” We can therefore justifiably speak of a single class society from which only a few isolated individuals stand out as exceptions—for example, Wedekind.

The fusing of a society into one estate has a very important consequence for the individual. In a society that is maximally horizontally differentiated the vertical value can be optimally developed. The individual living in this society is pervaded in his whole being by the value’s full range of expression; for to live in a society means to be woven into its value system, to be joined to society in its entirety. Even when an individual lives in the lowest estate of society, he still exists within the effective sphere of this cosmos; he is not isolated and exclusively confined to the characteristics of his own horizontal value.

If (without attaching a value judgment to it) we call this state of developed society full culture, then a society that has melted together is in the state of a diminished culture (again without a value judgment). The horizontal value of the “external personality” is probably still stamped with Novalis’s vertical value of love seeking its goal, but—and this is decisive—it requires completion. The need for completion is not a quality that would be necessary to the isolated, horizontal value in itself, but becomes necessary because human beings are carriers of the vertical value. These human beings do not allow their lives to be broken down into horizontal values and then allow some of these values simply to be taken away. This vertical value, as the foremost principle of tragedy, occupies them completely, at least it tries to. But it cannot do so if the individual does not live in a completely developed system of vertical values—in a full culture Society. The individual in a diminished society leads only a partial life that is not pervaded
by all the types of phenomena produced by the society’s transcendent, unifying principle.

This kind of fragmentary existence does not seem to disturb the tranquillity of the vast majority of human beings. Perhaps for a moment, at decisive points of life, the question of the meaning of life is raised. It is then that one notes with surprise or horror that it is an open question whether it has any. But such moments, if they occur, do not have any lasting effect. Some individuals feel this lack of meaning more strongly, and their life is defined by the attempt to overcome it. They constitute a particular type of person who clearly stands out from his environment. We still have no word for the type: Most often it appears as a writer, but it could also appear, for example, as the organizer and creator of great enterprises. For our purposes, the term writer will do, noting that writers make up just part of the type.

Writers emerged in greater numbers at a time when the transition to a single class society became particularly clear: with Romanticism at the end of the eighteenth century. There we find people without jobs, living only from their education and on the strength of their personalities. For the first time, they express values of life that diverge essentially from the German vertical value. Novalis remains within the mystical sphere of those who have turned away from the world, and for this reason his formulations can serve as the pattern of the “a priori” [values]. Novalis lived, so to speak, outside the society of his time; his friends received him as a stranger whose words offered glimpses into the beauties of an unknown land, a land, however, that remained closed to them. Others, like Tieck, were earthier and suffered much more under the conditions of the time. In Tieck’s William Lovell, we find this remarkable passage:

That we have sensuality is by no means contemptible, nor can it be. And yet we ceaselessly strive to deny it to ourselves and let it melt into and become one with our reason that in each of our fleeting feelings we may be able to respect ourselves. For
it must be admitted that sensuality is the prime, moving wheel in our machine. It moves our existence from place to place and makes it cheerful and lively—everything that we dream of as beautiful and noble touches us here. [. . .] Sensuality and lust are the spirit of music, painting, and all the arts; all the human being’s wishes circle around this pole like winged insects around a burning flame. The sense of beauty and taste in art are only other dialects and expressions that denote no more than the human being’s drive towards lust.

We do not want to multiply examples, though it could be easily done, for this would not substantially improve the clarity of the process. If we consider what this expression means, two possible ways of rescuing oneself from the fragmented life remain. Either one withdraws from society, encapsulated in its vertical value, and becomes a hermit as Novalis did in a life of contemplation of God; or one makes a virtue out of necessity and takes from society what it has to give.

We defined the horizontal value as the “external personality,” thereby characterizing the inner fragmentation of this value. The “external personality” is directed entirely toward that which is outward, the visible, tangible, and tactile—in other words, to the objects of sensory perception. The a priori, on the other hand, is completely internal and in principle exists without the perception of external objects. Indeed, it generates the object itself. The human beings who live in the fragmented world, who even affirm it and want to help it blossom, must somehow transform this horizontal value into a vertical one. In order to make it into a value that fulfills the whole of life, they must transform the “external personality” into an internal one. In Romanticism, we can observe this process of transformation. The sphere of the sensual is transformed into meaning. This process is very clear in Tieck’s work. It is even more compelling in a passage of Georg Büchner’s: “It all leads to one thing, to where pleasure is found: to bodies, pictures of Christ, glasses of wine, flowers, or children’s playthings. It
is namely the feeling, that he who enjoys the most, prays the most.” There is hardly any difference between this and the doctrines of Wedekind and Hafiz, to which we now return. Wedekind offered the most appropriate starting point for the analysis of this immanent law of social life because he most purely and exactly engages in the transformation process.

This process can be considered as taking place with the necessity of law, but of a sociological and not a natural law. This law—let us call it the *law of transformation*—is not a causal law of natural science but derives its validity from the categorical determinations of life and its structure from the concepts of the tragic and of the vertical value. For this reason, this law was rather more strongly emphasized than would have been absolutely necessary for the investigation. A few words will indicate the perspectives that this new methodological instrument opens up for sociology. With it we can investigate all phenomena that lie outside the normal course in which vertical values are concretely realized. Although I do not understand enough of [its history] to judge, a transformation like the one shown in Wedekind’s work may have begun just after the disintegration of the highest estate. In all cases where an estate dies out an investigation should be undertaken to identify the system, or systems, into which the remaining horizontal values have been transformed. A theory of influences would have to run parallel to a theory of transformation. The connection, for example, between the transformation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Germany and the influence of French culture should be examined, or between the transformation described here and the enormous influence of Judaism in the present day. These influences among societies take place at various times and are woven into a dense web that will keep generations of sociologists busy unraveling it.

5. [Georg Büchner, *Danton’s Tod*, act I, scene 5 (see note on 141, Wedekind, ed. Hollweck).]
XI. The New Society

The [horizontal] value of the “external personality” is transformed into a salvational value [Erlösungswert]—a vertical value. Yet as its name indicates, the “external personality” does not reach down to the roots of life. Thus, those who feel intensely are joyless if they possess this value alone. The writer opposed to the transformed value offers an exit—and indeed the closest exit—from the sterility of the one estate. The new direction lies in the construction of a full culture for the individual in opposition to the mixed culture of the masses. Unfortunately the new, complete culture is hampered by the fact that it bears the stamp of the creating individual. It has been made for only one individual, and that is perhaps the most frightful aspect—this individual’s loneliness despite the will to build anew. Here, as has already been emphasized, the contradictory nature of the vertical value is revealed. At one and the same time it offers salvation but stands for a hopelessly isolated individuality. Although in desperate need of mutual understanding, those with the new values stand beside one another like uncomprehending alien societies. For just as the value of each individual estate must be complemented because it lacks the higher levels of a developed vertical value, so the individual cultures lack the substructure in which the realization of their value could take place. The individuals live, so to speak, within a vertical value that cannot unfold in the horizontal and (depending on how one chooses to express it) are either crushed by the possibilities of the developing value or must perish in the vacuum of a meaningless abstraction before it can be realized. Scarcely any of these writers is happy: The fullness of life that a social body needs is too much for the isolated individual and has a suffocating effect on powers that seek to be active but instead must squander themselves in fantasies. It is moving, for example, to see how Nietzsche addresses “my brothers” and “friends”—an imaginary society that is supposed to bear his fullness of life, a figure such as the
one Wedekind portrays in Karl Hetmann, the dwarf-giant. In Hetmann’s teaching, Wedekind presents the writer’s tragedy. The dwarf-giant is yet another concept that expresses the notion of the complete life. Sensing the superior strength and values of this [new] life, the individual is the dwarf who carries within him enough life for an entire society. A giant as far as the meaning and value of the world is concerned, he remains in the eyes of others a mere nothing, a pitiful manikin who is ridiculed and whose [supposed] megalomania becomes the object of mockery.

The highest thing a writer can attain is a dream of his world. Wedekind dreams it in Hidalla. Hidalla endows beauty with morality and describes the society in which this ideal becomes real. Hitherto, morality has been directed solely toward well being, it was established in order to combat misfortune and focused on the unhappy. This morality still exists:

But for the rich I have created, over and beyond the old morality, a new one, whose highest good is beauty. [4:205] If human beings rise to prizing beauty more highly than goods, the body, and the soul, then they are one step closer to divinity than if victory over the suffering of the earth were its highest prize. [4:206]

The parallel between this construct and Nietzsche’s doctrine is surprising. “Principal viewpoint: one does not see that the task of the higher species consists in leading the lower [as Comte, for example, does]. But the lower, rather, is the basis upon which the higher species lives out its own task—the basis upon which it can first stand.” Both begin with the existing society and seek to use it as the basis for a superior class that justifies this fragmented society’s existence and gives it meaning. The new class is the result of breeding, and it must sacrifice certain things for the honor of being the elect class that gives meaning to this earth.

Our morality demands sacrifices as no morality has yet demanded them. General morality stands in the service of the greatest happiness, of the family. We demand from the members of our alliance the greatest happiness as the first sacrifice! [4:205]
No member shall refuse another, and the new morality is to abolish "barbaric life forms."

The prostitute, who has been driven from the human community like a wild animal; the old virgin, who has been condemned to be a physical and spiritual cripple, deceived about her whole love-life; and the virginity of the young female, preserved for the purpose of arranging the most advantageous marriage possible. [4:238]

One may assume that these demands obtain only for the superior class, which develops a new form of life to realize Wedekind's value in the greatest purity. Yet everyone lives and works at the base, contributing to the formation of the entire society. When reading Mine-Haha, one must keep in mind that this education has meaning and value for the whole, otherwise one is overwhelmed by a feeling of barrenness and horror. Forgetting the very real basis of this cultural peak, and focusing on the peak alone, one is reminded of exotic vegetation that has been carefully overcultivated. Let us compare it again to Nietzsche. The lower class needs

*justification*: It lies in the service of a higher, sovereign species that stands upon it and can only be raised to its height on the basis of it. Not merely a master race whose task would not go beyond governing, but a race with its own mode of life, with an overabundance of energy for beauty, courage, culture, and style up to the most spiritual level. It is an affirming race, one which permits itself every luxury—strong enough not to need the tyranny of virtue's imperative, beyond good and evil; a greenhouse for strange and exquisite plants. [source unknown]

To a considerable extent, this ideal can be regarded as valid for Wedekind as well. The similarity of the construct strengthens our opinion that Wedekind and his transformation of value are a typical phenomenon. His portrayal, however, still offers a special advantage: He understands purer forms of transformation than Nietzsche does, perhaps because he is the weaker personality. For Nietzsche, there are still spiritual values besides beauty and sensuality—he is more individualistic than
Wedekind. And here we make an observation to which we only attribute conjectural significance—Wedekind so closely identifies with the horizontal value, he binds himself in his transvaluation so closely to the sensual, that even characteristics of the sensual cling to meaning. The objects that are to yield meaning are all external; everybody can participate in them and everybody should participate because such participation brings salvation to the individual. That is the formula for communism. Just as the means of production should be the property of all in economic communism, so should one member of Wedekind’s supreme estate not deny the other, because then the meaning of life would not be fulfilled. A certain rigorism is at work here. The doctrine of the twin bodies has not been relinquished, but now the supreme estate is composed only of twin bodies, for only beautiful people can belong to it. The fact that a communist element is to be found here points to the possibility that the developmental tendency of the present society is somehow directed toward a social state that is related to the ones imagined by Nietzsche or Wedekind.

Hetmann fails in his attempt to introduce the morality of beauty:

The rich man has usurped the morality that was intended for the poor man and draws greater advantage from it than the poor for whom it was intended. The rich man is more likely to put his life at risk for his riches than his riches for his life. (4:238)

That is the same complaint that Nietzsche makes, that the strong allow themselves be trapped by the morality of the weak. Yet in contrast to Wedekind, Nietzsche believes that his ideas may one day be put into practice. This moment will arrive when the tension produced by feelings of dissatisfaction with the fragmentary form of life will have reached a climax:

A transvaluation of values is not achieved until a tension arising from new needs is present, from those with new needs who suffer under the old values without being aware of it. [source unknown]
The historical sketch has shown that the problem of duality, the fundamental bifurcation of life, manifests itself in the various versions of transcendental and identity philosophy. We shall now try to more clearly define the nature of this fundamental dichotomy.

In the course of his actions, the human, whom we know as a unity, also reveals a duality of fundamental principles. The one basic form has something tranquil and abiding about it. In the validity of its form its being achieves a certain objectivity that is independent of the individual. Although it forms and shapes experiences, it is above them. It imparts a particular form of conceptualization to experiences, but we find no necessary reason why this specific form should be given to the respective existential type. There is no reason why the experienced state of affairs should attain reality precisely in this form and no other. This basic form has something compelling about it; it is something external that surrounds the experience and takes hold of it with a higher power. It has about it an air of the inexorability of fate. Despite its phenomenal immanence, the first basic form has an aura of a being-in-itself; it becomes the model from which the phenomenon takes its particular quality. The


1. [The opening sentence reveals that “The Basic Forms” is a chapter in a larger work. The “historical sketch” Voegelin refers to here has not been found. In the text that follows there are further references to missing text sections that preceded or followed the text as it exists.]
first form lends value; its fulfillment grants a sense of satisfaction; it becomes the element that determines existence.

The first basic form comprehends the various a priori under which phenomena gain the quality of belonging to a particular world: law, economics, metaphysics, science, religion, art. The concept of the a priori may appear to encompass an area of unusual and unjustifiable breadth, particularly if one doubts the disputed a priori of law, and the even more disputed a priori of economics. But first, the concept of the a priori has been applied, and continues to be applied in so many ways, that we may venture to use it here in a manner that departs from customary use. Second, such use is not altogether unjustified in itself. If we free the a priori from its special meaning as that which precedes all experience ([illegible] experience of natural science) and understand it as that which precedes each phenomenal form as its synthetic element, we see at once the importance of using it in this sense. Law and economics are also such a priori through the application of which phenomena receive their particular qualified, formal, being-thus [So-Sein], into which they must be brought in order for us to understand them, i.e., for them to become phenomena. The economic or legal phenomena have the quality of independence. While in the first relation, they thoroughly resist being subsumed under another a priori. Such an additional subsumption would be evidence against the notion that the economic or legal a priori is justified. So long as we can distinguish particular relational qualities from each other without having one derive its contextual sense from the other, we must acknowledge the right of each separately existing form to be treated as a special a priori.²

The first basic form would thus be the totality of the a priori that confront life in order to determine [its direction] or in some way set goals for it and that press life’s course into their forms. Before we look at this basic form more closely in order

² In his effort to create a pure theory of law, Kelsen has attempted to free the legal a priori from the ethical. Compare the critique of Felix Kaufmann in the Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht [1923].
to explore its nature, we should briefly characterize and define the second basic form.

The first basic form was something existent, inalterable, permanent, offering a point of rest and support in the mutability of phenomena.³

The second basic form is a dynamic element. Expressed substantively, some kind of moving quantity pours itself through the first basic form and takes shape from it in order to flow further and take on new forms that render the earlier into “old” forms. There is something changeable, which stands in relationship to the first basic form as matter to form. Form is the preexisting, unchangeable element filled out by this flowing material. In this process the whole gains its form.

Up to this point we have used a vague and inexact terminology. Now we must undertake the fundamental analysis of the concepts, which will justify that use. The statement just made, that the second basic form fills out the first with material, must strike one as peculiar. Taken literally, this filling-out process would be unique in the sense that, however frequently repeated, the same shape would be produced each time. The whole formation-process of the history of the world would be compelled continually to generate the same forms, without the possibility of diversity. Eliminated from the world-picture would be that which we perceive to be perhaps its most characteristic feature: the great number of different phenomena that confront us and to which we must create some kind of relation if we are not to be overwhelmed by chaos. The whole wealth of philosophical systems, art works, state structures, religions, etc., would be eliminated, and in their place we would have a small number of forms corresponding to a limited number of a priori tolerating no variation.

The first basic form must therefore be split up. To the extent that it constitutes the whole of the a priori, its investigation

³ It will become apparent in a moment that the expression is intentionally imprecise. This is in order to avoid predicates that lie on a different level of reflection than that of the a priori itself.
falls within the realm of philosophical science and thus outside the realm of sociological investigation. To the extent that the basic form is something in addition to the a priori—namely, the possibility for the diversity of the formations that confront us [in the world]—it comes within the purview of sociological method. Below, we will show that the first basic form, to the extent that it is not just the a priori, may be denoted "sociological."

But first we want to look at two versions of the basic dichotomy of life, versions in which, it appears to me, the essential elements of the phenomena are contained. These versions of the problem are found in Simmel and in Spann.

In metaphysical valuation, Simmel terms the unity of the dichotomy life. In each moment of being, life, as a process in time, both fills and transcends the present moment. In such transcendence, the process creates the continuity of life, but in its continuous transcendence, it also destroys the formations through which it passes. "This type of existence does not limit its reality to the present moment and let past and future fade into unreality. Through its continuity it actually transcends the division between past and future; its past genuinely exists into the present and its present truly exists into the future. This type of existence we call life."  

Here the pure emanation of life radiates into time, bringing the whole course of life equally into every moment of reality. In fact a type of reaching out [Umgreifen] takes place because the individual moments of life's course are real in their own right. They are the "present," which, [in the next moment], life transcends. The [illegible], "in an antinomial relation" (12).

We imagine life as a continual flow passing through the generations. But those who constitute the flow [not those who have it, but those who make it up] are individuals: that is, beings who are closed [in a body], centered in themselves and clearly distinguish-
able from one another. The stream of life flows through these individuals, or more accurately, it is these individuals. In each one it is dammed up, becoming a form with clearly marked contours, distinguished as a finished thing both from those things that are like it and from its environment and the latter’s contents, and tolerating no blurring of boundaries. Here we find the ultimate metaphysical problematic of life: that it consists both of unlimited continuity and, at the same time, a discrete ego. (12)

To put the problem into terms that depart from Simmel’s metaphysical formulation, being and becoming constitute a unity, the essential characteristic of which is the fact that it can be divided into the existent and unchanging and into the dynamic which is always changing. With this formulation, Simmel believes that he has said the utmost that can be said about this object. The simplest fact on which the correctness of the description can be demonstrated is self-consciousness. I act, think, and feel, and can actually observe myself in this acting, thinking, and feeling. I can watch my life like a spectator in a play, can criticize it, follow its progress, and steer it as I wish. Here the problem emerges that, in an act of self-consciousness, it is possible for me to transcend myself and to actually place myself on a higher level of reflection. And this process is potentially endless, for I can again make this self-reflection the object of another cognition, and this reflection can also be made into an object of further cognition. The difficulty lies in the fact that the absoluteness gained over the one act in the act that contemplates it is itself relative in regard to the act which in turn objectifies this one, and so on endlessly. Simmel solves this difficulty by considering the absolute, not in its positional aspect of being above an object, but as the act of placing itself above [an object]. “The transcendence of life” manifests itself as

the true absolute, within which the opposition of the absolute and the relative is absorbed. Such elevation over the opposites takes place because transcendence is immanent to life. With this fact, the contradictions concerning life, which have manifested themselves from the beginning, are overcome. Life is at once
fixed and variable, both formed and developing, it has forms and it overcomes them, it remains in place and rushes on, it is bound and free, it is confined in subjectivity and it rises objectively above both other things and itself. All these contradictions only appear when we analyze the whole into parts in the prismatic breaking of the same metaphysical fact. But life’s innermost essence is self-transcendence; it creates its own contradictions and it transcends them, indeed, it even transcends itself. (14–15)

Simmel very elegantly formulates the problem that the characteristic of life is the immanence of its transcendence. But it is questionable whether this experience, which reaches deep into the metaphysical roots of the problem, actually grasps the matter fully. Ignoring Simmel’s metaphysical terminology, his presentation agrees with ours in all essentials; but Simmel overlooks the difficulty we indicated above, that there is no path from the basic forms of life or the human being to the reality and diversity of phenomena. Occasionally he speaks of the concrete cultural phenomena that bring forth life in its character as creative life. But in so doing he obscures the two things that are required in order for a priori forms to be filled out or realized in phenomena: first, a principle of movement, and second, a content. Only if one [illegitimately] puts these two things together and relates them to the one a priori form does one come to the terminology Simmel uses to speak of the transcending of life, not only in its formal nature, but also as the fulfillment of content. But it is precisely the fulfillment as content, the condition of the diversity of appearance, that concerns us here. And Simmel’s presentation of it is not satisfactory.

A formulation marking an essential advance, and grasping our problem in its whole depth, is to be found in the work of Spann. Simmel fails to see the problem because he understands the duality of life in a purely formal manner and leaves the element of content to fit in haphazardly. Spann understands the duality of life or—as he calls it—the individual, so that
one of its two basic forms is “ego-icity [Ichheit], the ego-form of all spiritual processes.” The other is “the disposition or the capacity in this ego-form, or, in other words, the ‘ego’ as content.” With this understanding of the content element, “as a point of power structurally present as a human capacity” (264), our problem is also solved. Below, we will examine the further consequences of Spann’s formulation. For the present we want to look at the relationship between the two basic forms.

Spann placed the element of content in the second basic form: the ego as potency or something that develops. But we spoke of a necessary division in the first basic form, without which we would be unable to account for the diversity of phenomena. There is a contradiction here we must clear up. The a priori form as such has none of the determination of content that confronts us in the phenomenon. Thus, of necessity, only the second basic form can be the source of content. Here we are helped by Spann’s understanding of the matter. On the other hand, the a priori must have a disposition that lends itself to clothing the many-faceted phenomenal world, must possess means of taking into account the possible variations that confront it. This meaning of the a priori, which includes the possibility of being an other, justifies our speaking of the conceptual dismantling of the first basic form. The two possibilities correspond exactly: The potentiality of the second basic form in regard to content and the potentiality of the first basic form in regard to form meet in the reality of the concrete phenomenon. Thus we may regard the phenomenon as a double realization or concretization: first, as the realization of the a priori of potency, and second, as the realization of the power center’s potency-as-content.

We may now conclusively define both basic forms: The first is the potency of form, the second is the potency of content.

5. [Othmar Spann, Kurzgefaßtes System der Gesellschaftslehre (Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer, 1914), 263. Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
THE BASIC FORMS

When we speak of the basic forms themselves and endow them with the character of potencies in order to define the dynamic of their being, we employ the most general formulation in which the problem of the dichotomy within reality can be expressed. Of course, the words form and content already imply a specific metaphysical position, and we have only used them because we need some language symbols to point to this state of affairs, which, ultimately, cannot be made fully intelligible. Fortunately, we really do not need such explanations, since the basic forms, just like the a priori, are immediately given. They confront us just as objects of the external world confront us. Nor do we need to “understand” them any more than we need to “understand” objects of the external world. They are immediately present to us in an act of intuition. We must approach the final constitutive elements of being with the same immediate act of intuition. For example, we speak of “truth” as an a priori but cannot define it without taking into our definition that which is already included in the concept itself. We can only describe it in the categorical determinations with which it emerges in natural science, philosophy, etc. Thus, we can ultimately say “truth is truth” only so long as we move on the ground of critical philosophy and do not make synthetic judgments, which of course would be metaphysical judgments. It is the same with the two basic forms. Description and definition only point to their existence and prompt us to differentiate between them; they are points of orientation to mark the way along which this differentiation should proceed, which, however, only takes place in an act of immediate intuition. The view we have presented here is not so unusual as it might appear at first glance. Recently, Husserl has again reminded us that we must accustom ourselves to the duality of the sources of cognition. Nor should we mistake this demand to bring, in an act of internal intuition, an object to originary givenness for something mystical or metaphysical, or much more shallow, something psychological. We must be clear on this point: All knowledge of the a priori and of the categories in the broadest
sense of the term—all eidetic knowledge, as Husserl calls it—
does not and cannot originate in any other way than in a simple
“taking a look at” the thing we want to know in internal intu-ition. All descriptions are completely inadequate substitutes
for this cognition out of our own power [Kraft].

In Simmel’s work the problem of the variety of phenomena
remained unsolved. Spann took it into account as the potency
of content on the one hand, and the potency of form on the
other. The supplement of the potency of content requires fur-
ther explanation and analysis of its inner meaning, for this in-
nner meaning differs substantially from the views usually held
about the essence of form.

By form, we generally understand something given, fixed and
rigid, something that by the superior power of its immanent
laws forces the material into the form it presses upon it, though
this form be alien to the material’s inner being. Perhaps the
best way to make our meaning clear is to describe form as a
limit or a border contrasting the concept “without measure”
(or limit) with the concept of the “measurable.” Form is re-
garded as the dissolution of matter where matter is discrete
and clearly set apart from other matter, much as a stone lying
on a table is recognizable as something different from the wood
beneath it and the air surrounding it. Here is a limit, or border,
and this is what we usually understand as form, something
wholly external. It marks the end of one being [Sein] and the
beginning of another. But this view is not suitable to our pur-
poses. Its inadequacy can be demonstrated by considering, for
example, the fact that liquids are transported in bottles but
stones are not. That appears to be so self-evident that we need
not mention it at all. But it sheds light on the concept of form.
Form is in fact not the dissolution of matter [by the creation of
a] border or limit in general; rather, it is always a specific border
or limit. Not every form suits every type of matter; instead,
specific forms fit specific substances, a type of correspondence
that in many ways reminds us of the notion of preestablished
harmony. To return to our example: Not everything can be
poured from bottles. Form and matter are not worlds that exist next to each other without connection, but worlds in one another that are brought together by a law of reciprocal correspondence. There is no more a “form-in-itself” than there is a “thing-in-itself,” and when we separate the two we have the problem that they no longer fit together. Then such a [notion as the] “facticity of the fact” is invented to provide an alien element to which the forms and their laws can connect.

In the example of the bottle, the case is very simple. There is no preestablished harmony but a functional correspondence between form and content. A bottle is a form created for the storage of fluids. The “storage of fluids” is the primary purpose for which the bottle receives its specific formal character in order to fulfill its purpose. In the case of the bottle, the dominant bond, or—if you will—the synthesis of form and matter, is inherent in the function it has to fulfill. For the intertwining of intuitive form and content in the phenomena of experience, the bond is also clear and relatively easy to find. In many cases knowledge is obscured by, on the one hand, the countless number of concepts that carry metaphysical shades of meaning and, on the other, by the *horror metaphysicae*, which, though it preserves the logical sphere and its thought from derailment, has often impeded it from attaining valuable insights. To be sure, such insights lie in the logical sphere, but they are also basic concepts, such as the concept of “form,” which extend into the realm of the ineffable.

The laws governing the intertwining of form and content of phenomena are to be sought in the producer of phenomena, in the human being. In order to penetrate immediately to the full depth of the problem, we defer to the language of a poet and profound thinker who says, “The human is that substance which infinitely breaks the entire substance, i.e., polarizes it. The world, the world of the human being, is as various as he is.”

6. [The selection of Novalis’s works that Voegelin used has not been identified. Here he quotes from “Freiberger Naturwissenschaftliche Studien
The variousness of the world does not exist in and of itself. To return from the metaphysical manner of expression to the realm of scientific formulation, we would have to say that the origin of the variety we find in the world is to be sought in the structure of the human spirit. The human is a natural being and, as such, exists in the all-encompassing context of nature. It is only when we forget this basic fact, this prerequisite of all thought, and place the human being in opposition to nature that we involve ourselves in contradiction. Properly understood, the formulation that “the human being gives nature her laws” means that in the human being, nature gives herself her law. Or to be more precise: In the human being nature appears as law. Thus understood, the whole problem of the abstraction in which [nature and the human being] do not meet is overcome. Instead we have a unified system of nature in which, comparatively, the human being represents the flowering and revelation of his own [and therefore nature’s] structure.

We have just said that it hinders the progress of knowledge that, in some areas, the fear of metaphysical derailment restricts the human being’s freedom of movement and leaves him groping about, afraid to say more than his reason permits. In the last instance, such fear originates in ignorance, in a lack of clarity concerning the structure of the system of thought, which with sufficient effort can, in principle, be clarified. In order to avoid ambiguity and achieve clarity in principle, we will introduce a concept of the metaphysical and delimit its pure sphere. Only when the light of our conceptual clarity has removed this ghost of a potential derailment by raising the level of our reflection can we proceed safely.

As the whole investigation is based on the philosophy of critical idealism, we must rely on criticism to inform our concept of the metaphysical. We find this concept in Kant. In addi-

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tion to questions concerning natural science and the critique of reason, he poses the third question: How is metaphysics as science possible? This Kantian question was more or less completely ignored by philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. [Friedrich] Paulsen's reference to Kant as a metaphysician was rightly rejected by the neo-Kantians, because the interpretation implied that Kant wished to take up the very metaphysics to whose rejection and destruction his life work was devoted. The Kantian concept of metaphysics is in no way a return to transcendent knowledge, but remains thoroughly within the bounds of the transcendental investigation: It is the concept of a transcendental metaphysic. Of the metaphysical, Kant says: "It is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions gained through pure reason, systematically arranged." 7 Taken together, all principles of pure reason are a machine without purpose. One can put it together and precisely determine all its parts; this is indeed what the neo-Kantian logicians do in the most painstaking manner. But then one can in fact do nothing with it, because one does not know what the meaning or purpose of the machine is. That is the impression gained from a very considerable portion of the modern literature on logic.

Transcending this mere taking of an inventory or collecting its principles, we find the systematic ordering of conceptions of pure reason. It is this further systematization that Kant calls the metaphysical. We must keep in mind that he applies the quality "metaphysical," not to the concepts of pure reason themselves, but to their ordering and systematization. If we wish to ascertain the place of the metaphysical still more closely, we could say that the activity moves from a center outward toward individual points, and that in this process the points are determined as the world. If we penetrate further into this world we reach the "hinterland," the regions inhabited by

7. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Riga 1781/1787,] A xx. [Further quotations will appear in parentheses in the text according to the first [A] and/or second [B] edition.]
pre-Kantian metaphysics. If knowledge wants to transcend the world, get beyond or behind it, it becomes transcendent. In contrast to the transcendent, transcendental knowledge aims, not at new objects located beyond the “world,” but rather at the modes of cognition with which the worldly objects are grasped. It does not move beyond the objects of the world, but raises itself above them in order to investigate the way in which they are known. If the beams of knowledge of the world have emanated from one center, scattering and dispersing themselves into the world, transcendental knowledge has raised itself above mere cognition of the world in order to grasp and know this scattering and dispersion. With this accomplished, metaphysical knowledge returns to the starting point of the beams that brought us knowledge of the world and searches here for the last unity of the knowledge found in this dispersion. Critical metaphysics thus remains within the sphere of knowledge as a matter of principle. In contrast to the old metaphysics, which was an attempt to go beyond knowledge of the world, the new—Kantian—metaphysics is a return to the roots of knowledge of the world. Kant says: “The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (a preliminary exercise), which investigates the faculty of reason in regard to all of its pure a priori knowledge and is called critique, or second, is the system of pure reason (science), which presents in systematic connection the entire (true as well as illusory) philosophical knowledge that emanates from pure reason, and is called metaphysics” (A 841; B 869). Here Kant very clearly expresses the difference we emphasized earlier, that metaphysics is the system of concepts of reason and not the individual concepts themselves. Kant points out, with all necessary clarity, that for him metaphysics means the systematic ordering of transcendental concepts, thus ruling out the transcendent concepts that characterized the old metaphysics. These observations were necessary because Kant’s division of metaphysics is so pertinent to our theme. Kant writes: “Metaphysics divides into that of the speculative and of the practical
use of pure reason, and is therefore either a metaphysic of nature or a metaphysic of morals. The former contains all the principles of pure reason that derive from mere concepts (therefore excluding mathematics) and are used in the theoretical knowledge of all things; the latter contains the principles that a priori determine and make necessary all our actions” (A 841; B 869).

Here again we find our two basic forms under the names of the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals. The basic forms can be classified as metaphysical concepts in Kant’s sense because their determination as formal potency, and potency of content, clearly expresses their systematic character. For Kant the metaphysical is found in the systematic. The systematic quality of formal potency is readily apparent; it releases from itself (or synthesizes within itself) the totality of all forms. Through their subordination to the concept of “formal potency” these forms receive their final determination, which they need in order to avoid giving the impression, which we discussed above, of being mere useless machinery. Without its disposition to receive a content, form remains an empty thing that can be characterized as empty machinery. Form attains life by being anchored in something that overrides and encompasses it. On its part, this order extends back into the very roots of life itself, from which it draws its quality of potency.

The relationship between the “potency of content” and the metaphysic of morals is not immediately clear. But we will not address this theme here, since it better fits into our discussion below of the relationship between the individual and the state. In the explication of this relationship the identical nature of both concepts will become manifest. And we can demonstrate this relationship on that concrete example more quickly and in a more thorough manner than we can here in a logical discussion of the problematic.

Kant’s successors set themselves the task of working out this concept of metaphysics, and their solutions accord with
the results of modern philosophers. But it is incredible to see how the classical representatives of German idealism have not received the recognition they deserve, perhaps because they referred to themselves as metaphysicians. Belated acknowledgment has recently begun to take place, because the same solutions are being offered, but without a relationship to metaphysics, by Bergson and, above all, by Simmel, and these works have been praised as valuable achievements.

It goes without saying that the following few pieces of evidence for this claim are offered without the remotest intention of giving an account of the development of these concepts. Our intention is to indicate briefly the origin and underline the historically determined nature of our present investigation. In this matter hardly one new point has been brought forward. Nowhere does current work go beyond the logical development and analysis of the concepts that were already present [in German Idealism].

Let us begin with a passage from Novalis: “The act of overcoming oneself is everywhere the highest thing, the primordial base and genesis of life. The [natural] flame is such an act. Philosophy begins in the same way: Out of virtue I act against virtue. This is the beginning of the life of virtue whose capacity perhaps extends into infinity without finding a limit, i.e., the condition of the possibility of its life being lost.” The passage is perhaps the best suited for drawing parallels to Simmel’s formulations that express similar thoughts. “The act of overcoming oneself” is almost verbatim Simmel’s definition of life, the form of which he describes as “reaching out beyond itself”; and its application to philosophy and morality, which we find in Novalis’s fragment, is used by Simmel in the same sense down to the smallest detail. Novalis’s last idea is noteworthy in this regard. From the thought of life overcoming itself he

8. [Novalis, “Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen [1798],” in Werke, 2:345, no. 134. Judging from Voegelin’s manuscript, the selected edition of the fragments he used did not quote the fragment in full, nor did it indicate gaps in the text. Compare n 6 above.]
concludes that the process can continue into infinity, without the limit of form losing its reality. In this thought we find Simmel’s concept of the absolute, which sees in the transcendence of the relativity of life’s two aspects [i.e., its fixed form and its continual overcoming of fixed form] the absolute itself.

An entirely similar view is found in Hegel’s definition of spirit: “Its being is actuosity, no restful existence, but rather this: to have brought itself forth, to have become for itself, to have made itself through itself. That it would be the truth, to this belongs the fact that it has brought itself forth; its being is the absolute process. This process, which is a mediating of itself with itself through itself, and not through another, includes the fact that it has differentiating moments, movements, and changes within itself, that it is now determined thus and, in the next moment, determined otherwise.” Here again, the absolute is seen to be neither something at rest nor something that conceives, but as the relation of the two to each other in the “actuosity” or “process.” This process is “the mediation of itself with itself by itself” and, so defined, expresses that which we indicated above to be the correct interpretation of Kant’s concept of spirit which gives nature its laws. Strictly speaking, such a statement cannot be made within the Critique; the Critique is concerned with cataloguing the concepts of pure reason. The proposition concerning the relationship between spirit and natural laws is a digression into “metaphysics” and must indeed have occasionally given rise to false interpretations, since to this day the essence of this metaphysics has not yet been made clear. It was post-Kantian philosophy that first succeeded in working out the concept of metaphysics in definitions, such as the one just quoted from Hegel. Here there is no longer a dualism between the internal and the external and no mysterious modes of unification. Rather, there is one absolute whose form of appearance is the

relativity of the double aspects of life and spirit. To formulate it very pointedly, in the process of cognition, life produces not the world, but itself as knowledge in the form of the world. We find the same thought expressed in a slightly different manner, in Schelling:

Created out of the source of things and thus the same, the human soul has co-knowledge of creation. The highest clarity about all things resides in it, and the soul is not so much knowing as it is science \([\text{{Wissenschaft}}]\) itself. But this primeval idea of things sleeps in the soul as an image, dark and forgotten, if not fully erased. Perhaps it would never wake again if the premonition and longing of knowledge did not itself reside in this darkness. But unceasingly the darkness calls out, to that which is higher, for completion. And the higher notes that the lower has not been given to it in order to be remain chained, but in order that the lower itself might have something [an other] in which it can see itself, manifest itself and become intelligible to itself. For in it everything lies without differentiation, as one, but in the other it can make that which is one in it, distinguishable, it can become articulate and interpret itself. (576–77)

Leaving aside the poetic mode of expression and the allusions to Plato, the idea of the preexistence \([\text{{Vorgegebenheit}}]\) of the phenomenon is perhaps here most purely expressed.

The prestabilized harmony that brings form and content together is dissolved here, or—if one will—is now presented as arising from one root. Form does not come to content as something external but, as “premonition,” is disposed to take up content. Here we must underline the extraordinary possibilities for the development of Schelling’s problematic, which Simmel, albeit without taking Schelling as his starting point, has carried through to a very high degree of perfection. In Simmel’s work, Schelling’s premonition corresponds to life’s series of imperatives \([\text{{Soll-Reihe}}]\). To the extent that this series of

imperatives, as the phenomenal form of life in its totality, is also directed to the totality of reality, Simmel's notion of duty [Sollen] acquires a meaning that goes well beyond the realm of the normative determination of action, or ethics. It broadens into a form that lends the character of duty to life as a whole, in both its temporal span and its unfolding in phenomena. In all their heterogeneity, the forms of life—the artistic as well as the scientific, the religious and the [illegible]—assume their phenomenal form in the process by which they issue from the life of one individual. This individual is the origin of both the phenomenal reality in all its variety and [life's] phenomenal imperativeness [Gesolltheit], and with this latter it leads [phenomenal] diversity back to a unity.

Despite obvious parallels in the formulation of the problems to which we have just referred, the entire investigation still leaves us with the impression of extreme complexity and confusion. Let us try to illuminate the reason for the lack of clarity. To begin with, a comment by Hegel, in which the problem of internal contradictions becomes clear, may prove instructive:

Principle, thus also fundament or law, is universal and internal. As such, as much truth as it might contain, it is not entirely real. Purpose, fundamentals, etc., exist in our thoughts and internal intention and also in books; however, not in reality, not in that which first is, in itself; rather it is a possibility, a capacity, but has not yet emerged into existence [out of] its inner being. A second moment must accrue to it for it to become reality, and this is activity or realization whose principle is the will, the activity of the human in the world altogether. It is only through this activity that the concepts and determinations that exist in themselves are realized, made reality.11

In this explanation a given reality—internal purposes and principles—is contrasted with the realization of these purposes and principles. Here the source of all equivocations becomes clear, for on both sides we have principles and purposes. To make matters more complicated, the concepts “principle”

[“Prinzip”], “law,” “universal,” “internal,” are used interchangeably with the concepts of “purpose” and “principle” [“Grundsatz”]. If under “principle” we understand the formal determination of a phenomenon, it is a complete mystery how this principle can be brought into relation to thoughts or purposes found in books, and which are thus matters of content [and not merely formal]. It is only in the changing meanings of the words that such imprecision becomes possible; the word purpose especially is extraordinarily suited to creating such confusion. Hegel’s use of the word internal is also remarkable. He uses it as a predicate for “principle, fundament, law” and apparently intends to express the opposite of something external. Yet by external, he means the “reality” of the principles, fundamentals, and laws. This usage is logically inadequate.

Let us assume that by principles and fundamentals are meant specific propositions with particular contents, are to be transformed into reality as purposes. The act of transforming purposes into reality takes place in a causal process. I have in my consciousness a picture of external reality that does not yet exist but which I intend to realize. In order to do so, various means are required, whereby the term means refers literally to the things lying between the idea of the state of affairs and the realized state of affairs itself. In accordance with the laws of the principles governing these means, I apply them to the realization of the state of affairs that previously had existed only in my imagination. Thus a chain of cause and effect exists: idea, means, reality of the idea, that is adequately described by referring to it as a chain of cause and effect. To the extent that one prefers to call this chain of cause and effect teleological, the teleological connection is merely a special case of the chain of cause and effect. Therefore, in principle, the opposing of the conceptual pair “causal” and “teleological” should be avoided. When such opposition takes place the “teleological” is understood to be something entirely different from the chain of cause and effect, and it is thus thought that a new term must be introduced to express new meaning. In the
passage just cited, a teleological causality is partly intended. When Hegel speaks of the purposes, which are in our thoughts or intentions, he apparently means the psychic reality of the idea of a state of affairs we intend to realize. If he means the psychic reality, then the addition of the principle of willing is obviously inadequate. For the will—which is indeed nothing other than the motivating power behind the idea—finds the means, the useful objects that serve the realization, but the means are not produced by the will. To be sure, I can have an idea of the moon on the table before me and can direct the most intensive willing toward realizing this idea, but I will find no objects that function as means to realize this idea. Thus, in addition to the principle of willing—which, as it were, forms the mediating instance between idea and means—it is still necessary that the means conform to certain laws that enable them to help realize the idea. This second mediating instance between means and realization is just as necessary as the first one of willing. Therefore, as far as Hegel intended a teleological causal explanation of this type, his description is incomplete. In all probability he did not intend such a teleological explanation, but let us assume that the primary intention was to juxtapose the principles with one another, and let us analyze the consequences of this assumption. The principle of willing offers us a possible and secure starting point. It is not analyzed in its possible equivocal applications and permits us to make the formal assumption that its intended meaning is that of “dynamic principle.” Hegel tells us what this willing sets in motion: “concepts, determinations that exist in themselves.” But concepts are anything but psychic. They are not present in thoughts or intentions. There we find only ideas of objects, or indeed ideas of concepts. In any case there we find only ideas but never concepts.

We must therefore reject Hegel’s claim that the principle of willing can realize something found in the mind or in the mind’s intentions. Instead we take up the second assertion, which corresponds much better to the logical character of
concepts and allows the principle of the will’s determinations that “exist in themselves” to be realized. Of course this type of realization is of an entirely different order than the first. In the first we understood the term realization to refer to the causal-teleological process in which an idea is implemented in reality. Now we refer to a process of a completely different kind, for which we do not yet have a concept because we have yet to find out what actually takes place in it. However, we can do this with the help of the concepts defined earlier. If something is to be realized—and this something cannot be an idea—it can only be a formal determination becoming real in a phenomenon. By “determinations [that] exist in themselves” we must therefore understand the formal determinations into which Hegel’s “concepts” are ultimately resolved. But with this assertion something is removed from Hegel’s theory, perhaps the most important part—the notion that the “concepts” that are realized have content. And now our task is to find some logical place for this content. Up to this point the fact that they did not have any place was hidden in a presentation that was not conceptually precise enough [to reveal the omission]. We must find what the content of the phenomenon is and, if there is such a thing, what its source is.

In order to gain clarity in this matter, we will turn to the analysis of other theories and attempted solutions. In Hegel, the “content” was carried along by a lack of clarity in terms like principle, purpose, fundament, etc. In Simmel, the explanation of concepts has gained a clarity that makes it easier for us to find points of imprecision. We mentioned above that a certain difficulty of Simmel’s theory is that the aspect of content is contained in the principle of the transcending [Transzendieren]. This is an elegant notion, but the transcending element is ultimately the same life beyond which life further reaches. Simmel speaks of the typical tragedy of spiritual culture, and by this he means
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that life, at the level of spirit, generates objective structures as immediate expressions of itself. As its vessels and forms, these take up its onward rushing currents [Weiterströmungen]. But, sooner or later, their ideally and historically fixed forms, their limits and rigidity come into opposition with life [itself], which, in its continuity, is eternally variable and [consequently] breaks down all limits, borders and forms. Life continually produces things upon which it breaks, through which it is violated, things which, of necessity, incorporate life itself, but because they are forms, get in the way of life's movement, and come into conflict with life's incapacity to stop [anywhere for long].

In this tragedy, “life breaks on the objects it has created; these objects are what one generally calls cultural phenomena: works of art, moral norms, and social ties.” All these phenomena, which life has generated, Simmel calls forms. This description comes as somewhat of a surprise when we recall a passage earlier in which the act of transcending was defined as the “form” of life. The concept of “form” was applied to both the streams of life and the clearly defined ego. The stream of life flows as individuals and, in individuals, becomes the stable form of itself. Let us for a moment ignore the fact that a “form” of life is spoken of at all, and instead concentrate on a branch of the stream of life—the dammed-up ego. It is also called “form,” but in this case it is clear that form refers to something other than cultural phenomena. If we are not to assume at the outset that the object stands in relationship to the ego as that which is produced to that which produced it, we must at the very least determine the relationship between ego and object. The resolution of the confusion of concepts may be sought again in the elimination of the equivocations we find in the concept of life. The transcending life is not the same life from which both the limit-determining ego and the transcending stream emerge. If we wish to avoid ambiguities, a conceptual division into three sharply different meanings must be undertaken. To

use Simmel’s terminology, life, the ego, and the transcending principle must be separated from one another. For example, Simmel says that “the movement of life is not only brought to a halt in the ego as a totality existing in itself, but in all spiritual experiences and objectifications as well” (12–13). Here he brings two entirely different things together. He has taken the ego and the spiritual objectifications into the same concept of “form.” But that ignores the basic problem of content. It is indeed very arbitrary to describe the damming-up of life in the ego as form. Such damming-up, which becomes an obstacle to life, could just as well be a formed content. It appears even more arbitrary to refer to the spiritual objectifications as forms. Hegel had to struggle with the opposite problem of trying to make the objectifications intelligible as content. Life is that which flows and which also proceeds along a fixed course. It is therefore something with content, and Simmel fails to make clear how this content should be understood as “form.” Whether it be the form of the ego or the form of the objectifications, they emerge from the content. Staying with Simmel’s image, it is entirely inconceivable why this life, which must produce forms as it flows, later allows itself to be hindered by the same forms. Why does it not just flow further, produce new forms, and leave the old ones behind? Why does it have to turn around and get caught up in them “as in a dead-end street” (13) and thus arrive at the point Simmel calls the tragedy of culture?

Here Simmel’s formulation of the basic forms breaks down and, as we will see below, Spann’s formulation of the problem provides us with a brilliant solution. Put more precisely, the decisive inadequacy of Simmel’s solution is that it cannot explain why the objectifications should be an obstacle. For Simmel the ego is, not an obstacle, despite all the “damming-up” it produces, but the bed, as it were, in which the stream of life flows. It is also characteristic that form’s obstacles do not cause a tragedy of the ego but are responsible for the “typical tragedy of the history of spirit” (160). Here Simmel apparently differen-
tiates between the ego and the objectification, a distinction he had earlier omitted in order to achieve a unified concept of that which transcends. The dismantling of the “forms,” which were previously understood to constitute a unity, goes so far that, when it comes to examples, Simmel almost completely drops the tragedy of life and arrives at the tragedy of the ego. Such an obstacle would be, for example, “the style of art in which, in one epoch, the will to life and to art happily coincided, but then in the unavoidable mutability of forms, is experienced by the next generation as unbearable academic art and gives way either to an inner polar opposition or to an anarchy of art production” (161). In moving from the plane of objectifications to that of the personalities which produce the objectifications, the personalities of the younger generation become the tragic heroes. Thus the concept is removed from a sphere where it can only be used metaphorically and brought back into the area where it could possibly be used literally, into the life of the individual, where, however, it is applied in a dubious anthropomorphizing way.

The lack of clarity and the ambiguity of Simmel’s concepts emerge again in his recapitulation. “The fundamental opposition between the principle of life and the principle of form manifests itself because life can only express itself in forms. But in each individual case, the form that life has brought forth turns against life, though it [embody] life’s Gestalt, language, and palpable qualities. Just as life consciously determines itself spiritually or culturally, creatively or historically, it is also confined to existence in a manner that is opposed to it, in the form of forms” (161 ff.). The opposition of form and life arises from a principle that is also called life. Life pours itself into and through the form and shapes itself in the process of flowing. But Simmel completely overlooks the fact that a form must be the form of something, and that this something can only be the life that has established itself in the forms. Only when we consider this fact do we arrive at another of Simmel’s favorite ideas: that life is not identical in each of its moments.
but also includes all of its previous objectifications. Only if these objectifications were “forms,” and not forms that also included content—which of course makes the value of this form concept very questionable—could the qualitative modification of life in its course be made intelligible. It must carry the idea with it that the individual life, in its totality, receives form and content already determined. Thus there is a quantitative determination present as well; every phenomenal reality, every objectification takes a piece of this predetermination with it and produces a new determination. This new determinacy permits us to set both it and the quality surrounding the whole of life in relation to indeterminacy. With regard to the objectifications lying between, we can say that, in their totality, they are the determining grounds of each present moment and, at the time, are retained in the next present. Simmel’s argument becomes meaningful only when we illuminate its background concepts. To be sure, these concepts are not expressed, but they provide the basis for any attempt to gather Simmel’s essayistic thoughts into a system free of contradiction. Above all this would require the concept of content.

Rickert

Rickert has made the most progress in the development of concepts. He recognizes that two principles do not suffice to characterize the spheres being scientifically investigated. Two areas of science are distinguishable in which a “number of things and processes of great importance to us emerge from

13. [Voegelin refers to the following works of Heinrich Rickert; the abbreviations are used in the text:]

Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, 4th and 5th eds. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921). [K.u.N.]


the basic forms

the sum of investigations into reality, and in which we see something other than mere nature. In them the usual, and justified, natural science presentation by itself is inadequate. Of these things and processes, especially of those objects we bring together under the name of culture, we ask entirely different questions than we do of nature" ([K.u.N., 16 f.]. Values accrue to cultural objects. Rickert calls them goods in order to distinguish them, as valuable realities, from the realities of nature on the one hand and the order of values on the other. Through the relationship of objects to values, two types of objects of the individual sciences can be distinguished. Corresponding to the two types of object, there are two kinds of science: natural and historical science. “For the formation of historical concepts, the concept of culture gives us the principle needed for the selection of the essential, just as the concept of nature, understood as reality in general, does for the natural sciences. Through the values that accrue to culture and through the relationship to them, the concept of a historical individuality, which can be scientifically presented, is constituted” ([K.u.N., 93]). What is the nature of these values in reference to which a phenomenon attains historical individuality? “Values are not realities, neither physical nor psychic. Their being consists in their validity, not in their actual existence [Tatsächlichkeit]. Nevertheless, values are bound up with reality” ([K.u.N., 99]. “We must distinguish between three spheres: the realm of reality, the realm of values, and a third, which contains objects of reality that stand in a relationship to values. These distinctions are to be kept free of all psychological misinterpretations. We must energetically insist that the values must be carefully distinguished from the psychic acts of the valuing subject. Equally they must be distinguished conceptually from every valuation and act of will as they are from the objects which bear them, i.e., the goods” ([B.d.Ph., 12]. Values therefore do not bring any psychologizing element into the investigation that would render the observation valid only for the observing subject. Value-related realities are not values, but the “connections of realities
with values. Therefore, values themselves are not found in the
spheres of objects or subjects, but constitute a realm of their
own that lies beyond the subject and object spheres [B.d.Ph.,
12]. Taken together, subjects and objects form one side of re-
alilty. Values constitute the other half. “This raises the ques-
tion of how the two parts relate to one another and how they
can be brought into a unity” [B.d.Ph., 13]. The cultural goods
play a particularly important role in bringing the two realms
together. It is the cultural goods that reveal the multiplicity
of values to us, since, during the course of historical develop-
ment, the values have become manifest in them. Thus, if phi-
losophical science wants to know its object, the values, it must
examine the historical material. “Out of historical materials,
philosophy must bring the values as values to consciousness”
[B.d.Ph., 18]. Historical objects are sources of knowledge, from
which the philosopher analyzes the multiplicity of valid val-
ues. Through their function as a source of knowledge of values,
the historical objectifications [Gegebenheiten] can themselves
be related to values. In this way, they create a connection be-
tween two spheres, reality and value, which are otherwise in
danger of drifting apart. “Of course the concept of philosophy
is not exhausted with the concept of a pure theory of value.
The final problem must be the unity of value and reality, and
philosophy must therefore seek a third realm that will link the
two concepts which, up to this point, have been intentionally
separated” [B.d.Ph., 19]. We must seek a new realm that stands
between the first two, a mediating realm that does not exist for
itself in the way the two others do, which represent mutually
exclusive alternatives.

To ascertain more closely how this third realm is to be con-
ceived, Rickert introduces the concept of the act-experience
[Akterlebnis]. “We go behind the state of our thought, in which
the subject’s act of valuing is [already] an objectified reality for
us, to arrive at something that, in order to express its proximity
to experience, we will call an ‘act-experience’” [B.d.Ph., 24].
The word *act-experience* does not describe a concept. It is entirely preconceptual and merely denotes “the beginning of a concept, a half-made product still in need of further work.” But this act-experience has the advantage that it holds three possible directions open for further conceptual development. These three possibilities are, first, “that we grasp the experience as pure reality which takes place in the context of other realities.” Second, that “we do not think of a reality at all, but only the value that is valued, therefore of its validity.” And third, “that we follow neither of the two directions to their logical end, and that despite this—or rather because of it—unite them” ([B.d.Ph., 25](#)). This not-going-to-the-end of the two directions and their resulting unification should be so thought of that the act constitutes taking up a position in relationship to the value, but the value remains in its pristine experienced mediated reality. “Despite this, we obtain a concept that contains the connection between value and valuation if we assume the concept of value but only use it to complement the first steps toward a concept implicit in the act-experience. The objectifying sciences can grasp the act as a psychic reality and thus keep pure reality and value separate. But it remains connected to value and, for that reason, becomes a concept that we can understand as value in the sense of value as value-response” ([B.d.Ph., 25](#)). Rickert uses the term *meaning* ([Sinn](#)) to indicate how he understands this act. “On the one hand, the meaning of the act of valuing is not psychic, but points beyond this to the values themselves. On the other hand the act is not a value, but only points to values. In the last instance, as a third realm, and by virtue of its mediate position, it unites the two other realms which would otherwise remain separate” ([B.d.Ph., 27](#)). Our presentation has carefully followed Rickert’s wording. We must continue to do so, for as we will demonstrate, the source of the mistakes that we find in Rickert’s treatment of the problem, which render it inadequate, is to be found in the expressions he uses.
It comes as somewhat of a surprise that Rickert does not content himself with the connections between value and reality that he has before him, that is, with goods. He himself says that the values only appear connected to realities “in goods or valuations” (B.d.Ph., 23). In the interest of greater clarity, it would be useful to know what Rickert means when he says that values connected with realities appear in goods. Values and realities present themselves to us in their connection as goods. The word in evokes the entirely erroneous notion that the good is something whose existence transcends the value, something from which, as it were, we could remove the value without it losing its character as a good. It is something like a rash that appears on a person, but when the rash has long since disappeared, the person is unchanged. With goods, the matter is entirely different. When the value is removed, the good no longer exists. It is indeed questionable whether anything remains at all. However, with Rickert, in any case, the reality still remains, in connection with which the value produces the good. This criticism may appear to be a superfluous splitting of hairs. In what follows we will have to demonstrate that this is not the case, but that in such small matters the system’s ambiguities already begin to manifest themselves. Let us remark here, that, in the passage cited (B.d.Ph., 27), the meaning is once termed a means, not between value and reality but between value and valuation. That might be a mere linguistic slip of no symptomatic importance. But for Rickert the goods do not suffice, and the principle by which values are combined with other elements is not made clear here. We must try to start with that which has come into existence—the good—and work back from it, from the finished good to the act of valuation that imparted value to reality and, in so doing, produced the good (B.d.Ph., 23). [Here value accrues to reality, but just four lines above the claim was made that “value accrues to goods.”]

Rickert described the return to the act-experience at length in what appears to me to be a brilliant exercise in hiding am-
biguities. The act, namely, is left in its “immediacy and originality” (B.d.Ph., 25) and is made merely the precondition of value in order to be given meaning as the mediating instance between act and value. [Now the sudden change of meaning to that which lies between “value and valuation” seems to have been symptomatic after all.] With the recourse to the act-experience, the earlier, relatively clear argument concerning the good’s mediate position between value and reality has become very unclear. For in the act-experience we no longer have any reality, but something new that is very important: the act. We did not have this before, and it enters [the chain of argument] in a rather disruptive way. It brings about the following situation: The act-experience can be understood as psychic reality. In this case it is only experience, experienced reality. (At the same time we must also deny Rickert’s claim, that the act-experience is an experience that can be understood as reality [B.d.Ph., 25]. This is wrong. In fact the act-experience is a fiction for the thing-in-itself, which transcends all conceptualization and categorical determination and has only the pedagogical function for which it is intended.) Besides eliminating the experience, it is also possible to isolate the value. But that is all. If it was earlier conceded that we could think of the act-experience both as experience and as value, a third possibility cannot now be admitted. Now, the act-experience is not something thought but, according to Rickert, becomes active itself and binds reality and value into a good. And it is only this combination that can, with certainty, become the object of thought. This puts Rickert in the same situation he was in earlier, however, that he only has the finished goods. We must look more closely at this situation. We cannot accept that the act-experience is a value-response, because this value-response lies entirely within the act-experience itself, and the latter is only a fiction. Both psychic reality and value had to be removed from the act-experience before they could become objects of thought. The recourse to the concept of “the value-response,” which is the essential element within the act-experience, only
creates ambiguities. For one can indulge in all possible notions concerning the value-response, but the only one that is actually possible is that we cannot have a notion of it at all, because it belongs to the realm of fictive notions for which there is no objectification.

**Fiction: Doubling**

Now that the concept of the act-experience has been formulated, however, it should be used to unfold the possibilities of critical investigation inherent in it. If we conceive of the act, as Rickert expresses it, as reality or value, then we arrive—and this concession is only temporary—at something existent: to real being or valid being that exists as such because it can be conceptually grasped. If we remain in the middle of this act, we arrive at “value-response,” but since this is a fiction with which we can do very little, we must proceed further to the products, or objects of this value-response; we must proceed to the goods themselves. First, the goods are something existent; second, they are something that can be conceptualized; and these concepts are also something existent. The simplicity with which reality and value can be thought—they only exist to the extent that they are concepts—and both [in] goods, complicates the duality of their existence and the concept of their own individual existence. The “Prussian state” or the David of Michelangelo are independently existing entities and differ from the concepts we form of these objects. But nature is not an entity in itself that is captured in concepts, but rather exists only to the extent that the concepts are formed. This relation could give rise to the paradox, that nature is what we find in natural science textbooks; nature is natural science, whereas forests, the beauty of the landscape, and the entire experience that the [illegible] human being calls “nature” is not nature at all but merely a [subjective] experience or an emotion.

This consideration sheds more light on the structural relationship between the concepts of cultural science and natural
sciences. First, we must emphasize a contradiction. Rickert states, as we have already pointed out, that out of the whole of reality a number of things present themselves that have special meaning for us and in which we “see something more than mere nature” (K.u.N., 16). This appears to me to mean that a special significance is to be attached to “nature”—reality and nature are used synonymously. And it appears to be entirely in this sense that Rickert continues: “For the things that have a special meaning for us, the normal presentation of natural science, which is otherwise completely justified, does not suffice; in regard to them, we must pose completely different questions” (K.u.N., 16). Thus, first we have nature, but nature by itself does not suffice and of nature we ask further questions. Let us note in passing that Rickert’s lack of examples is regrettable. It would have been truly instructive to see how he forms the “natural” concept of a painting or of a legal order and then poses “cultural” questions of this “natural” concept. Not entirely in agreement with this presentation, he writes in another passage: “When we consider reality with regard to the general, it becomes nature; when we consider it with regard to the particular and individual, it becomes history” (K.u.N., 63). The goods or cultural objects are defined as such by the methods of concept formation—in this case, the [illegible] [cultural science] method. The cognitive process endows them with their qualification as cultural objects. Specifically, they are directly lifted out of reality; the method of the additional questions mentioned earlier is dropped. The reason for this difference is perhaps to be found in Rickert’s peculiar concept of reality. Reality is not pictured [abgebildet] in concepts, for in that case the infinity of reality would render [making an image of it] an insoluble task. Instead, [Rickert says], “we will have to stick to the idea that cognition is not the making of an image of reality, but the re-forming [or restructuring of reality]. And it must be said that this always involves a simplification of reality” (K.u.N., 34). If we adopt Simmel’s position, that reality is a principle of order for such worlds as natural science, art, the
state, and the economy, then it is not quite clear what such a reconstruction of reality can possibly mean. Reality has a special position insofar as we start there in order to get to the other “worlds.” But, for example, in order to become acquainted with a species of beetle, we can just as easily start with an artistic image of an example of the species than with a real one. For here, starting means no more than drawing attention to the existence of the exemplar. It makes no sense to talk about a reconstruction of reality and, as the example of taking an artistic depiction for our starting point reveals, certainly not of a simplification of reality. The term simplification has no meaning when we are talking of phenomena divided into such categories as reality, nature, works of art, etc. We cannot say that the natural sunrise—the movement of the celestial bodies according to the principles of mechanics—is more simple or complex than the actual sunrise—the rising of the sun over the horizon. Nor can we say that it is more complex than the sunrise that is symbolically depicted in Hodler’s painting The Day. The relation “simple” or “complex” does not obtain between members of different worlds; they are separated from one another toto genere. A relationship between them could only be established if we were to understand them as forms of one cosmic material [Weltstoff]. In the last instance, that amounts to nothing less than asserting a substance that encompasses all of these “worlds” and provides them with a metaphysical point of synthetic unity, i.e., which causes them to appear as various aspects of one world. But Rickert would reject the assumption of a reality that lies behind things. He expressly rejects such a notion (K.u.N., 31). But if we disregard this possibility of interpreting the concept of reality, nothing remains for us but to declare Rickert’s theoretical construction erroneous. Reality is one world next to others, and neither natural nor cultural sciences originate from a reconstruction or simplification of it.

Let us now look a little more closely into the relationship between the concepts of value, reality, natural science, and
cultural science. Even if science has nothing at all to do with reality, the immanent problems of classifying it still exist. Cultural objects are characterized by the fact that they are related to values. “Through the values that cling to culture, and through [the] relationship to them, the concept of a demonstrable historical individuality is constructed” (K.u.N., 93). The subsumption of a notion under a rule, in Kant’s sense, and the validity of this rule constitute the value. “A rule must be grounded in a valid value” (“Psychologie,” 1). Rickert secures this concept against misinterpretation with an enumeration of possible misunderstandings:

We mistake the valid values, either for the real “goods” that carry them, or for the “goals” we strive to realize, or for the “means” that we employ to attain an “end.” The value itself is neither the good nor the end nor the goal nor the means. Nor does it coincide with the psychic acts in the value-response. From time to time—in the event that we have gotten beyond the confusions just mentioned—we only see empty forms without content in the value structures, and do not think that contents belong in the form of values. (“Psychologie,” 3)

By such contents in the form of values, Rickert understands, for example, the true, valid “sense” of a theoretical act (“Psychologie,” 3).

The good is related to such a value as we have just characterized, and this is how historical science grasps it. Here, too, we must complain of Rickert’s lack of examples, which prevents the technique of the value-relating method becoming clear.

A cultural good is either actually acknowledged by all as valid or its validity, and with it the more than individual significance of the objects to which it clings, is postulated by a cultural human being [Kulturmensch]. Further, culture in the highest sense cannot merely involve objects of desire, but must involve goods to use or care for which we feel more or less “obliged” with regard to the community in which we live, or for some other reason, and this obligation is something we feel when we reflect on the validity of values in general, whereby we do not have in mind morals alone. (K.u.N., 32)
Cultural objects are delineated by the thought that such an object "can confront" us as an obligation (K.u.N., 32). Although we cannot say for certain, this might mean that historical science proceeds in the following manner: A cultural good of acknowledged validity is given, for example, the "Prussian state." The historian makes a selection among the events that led up to this good and relates them to the value that he recognizes in this good. Thus, the value is the methodological principle for making the selection. This just might be what is meant by the distinction Rickert makes between sciences that are directed to general principles and those that have individual phenomena as their object and whose particular kind of individuality is determined by the fact that they are brought into relation with a value. But to what kind of value are the cultural goods in our example related? The value of the Prussian state is of a kind that Rickert has said can only mistakenly be described as a value; it is what is commonly called a cultural good. Now, it could perhaps be objected that the example was badly chosen and that Rickert did not really mean an object of that kind. But the attempt to imagine another possible kind of historical science will not succeed. Rickert puts the historian into a dilemma when he writes: "Religion, the Church, the law, the state, morals, science, language, literature, art, the economy, and all the technical means that are necessary to their operation, exist—at their particular level of development—in exactly the same way, namely, that the value they carry is recognized as valid by all members of the community, or at least the community members may (justifiably) be expected to recognize it" (K.u.N., 23). We can only ask Rickert to show us how the trick is done of relating the "Prussian state" to the value it carries; namely, to the value "state" in general. It is possible to establish this relationship. In this investigation, we have set for ourselves the task of finding the methodological means to demonstrate this relationship—but that is not what historical science does. Although it is [illegible] [difficult to recapitulate] Rickert's thought in detail, we can imagine it
proceeds approximately as follows. History “individualizes” its objects by relating them to values. Through an equivocation, to which we must return below, Rickert manages to use the same word to denote two kinds of value. There is the value to which the historical investigation is oriented, the value as a cultural good [Kulturgut], and the value which gives the historical phenomenon its structure. (It is not the value that lends structure to historical phenomena. We shall demonstrate below that value emanates from a different quarter entirely.) But by arbitrarily shifting the meaning of the concept of value, Rickert manages to bring various sciences together as cultural sciences. We will not criticize this process in detail here. Suffice it to say that, for example, even national economy [K.u.N., 23] is included in the cultural sciences. It is our view that no manipulation of concepts, however skillfully done, can succeed in bringing this science and the science of history under one heading. If we are to assume that this notion is held in good faith, we can only conclude that Rickert has a very confused idea of the nature of national economy. This is quite conceivable, in view of the fact that he lives in Germany, where the theory [of national economy] is not held in very high esteem. But between the methods of historical science and those of national economy, which always tend to erect a system of economic forms or categories, we are unlikely to find a bridge to unite these two sciences within a concept of cultural science.

We spoke of an equivocation in the concept of value. The following passage demonstrates the truth of our claim: “In any case, true, good, beautiful, and holy are value concepts. Perhaps this finds its most clear expression in the fact that the corresponding pairs of concepts—true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, holy and unholy—present themselves as value opposites” [Grenzen, 612]. By truth, we either understand the principle of connection of phenomena—in which case this rule of connection is not a value, but merely possesses a priori validity, and it is completely unclear how it should attain the
character of being a value. But true and false, ugly, beautiful, etc., are valuations of the subject relating to phenomena. And in no case can the sphere of the rules of connection—that is, the transcendental sphere—coincide with the sphere in which phenomena are evaluated. Nor can the appearance of values in one sphere and the appearance of values in another lead to conclusions concerning the relationships of the meanings of these values to one another, for these values have been arbitrarily chosen. If in the sphere of transcendental validity we replace what Rickert calls “truth” with the term nature, this whole business of juggling concepts and of mystical meanings collapses.

By that we do not wish to deny that talk of a more or less beautiful art work, a more or less profound philosophical system, a more or less good theory, etc., makes sense. But, and we can make this statement at this point in our investigation, this sense is not found in the contrasting absolute poles. This was deliberately avoided in our enumeration. Rather the sense is found in a continuous scale of intensity, with which the world is suffused and with which it is given form. We will go into this matter in more detail below when we come to the explication of our own position.14

In conclusion, we want to touch briefly on the relationship of the sciences to one another. Where cultural sciences are seen, not as a concept containing value [bedeutungsenthaltender Begriff], but as a value without meaning [bedeutungsloser Wert], only natural science remains. We find an escape from this situation if we again adopt Simmel’s position, which assumes that the worlds are principally coordinated with one another. The world or reality exists next to nature (natural science), the work of art, the state, the system of sciences; it is at this level of the worlds that natural science is to be sought next to art, etc. These worlds are the structures that are coordinated with

14. [This paragraph points to the intention of writing text sections which have not been found.]
natural science. Cultural science has disappeared and been replaced by the cultural phenomena, which are valuable structures, even if no science relates them to the values that cling to them. What perhaps lies beyond the phenomenon in the broadest sense of the word is not the value but the validity of the principles of the world’s structure, whether this be the world of nature or one of the [other] worlds mentioned. [If we describe a priori validity as a value—in whatever relationship to content value implies—we immediately see that a cultural good, such as natural science, does not have an a priori valid rule that would connect it (to the value of) love, but it exists in some relationship to love, which must be more precisely determined but which in any case is not to be found at the level of the transcendental [phenomenon].] ¹⁵ In a manner of speaking, Rickert makes the same point: “Not only is natural science a historical product of cultural science, but ‘nature’ itself in the logical or formal sense of the term is only a theoretical cultural good, a valid—that is, objectively valuable—understanding of reality by the human intellect. The absolute validity of the value that clings to nature must always be assumed by natural science” (K.u.N., 166).

Here, the chain of thought becomes somewhat confused. Natural science and nature are separated, something that is not correct, for in fact they are identical. There is no nature outside natural science. This mistake immediately makes itself felt, for the description of natural science as a historical product obscures the fact that it is a cultural good. Instead, nature, in the logical or formal sense, is described as a cultural good. The only possible meaning we can attribute to this sense of nature, if we must point to it at all, is that there is nature in another sense as well. Perhaps, with this other sense, Rickert means natural science. If so, the only interpretation we can offer is that the logical or formal nature refers to the rules of nature’s

¹⁵. [The state of the text did not allow the reconstruction of this sentence. It must be understood as a conjecture and not a translation.]
structure. But if it refers to the structural principle, then it is a value. When nature itself, however, is a value, it makes no sense to speak of the validity of the value that clings to nature.

The standpoint of cultural science is ranked above this nature: “The historical-cultural-scientific point of view is definitely to be ranked above the natural scientific one because it is by far the most comprehensive” (K.u.N., 166). This is the first point in which Rickert comes closest to a solution. It lacks only the coordination of the worlds (to which nature or natural science also belong) in order to proceed to the science above it that investigates cultural products. The present work is concerned with the establishment of such a science; and without anticipating our argument, we may point out here that such a science is not a historical science. For such a science, empirical historical science merely provides the collection of materials, and, regrettably, [it is] for the most part a poor collection because its practitioners select the materials in accordance with standpoints that have not been very well thought through.

Within this miscellany of values, goods, cultures, and sciences, only one thing can be clearly recognized: that to the extent we can speak of solutions at all when we discuss real problems, a particular problem was left unsolved. As earlier critiques have indicated, this is the problem of content. We have said it before, in the term value, a content is always implied, even when value is so elegantly defined that it becomes a form and its mode of being the a priori. Determinations of content are also present in Rickert, though he leaves in ambiguous obscurity just how science manages to relate an object to a value. Indicative in this regard is the way he concludes Cultural Science and Natural Science. He cites Alois Bichl: “Without having an ideal above him, the human being, in the spiritual sense of the word, cannot walk upright” (K.u.N., 169).

The incredibly ambiguous “ideal” is now above the human being. Just about anything can be done with “ideals.” The content of a cultural good with its validity as a value and its validity as a form can all be thrown together in an “ideal.” Ideal
is an indistinct word, full of moods, feelings, valuations, and images that enable it to brilliantly fill in where concepts fail and replace clarity with pathos. This seems to be the function Rickert assigns to the “ideal.”

The result of our critique is this: The content of the phenomenon is the riddle that cannot be solved, and the inadequate knowledge of the problem is concealed by the ambiguous term value.

If one were to assume that our critique served to prove the falsity of the systems criticized in order now to replace them with the true system, one would miss the purpose of our critique entirely. Systems are always false. It is always easy to discover inconsistencies in them and criticize the exposed points, such as the ones we have identified here. The system is only a garment, sometimes well cut and sometimes ill fitting, whose shape indicates what it clothes. From the cut of the coat we cannot draw absolute conclusions about the clothed figure. The criticism we offered was not made in order to prove that systems are bad—they are always bad, that is not the point—but to show that under various wrappings we find the same hidden figure. We undertook this task in order to get closer to the problem, to better grasp its essence, and to analyze anew what we have found. Negative critiques are a bad thing. It is not the purpose of criticism to prove that the other person is wrong, but that he is right, though appearances are against him.
# The Theory of Governance

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1. [This section is incomplete, breaking off near the end of the discussion on Husserl.]
2. [Voegelin moved sections 1 and 2 to chap. 3, where both are absorbed into his discussion of Weber. See editors’ notes, 8, and the table of contents to chap. 3, 268–69 below.]
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3. [This section is missing.]
4. [For Voegelin’s changes to chap. 3 and the chapter’s page numbers see 268–70 below.]
Chapter 1. To Determine the Concept of the Person

1. Saint Augustine’s Theory of the Person

The determination [Bestimmung] of that which a person essentially is [im ihrem Kerne sei] takes place when the attempt is made with adequate means in a fundamental form of philosophical thinking that, following the name given to it by Descartes, we will call meditation. Before we introduce a concept of meditation that will suffice for our purposes, we shall demonstrate with an example what takes place during a meditation and what its essential characteristics are. For our example we have chosen Saint Augustine’s investigation of memory and time that he presents in Books X and XI of his Confessions. The forms his Christian thought takes and the formulae it finds remain to this day the classical model that has been praised and followed for investigations into the essence of the person and time.

Every meditation requires a beginning that also gives it direction. For Saint Augustine the beginning is constituted in the

5. [The edition of Saint Augustine’s Confessions that Voegelin used is not identified in the text.]
question: Where does the soul find God when it seeks Him in order to find peace in Him? After much unsuccessful seeking, he must say: “Neque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, invenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea nec a te quicquam recedat ex me” [Nor in all these that I review when consulting Thee, find I a secure place for my soul, save in Thee, into whom my scattered members may be gathered together, and nothing of me depart from Thee] [X.c.40].

This turn of phrase is characteristic of the course of this and every other genuine meditation, because it clearly expresses the fact that the seeking has a direction, but no rational notations with which to describe its goal. Saint Augustine seeks, not God, of whom he might have a definite concept, but that point in the movement of his soul at which his soul finds peace. This point is found when no driving impulse remains in the meditative course. The meditation must therefore be understood as the step-by-step elimination of all that is unsettling, all that is merely world immanent, until the soul stands naked before God. This “place” [Ort] can only be negatively determined as being none of those which the meditative course passed through in the soul’s state of unrest. It is simply the other place. What it is positively can only be seen by the one who follows the whole movement of the confession, who has himself enacted the confession to God. The mystic’s via negationis, the rejection of all empirical levels of being, leads at last to the highest level of being, that which all world immanent things are not. The question posed in chapter 6 of the tenth book expresses the pure form of this elevation: “Quid autem amo, cum te amo? non speciem corporis” [But what is it that I love in loving Thee? Not corporeal beauty] “nec decus temporis, non candorem lucis ecce istum amicum oculis, non dulces melodias cantilenarum omnimodarum, non florum et ungentorum et aromatum suaveolentiam, non manna et mella, non membra acceptabilia carnis amplexibus: non haec amo, cum amo deum meum” [nor the order of time, nor the radiance
of the light, so pleasant to our eyes, nor the sweet melodies of songs of all kinds, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs pleasant to the embraces of flesh: I love not these things when I love my God] (X.c.6). At the highest point of this negation [Augustine] follows with et tamen [and yet]. It is the reflexive turning back indicating that, though God is none of this, “nevertheless,” for the soul, He is this as well. God is all that has been negated, and again, at the same time, He is not that either; all the propositions have been simultaneously asserted and canceled in order to determine the locus where the fullness of being is to be found at the same time as the repose devoid of everything connected with the earthly impure aspect of being: “et tamen amo quandam lucem et quandam vocem et quandam odorem et quandam cibum et quandam amplexum, cum amo deum meum, lucem, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, [. . . ] et ubi sonat, quod non rapit tempus, et ubi olet, quod non spargit flatus, et ubi sapit, quod non minuit edacitas, et ubi haeret, quod non divellit satietas. hoc est quod amo, cum deum meum amo” [And yet I love a certain kind of light, and a kind of voice, and a kind of fragrance, and a kind of meat, and a kind of embracement, whenas I love my God; who is both the light and the voice, and the sweet smell, and the meat, and the embracement of my inner man: (. . . ) that voice soundeth, which time deprives me not of; and that fragrancy smelleth, which no wind scatters; and that meat tasteth, which eating devours not; and that embracement clingeth to me, which satiety divorceth not. This it is which I love, whenas I love my God] (X.c.6).

The course of the meditating person in pursuit of his or her goal is not an arbitrary wandering but strictly determined by the structure of being. It is this strictness that persuades the meditating person that the course was the correct one and the goal that was found was the one sought. The meditation proceeds from the world of the senses and passes through all of its levels upward toward the soul, where it penetrates to
the soul’s core. From the core of the soul follows the crossing over [Überschritt] to God. The circles within which God is sought are ordered in approximately the following manner: (1) first comes the corpus [body] or the sensus [the senses], the corporeal realm, (2) the anima [soul] as the universal life-giving principle of the corporeal realm, including the animal kingdom. God cannot be found in the anima: “non ea vi reperio deum meum” [not by that power do I find my God] [X.c.7]. The next layer is quite generally called memoria [memory]: “transibo vim meam, qua haereo corpori et vitaliter compagem eius repleo [. . . ] gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, et venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae” [I will soar beyond that power of mine whereby I cling to the body, and fill the whole structure of it with life [. . . ], ascending by degrees unto Him who made me. And I enter the fields and spacious chambers of memory] [X.c.7, c.8]. Within the faculty of memory a number of levels are identified and differentiated: a) the memory of sensory perceptions, b) the memory of objects of mathematical theorems [Platonic anamnesis [Rückerinnerung]], c) the memory of emotions. And after all of these levels have been traversed, I arrive d) at the memory of memory: “et meminisse me memini, sicut postea, quod haec reminisci nunc potui, si recordabor, utique per vim memoriae recordabor” [therefore also I remember that I have remembered; so that if afterward I shall call to mind that I have been able to remember these things, it will be through the power of memory that I shall call it to mind] [X.c.13]. Memory that remembers itself, the consciousness of consciousness, this reiterative power [iterierbare Kraft] of man is his innermost self, his animus [soul]; thanks to this faculty of reiteration [Iterierbarkeit] memory qualifies as “quasi venter animi” [so to say, the belly of the mind] [X.c.14] “magna vis est memoriae [. . . ] et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse sum” [great is the power of memory [. . . ] and this thing is the mind, and this I myself am] [X.c.17]. In chapter 16 this thought is compactly expressed in wording reminiscent of Descartes: “ego sum, qui memini, ego animus” [It is I myself—
I, the mind—who remembers] [X.c.16], and, elsewhere, “ipsum
me non dico [sic] praeter illam [scilicet memoriam]” [I cannot
name myself without it [i.e.,] memory] [X.c.16]. The medita-
tion comes to a provisional end in a definition of the core of
the person [Personkern] as the reiteration of memory. It is in
reciprocally related acts of memory that the ego ipse [the very
core of the self] is constituted.

But the core of the person is not the goal that the meditation
set out to attain. The ego is also world immanent. This level
of the human spirit must also be transcended into a level be-
yond [Jenseits] the human being, into the superego [Über-Ich]:
“transibo et hanc vim meam [. . .] ut pertendam ad te, dulce
lumen” [I will pass beyond this power of mine [. . .] that I
may proceed to Thee, O Thou sweet Light] [X.c.17]. Chapter
25 reviews once more the levels of memory that have been passed
through: 1) “partes eius, quas habent et bestiae” [those parts of
it which the beasts also possess] [X.c.25] [i.e., remembrance of
sensory perceptions], 2) “affectiones animi mei” [the affects of
my mind], 3) “et intravi ad ipsius animi mei sedem (quae illi
est in memoria mea, quoniam sui quoque meminit animus)”
[and I entered into the very seat of my mind [which it has in my
memory, since the mind also remembers itself]]. Nevertheless,
all of these levels, including the core of the person, are still sub-
ject to change, while God remains unchangeable and permanet
[endures] over all [things] [X.c.25]. In chapter 26, the question
concerning the place where God may be found must at last be
answered: “et nusquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et
nusquam locus” [place there is none; we go both “backward”
and “forward,” and there is no place].

The course of the meditation is prescribed by the structure of
the world and culminates for the immanent world in a center
defined by means of the self-reflection of the spirit [Rückwen-
dung des Geistes auf sich selbst] and ends by revealing the
being, in which the predicates and structures of the immanent
world are overcome [aufgehoben], as that bordering immedi-
ately on the immanent world. Leaving out the intermediate
levels, the meditative course leads from body to soul, from the soul to the ego itself ego ipse and from the ego itself to God. This course reaches its unequivocal end (if we ignore the intermediate steps), when, after exhausting all that is predicable, it reaches the place that is no longer a place in any palpable sense of the term.

The meditative course that is oriented to spatial images and passes through the realm of being by ascending from level to level is one of the fundamental forms of speculation about the nature of the person. The other equally important form is oriented to the image of the flow of time, to the coming into being and the perishing of things. In the eleventh book of his Confessions Saint Augustine performs this meditation on time. Once again the hope of attaining peace is the driving impulse, but, unlike in the tenth book, it is not a spatial goal. What is sought is not a tutus locus animae [secure place for the soul], a site of safety that is no longer any real place, but a time that is no longer any real time, a sabbath of eternal life and a peace in God: "Etiam tunc enim sic requiesces in nobis, quemadmodum nunc operaris in nobis, et ita erit illa requies tua per nos, quemadmodum sunt ista opera tua per nos. tu autem, domine, semper operaris et semper requiescis; nec vides ad tempus, nec moveris ad tempus, ne quiescis ad tempus; et tamen facis et visiones temporales et ipsa tempora et quietem ex tempore" [For even then shalt Thou rest in us, as now Thou dost work in us; and thus shall that rest be Thy rest through us, as these are Thy works through us. But Thou, O Lord, ever workest, and are ever at rest. Nor seest Thou in time, nor movest Thou in time, nor restest Thou in time; and yet Thou makest the scenes of time, and the times themselves, and the rest which results from time] [XIII.c.37]. To reach this goal the same process is implied as unfolded in the meditation oriented to spatial images, the simultaneous affirmation and negation of a predicate. When God reposes within us, His peace will be within us, the same as His activity is now at work within us; hence the state of human peace will be one fulfilled
by the presence of God [ein gotterfüllter], the same as is the state of activity. And yet, while identical, this state of peace is an entirely “different” state. Yet God is act and repose in one. No discrete time segments exist for God in which he would alternately rest and act, and yet he creates time and activity within time, and peace from time, etc. The speculation about time has its point of departure in the relationship between creator and creatura, between creator and creation, to which the human being, including the core of his person, belongs. This gives rise to the following question: How are the creator and the act of creation to be understood, if idle questions are to be avoided—questions such as: What did God do before he created the world? Why did he create it at all and at a specific time rather than leave it undone? How can God be eternal and unchangeably the same, if decisions come to fruition in him such as that to create a world? Questions of this nature are answered in the following statements: “antequam faceret deus caelum et terram, non faciebat aliquid. si enim faciebat, quid nisi creaturam faciebat? [. . . ] si autem ante caelum et terram nullam erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid tunc faciebas? non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus” [before God made heaven and earth, He made not anything; for if He did, what did He make unless the creature?] [XI.c.12] [What didst Thou then? For there was no “then” when time was not] [XI.c.13]. There was no then, when there was no time. Time is viewed as a thing [durchaus dinghaft], as something created and belonging to the whole of creation along with heaven and earth, which in its entirety is differentiated from the creative will of God. The substantial will of God does not precede time as some kind of a time, but as the “celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis” [high advantage of an always present eternity] [XI.c.13].

The eternal substance of God should be understood as the opposite pole to time and yet directly related to time [to the tempora et saecula [times and centuries]] by the act of creation. [This pole] should be understood “quomodo fieret, quae per te atque in te fluint” [as the manner would be in which
they come into being by you and in you]. God is eternal activity without, however, having the form of time. When he is characterized in terms of temporality, then in such a manner that all positive determinations are neutralized by appropriate qualification and emptied of their experiential content. In eternity nothing can perish \( (\text{praeterire}) \), for everything is simultaneously present. The present, which has meaning only in relation to past and future, as a movement from the former to the latter, is lifted out of context and represented as continuously enduring, but not without the explicit qualification that there is no time that can be present as a whole [nullum tempus totum esse praesens]. God's years do not come and go like the years of human beings, but stand; and since they stand, they do so all at the same time. God's “years are one day,” but His “day is not each single day” but a continuous today, for this “today yields not with tomorrow, neither does it follow yesterday [. . .] today is eternity [. . .]. Thou hast made all time; and before all times Thou art, nor in any time was there not time” [“hodiernus tuus aeternitas [. . .]. omnia tempora tu fecisti et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus”] [XI.c.13].

The denaturization of the words \( \text{praecedere} \) [precede] and \( \text{ante} \) [before] in these passages is noteworthy. As a result of Saint Augustine's analysis, these terms lose all spatiotemporal sense of progression. Only by their movement through the monolog form of the confession of faith and the dialectical turn of meaning do they direct the reader's attention toward the transcendent, which is the ego's goal, sought in an individual act that we will describe below.

God does not exist in time nor prior to time; instead, creator and creation continue parallel in their entire extension—if the term \( \text{extension} \) can be applied to God—whose duration is characterized by the fact that it is not subject to the quality of temporal extension. Time can be experienced in every one of its points as world immanent by the fact that, at any point, the \( \text{intentio} \) toward God may be achieved. It is in the core of
the personality of the soul that the point is found in which created, extended time intersects with God’s uncreated eternity, which has no extension. The tension between God and time brings the proposition to its climax: “et nulla tempor a tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora” [and no times are coeternal with Thee, because Thou remainest for ever; but should these continue, they would not be times] [XI.c.14]. No time has the quality of “coeternity,” for time does not endure, but flows. What then is this time, which lacks coeternity, which nevertheless exists as a whole and is something with which God coexists, but not in any sense intelligible to human understanding!

The answer becomes possible through the description of the core of the personality as something that has fallen into time, whence a return to God must be sought. “At ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem nescio, et tumultuosis varietatibus dilaniantur cogitationes meae, intima viscera animae meae, donec in te confluum purgatus et liquidus ignem amoris tui” [But I have been divided amid times, the order of which I know not; and my thoughts, even the inmost bowels of my soul, are mangled with tumultuous varieties, until I flow together unto Thee, purged and molten in the fire of Thy love] [XI.c.29].

The concept of distentio has the double meaning of extension and dis-tension [i.e., relaxation of tension], dissipation, and of a lapse—“tempus [. . . ] quandam esse distentionem” [(I see that) time [. . . ] is a certain extension] [XI.c.23], a space. Not only [is it] an extension in the sense of the spatial image of a line, but also in the sense of a lapse from God; the entire creatura [creation]—and, along with it, the human soul—is a distentio: “ecce distentio est vita mea” [behold, my life is but a distraction] [XI.c.29]—a slackening, a dissipation. May God remove it and lift me up (colligere) so that my soul might henceforward forget the things that are past and not strive for what lies in the future, i.e., for what is transitory, but follow the One. “In ea quae ante sunt” [let the soul be extended unto those things that are before] “non distentus, sed extentus, non secundum
Let us now look at what Saint Augustine’s meditation achieved, and what it could not.

(1) We learn from it that there are two principal schemata that can illuminate the essence of the person [das Wesen der Person]. In the one the world appears to be a static order of being through which the person in his or her meditation can pass until the core of the person is reached. From here the leap [Sprung] is taken to God. This meditative path is strictly prescribed by the order of being and is constituted by the relationships of body to soul and soul to God. The existence of an explicit or naïve ontology is the prerequisite for a meditation of this type to be convincing. Just as the first way is oriented to being, so the second is oriented to becoming. Saint Augustine’s approach from the theological problem of creator and creatura is merely incidental. What is essential is the relationship of the endless flow of events toward that which endures and, in relation to which, the flow itself becomes perceptible; a flow without firm edges, a flow without banks in which motion emerges as a phenomenon is not a flow at all. Coming into being in the flow of time is related, in its entirety, to something fixed [ein Festes], to a beyond that is removed from this flow and endures (permanet). When I look toward what is permanent, in the intentio that is to carry me to God, I experience my
distance from God and realize [erlebe ich] that I am not with Him, but immersed in becoming, in moral decay and in time.

[2] Both meditative ways, that of being and that of becoming, lead back to the same goal: the meditating person to God and therewith the understanding person to insight into the essence of the human person, who can be characterized by his openness to a transcendent being, by his being a frontier between the world, with its being and becoming, and a superworld [Über-Welt]. The person is, as we have said, the point of intersection between divine eternity and human temporality; in the person finitude is revealed as the essence of the world. The person is the experience of the limits demarcating world-immanent finiteness from the transcendent infinite.

[3] We will call the procedure, by which our results in both meditative schemes were achieved, dialectical. We understand by this term the determination of an object with the help of a change in meaning of the concepts [Bedeutungswandel] that is prescribed by the structure of the borderline relationship [Grenzbeziehung] between the finite and the infinite. Saint Augustine's approach is characterized primarily by a form of the change of meaning that concepts undergo when they are simultaneously posited and negated. (In the course of this investigation we shall become familiar with other forms.)

The simultaneous positing and negating strips a concept of its positive meaning by transferring it from the finite realm, where it can be meaningfully applied, to the infinite, where it loses its intuitive content. The loss of intuitive content, parallel with the loss of finitude, is verbally expressed by the simultaneous positing and negating. Let us call this change of meaning, which expresses the crossing of the border [Grenzübergang] from finitude to infinity, the "dialectization" of concepts. (Below we shall have occasion to discuss the reiteration that Saint Augustine only incidentally uses in his analysis of memory.)

[4] Saint Augustine's meditation is the basis of all more recent meditations. But it does not achieve everything that the
new theory of the person [Personlehre] needs. For Augustine the problem of the person is not the focus, but is treated obliquely in the question of the dualism between creator and creatura. For the modern philosophy of the person, the primary focus is the difference between person and world; for Augustine it was between God and the world. For him the whole of creation is given objectively and within it the person. His vision of the world is ordered in terms of space, from the bottom, the corporeal, to the summit of the soul. The modern philosophy of the person proceeds from the outward, the corporeal, as the outside of the person, to the most inward and intimate of the person. But for Augustine the self-possession [Selbsthabe] of the person, and with this the process of reiteration, is only a peripheral theme. The clearest symptom of this objective order, in which from the standpoint of an observer even the person is an object among other objects, can be seen in Augustine’s concept of time. It is not internal consciousness of time, not the constituent of the ego, but exactly the opposite, a dissolvent. The tempora and secula are identical with the creatura in the sense of a concrete realization [Erfüllheit] of the objective course of the world, in which the person, to the extent that he does not hold himself in the intentio to God, is also consumed.

Before we turn to the meditation centered in the ego, which we will illustrate with the example of Descartes, we should like to quote a few verses to demonstrate that the fundamental approach of Augustine’s Confessions has survived the ages to become the model of the meditative habitus, even outside the bounds of rigorous theological and philosophical speculation. The verses stand at the beginning of the age that is the topic of our theory of the state and originate in a Chanson spirituelle, one of the marguerites written by la Marguerite des princesses [i.e., by the Princess Marguerite de Navarre, 1492–1549]:

Parquoy voyant nostre vie
Par le temps ainsi ravie,
Pour n’estre des mal contens,
Arreste ton cœur et envie
A Celluy qui est sans temps.

(As we see our life
Thus ravished by time,
So as not to become one of the malcontents,
Put an end to your cares and envy
By turning to Him Who is beyond time.)

2. Descartes’s Meditation and the Internalization of the Idea of the Person

Augustine’s *Confessions* begins with the question of the relationship between the creator and creation. The Cartesian meditation is initiated by the question of the dualism between the subject of cognition and the world. Augustine was searching for the point where the soul might find peace. Descartes searches for the point of certainty from which knowledge of the world might be constructed. In order to find this point, his meditation systematically casts doubt on the reality of all being until a level of being is reached whose reality can no longer be doubted. Descartes’s doubt is not a negation of reality, but the method used to discover the fixed point, from which, starting again, even the reality of the previously doubted levels of being can be made intelligible. Being is not negated by the judgments made in the course of the meditation; indeed, judgments are suspended; “I have the power to suspend my judgment” [I, Meditation]. This “suspension” was systematically developed by Husserl into the “epoché” of judgment, or “parenthesizing” as the fundamental procedure of phenomenology.

Like Augustine, Descartes’s skeptical meditation follows a rigorously laid out path, shaped by the structure of the being that is to be exposed to doubt. First, the entire objective corporeal world is parenthesized as a possible illusion; next, to the extent that my body is a mechanism that occupies space, it is

6. [Voegelin used a French translation of Descartes’s *Meditations*. The exact edition is not identified in the text.]
also parenthesized. Furthermore, the soul of the body [*die Leibseele*] is “something extremely rare and subtle, like a breeze, a flame, or a very agile air” (II, *Med.*)—and following this reduction I ascend to that property of my ego that is called “thinking.” Thus I have arrived at the point of certainty, for the proposition *cogito, sum* is true, every time I think it. “Hence, to put it precisely, I am nothing but a thing that thinks, i.e., a mind, an intellect, or a reason, which are all concepts, whose meanings were unknown to me before” (II, *Med.*). As a thinking thing, I *am* only in the act of thinking; what I am when I am not thinking must remain doubtful; perhaps when I cease to think, I cease to be.

The certainty of the existence of my person as a thinking person should not be misinterpreted to be the conclusion of a syllogism. It is not a deduction of a proposition from axioms, but a simple descriptive demonstration of a state of affairs. In his *Answers to the Second Objections* Descartes states explicitly that the proposition *cogito ergo sum* is not to be understood as a statement that my existence is the consequence of my thinking. Such a syllogism would call for the major premise “everything that thinks, exists”; but on the contrary, he is taught to recognize it [the major premise] through what he feels within himself, that in no way can he think if he does not exist. In order to understand the nature of the meditation, the awareness of the descriptive moment must be present in our minds, especially since the description does not proceed affirmatively with a catalogue of characteristics, but focuses on its object [if we may call it an object] by abstracting from familiar characteristics and defining the object as the residue that results from this process. The out-and-out personal existential nature of this description also attains greater clarity in Descartes than it did in Augustine. The meditation is the life of the person in which the person becomes aware of his own uniquely individual being [*Eigenwesen*]. The person is both the subject of the meditation as well as its object; in the
meditation as a succession of acts of the person the person is itself given, not the person in the abstract, nor the universal essence of the person, but the concrete essence of the person engaged in the actual meditation that brings the person to himself. Only in view of the existential nature of the process can we understand passages like the conclusion of the First Meditation where Descartes reflects upon the difficulty of his task. It is burdensome and laborious; a certain lethargy pulls the meditating person back into the course of everyday life. “I relapse imperceptibly away from myself into my old opinions.” It is not new knowledge that is contrasted here to old, falsely held opinion, but the active life of the person is contrasted with dogmatic assertions, void of intuitive content. Meditation is an effort, it is a concrete, intensive life mode of a person, within which the person cannot endure for long, from which, in fact, he or she departs, falling away from the self into everyday opinions and formulas that lack the active character of the meditative mode of life. The process of meditation does not define the person as an object is defined, which can be alternately looked at and turned away from, but as an intensive self-possession, or more precisely—since this term still too strongly suggests the dualism of subject and object—as an intensive “being-with-one’s-own-self” [das Bei-sich-selbst-sein].

Once the essence of the person as a thinking being is established (which includes judging, feeling, imagining, representing), the second step of the meditation follows, one that Descartes distinguishes more clearly from the first step than Augustine does. The latter undertook the transition from the ego toward God with an unexplained leap [Sprung]. In the intentio the ego sought God, but the possibility of a rational analysis of this content was not considered. With the ego cogitans

the theory of governance

[thinking ego], Descartes attains the point of certainty in the chain of his doubts, but not the actual goal of his meditation: the gaining of certainty of a thing beyond his own self that might move him to change his “suspension of judgment” on external reality [das Ausser-Ich] to an affirmative one. The Third Meditation takes the step beyond the ego toward a substance, the reality of which can no longer be doubted.

Descartes clearly sets forth the conditions such a substance has to fulfill if it is to be convincing. Unlike the levels of being heretofore examined, which could be doubted, this level must not consist of elements derived from the ego itself, which therefore might be illusions of the ego. “If the objective reality or perfection of one of my ideas is such that I know quite well that it is not in me, either formally or eminently, and that, consequently, I cannot be its cause, it necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world, but that something else exists that is the cause of that idea.” The only idea that would fit this description and that has as yet not been examined is the idea of God. “I understand the name of God to be a substance which is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, omnipotent, and through whom I myself and all other things that are [if it is true that there are such that exist] have been created and produced.” The merits of divine reality are so extraordinary that the more closely the meditator examines them, the more he becomes convinced that the idea of this reality could not have originated in him; hence it follows that God truly exists. For even though the idea of substance may have originated in the ego, which is itself a substance, the idea of an infinite substance transcends the finite ego and can only be explained by assuming that the infinite substance has infused the idea of itself into the finite one.

Descartes's thought, that the reality of the levels of being traversed in the course of the meditation culminating in the ego can be doubted because the idea is produced by the ego and may be no more than the ego's illusion, may also give rise to justifiable misgivings. Nevertheless this moment of Cartesian
skepsis is as incidental for our investigation of the person as the Augustinian problem of the creator and creation. On the other hand, embedded in Descartes’s doubting of reality—and, for our problem, essential—is the process in which the person is determined as the residue after the positive qualities of being have been removed. Equally essential is the process in which contact between the person and the world is reestablished following the meditating person’s own withdrawal through the suspension of the world. Contact is reestablished in the closer scrutiny of the isolated residuum, which reveals essential features that point indubitably to a being external to the person. At this point the meditation is interrupted. The skeptical suspension has isolated the sphere in which the essence of the person is to be sought. Now that it has been found, a new process of positive description can begin, in which the borders of the finite person and that which transcends the finite person can be explained. The borders separating them become clear through reflections on the possibility that doubt is an imperfection. Descartes asks himself: “How would it be possible that I could know that I doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not entirely perfect, if I did not possess within me an idea of a being more perfect than my own, in comparison with which I would get to know the defects of my nature?” These are the same type of considerations we find in Scheler’s discussion of the essence of Thou-evidence [Du-Evidenz]. The ego finds empty spaces [Leerstellen] that point to possible fulfillment. From the nature of these empty spaces the ego has a notion of the nature of the being that could fulfill them, without having concretely experienced this being. Longing, gratitude, and acts of love point beyond the ego toward the need for fulfillment in a Thou, through another person. In experiences of this kind I become aware of my person as a finite person, finite in the specific sense of being both limited and open to other personal substances.

These last reflections carry out more accurately the final phase of the meditative schema that begins with being and
ascends by degrees through the fixed structure of being until it reaches God. The second type of meditation, that which starts with becoming, remains a felt presence in the first type when, at decisive points, the apparently object-oriented train of thought, in its peculiar quality of [being] an intense mode of life, is consciously felt by the concrete person [performing the meditation]. We call the reader’s attention to the conclusion of the First Meditation and, primarily, to the thought that the person’s being is certain only as a thinking person and that this being becomes doubtful when the person falls away from himself. Only in the actually achieved high point of the meditation does the person truly exist as a being-with-its-own-self [bei sich]. When the person falls away from this self, back into the everyday world, the reality of the person and the person’s essence as a border to God [Grenze gegen Gott] again becomes uncertain. This opposition between existential meditation and everyday [“existence”] occasions reflection designed to assure Descartes of the existence of the person through the entire period, even on those occasions when, outside the act of meditation, he does not directly experience his person as real. “When something slips my attention, my mind, having become obscured and, as it were, blinded by the images of sensible things, does not easily recollect again the reason why the idea I have of a being more perfect than mine must have been necessarily implanted in me by a being which is in fact more perfect.” Thus the further question arises, whether the ego could exist at all, if God were not. The answer is that, in that case, the ego would either have to be independent and itself an omnipotent God, or its existence would have to be the creation of an omnipotent substance upon which the ego would depend. Since the experience of doubt and of finitude has already demonstrated with absolute certainty that the ego is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, the second relationship of the ego to God is the only possible one. It is only my being [Wesen] as a creature that guarantees me the endurance of my person throughout my life span; in meditation I experience myself as existing only for
the duration of the moment of my concrete *cogitare* [thinking]. Beyond this moment into the next and the following moments in time I am carried only by the power that created me. “It does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago, that I must necessarily exist now, unless in this very moment something produces me and creates me, so to speak, once again, which means preserves me.” The act of creation does not fill a moment of finite time but is the continuously working force that maintains the life of the person: “Maintenance and creation differ only in respect to our manner of thinking and not as a matter of fact.” Just as in the case of Saint Augustine the problem of a parallel course pursued by finitude and infinity emerges here. For the finite ego, the meditative step toward God is possible from every point in time, since the ego verges on God. But their boundary that, as such, belongs to both, and thus should constitute a relationship between them and a system of measurement [*Maß*] between God and the ego, is essentially a boundary between two absolutely unrelated spheres, between quantities that share no common standard of measurement.

The Third Meditation concludes with the sentence: “Just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the eternal life consists in the contemplation of divine Majesty, so now we feel that a similar meditation, even though incomparably less perfect, allows us to experience the greatest joy that we may have in this life.”

Let us now summarize the additional insights into the nature [*Wesen*] and determination of the person that the Cartesian meditation gives us, beyond those gained from Augustine’s *Confessions*.

[1] Descartes’s meditation reveals the same two patterns we found in Saint Augustine. But the concluding phase of the meditative course, the transition that reveals the finitude of the person and the person’s openness to a super-personal being, is much more clearly separated from the process in which the person-sphere is isolated by means of the *via negationis*. 
The transition to God is not the same as the preceding steps. Instead, with the person determined as the residuum following the skeptical reduction of being, this aspect of the meditative course [Verfahrensreihe] is broken off and an entirely different kind of investigation is initiated that examines those experiences of the person that Scheler has termed the empty spaces, which require fulfillment and, as such, point to a being who can fulfill them.

[2] The nature of the person itself has emerged in Descartes as the same found in Augustine; the experience of being the border between the individual’s finitude and openness toward a super-ego [Über-Ich].

[3] But this nature is more precisely grasped because every appearance of a contemplation of objects has disappeared and the “experience” of the person as an intensive moment of life in the course of the meditation has become clearer. The concluding sentence of the Third Meditation compares this moment with transcendent contemplative immersion in God and recognizes it as a state in finite life that comes closest to transcendent blessedness. Augustine’s intentio is more precisely determined as the most intensive possible proximity to God attainable by the finite person. Meditation is the finite form of the blessed contemplation of God.

[4] These more precise explanations are made possible by the break in the meditative process treated under [1], which turned the meditative course toward the contemplation of the person. The skeptical reduction leads us to the person; the analysis of finitude, longing, and doubt turns us away from and leads us beyond the person. When, through the successive negations of the levels of being, the meditating person has come to himself and experiences “being with his own self” [erfährt sich als bei sich] he turns around and proceeds in a completely different direction. With this focusing of the analysis and the turning away of the person from the reductive process toward one of positive description, we have demonstrated the contemporary treatment of the problem of the person. Only one of the
moments of the meditative course needs to be more clearly explained. We see that the meditation reaches its high point in the intense moment in which the person experiences himself as a person. And we have followed the exemplary path through which this high point is reached. But we have not yet fully illumined the structure which, starting in the corporeal world, leads us with certainty to our goal within the person. This last clarification is the object of the following analysis of the most recent attempts to determine the essence of the person.

3. Husserl and Scheler on the Person

It was Husserl who most recently, under the title of phenomenological investigations, conducted meditations that shed light on the issues that our analysis of Descartes has left unclear. Husserl’s efforts did not directly address these issues, but implicitly made their questionable structures so transparent that we can now adequately describe them. The fundamental phenomenon at the basis of all phenomenological description is the intentionality of consciousness. All consciousness is essentially the consciousness of something; a perceiving is a perceiving of a thing, judging is a judging of a predicatively formed affair-complex, valuing of a predicatively formed value-complex, a wishing of a predicatively formed wish-complex. Acting bears upon action. Doing bears upon the deed, loving bears upon the loved one, being glad bears upon the gladsome. “In every actional cogito a radiating ‘regard’ is directed from the pure Ego to the ‘object’ of the consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the affair-complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it.” The subject of knowledge, in this case the so-called pure Ego, is intentionally directed to its objective correlate; the ego and

the world of objects in the broadest sense of the term face each other [Gegen-stand]. The term intentio stems from the patristic tradition, and the dualism it bridges is the Cartesian one of the ego and the world. But the specific content of the bridging cogito, which is elucidated in the phenomenological examination, emerges “in-itself” in a meditative process that Husserl calls phenomenological reduction. The thematic field of phenomenology becomes apparent when, through preliminary reductive investigations, all contents of reality are removed from the problem of the Ego-world. All real “transcendences” of the cogito are forfeited through the “epoché,” the “parenthesizing,” and are removed step by step in order to lay bare the true essential structure of consciousness. The entire external world is parenthesized and not only this world, but the human being, both as a natural being and as a social person, and finally, all animal nature as well (in an analogy to Descartes’s esprit animal [animal spirit]). Nevertheless, after these reductions the pure Ego does not emerge as an event among other events “and likewise not as a particular part of a process, coming into being and disappearing with the process of which it is a part.” Rather it belongs to each coming and going mental process in which, in every cogito, the regard is directed to its object. “This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next [. . . ]; the Ego, however, is something identical.”9 The individual cogitation [act of thinking] is transient, but the pure Ego in its background is something essentially necessary, “and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental processes, it cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the mental processes themselves.”10 The pure Ego is the firm point of reference of all transient mental processes; beyond their sphere a being appears that again requires purifying by the phenomenologically purified sphere, in order to appear “in itself.” In the Kantian sense

9. Ibid., 109 [ibid., 132].
10. Ibid.
this “I think” must be able to accompany all of my representations. The pure Ego presents “a unique transcendence—not a construed one—a transcendence within immanence”—which differs from other transcendences, such as God and the world, which exist in reality beyond consciousness and its purified stream.

The dialectical formula of the immanence of the transcendence of the pure Ego indicates that we are dealing here with mental constructs similar to those we encountered in the Augustinian and Cartesian meditation. The pure Ego is the highest product of the Husserlian “reduction,” and we must be quite clear about the steps that preceded it. The pure Ego has revealed itself to be the background point from which the ray of regard radiates toward the objects in the individual cogitations. Every cogitatio must be understood as a transcendentally purified mental process, i.e., as the pure essence of a mental process following the suspension of the real world and of the empirical subject. The real world and the empirical subject separate in an act of reflection upon the primary objective relationship of the human being to his world. If we retrace our steps in the opposite direction, the point of departure for human life as an object-directed life is that of life facing the object [Leben im Gegenstand] that sees, hears, judges, wills, values, etc. But this is overstating the case. For the “object” is not given until, in reflection, it is set opposite the human being. We will speak of a “life of the world” or a “life of things” [ein Sachleben] as a primordial unity in which the intentional split between world and subject admittedly exists as a structure but has not been made the object of reflection.

The “life of the world” and its internal structure of directedness [Gerichtetheit], the tension of the intentio, is the primeval given of every reflection, including Husserl’s. All further stages of the meditative course would thus have to be developed as steps of reflection that unfold from the original intention of the “life of the world” as a series of higher and more powerful [Potenzreihe] reflections. Reflection in its simplest form
is the first power of the original intention, i.e., a step back on the part of the subject pole from its relationship to the life of the world. Here, in their opposition, the world and the empirical subject become visible for the first time. The physical world is separated from the psychic world of mental processes; it is no longer directly experienced \([\text{durchlebt}]\) as an immediate possession, but appears as the mental process of the ego. This introduces the second level of reflection; for in the mental processes of the ego the structure of the original intention is renewed, independent of the involvement of each specific mental process with the real world. Through its orientation to a part of the real world and the place of that part in the concrete consciousness of a psychic unity of life, we can examine the essence of ego structure itself. This is where the real Husserlian \(\text{epoché}\) takes place. Here both the world and the ego, with its involvement in the natural or the social world, are suspended in order to focus on the pure essence of mental process. In its turn, the mental process is essentially structured in accordance with what Husserl calls real and unreal moments of mental process, in accord with noesis, hyle (matter), and noema. At the second level of reflection, noesis corresponds to the empirical subject, the noema to the world of objects. “That which is ‘transcendentally constituted’ ‘on the ground of’ the material \([\text{stofflich}]\) mental processes ‘by’ the noetic functions is, to be sure, something ‘given’; and in pure intuition we faithfully describe the mental process and its noematic object intended to \([\text{sein noematisch Bewusstes}]\), it is something evidently given; but it belongs to the mental process in a sense entirely different from the sense in which the really inherent and therefore proper constituents belong to the mental process.”

The pure sphere of process is called transcendental, because it is an absolute sphere of \(\text{stoffs}\) and noetic forms to whose essence belongs

11. Ibid., 204 [ibid., 239].
the marvelous consciousness of something determinate and determinable, given thus and so, which is something over against consciousness itself, something fundamentally other, non-really inherent \textit{Irreelles}, transcendent; the characterization of mental processes as “transcendental” further rests on the fact that this is the primal source in which is found the only conceivable solution of those deepest problems of cognition concerning the essence and possibility of an objectively valid knowledge of something transcendent. “Transcendental” reduction exercises the epoché with respect to actuality: but what it retains of “actuality” includes the noemas with the noematic unity included within them themselves and, accordingly, the mode in which something real is intended to and, in particular, given in consciousness itself.  

The “object found in the noema is intended to as an identical object in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is a non-identical, only combined, continuously united consciousness in the different segments of its immanental duration.”  

The noema and real moments of the mental process are within their sphere a mirror of the intentional split between the human being and the world that we find on the immediately preceding lower level.  

The pure sphere of mental processes and its split into real components of consciousness and a transcending noema constitute the starting point for the third reflection in which these components are objectified. The reflective ego can also transcend this purified sphere and subject it to a renewed reflection in which, at last, the pure Ego becomes visible as something in some way connected with the stream of mental processes and which, at the same time, nevertheless lies beyond as a constituent that cannot be constituted anew. Husserl explicitly draws our attention to the transformation the pure phenomena undergo when they pass to the next higher level of reflection.  

“Any transition from a phenomenon into the reflection that itself is an analysis of the really inherent, or into the quite differ-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{12. Ibid.}
\footnote{13. Ibid., 207 [ibid., 242].}
\end{footnotes}
ently articulated ‘reflection’ that dissects its noema, generates new phenomena.” It would lead to serious errors if that which emerges at the higher level of reflection were to be ascribed to the old phenomena. “Thus it is not meant, e.g., that the material contents, let us say the adumbrative color-contents, are present in the perceptual mental process in just the same way in which they are present in the mental process of analyzing. To mention only one ‘difference,’ in the former they were contained as really inherent moments, but they were not perceived therein, not seized upon as objects. But in the analyzing mental process they are objects, targets of noetic functions which were not present before.”

Just as in the “life of the world” the world is the only immediate possession, but not the mental processes in which the world is represented, so also at this level the real movement of the mental process itself is not objectified, but only the continuity of objects. It is only at the next higher level that the intentional poles separate in order to set free their last source, the pure Ego, which no longer contains a split, being nothing but the absolute subjectivity of all mental processes. We thus arrive at the following graded order of reflection:

The Life of the World (Primeval Intention)

1. Reflection
   World
   Empirical Subject

2. Reflection
   Noema
   Noesis

3. Reflection
   Pure Ego

Proceeding from the primeval given, the absolute devotedness to the thing or forfeiture to the world, the meditation proceeds through its hierarchy of reflection to attain absolute subjectivity.

With the positive construction of this series we become simultaneously aware of its critical function. If we philosophize

14. Ibid., 205 [ibid., 240].
from the unreflective first level, all of the higher levels will appear to us to be the same type of being as the substratum of the world, matter. In principle the unreflective attitude to the world corresponds to a materialist interpretation of the entire order of being, including the life of the psyche. The first reflection, in which the stream of mental process in the psychological sense has the world as its object, constitutes the psychic character of subjectivity. If, however, we were to arrest our progress at this level of reflection, we would be forced to psychologically interpret the spheres that, up to that point, were not yet meditatively interpreted, and we would fall into the trap of psychologism. It was, however, the critique of psychologism that led Husserl to see the necessity for a second level of reflection, which revealed the real field and central interest of phenomenological investigation. However, the second level is not the ultimate place of repose either, for from this vantage point subjectivity would only come to light in the examination of noetic functions; the ego would be dissolved into its individual constitutive functions, and we would miss the concentration of the mental processes in a final focal point. We would fall into the trap of transcendental functionalism, without reaching the center of all of the functions. Only an additional reflective step can take us beyond phenomenologically pure mental processes and allow us to grasp their unity in the transcendence of the pure Ego. Structurally the dual unity of the life of the world contains the possibility of taking a reflexive step back in order to consider the residuum of subjectivity itself and make it the object of further levels of reflection. The inner tension inherent in the act of yielding to the realm of things [Sachverlorenheit] already contains all reflective powers [Potenzen] all the way up to the pure Ego itself. We see grand perspectives open that promise to make intelligible the classical speculations concerning the split between the ego and the world, the positing [Setzung] of the ego and the non-ego as existential steps in meditation; and thesis and antithesis and, as result of which, the form-
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ing of a new point of departure for thesis and antithesis, etc. These issues, however, are the subject matter of a theory of forms of philosophizing and cannot be addressed any further in this essay.

We have looked at one leading strand of thought in Husserl’s investigations and presented its consequences, without even hinting at the abundance of secondary strands that branch off from it at every point. However, the same problems of reflection turn up in all special investigations into specific noetic functions. We draw attention to only one such case, since Husserl has formulated it in such an outstanding fashion in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. It deals with the problems of the constitution of the theoretical sphere, in which ever new degrees of reflection succeed one another. The formal theory of science Husserl discusses is meant to establish once and for all the a priori for all possible sciences. Above every science of real objects there rises a level of reflection articulating an a priori of the science that has reality as its object. All of these possible sciences are subsumed under the idea of science in general, into an a priori dealt with in the formal theory of science whose object is formed in second degree reflection. But now the possibility of this reflection itself becomes questionable, and logical theory refers us back to logical reason and to yet another new theoretical sphere. Husserl asks: Do we not become caught up here in a continuous vicious spiral of questioning? Are we not drawn into a game of endless questions? Does not a new question immediately become urgent:

*How is a theory of logical reason possible?* But this question is answered by our last investigation: *Such a theory is radically possible as the phenomenology of logical reason, within the frame of transcendental phenomenology as a whole.* If this science is then, as may be expected, the ultimate one, it must show its ultimacy by showing that it can answer the question of its own possibility, therefore by showing that there is such a thing as an essential, endlessly reiterated, reflexive bearing (of transcendental phenomenology) upon itself, in which the essential
sense of an ultimate justification by itself is discernibly included, and that precisely this is the fundamental characteristic of an essentially ultimate science.\textsuperscript{15}

One “meditative inquiry” follows another and each generates an additional question. “[Eventually however the inquiry must end with a cognition—itself intuitive—of results and methods as always repeating themselves, always having an identical essential style.] When we follow this procedure, we have continuously anew the living truth from the living source, which is our absolute life, and from the self-examination turned toward that life, in the constant spirit of self-responsibility.”\textsuperscript{16} The levels of reflection come to an end that excludes all doubt, in the referring back [Rückbeziehung] of reflection to itself and in a continuous, in its essence, identical renewal of reflexive objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] of the highest level. The dialectical formula of the reiterative backward-related reflection is an expression that brings the meditative course to an end with the help of the very formula that earlier had been its driving force. The withdrawal of the subject pole from the intentional tension does not bring forth new objects. Instead it leads to absolute self-reflection; within it there no longer appear new phenomena as the result of reductions carried out at lower levels of reflection.

The absolute goal of the meditation at the source of self-reflection [Selbstbesinnung] calls for a retrospective glance at the meaning of the levels of subjectivity attained so far. For neither Husserl nor Descartes is the phenomenological reduction through the suspension of levels of being an arbitrary means of illustrating coordinated objectivities. Rather it is an existential, philosophical process on the part of a concrete human being, beginning with his own concrete life in the world and rising by degrees of reflection toward his own concrete tran-


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 246 [ibid., 279].

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scendental ego. The pure Ego at which we arrive is not an object to be discussed by anyone in general, but is the ego of the concrete philosopher. His meditation is not intelligible as a general reference to transcendent objects, which would be available to the reader in the same way as they are to the person who has completed the meditation. The meditation is only intelligible as a reference point for one performing his own meditation [Mitvollzug]. This meditation would bring me—the concrete reader—insight into my own possible reflections [ . . . ]

Chapter 2. The Powerful and the Powerless Person

3. The Essence of Governance

It is our intention to try to find out what can be rationally said concerning the phenomenon of governance by human beings over other human beings and about the corresponding acts of obedience.

The possession of the means of force and the threat of its use in an attempt to motivate others by fear of injury will be excluded from our study. We will also exclude from consideration governments whose power is rooted in custom, ideology, or institutions. We intend to penetrate to the core of the foundation of governance in the superiority of one person over another.

a) [Alfred] Vierkandt

In order to shed more light on this phenomenon, Vierkandt has explored its sociopsychological aspect. He speaks of an instinct of subordination or of an innate will to obedience that psychology has identified, and he concludes it is this disposition [rather than fear] that constitutes the basis of all power—or, as we would say to be more accurate, all governance. Without the assumption of such an instinct, he continues, some of the

17. [Ibid. 244 (?) [ibid., 276?]. Voegelin has not quoted directly. His text seems to indicate these passages.]
18. [The typescript breaks off here.]
most arbitrary and successful uses of force would leave us staring in uncomprehending amazement. However, the institution of the law, which is not based on fear but on respect, would be equally incomprehensible in the absence of the instinct of subordination. But, in our view, the introduction of the term *respect* takes the investigation out of the realm of a natural science causal explanation of instinct—the psychology of drives [*Triebpsychologie*], patterned after an Anglo-American model that is not very convincing, and introduces a psychological description of the state of affairs rooted in the spirit. For according to Vierkandt, “Respect denotes inner subjugation.” The psychology based on instinct could do no more than establish that the inclination to subjugation can be found equally in all men and assume the existence of a corresponding instinct for domination in order to explain the conduct of those who govern. In order to explain further why the vast majority of human beings prefer to be subjugated, while a minority prefer to dominate, we would have to assume a qualitative difference in the power of the instinct. From this metaphysics of the mechanism of instinct, which operates behind empirical phenomena and which can be neither proven nor disproven, we would not gain insight into the meaning of acts that take place in relationships of governance and obedience. By adopting the definition of respect as inner subjugation, Vierkandt abandons the theory of instincts—even though he continues to speak of it on occasion and his theory of society is based on it. Instead, he begins with an analysis of the phenomenon itself. The weaker person in a relationship of governance is the weaker one because he feels that he is weaker and receives from the other person the well-founded impression that the other is superior. This superiority can be expected to result in either harm or benefit. Depending on which of these prevails the weaker person will either fear or respect the stronger one. Only the case of “benefit” constitutes

a genuine relationship of governance. [We can pass over what real content is expected in the concrete cases of benefit.] In the situation in which benefit is expected we find the tendency on the part of the weaker person “to allow himself to be psychologically influenced” and “the willingness to adopt or imitate the convictions, valuations, and modes of conduct of the stronger party.” “Here the essence of power most clearly manifests itself: It is the governance of one soul in another soul, as if, under the pressure of authority, the personality [of the one dominated] were transformed by an alien form.”

We can try to differentiate the problem further and bring its core more sharply into focus. But we must first exclude the mechanism of instinct and the moments of one soul’s connection to another soul, the term soul taken in the fullest sense of the word. The relationships referred to in the sentences just quoted, the governance of an alien soul in my own and the governance of another person over my person, must be separated. The establishment of emotional and spiritual contacts between two human beings and the convictions they share have their own structures that vary according to warmth, strength, the frequency of their actualization, habitual and occasional occurrence, and according to the stormy excitement or gentleness, friendliness and trust [in which they take place]. They also exhibit structures, which are essential to the building of a relationship of governance: the will to penetrate, to seize, and to form; corresponding to the actively loving disposition: willingness, anticipation, openness, readiness to submit to being formed. It goes without saying that within this emotional relationship, from the variations in warmth, intensity, habitual occurrence, emotion, and direction, of domination, and reception on the part of the dominated party, the spiritual content, which is carried by the emotional relationship, must also be differentiated according to its extent and according to personal depth. In Vierkandt’s view, the inner unity between

20. Ibid., 16.
those who obey and those who command typically manifests itself in the inner desire on the part of the one obeying to imitate the adored personality and to transform his personality into the personality of the respected person. The will to submit is awakened by what one sees as valuable in the superior person. The personality [of the obedient person] becomes polarized. “For the surrender of one’s own powers is joined with the development of powers in the direction pursued by the leader himself. The leader reorients the powers of the dependent person and channels them into a new direction.”

The above-mentioned “benefit” is now revealed to be “a benefit [springing] from the essence of personality itself.”

The benefiting psychic relationship and the relationship of governance it sustains, along with the latter’s origin in the difference in value between persons, are discussed together in Vierkandt’s analysis without their differences being properly considered. Thus, for instance, one of his typical definitions reads: “The nature of the relationship of power is constituted by the fact that the weak member is internally ruled by an alien personality; it is as if this personality determined the weaker member’s view of the world and mode of life; as though the weaker person surrendered the governance of his own soul to the other person.” Here [Vierkandt] blurs the psychic and spiritual aspects, and even where the spiritual relationship is set off more distinctly, it seems to take place without [Vierkandt having] a clear awareness of what it means [to draw such distinctions]. Vierkandt’s Sociology [Gesellschaftslehre] defines governance more precisely as the imitation of a personality. The follower attempts to imitate the model in order to be able to “actually follow him.” Vierkandt’s analysis of command comes closer to [dealing with] the spiritual content. A command is effective when those receiving it are “con-

21. Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, 2d ed. [Berlin, 1928], 42.
22. Ibid., 53.
23. Vierkandt, Machtverhältnisse, 32.
vinced of its value and necessity.” But even here, moments—the nature of which require that they be clearly distinguished from one another, such as the value and the purposefulness of a command—are not carefully differentiated.\footnote{Ibid., 291.} I feel he has fully grasped one component of the spiritual content when he states: “What links the participating persons is subordination to the law of meaning \textit{[das Sinngesetz]} and the will to abide by the order expressed in this law [and along with it, the acknowledgment of certain values and rules of implementation—inherent values and derivative values]. In each individual case meaning can be realized only by the participants working together as if they were linked together as if by hooks.”\footnote{Ibid., 244.} The meaning of a specifically defined material appears in that which is realized in cooperation and therefore as the connecting link between acts of command and obedience. To be sure, the vagueness of the expression “will” to subordination obscures the very delicate ethical problem of the different degrees of insight into value held by those who command and by those who obey.

b) [Eduard] Spranger

Spranger has very clearly identified the spiritual element of the social relationship and, especially, of the power relationship. According to Spranger, social acts contain a binding moment that arises from values commonly shared or held in opposition and, consequently, the consciousness of a difference due to the superiority of one’s own value orientation or due to the dependence of one’s own value orientation on an alien one.\footnote{Eduard Spranger, \textit{Lebensformen}, 6th ed. [Halle, 1927], 64.} The distinguishing feature of the power relationship is that “the superior person has created a field of values for himself and realized them in himself, and that they bring another person into an inner relationship of dependence. It follows that power is always actual superiority made comprehensible purely through

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{25.} Ibid., 291.
  \item \textbf{26.} Ibid., 244.
  \item \textbf{27.} Eduard Spranger, \textit{Lebensformen}, 6th ed. [Halle, 1927], 64.
\end{itemize}
the values embodied by the powerful individual and is thus
based entirely on their factual existence.\textsuperscript{28} In addition to iden-
tifying the spiritual content of power, Spranger’s contribution
consists in having identified the core phenomenon of power as
the basis of governance. Governance and obedience may be an-
alyzed into a series of acts of domination and obedience, both
of which are founded on power; this consists of the tension
between different levels of value in concrete persons. By power
we mean the “spiritual phenomena that are the foundations of
the governing relationship.”\textsuperscript{29}

Spranger characterizes the specific objective states of affairs
in which value differences between individuals become mani-
fest as: 1) intelligence and expertise, 2) economic and technical
resources, 3) the fullness and integrity \textit{[Geschlossenheit]} of
personal being, 4) religious force and the certainty of values
\textit{[Wertgewissheit]}. In contrast to all differences in value content,
the essential element of power may be described as the “force
of the life of value” \textit{[“Kraft des Wertlebens”]}. “At first, this en-
ergy is something internal that belongs to an individual nature.
But to the extent that the force of one’s own life of value is a
prerequisite for leading others in the direction of these values,
it also extends into social relationships. If power is understood
as a social phenomenon, this turn toward other people is an
essential part of it. Hence power is the faculty and, along with
it, the will to make one’s own value orientation a lasting or
transient motive for others.”\textsuperscript{30} The life of the man of power
manifests itself as the vital self-assertion of his own nature
in the form of a primordial drive. Spranger’s first definition of
power finds the essence of power in the difference between per-
sons. His second definition adds the aspect of the dominating
person’s desire to have the validity of his will acknowledged.
We shall have an opportunity to look at this aspect in greater
detail when we examine the essence of the political idea and,

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 212.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 213.
especially, the idea of the state. In social relationships the existence of “spiritual vassals, of people only capable of living by relying on the benefit of stronger natures,”\textsuperscript{31} corresponds to the will on the part of the powerful to have the validity of their values acknowledged. Finally, a third definition of power tries to determine what constitutes the superiority of the powerful, i.e., the person’s spiritual rank: “The primordial phenomenon of power, in the sense in which we have discussed it, is found in the force [\textit{Kraft}] that enables the person to pursue the highest value confronting his consciousness and demanding to be realized. This kind of self-discipline is the true source of all real external power relationships. For in the end, only power that is based on a genuine source of value is true power.”\textsuperscript{32} It seems to me that in this fashion we have in fact arrived at the conception of the primeval phenomenon of power that we believe to have found [in chapter 1] in the structure of the person. When a person is at one with himself [\textit{ganz bei sich selbst}], he is simultaneously open to a super-personal sphere. When one is in possession of one’s self, one possesses simultaneously more than oneself. In manifesting one’s self, one also manifests what transcends the self. Those persons are powerful who manage to live in self-possession [\textit{bei sich}] and thus transcend themselves. Personal power is a fullness of personal being [\textit{das Person-sein}]. This content of the experience of the person [\textit{die Personserfahrung}], which can only be formulated dialectically, appears to me to be the utmost that we can say in the analysis of power.

c) The Aporia of the Problem of Power

The insight into the essence of power as the fullness of personal being plunges us into those difficulties that emerged in our introductory investigation of Weber’s concept of governance: It requires a more detailed determination of the nature of the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 231.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 228.
powerless individual and of the relationship between the powerful and the powerless.\footnote{Sometime after writing this passage Voegelin moved the section on Weber. It is no longer the preliminary investigation to chap. 2, but opens chap. 3.} In the obedience to commands in accordance with “one’s own view,” we have not yet touched upon the essential characteristics of the relationship of governance. For the one issuing commands did not in any imaginable sense as a “powerful individual” confront the one obeying the commands. When the consequences of this situation are thought through it becomes clear that at its core there is an internal contradiction: If one does what, in one’s own view, is morally right, there is no need for a command relationship, as long as what is seen to be morally right refers to something confronting the concerned person here and now. Indeed, in this situation there is no place for a command, since no “other” person can know for sure what the right thing is for me to do. Such knowledge would require that the persons involved be identical. But if the persons involved are essentially identical so that all of the insights into what is “right” would coincide, there would be no need for one person to issue orders and for the other to follow them. The latter would already know what to do and would do it without having to be ordered to. We came to the preliminary conclusion that [the existence of] a moral whole \[e\textit{in sittlich Ganzes}\] would have to be assumed that would embrace both the issuer of commands and the one who obeys, and that could only be realized by the cooperation of both. The acts of command and obedience would have to be viewed equally as partial realizations of this whole, so that he who commands, communicates, on the strength of his specific insight into the value-whole \[\textit{Wertganze}\], the contents of action, while he who obeys, lacking this insight, contributes to realizing the whole through acts of compliance. Neither the autonomous person of the commanding individual is the source of the imperative \[\textit{Sollensquelle}\], for that would annihilate the person of the obeying individual, nor is the obedient individual
the source, for in that case there would be no need for the individual issuing commands. Instead the value-whole is the source, from which acts of command and acts of obedience receive their moral dignity.

d) [Max] Scheler

Scheler has made a remarkable attempt to shed light on these aporia. His analysis of the Kantian concept of the autonomous person reaches conclusions similar to those we reached in the analysis of Weber’s concept of governance.\textsuperscript{34} Between autonomous persons a community of spiritual sharing is impossible, for the term refers to those who essentially participate in the universal reason they hold in common, i.e., for whom the intuitive grasp of an identical moral law is equally valid. The defining essence \textit{[Inbegriff]} of persons who are all equally capable of insight into an identical law constitutes, not a community, but an agglomeration bound by no relationship whatsoever. “A concept of autonomy like Kant’s \ldots would exclude as ‘heteronomous’ all moral education and instruction, the idea of ‘moral obedience,’ the far higher form of the moral determination of other persons (that is, following the pure and good example that the good person gives), and, finally, the immediate evidence of the unity of meaning of our willing and God’s willing that is given in the loving union with God, not in obedience to a ‘divine command.’”\textsuperscript{35} Evidently Kant’s construction proves inadequate when confronted with empirically existing types of social relationships. This is why Scheler proposes that Kant’s concept of autonomy be dissolved into a) a concept of the autonomy of moral insight manifested in acts of love and hate, and b) a concept of the autonomy of the person willing that which he has grasped as the morally good.\textsuperscript{36} The

\textsuperscript{34} [See the previous footnote.]


\textsuperscript{36} [Ibid., 64, 521 [ibid., 65, 499–500].]
relationship between these two concepts is that the immediate autonomous insight into the good necessarily requires, at the same time, an autonomous willing of that which has been grasped as being good. The converse is not true, however: It is not necessary that every autonomous good will has, at the same time, an immediate insight into that which is good. Thus acts of autonomous willing are possible in which no autonomous moral insight can be found. “Thus autonomous and immediate insight into the moral value-content of the value-complex that is commanded to be realized is not given in ‘any’ act of ‘obedience.’ If we assume that there are things like ‘obeying oneself’ or obedience to a self-posited norm of the will, such things also lack ‘this’ autonomous insight.”37

However, not every act resulting from a command and lacking insight is automatically an expression of genuine obedience. Rather, obedience is the exact opposite of acts resulting from suggestion or contagion [Ansteckung]. Obedience does not result from a relationship in which one will is motivated by another. The one who obeys does not simply act in response to a command “because” (in a causal sense) the one issuing commands has so ordered—this would literally be “slavish” behavior. Instead, obedience is founded on the express will “to obey.” For the one rendering obedience “the positive act of obeying becomes an immediate volitional project in which the willing of what is commanded is formed. A distinct awareness of the difference between one’s own and another’s willing, together with the understanding of another’s willing ‘as’ that of another, is the necessary condition of genuine obeying.”38

Hence this type of obedience is heteronomous only in regard to the fact that the obedient person’s insight into the moral value of the project of the will is directed by another person. Nevertheless, despite lack of insight into the moral content itself, this obedience is of moral worth and autonomous by

37. [Ibid., 519–20 (ibid., 499).]
38. [Ibid., 520 (ibid., 499).]
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virtue of the fact that “the insight into the moral goodness of willing and willing persons (or their ‘office’) is evidently given, the goodness becoming manifest in the making of the commandments or (in concreto) in the ordering of the orders. In this case there is autonomous and immediate insight into the moral value of commanding, heteronomous and mediate insight into the value of the commanded value-complex, and at the same time complete autonomy of willing in rendering obedience.”39 Obedience in the genuine sense is not blind, but based on [moral] insight; however, it is not immediate, but is mediated by the fully adequate insight on the part of the ruler. The moral goodness of the person who commands becomes immediately intelligible to the one who obeys in the specific acts of command. It is not necessary that the individual attain autonomous insight into good and evil himself; insight may be mediated in various ways, through authority, by tradition, by the act of following an example. In Scheler’s view, it would be absurd to make acting on our own insight and judgment in every volitional project the precondition of our being able to call our act morally good, if, in a concrete case, we have gained insight into the moral superiority of another person [and followed him]. Our conduct remains autonomous and guided by moral insight [?], if we have clear insight into the various cognitional values present in these possible sources of moral insight, and if, as well as the source, in our own life experience we evaluate these sources in accordance with their obvious general value.40

Scheler begins his analysis by differentiating between insight into value [Werteinsicht] and the willing of value [das Wettwollen]. Only in the completely autonomous person do we find the act of willing what is morally right founded in that person’s own insight into the [morally] imperative. The person of lesser moral dignity can manifest the same willing of value as the

39. [Ibid., 520–21 (ibid., 500).]
40. [Ibid., 521 (ibid., 501).]
fully autonomous person, but his insight into what should be done is mediated by the commands of a person who is recognized as being evidently morally superior. The moral differences in the rank of the personal value essence [Wertwesen], to the extent that it manifests itself in a greater or lesser capacity for autonomous value insight, is the prerequisite for the existence of genuine relationships of command and obedience and of genuine governance founded on personal power. This argument seems simple, transparent, and adequate—but it merely seems so as long as the meanings of the concepts “insight” and “autonomous” are not closely examined. Toward the end of the preceding paragraph I drew attention with a question mark to the fact that at first the characteristic of obedience was described in terms of the heteronomous determination of insight into the value-content of a project of the will; but later [Scheler] maintained that the act of obedience took place as a type of autonomous insight, that the obeying person had a clear insight into the cognitive value of various sources [of value], such as authority, tradition, etc. The contradiction arises from the changed meaning of the concept “autonomous insight,” whose origin goes back to the difference between insight and [the act of] willing. In the moral actions of a fully autonomous person, insight and will are intimately joined; this is what Scheler means when he asserts that the act of willing is “necessarily” determined by autonomous insight. Insight and the act of willing are a necessary unity in the carrying out of an action, when the person is in full possession of his or her self [ganz bei sich ist] and is thus capable of acting from conviction. But when insight and will are separated they lose their existential meaning as moments in the unity of concrete action. Insight then becomes a rational recognition, on the part of a person, that something is good, but in indefinite distance from the person and involving no immediate relationship to action in the concrete present. This mode of insight, removed from the presence of action, is also possible on the part of one obeying. Insofar as a person may adequately experience such an insight,
we may consider that person autonomous, as indeed Scheler
does. However, it would be more accurate, and would help us
to avoid error, if the insight that took place in the present were
termed *existential insight*, or the insight that arises out of the
fullness of personal being, out of self-possession. This would
distinguish it from insight that is remote from the immediacy
of action, that which is formed by judgments and [other] forms
derived from existential insight.

What motivated Scheler, though, initially to call an insight
“heteronomously determined” that he later termed *autono-
mous*? Judging by the essential structures of the relationships
themselves, he must have had in mind the difference between
an action, the guiding principle of which is existentially de-
termined by the agent himself, and an action whose guiding
principle stems from the insight of another person, not that of
the acting person. Scheler’s opinion that the moral goodness
of the person who commands is evident, this goodness being
manifest in the quality of the specific commands given, cannot
mean anything but that the *contents* of the commands convey,
to the one who obeys, insight into the goodness of the person
[giving commands]. But he cannot know the nature of the per-
son [giving commands], except through the communications
and actions in which he manifests himself. Therefore, the dis-
tinction Scheler draws between the heteronomous insight into
the value-content of commands and the autonomous insight
into the goodness of the person who commands dissolves and
disappears when we realize that this person only becomes vis-
ible through the contents of his commands. If we abandon
the inadequate terms *autonomous* and *heteronomous*, and, in
addition, do away with the equivocal concept of insight, we
can say that a relationship of governance that is founded on
personal power may be characterized as a relationship between
persons of different existential fullness, such that the existen-
tially weaker person adopts the law of his or her conduct
from his model, or the direct command he receives from the
existentially stronger person.
For the rest, Scheler’s theory is quite similar to the one we sketched above. The superior person who is called to command on the strength of his or her higher moral rank is the powerful one in terms of our conception of the person who, in full possession of himself, has insights that transcend this self. The powerless do not have these insights, and correspondingly, the powerless person is defined as the one who can gain insight into what is morally right only through the mediating authority of the powerful. Both of these theories share the assumption of a super-personal moral reality [ein überpersonales Sittliches] into which only one of the two persons has insight, but in which the insight is realized by both persons in the corresponding acts of commanding and obeying. But one question, which Scheler does not address, remains obscure: How is the super-personal moral reality—which, in accordance with the way it enters into the relationship of ruling and being ruled, is ethical, manifesting itself existentially in the person of the ruler—compatible with the assumed uniqueness of the individual, also the uniqueness of those individuals who are ruled? But I fear that the answer to this question will remain obscure, for here lies the seed of evil that clings to all power.\footnote{41}

\footnote{41. [The manuscript breaks off here.]}
§1. From the beginning the range of Max Weber’s investigations into governance are determined by the fact that governance interests him primarily “insofar as it is combined with ‘administration.’” The political association is the field of experience that gives him occasion and example for a more exact determination of the concept. Governance becomes topical to the extent that it has something to do with the administration of political bodies “Every administration . . . needs domination, because it is always necessary that some powers of command be in the hands of somebody” ([W.u.G., 607/948]). Ruler, administrative civil servant, and subject make up the concrete circle in which domination takes place; and in accordance with its mode of appearance, it is understood to be essentially linked to orders that the ruler gives to his civil servants or subjects, or that a civil servant decrees to the subjects. Under domination Weber understands the situation “in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the other end, this situation will be called obedience” ([W.u.G., 606/946]).

43. [Judging from the table of contents on 226 above, Voegelin had originally intended to discuss La Boétie and Elyot in §22 under the title “Two Renaissance Theories.” In the text that exists he assigned §22 to La Boétie and §23 to Elyot.]

The definition distinguishes between external circumstance of domination—the manifestation of will (command), the intention to influence, and the actual exercise of influence—and the essence of domination itself, the fact that the content of the command is followed as though it had been made a maxim of action for its own sake. For Weber obedience to a command means “that the action of the person obeying follows in essentials such a course that the content of the command may be taken to have become the basis of action for its own sake. Furthermore, the fact that it is so taken is referable only to the formal obligation, without regard to the actor’s own attitude to the value or lack of value of the content of the command as such” (W.u.G., 123/215). Seen from the other side, from that of the ruler issuing the command, this obedience corresponds to the fact that the command has been issued with a particular claim to legitimacy. The ruler does not give a command with the expectation that the person receiving it will independently decide on its moral value and, according to how he decides, determine his conduct. Rather, commands are issued with the expectation that they will be followed because they originate in the will of the commanding person. Concerning the value-content of the command, there apparently exists between the person who commands and the person who obeys a relationship of legitimacy and recognition of legitimacy.

§2. These explanations are of a mere preliminary character. We must try to focus on the individual aspects of the relationship of command and obedience chosen by Weber for the starting point of his investigation and distinguish them from one another.

a) Under domination we understand the actual issuing and following of commands that even an uninvolved person can observe, though it is not at this empirical level that the essential nature of governance is to be found. Person A may stand in a routine relationship of giving orders to person B and, vice versa, B in a routine relationship of receiving orders from A. As an uninvolved observer I can see the acts of command
on the part of A and observe the acts of acknowledging and carrying out the commands on the part of B. For example, I can observe how a group of workers carries out the foreman’s orders and see both the foreman’s acts of command as well as the workers’ corresponding actions to carry out the orders and the questions they ask concerning the exact meaning of the orders. In this way I learn the content of the orders; further, I know that the workers have understood them and I see how they are carried out. These actions are intelligible to me because they follow the interpretative pattern contained in the foreman’s commands. Thus, in this connection, the following elements are commonly found: the intention as expressed in the order of the person issuing the command, the intention as it is understood by those carrying it out, and finally, the action carried out by those being commanded, in accordance with the intended meaning. Occasionally Weber refers to the existence of such an interpretative pattern and action in accordance with it as the “sociological validity” of a command. Validity in this sense has no normative implications; it merely refers to the actual coordination of action with an interpretative pattern set by one person with the knowledge that the action will be carried out accordingly by another person. The actual existence of coordinate posited meanings, their interpretation, and their execution in accordance with those meanings constitutes the basic level of the phenomenon of domination, but does not itself reveal its essence.

b) The next step brings us to the motives of the acting persons, both the rulers and the ruled. These do not yet make up the essence of domination, but they are important for the structure of the situation in which domination becomes problematical. The order can be carried out for reasons of “fear or ‘dull’ custom,” or by a desire to obtain some personal benefit. “Sociologically, those differences are not necessarily relevant” ([W.u.G., 607/947]. Yet it must be acknowledged that to a large extent motives determine our image of governance. “Purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis
of solidarity between the chief and his administrative staff result, in this as in other connections, in a relatively unstable situation. Normally other elements, affections, and ideals supplement such interests” ([W.u.G., 122/213]). Paradigmatic for this level of meaning would be the conduct of a civil servant in an organization who neither feels a personal bond with the enterprise nor has a clear positive or negative attitude toward the contents of his work. Rather he has entered the organization and conscientiously does his work for the sole reason that his position and income depend on his doing it. Were he to find another source of income he would leave the enterprise. In this civil servant’s situation we find the basic level of the acts of meaning [the tasks to be done], the acts of obedience [completing the work], and the guarantee of the length of the relationship. This is the product of the rational economic interests of the person following orders and does not extend beyond that. The relationship is “unstable,” i.e., constantly faced with the possibility of termination, because following orders is exclusively a means serving the purpose of economic security for the person involved. If this purpose is served in another way more amenable to the person, for example, by a pension fund, the relationship of command and obedience is terminated.

The particular “unstable” character a relationship has, when it rests only on the so-called rational or material interests of the person obeying, results from the distance of the action carried out in obedience to the normative center, from which the acts of obedience receive their imperative character. In our paradigmatic case neither the content of the action nor the act of obedience as such are directly willed by the person receiving the order and carrying it out, but are only derivatively present.

The action in question is willed because it serves the purpose of remaining in the [occupational] “position,” i.e., of retaining the chance to be allowed to follow orders in the future; the occupational position is willed because it secures an income. In its turn the income is willed because it provides the means for accomplishing other purposes that, in the person’s life, may
be willed as primary or ultimate ends. Through two, three, or even more levels, the normative character of the originally willed action radiates into the carrying out of the orders within the concrete relationship. Properly understood, the term material interest refers to the derived normative character of the acts of obedience and their great distance from the original imperative.

c) The imperative comes very much closer to the concrete social relationship in those cases in which the command—to use Weber’s words—is obeyed because its “content” is acceptable to the obeying person’s “personal view.” In this case the order is not obeyed because the ruler commands it, but because it corresponds to the obeying person’s moral standards. The moral value of the command is examined in the light of the obeying person’s own moral orientation and, according to that person’s judgment, carried out or rejected. Thus these actions are not to be understood like those in the previous case in which the obeying individual B followed A’s commands. In sum these were hypothetically willed imperatives that stood in relationship to [A’s] original imperatives. But these latter lay outside the sphere of the acts of obedience. Here the action of obedience is fundamentally an originally willed action. Of course in this pure example the essence of the relationship of command and obedience is itself destroyed, just as it is in the case of following orders out of motives of “material interest.” In both cases obedience to “commands” can only be expected from others when the commands accord with what the obeying persons would have done out of original motives, without having received a “command.” Thus “commands” would be devoid of any real meaning and would constitute mere nonessential reminders of interpretative patterns. B would act as he did in any case, without reference to the fact that A constantly accompanied B and continually interpreted B’s actions as the carrying out of A’s orders.

d) The essential level of governance, which Weber links with the right to be recognized as legitimate, first exists when B’s
acts of obedience are normatively subsumed under the originally willed action of following orders per se. Each individual order would be hypothetical in relation to the imperative character of obeying the directives of person A. But this case of a derived imperative is essentially different from the two types discussed above. In both the case of following one's "material interests" and of acting in accord with one's "personal view," the content of the act of obedience was subsumed under the normative center of B's own will. The imperative character of the particular action carried out in obedience to an order could indeed be derived [from another person], but not in such a way that the imperative content was determined by an alien imperative center. In both cases the acts of obedience were taken out of the relationship between command and obedience, properly speaking, and transformed into action out of one's autonomous will. When an order is followed out of "material interests," that means that the form in which a society functions is accepted as an external one with connections comparable to those of the laws of nature. Following an order is then just as much a means to an end (e.g., acquiring an income) as the exploitation of known causal connections in nature are a means to constructing a properly functioning machine. A proper relationship of command and obedience no more exists here than it does in the case of obeying according to one's own "personal view" of the matter which, if it appears, renders the order unnecessary and if it disappears renders it ineffective. If, on the other hand, the legitimacy of giving commands as such, without regard to their content, is "accepted," the accepting person, B, recognizes the right of the commanding person, A, to exercise normative sovereignty over B's actions. Thus B's actions derive their imperative character from A's imperative center and B's actions are thus heteronomously determined. B's actions, carried out in obedience to imperatives, are termed hypothetical because their imperative character is derived from the general hypothesis of the imperative nature of the commands issued by A. In actual fact, this type
of relationship eliminates B as a moral person. The dominated person sets the dominating person in place of his own person and acts on the dominating person's moral decisions. From A's perspective, the converse is true: A's claim for the legitimacy of his orders is that his decisions on the imperative character of actions are binding not only for his own actions but for those of the dominated person as well. This amounts, however, to an expansion of A's action radius at the price of absorbing and instrumentalizing B's person.

I do not believe that Weber's description does justice to the facts. At bottom it is unsatisfactory because the image of a dichotomy between a command's content and its form is inadequate. We must analyze and resolve this form-content relationship, just as we have done with the superficial images of "material interest" and acting upon one's own "personal view." The notion that an action is not to be attributed to the person carrying it out, but refers back to another person, is a specifically legal way of looking at things. In the sphere of legal concepts we find the phenomenon of the extinguishing of a person's moral center through a chain of responsibility going back from the action of the person performing it to a center transcending that person. Concepts like "representative" or "organ" are constructed with the notion of actions committed by an instrument without its own center and in conjunction with an instance responsible for action lying outside the working instrument. But in the sphere where human beings really exist [Daseinswirklichkeit], there is no "extinguishing" of the moral person. Each human being exists in all the modes of that being, including moral being, even if he is in a relationship of command and obedience. In his analysis Max Weber obviously allowed himself to be too much influenced by certain phenomena that, although we find them in relationships of command and obedience, are in fact external to the relationship as such. Specifically his explanations assume that a relationship of command and obedience already exists in which orders are actually being issued and obeyed. The source
of this perspective seems to me to lie in the fact that the next subordinate concept to domination is the concept of discipline. This is defined as “the probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons” ([W.u.G., 28/53]). The already external view of domination as the “probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons” ([W.u.G., 28/53]) is thus further externalized into the realm of the mechanical and automatic. The most likely source for Weber's choice of paradigm is the obedience of administrative civil servants, particularly the type found in the Prussian administration. On the other hand, in the description of the human being as a moral being, the following of commands inescapably and essentially manifests itself in accordance with acts of moral obligation. The [morally] imperative nature of such acts are present in the acting person either originally or in a derived form. The moral acts are experienced as partial realizations of a whole and the contents of such acts are grasped independently by others as well who, in their turn, also realize them. Essentially, a relationship of domination and being dominated means that B accepts and follows an order because he ascribes to A an insight into the value-whole [Wertganze], the realization of which B experiences as a moral obligation. The moral content encompasses both A and B and forms them into a community in which A and B experience their respective actions as the realization of a moral-whole. Each believes of the other that the giving or following of orders, as the case may be, is a "proper" contribution to the realization of the whole. Only out of the experience of one's own and another's actions as the partial realization of a commonly willed moral-whole can Weber's notion of the claim to legitimacy, and of that claim finding acceptance, take place. Only where the issuing of orders on the part of a ruling party is understood as its share in realizing a whole can it demand that its orders be carried out. It is not A's demand that an order be followed that leads to B's
obeying it, but because obeying the order constitutes B's part in realizing the whole. Conversely, the person dominated can recognize the legitimacy of an order and obey it, not because it emanates from a person who is the imperative source, but because issuing the order is A's part in the realization of the whole. In the acts of issuing and obeying orders we find the objective coordination of partial acts within a whole, which each of the acting parties experiences as his contribution to the indirect realization of the assigned whole. The ruler's order does not emanate from him as a moral source, but rather he formulates the command, the execution of which, for the one obeying, comprises the corresponding share in the common task.

e) After this more precise explanation we can now distinguish the problem of legitimacy as such from the core phenomenon of the partial realization of a commonly held moral-whole and more clearly define legitimacy for what it is, the justification of existing relationships of command and obedience. The person B, who experiences his actions as the partial realization of a whole, does not need a theory in order to further justify his conduct and its morally imperative nature, or to explain the imperative nature of the order he carries out. The relationship between A and B and between command and obedience finds its justification in the insight of both persons into the context of their acts as the realization of a commonly shared task. Beyond this lies the generally observable need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself.

The fates of human beings are not equal. Men differ in their states of health or wealth or social status or what not. Simple observation shows that in every such situation he who is more favored feels the never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way “legitimate”, upon his advantage as “deserved”, and the other's disadvantage as being brought about by the latter's “fault”. [W.u.G., 611/953]
Every form of domination inclines to the creation of “legends” in order to produce a theory that justifies the existence of domination. Below we will examine more closely such theories of justification and the remarkable “necessity” that calls them forth. Here we only wish to remark in a preliminary way that this level of attempts to legitimize rule is not identical with what they are called upon to legitimize, namely, the relationship of domination, in the sense in which we use the term. This sense is not explained by the application of physical force, nor by the relationship of participation based on the pursuit of one’s own material interest, nor by the approbation of commands [by those obeying them] because the commands are commensurate with their own personal views.

The above analysis has shed some light on several problems, but in the place of problems solved new ones have arisen that are at least as complicated. What does it mean to realize a whole? To what extent is the whole held in common? How does the problem of power fit into this thematic complex? Is physical force the only means by which power is expressed? If there are other kinds, for example, spiritual power [Macht des Geistes], how are we to understand such a form, etc.? These questions can only be answered after we have gained insight into some essential aspects of the human existential constitution [Daseinsverfassung].

§ 3. In the field of sociology it is Othmar Spann who has considered the constitution of human existence [Daseinsverfassung des Menschen] with the utmost clarity and rigor. In principle the human being is not a closed being who confronts the world in such a manner that, in the last instance, all spiritual phenomena can be traced back to the constitution of objects in consciousness, to the mode of the appearance of an object for a subject, even if it be a transcendentally purified one, free of all material and empirical-psychological misinterpretation. Rather, the human being is a spiritual being [Geistwesen] open
to a super-personal spiritual reality [Überpersonales geistig Reales], which we will define more precisely below.

The fundamental ontological state of affairs is “that spirit is contained in a higher whole by virtue of its being reflexively contained in this superior spirit.” “The content of our spirit, and our spirit as a whole, are reflexively connected [rückverbunden] to and contained within a higher spirit.” 45 In accordance with this fundamental assumption, we must give up the easily misunderstood notion that the human being himself can produce the original [ursprüngliche] contents of his life. “Inspiration” [“Eingebungen”] and “ideas” [“Einfälle”] are the typical experiences of the spirit in which its connection to a higher world of super-personal spirit become manifest. “We cannot do anything directly to produce ‘ideas’; they come unconsciously and unbidden. . . . The spirit lives from inspiration; in inspiration spirit itself is created. The inspiration works through us, and in so doing, we come into being” [62].

The individual human spirit is not alone. As the experience of inspiration reveals, it is constantly accompanied by the presence of a higher spiritual reality, which Spann calls the world of ideas. Inspiration is, as it were, the door through which ideas enter [into our individual spirit]. A “higher spiritual order shines through such inspiration. From the standpoint of the individual we could say: Through such opening gates we penetrate into the realm of ideas, the realm which, by our nature, is our very own” [68]. But the realm of ideas should not be misunderstood to be something that transcends time without historical form, something perhaps like mathematical objects on which consciousness focuses in cognitive acts, just as it does on any other class of object. Such a notion would separate the super-personal spirit from human existence and, in principle, render it inaccessible. It would confront the human being as something external [like an object in space and time], and human existence would once again become closed existence. “The pure

45. Othmar Spann, Gesellschaftsphilosophie [Munich: Oldenburg, 1928], 61. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
realm of ideas would constitute the absolutely transcendent, a world of ideas of which we knew nothing, but, as in Plato, into which we had once had insight in our ‘pre-existence,’ but of which we could not now give any evidence” (73). But here we are concerned, not with such a preexistent idea, but with one present in our existence as something historically concrete that realizes itself continuously. “It is not the pure world of ideas of which we gain knowledge in the objective spirit that appears in history, but of the historically effective world of ideas that realizes itself in particular communities” (73). We must avoid the further error of assuming that the person does not have a life of his own, but is absorbed in his being created by a higher power. Quite the opposite is true: The vita propria of the human being, his “existence” [“Dasein”] as we will call it, is the exact opposite, a power in its own right, creative, active, and capable of being directly experienced, but only active and creative out of the center of its “inspirations.” All of the human being’s own actions originate in the “reception” [“Annahme”] (61) of intuition and proceed from this starting point to intelligible forming and implementation in action. Only after such reception can the opposition between ego and object be overcome through deeds in which the human being—through knowledge and action—makes the intuition his own and realizes it in the world. Creative activity is only possible because the human spirit is reflexively connected with a super-spirit [Über-Geist]. In this “super-Thou” [“Über-Dir”]—that is to say, out of our “having been created” [Geschaffen-Werden]—all creative activity occurs, but for all that, it is still real creative activity.

§4. In Spann’s explanations, two levels of thought, which should be kept apart, run together linguistically and objectively: These he terms the analytical and the ontological. In its intention the analytical level corresponds approximately to what we call existential description [Daseinsbeschreibung]. The ontological goes beyond results obtained in description to delineate the structure of metaphysical order, as we would
have to assume it in order to fit what we have discovered in our experience of human existence into the structure of being. It must be said, however, that the purely analytical investigation need “not lead to the ontological conclusion that the holistic \([\textit{ganzheitliche}]\) super-Thou is endowed with super-individual \(\textit{being}\)\(^{73}\). Within the human science of society and the state, which, as we wish to pursue it, is object oriented, the correct empirical description of existence is quite adequate, while, “without this assumption, social philosophy is indeed impossible” \(^{73}\). The analytical core is the paradigmatic “intuition” that constitutes the openness of the human being toward something which, to use a spatial metaphor, we may speak of as a being “prior to” or “above” the autonomous \([\textit{selbst-mächtige}]\) or creative act. The example we can use to illustrate the problem of the constitution of existence is the great scientific or artistic intuition: “No artist has ever created anything by himself. The deeper an artist penetrates into the realm of his art, the less he attributes to himself, the more the half-conscious and the almost sleep-walking aspect of creative work becomes manifest. We ourselves can do nothing directly, the ‘idea’ \([\textit{Einfall}]\) comes to us unconsciously” \(^{62}\). Spann takes this paradigm of striking and extraordinary intuition—which can be neither rationally explained nor accounted for by the laws of psychological association—as his starting point. Spann deepens the “divination,” or, properly speaking, the bond with God—as, for example, Peirce has clearly demonstrated\(^{46}\)—into human existence’s continuously effective mode of being throughout historical time. The human being is intuitively open to a being.

\(^{46}\) Charles S. Peirce, \textit{Chance, Love, and Logic}. (1923), 287 ff. “The agapistic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies \([\ldots]\) by an immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind \([\ldots]\) [this mental tendency] may affect an individual, independently of his human affections, by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind, even before he has comprehended it. This is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination of genius; for it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the most high.”
before time and to a super-Thou, not merely in cases of exceptional spiritual importance, but throughout his entire existence. “From the child’s first steps in the world until old age and death, human life is guided by intuition” [63]. The entire course of life is being [Sein] out a pre-being [Vor-Sein]. Spann extends this thought beyond human existence into the entire realm of life when he writes: Intuition “is granted as a gift, to the human being in a form commensurate with his existence, but also to the canine or to the plant in forms commensurate with their existence” [63]. In all realms of living being, each individual has a foundation from which life springs. “This ground is irrational and dark; it is a mystery that will never be completely illuminated” [63]. It is a historically concrete ground.

§5. The expansion of the paradigmatic problem of “intuition” from its ideal pure “model” to address the human being’s constitution in its entirety proceeds along lines of thought, the laws of which can be most clearly seen in certain reflections of Descartes. In the third of his Meditations, concerning the existence of God, he raises the question just discussed concerning the anchoring [Rückverbundenheit] of the individual human existence in God, and the additional one of the individual being continually created in God. Is the human being the author of his own being or, in order for him to understand himself in his finite existence, must he transcend himself and recognize an infinite godly substance as his creator? The paradigmatic formulation of the problem, in which the question is directed toward its answer, is closely related to Spann’s notion of intuition. Descartes begins with a special case of intuition: from the appearance of a thought in my psyche, which would be inexplicable were my thought confined to the closed space of my monadic existence. The openness of existence becomes intelligible in the case of a specific spir-

47. [René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Other Writings, trans. and ed. F. E. Sutcliffe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), 113–31. Further references to this text will be made parenthetically in the text.]
ritual “experience,” an event in my spirit that cannot be explained by a psychology that recognizes only world-immanent experience. The experience of the finiteness of my existence, which can be discursively explained in a determination of the qualities of my substance, is contrasted to the concept of a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, and all powerful. For Descartes asks, “How would it be possible for me to know that I doubt and desire, that is to say, that I lack something and am not all perfect, if I did not have in me any idea of a more perfect being than myself, by comparison with which I know the deficiencies of my nature?” (124).

In this foundational intuition [Grundeingebung], the human substance is open to a godly substance and the human understands himself as the finite substance that is enclosed in the infinite one. From this paradigmatic case of intuition the concept of the openness of human substance is extended to the notion of the substance being continuously created by God.

For the whole time of my life may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which depends in no way on the others; and thus, it does not follow that because I existed a little earlier, I must exist now, unless at this moment some cause produces and creates me anew, so to speak, that is to say, conserves me. In truth, it is quite clear and evident to all those who will attentively consider the nature of time, that a substance, in order to be conserved in each moment of its duration, needs the same power and action that would be necessary to produce and create it afresh, if it did not yet exist. So that the natural light shows us clearly that conservation and creation differ only in regard to our mode of thinking, and not at all in fact. (127–28)

§6. Descartes and Spann proceed in the same manner. Starting with a paradigm of spiritual experience, they extend it to the whole of human experience. They differ fundamentally, however, in their starting point and in their own position as recorders in relation to the point of departure. Spann considers the experienced “intuition” from the outside, much as one considers an object; he views the human being, the structure of whose existence he wishes to understand, like an object in the
space-time continuum \([\text{gegenständlich}]\). For Descartes, finitude does not appear as the substance of an experience of just anyone, but is the existential foundation of the philosopher and his philosophizing. The “meditation” is the philosopher’s personal way to that point where he finds his existence open to God. Through the step-by-step removal of the moments of finiteness, at the end of the skeptical reduction, the thinker gains insight into his existence as a thinking being \([\text{denkende Existenz}]\), in order then to explore the realm of thought in search of something that cannot have its origin in finite experience, and finds it in the idea of a perfect being. The goal of thought is not to prove God’s existence, but the actual contemplation of God himself, which is achieved in meditation. Thus \([\text{Descartes’s}]\) sentence: “For, just as faith teaches us that the sovereign felicity of the other life consists in the contemplation of the divine Majesty alone, so even now we can learn from experience that a similar meditation, though incomparably less perfect, allows us to enjoy the greatest happiness we are capable of feeling in this life” (131).

To the extent possible for a finite being, the meditation leads directly to the intuition \([\text{Anschauung}]\) of God, and thus to the “experience” in which the limits [borders] of human existence, and that which transcends it, encompassing and holding existence, is originally given. Such a meditation, with its experiential goal, is, however, a unique event. When the person lapses from the concentration needed for the meditation into the everyday world, the direct contact with the infinite is interrupted. This results in the situation that Descartes describes as follows: “And, in truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which is not very easy for all, who give it careful thought, to know by the natural light of the mind, but when I let my attention relax somewhat, my mind, finding itself obscured and, as it were, blinded by the images of sensible objects, does not readily remember the reason why the idea I have of being more perfect than I am, must necessarily have been put in me by a being which is in reality more perfect” (126).
Thus the philosopher must go beyond the movements of thought in which he discovers that the idea of God is an idea given him by God. In order to render intelligible and certain that his entire existence is maintained by God, he must make the whole course of existence rationally intelligible as being [continuously] created by God. This is done by introducing the infinite segmentation of time and by extending the notion of creation into the notion of preservation.

§7. The meditation in which finitude and openness are origin-\[Über-Ich]\]narily given can be repeated. But each existential contact with the super-ego [Über-Ich] is a unique historical event. When the philosophizing person ceases to meditate, his contact and openness are again brought to an end. Thus when we consider that existence as a whole, between birth and death, is characterized by a particular structure in which a personal spirit is encompassed by a super-personal one, we are confronted with a problem of knowledge that in part is closely related to the question of the object of sense perception. For example, when I turn toward a tree and look at it directly, it is given to me in immediate intuition. When I turn away from it I therefore remain convinced that it continues to exist in the time in which my back is turned to it and that the concrete tree will be present when I look at it again. In the same way my existence, in the fullness of its nature, is given to me only in particular meditative acts in which I turn toward it. The assumption that it exists when I am not turned toward it is pragmatically motivated, and in substance metaphysical. Practical reasons of everyday existence lead me to the metaphysical assumption that my existence [like that of the tree], even when I am not directly considering it, continues and retains the structure that I experience when I turn to it directly.

Remarks on Husserl.\[Daseinslehre]\]

In our view, a theory of human existence [Daseinslehre], if it is to be good, considers the movements of thought in which

\[Voegelin's note indicates his intention of adding a passage on Husserl here, which he did not carry out.\]
existence, in its constitution, can originarily be given to itself and explains the same continuous structure of existence for life’s entire course. Only the first part of the theory yields real knowledge by pointing the way to an evident giving of the self to the self [Selbstgebung] in concrete existence; not, however, in the form in which objects are given to us in experience, but in existence illuminating and manifesting itself to itself [existenzverdeutlichendes Darleben der Existenz]. Generally the second part consists in the more or less successful attempt to rationally present the temporal course of existence as a continuum, i.e., as the life revealed in the existential self-giving. In principle these attempts are doomed to failure because they treat human existence as an object, like a thing we can perceive. In reality human existence cannot be grasped in an objectifying mode of thought, but only in the existential movement of thought, in which it becomes present to itself. Therefore the exactness of these attempts at rationalization is not important. Even the best of them and those that have been most carefully thought through are mere equivocal and conceptually inconsistent coverings for the simple metaphysical assumption of human existence as an existing substance.

§8. Spann does not arrive at the constitution of existence by means of the experience of existence giving itself to itself and its limits. Instead he speaks of intuition and the structure of the human being determined by this fundamental experience, i.e., the human being as a spiritual being open toward a super-personal spirit. He assumes that this view is a known fundamental of existence and, without formulating any special precautionary measures, proceeds to the metaphysical assumption that existence is historically concrete and continues through time. His only reservations occur at the assumption that super-personal spirit is something real. Here he concedes that, proceeding from an object-oriented theory of society, the deduction of the reality of the objective spirit is not logically compelling. But the assumption of an objective spiritual reality appears to us to be no less questionable than the assumption
of the individual human existence-continuum. After all, this continuum is not to be understood as the existence of a natural thing from which the step to spirit would have to be carefully thought through, but is itself intended to be a spiritual continuum [Geistkontinuum], that creates out of its having been created [Schaffen aus Geschaffenwerden]. If we are to address the problem of open existence and the realization of the superpersonal whole at all, and we must, as we have seen when we speak of domination as the fundamental phenomenon of the state, we must also adopt the metaphysical assumption of the objective spirit, in the same sense in which the natural scientist must adopt the metaphysical assumption of “nature.” Of course we cannot view the objective spirit, which is present in the historical world as real and continuous becoming, as timeless [being] in itself; but as scientists [we can] only approach it through the scientific [wissenschaftliche] treatment of it in historical reality. We shall have to say more later about the problems of creating political science concepts, which come to the fore here.

§9. The meditation in which human existence advances to its limits and as a knowing being knows itself to be an entity that constitutes objects and, at the same time, constitutes itself, which as a “given” being also gives itself to itself, is [a meditation] historically determined in its language and in [its understanding of] the content of the soul. The finiteness of human existence in the double sense of being closed within itself and open toward an “outside” can grasp itself as creative activity that arises from a self that has been created, as a being held, as a being that has been hurled [Geworfensein], and in terms of other verbs belonging to the subjects of creator, preserver, and hurler. The experience of finitude can be bleak when the imperfection of existence is held up to view; it can be joyfully hopeful when the brilliance of a transcendent perfection shines through; it can result in a calming experience of being held and protected, or in an experience of being threatened, or in a heroic experience of having no being to rely upon.
but its own. But the investigation into the typical states of the soul and the forms in which such border experiences are grasped is a matter for a psychology and theory of forms of philosophizing. We only touch upon it here in order to make clear the core situation of such liminal experiences. We must speak of them in terms that in principle only make sense when applied within the limits such experiences transcend, though the situation is essentially characterized by the fact that it cannot be adequately expressed in immanent categories. “Act” and “content,” “consciousness” and “object” are epistemological categories that are only applicable if we posit an absolute subjectivity in which all experience of the world, including the spiritual and those expressed in the categories of being, are given as the content of its consciousness. But the existential meditation goes beyond such absolute subjectivity and overcomes its objective correlatives. In the meditation we follow a course of thought that does not lead to emptiness, but attains a goal; this goal is not given in the manner of the data [of sense perception], but only in the taking up again of the same course that had been followed earlier. When we speak of the structure of this meditation we must use the formula of “existence” [“Dasein”] that is rational or unambiguous. We speak of the knowing existence that knows itself, or of the constituting existence that constitutes itself, etc. We speak in the form of propositions and must take existence as a grammatical subject that performs an activity, that knows and that constitutes, and then we find this same subject as the grammatical object of this activity. The necessity of the linguistic expression can very easily deceive us into assuming that the grammatical subject actually indicates something that is given in perception, and that can be seen in action, likewise that the grammatical object refers to an object of knowledge constituted in our consciousness, concerning which verifiable propositions may be made, though in both cases these assumptions are false. Neither is the constituting existence a consciousness, nor is that which is being constituted an object, nor, finally, is joining the two
into a whole something that takes place within the structure of act and content.

We must remain conscious of this aporia, which belongs to the essence of existential thought, in order to understand why the problem of power has not been satisfactorily treated up to now. Nor will it be adequately treated as long as the theory of governance demands that the subject and object of power are unambiguously identified. The actions of the ruler A and the subject B have been shown to consist, each in his way, of partial contributions to the realization of a common whole. The realization takes place in the objective correlation of the acts of “dominating” and “issuing orders” to the acts of “obedience.” We must now address the question concerning the nature of the objective correlation of partial realizations. We want to know what governance is, who the ruler is, what obedience is, and who obeys.

§10. The question and its answer are particularly complicated by the fact that the problem of the partial realization of a commonly held whole through a plurality of persons is interlocked with the structure of the reality of domination as it is constituted in the relationships of the persons engaged in the partial realizations of the whole. For example, the objective spirit of “romantic music” can be realized in the following way: Each individual person contributes to its realization by creating a spiritual work that in itself is a closed whole. Perhaps the persons engaged in this realization constitute a community and perhaps only through this community is it possible to realize the commonly held objective spirit in concrete works. But the works stand next to one another, independent of one another, each for itself. In the case of a spiritual structure such as the state there are no objectifications created by persons that could be compared to the closed work of art. Rather, the realized actions themselves are part of the spiritual connection “state,” which only as a whole could be compared to a work of art. The work of art is not a self-creation; its creator lies outside the work in the person of the artist. The state, on
the other hand, is never finished, but always in the condition of becoming, realizing itself in its own self-structuring acts. The creative center does not lie outside the state, but exists in the variety of the realizing acts between ruler and ruled that are coordinated with one another. In a science that deals with such spiritual structures as works of art, the problem of open existence and its being anchored in a super-personal spirit can be separated from the analysis of the work itself, even if in the various layers of the work, which in part can be attributed to the artist himself, in part to the super-personal spiritual reality, the fundamental fact of the openness of existence becomes manifest. The science dealing with the spiritual structure of domination investigates the special content of domination that consists of one existence exercising power over other existences. Since the context of domination includes the constitution of existence of the participating human beings, the problem of the openness of existence itself is thereby included. This problem also includes that of the relationship of the ruler and the ruled to the common whole that is realized in their partial and coordinated acts of command and obedience.

In order to establish the nature of domination, we must more closely examine the possibilities of localizing the source of domination, the origin of power. We cannot simply say that human being A rules over human being B, for we know that a human existence that is said to rule is a metaphysical assumption made on the basis of existential experiences, and we must immediately raise the question: Is power rooted in a realm that transcends the limits “experienced” in existential meditation, or in the commonly held whole, for example, in the state as a super-personal reality? Or is power rooted in the immanence of existence that is to be realized? If it has its roots in realized existence, does it flow equally from the existence of the ruler and the ruled, as would appear to be the case when we speak of the power of a governing organization as a whole? If so, what does it mean to speak of the power that the ruler exercises over
the ruled as the domination of one existence over another? And what is the role of physical force in this problem?

In order to shed light step by step on this complex of questions, we will again begin with Max Weber's theory of power and proceed from the outer circle of the "application of physical force" to the core of the problem of domination.

§ 11. Max Weber viewed domination as a special case of power. By power in general he understood the probability of compelling others to carry out one's will (W.u.G., 604/942) or the probability of one's will triumphing over resistance (W.u.G., 28/53). But this concept struck him as being socio-logically imprecise, and he therefore narrowed it down to the well-known definition of domination as the probability that a command will be obeyed by a given group of persons. With these definitions we find ourselves in the area in which power is seen as the rule of one human existence [Dasein] over another, with the undertone that the probability of commands being obeyed is guaranteed by coercion, or, to be more precise, by the threat of "physical force." For Weber the will as a subjective-spiritual phenomenon is the source of power, and it expresses itself in two modes of implementation that are poles apart: by means of a constellation of interests and by means of authority. In the first case a social and, in particular, economic connection is assumed into which the individual human beings are interwoven and in which, in following their own "interests," they strengthen its power and, in particular, obey monopolistic property interests. Typically, the owners of large enterprises exercise power by virtue of the fact that their weaker partners willingly yield to them in their own interests. The case is very similar to our example of the civil servant who does his work only because it is the means to another end that he really desires. The case of the owners of large enterprises, however, includes more elements of enforced obedience. In the case of economic power, behind the innocuous sounding "interests" looms the fact that, ultimately, the one who disregards them risks his own destruction. Here Weber's subtly nuanced
concept of rationality comes close to designating the vital necessity, arising from the fact that the human being is rooted in nature, of submitting to a situation in his own “interests,” in which he is forced to reach a compromise with the “powerful” if he wants to stay alive. When therefore, without considering the question of the partial realizations of the whole in acts of command and obedience, we speak of the type of domination resulting from the “possession of purely de facto power,” we are not speaking of domination in the true sense of the word ([W.u.G., 608/946], though, according to Weber, such “de facto” power tends to change into “authoritarian” [i.e., command] relationships.

§12. “De facto” power itself is not yet domination, but it appears in combination with domination when the harmonious cooperation between commanding and obeying parties fails. It guarantees the continuity of domination by providing for the possibility of applying pressure or force against those who do not obey unconditionally. When we compare the power that is a mere accidental attribute of pure domination to the power that we find in the use of pressure in compromises of interest, the particular character and essence of certain aspects that are left unanalyzed in the expression “physical force” become manifest. “Power” is not expressed with the help of weapons that hack, stab, or shoot in order to more or less severely wound the body, which is a part of organic nature; rather, power is manifest in the success achieved by the threat of such wounds. After all, power is supposed to be the probability of “imposing one’s will upon others in order to determine their conduct.” Power does not intend the use of physical force but tries to compel human beings to act in a particular way. The threat of physical force is a practical means of achieving this goal, for the same reason that the monopolization of the means of production is: It compels others to act as the powerful wish them to because, in the event of undesirable conduct, ultimately they are faced with the possibility of destruction and death. [If we follow the analysis of the situation of the compromise
of interests to its logical conclusion, we see that the pressure applied in such a situation ultimately points to physical force. For in the concept of the “economic context,” Weber tacitly assumes the state’s guarantee to maintain it. But only the threat of force achieves success, not the application of physical force itself: When a squad of police “drive” a crowd from a square with the help of fire hoses, the application of force consists in soaking the crowd. However, the crowd is driven from the square, not because they have been sprayed with water, but because they do not want to be made still wetter. (In a hot climate this application of force will perhaps not achieve the desired end.) The effectiveness of physical force lies, not in its use, but in the fact that its threat renders application superfluous. For physical force to be an effective means of imposing domination, the situation in which it is used must have a particular structure, the essential features of which we must examine more closely.

1] The application of physical force can follow the goal of destroying an alien existence, for example, in the conquest of a foreign territory for the purpose of clearing it for settlement by members of one’s own community, or in the wars of annihilation between the Greek poleis. Such a case is an example of the expansion of an entire ruling organization with the goal, not of imposing a particular conduct on the persons under attack, not, therefore, exercise of power in the sense in which we speak of it, but it may rather be compared with the relationship to inorganic nature, the clearing of a field for the purpose of cultivation.

2] If the aim of threatening force is to compel obedience, this can be thwarted if a] the threatened party escapes from the area where the use of force is a threat and continues to exist elsewhere, or b] the threatened party prefers to let force be used against it, rather than obey.

3] With what Laski calls the organization of the hinterland, the possibility of removing oneself from the exercise of force in the modern political world is continually decreasing. The areas that lie outside the exercise of power continue to decline in size and, for the citizens of modern Europe, have practically ceased to exist. In addition to the threat of force proving successful,
owing to the impossibility of escaping the territory in which it can be applied, these threats generally prove effective, since those threatened have no intention at all of leaving the area. As a rule, their lives are closely bound to the area of organized domination by family and other community ties, through membership in a cultural community, and by having achieved the economic chances for securing their existence. They want to remain at all costs within this power structure; thus force can be indirectly applied against them through their ties with the community. A living community that they cannot do without, with the structure of domination already in place, is a prerequisite for the use of force as a means of imposing one's will in the sense of enforcing conduct. Therefore, complex layers of social ties, having nothing to do with domination, are the prerequisites for imposing one's rule upon those who would otherwise resist it. In the sense relevant to our theme, the notion of physical force as “guaranteeing” domination points to domination as a social substructure of particular content within an overriding social context that also includes associations possibly for the sake of which, albeit reluctantly, even those who would otherwise resist domination are willing to stay.

4) The limit of this “guarantee” is reached in case 2b, if, by resisting, the dominated intentionally provoke the use of force in order to destroy the governing relationship. In principle, the possibility of destroying the governing relationship by provoking the use of force was demonstrated in the Indian civil disobedience to the English administration.

The threat of force for the purpose of guaranteeing domination can only be successful if the danger to the community ties lying outside the governing relationship is coupled with the extreme consequence of the destruction of life itself; this succeeds in motivating those threatened to alter their conduct. The threat of violence is only successful when it is directed against individuals or against relatively small minorities within a community. If the number resisting is very large and those threatened with violence refuse to be cowed by “bluff,” so to speak, domination is at an end. Within more or less tightly drawn limits, “domination” as a social substructure must be able to get along with other social substructures in
the overriding social context, at least to the extent that the relevant groups and numerous dominated persons prefer domination and possible damage to their community life to the risk of violence and injury. In every stable form of government there must be a positive core of corresponding substance [Gehalt] between the governing instance [Herrschaft] and the other social communities. Thus our analysis leads to the conclusion that, although force may guarantee domination, in its core domination can only be maintained by “authority.” The acts of those dominating and those dominated must be experienced as “correct” partial realizations of a commonly held whole.

§13. The threat and the application of physical force has meaning for the theory of governance only where the relationship of domination is understood to be a social substructure with a particular objective content. More concretely expressed, the general discourse in which acts of domination are understood to be the partial realization of a commonly held whole refers to a social context with its typical content of family, free associations, economic relationships, language groups, art, scientific, and philosophical communities. The typical objective content of governance, as a partial realization [of a common good], is found in the higher institutional anchors of legislation, administration, and the maintenance of law and norms within society and the protection of society from external danger. The concept of the “institution” is not a priori and can only be constructed as a historical ideal type with the materials that the experience of a concrete historical epoch gives us. If we orient ourselves to our experience of the modern state, the institution essentially comprises an organization with a director, a legal order, and an administrative staff to impose this order and maintain it over a specific area. Within this paradigmatic structure we are concerned with the problem of governance as the “correct” partial realization of an overriding whole with its typical objective content and the “authority” that flows from the “correctness” [of the realization].
§14. In his *Sociology* Spann devotes particular attention to the “inner,” valid domination, contrasting it to the “external,” mechanical domination by force. We cannot content ourselves with the naked fact of power that is necessarily present whenever we find dominance, but must probe deeper and inquire into the origin of domination. When we do we find the same source of domination in the inner validity, in the correctness of that which is meaningful; governance does not take place by means of external mechanical force, “but by virtue of the binding nature that inheres in the spirit as such” (239). “History teaches us that it is the validity of spiritual values that constitutes the spiritual bond. They cannot be replaced by fire and sword, nor by any other form of force. All governance that endures, and all the order that society has thus achieved, is the result of inner domination” (240). External domination can only be maintained through time when it is based on valid inner grounds, and serves the purpose of realizing the objectively valid spirit. “It remains absolutely necessary that that which is intrinsically valuable and possesses [spiritually] valid content, precedes power as it is represented in law and the state (just as it must precede all other areas of practical life in society). As soon as authority and force, inherent right and external power, become separated, the continued existence of the affected area of society is endangered” (241). To put this in the framework of our exemplary situation, and in our terms, we would say that governmental domination is the partial realization of the spiritual whole. Its typical objective content is the regulation, direction, and, in the broadest sense, support of the nongovernmental areas of society mentioned above. In accordance with the specific objective spirit, in the full range of concrete historical societies—Athens five centuries before Christ, imperial Rome, Germany in 1930—spirit is realized either adequately or inadequately. In cases of adequate realization of the objective

spirit throughout a period of historical time, we speak of authority and of valid inner domination supported by the threat of force. In other cases, inner and external domination separate and the society based primarily on external domination is threatened in its existence. In its formal organization, the power to dominate \(\text{Herrschergewalt}\) is rooted in its “inherent fruitfulness for the substance of the spiritual community and for the communal actions” (428). Expressed more compactly, governmental action, in the sense of the partial realization of a spiritual whole, must correctly realize its part of the spirit of the whole. Therefore the source of power and rule is not found in the application of “psychological or mechanical coercion, which would be independent of inherent validity, but in the inherent spiritual validity of that which rules” (494). The fundamental question of a theory of governance, is not who, but what rules. Power cannot be deduced from specific persons and their wills, whether it be from the rulers or the ruled, but only from the valid content that the ruler, in his governing actions, realizes. For this reason the concept of the sovereignty of the people, or of the monarch, is inadmissible and should be replaced by the concept of objective sovereignty, or the sovereignty of content \(\text{Sache}\). “Essentially it is not the personal will of the citizen that rules in the state, but the will of those who rise to the challenge of the task itself \(\text{Sache}\); the most sociated powers rule in truth and according to their nature, and all special powers are derived from this circle of people” (429).

In the notion of “the most sociated powers” the analysis of the problem of power has been tacitly extended a step beyond the notion of the partial realization of the objective spirit. A transition has taken place from the sphere of the objective spirit into its realization through human beings. The “powers” that realize the objective spirit are not those of the spirit in itself \(\text{an sich}\), but those in living human beings. That which is objectively correct and constitutes the essentially valid would be completely ineffective were it to remain confined to the
realm of the spirit, recognized and brought into existence by no one. The objective spirit does not exist in itself, but always and only is realized in the reality of governance; we find it in the acts of the essential authoritative ruler who realizes it in his actions. “When we consider the essential nature of the matter, we see that the leader is not elected but represents an idea that corresponds to the essential power of the matter. (Without this correspondence he is not truly the leader.) This essential power inherent in the matter makes him the leader, and it cannot be replaced by an election or by external powers or by any other means” (495). When, in their actions, ruler and ruled are inspired by the essential power of the whole, by the objective spirit—because they are open to the super-personal spirit and express it in their actions—then, and only then, does the spiritually valid become historical reality and reveal itself in the temporal course of governance.

But we must probe further. What is this essential nature? How do the ruler and the ruled know what is spiritually valid? Spann responds with the logical consequence:

Only the whole is the socially essential. It alone is the first essence or that which is a priori present. The members—or branches—of the whole have essences of a merely derived and participatory character. The parts of the branches not essential to the whole constitute what is erroneous, are invalid for the whole, and tend to its destruction. Thus they are mere self-destructive appearances of power. The converse is also true: What is unessential for the branches is also erroneous. For the whole is born in its branches. Therefore, that which is essential to the branches is also essential to the whole and constitutes an essential, genuine, and constructive power. (496)

The explanation lies within the area of the doctrine of intuition and of the openness of human existence. Whatever does not emanate from true intuition is false in its relationship to the genuine objective spirit. The objective spirit itself can only really be grasped in a true intuition—it cannot be grasped in itself. The whole is that which is essential, but what the true
partial realization of it is can only be known by the person who realizes it, by the person who has the intuition. Only he stands in the concrete place in the historical course of the spirit, and only in him at that particular point in time, through his intuition, does the spirit become real in its concrete fullness. *Staatslehre* can demonstrate the typical content of governance for a particular historical period, but by its nature it cannot come close to the historical *concretum* itself. However close its ideal types approach the contents of a specific historical time, it is incapable, in principle, of saying what was “valid” at that point in historical reality. Every particular place in reality is occupied by the persons acting in that time. Based on their own intuitions, only they can pass judgment on the “validity” of the spirit realized at that time. The objective spirit is the object of scientific investigation only to the extent that it can be known through the sequence of the concretions in which it has been realized. It is not present in the form that, independent of its concretions, scientific propositions could be made about it and tested in a procedure, equally accessible to everyone, so that everyone could form [valid] judgments about it. From this definition of the essence of the objective spirit, that in the immediacy [of its living] self it can only be known directly and intuitively by a concrete historical person, and not “discursively” by everyone, a number of important problems arise concerning the reality of domination.

§15. Spann did not follow the problem of the sovereignty of content to its logical conclusion in a theory of the constitution of human existence. In our examination of the fundamental problems involved in the theory of governance as a theory of human existence, we saw how difficult it was to define the subject of power. We also learned why clarity in this matter is impossible. Spann wanted to isolate the “content” [“Sache”] of the super-personal spirit as the source of governance. But we found that such an attempt is doomed to failure because that which transcends the limits of experience is not an identifiable datum, but a dialectical topos that can only be reached through
the objectifying speculation on the existential experience of meditation. Nor could Spann escape the structure of this speculatively determined thematic field. After establishing the fact that it is not important who but rather what governs, he too had to speak of the persons in whom the “what” is alive and who, for that reason, embody true leadership. The “what,” the objective content that should rule, was transformed into effective living powers, and in place of the validity of content we had the authority of the ruler.

[Spann’s] change of theme along the dialectically marked-out [speculative] path does not become immediately apparent because an additional thematic change takes place involving a set of problems belonging to a different level of reflection. We find, for example, that the sentence referring to the valid spirit—“according to the nature of the matter, the best should rule, indeed they must”—is embedded in the exposition concerning the sovereignty of the human beings qualified to govern. This is indeed the level of reflection appropriate to the dialectical structure of the theme. But, in addition, the notion of the sovereignty of content is brought into remarkable contrast to the sovereignty of the people: “The source of the governing power is not the sovereignty of the people, but the sovereignty of the content” (429). Various levels of the problem of power are incorrectly brought together here. The concept of the sovereignty of content—along with the concept of the ruler, to be discussed below—belong to the possible rationalizations resulting from our understanding of the constitution of existence. On the other hand, concepts like sovereignty of the people, sovereignty, representation, etc., belong in the more concrete level of problems relating to the dynamics of power throughout the course of history. In contrasting and opposing the sovereignty of content to the sovereignty of the people, the former takes on political significance. This is Spann’s private affair and concerns us here only insofar as the sovereignty of content is transformed into the sovereignty of the “elements most capable of becoming the fruitful figures of the
community, the most sociated powers.” Words like elements and powers, designating neither spiritual content nor its validity, nor the human beings imbued with spirit, are unclear and only veil the transition to the concrete level of ideology, in which the sovereignty of content is to provide a foundation for the idea of the corporate state [Standestaat]. We will comment on this function of the notion of the sovereignty of content in its proper place below.

The reason for this lack of clarity is to be found in the theory of existence, where further lack of clarity—arising from the confusion of power-related problems from different levels of reflection—prevent their becoming immediately apparent. Now that the problems are clear at one level, we can focus on the next lack of clarity concerning us at this stage of our investigation. This is to be found in the transition from emphasis on the validity of the content—which lies beyond the limits of existence—as the source of domination, to the emphasis on immanent human existence as its source. For the moment, we will set aside the question of the extent to which the dominated person is equally a source of power along with the person who dominates. His acts of obedience also constitute partial realizations of a commonly held spiritual whole and are thus of equal importance to the acts of domination themselves, so the question arises how rulers and ruled, within the relationship of domination, differ as types of human beings. Now, by means of intuition into the objective spirit, the dominant person must be closer to the objective spirit than the dominated person, since the content of the latter's activities derive from orders issued by the former. Through his orders, the dominating person brings the dominated into indirect contact with the super-personal spirit. A human being who dominates another human being (in our sense of domination anchored in a commonly shared spiritual whole) enters into a special type of unity with the spirit, i.e., that of the dominant constitution of existence with the spirit it is called upon to realize.
In order to explain the present state of the problem, and to present several of the variations we find concerning governance, we shall look at several attempts to define the existential constitution of the ruler and the ruled.

§16. The question concerning the typical constitutions of existence of the rulers and the ruled, as we formulate it, is a theme essentially confined to the era in which we live. It arose because the traditional European forms of governance and their ideologies disintegrated to the extent that the human being has been thrown back on the naked constitution of existence, without benefit of the qualities of political form that characterized earlier periods. Only after the French Revolution and under the strong impression of its destructive impact on governance do we find an attempt to classify governance in our sense of the term. However, the question concerning the existential constitution is only radically raised for the one type, that of the ruled. The ruler as a type remains closely tied to traditional notions. In his Réflexions philosophiques sur l’égalité [Philosophical Reflections on Equality] (1793), Necker considers the events and ideas of the Revolution and tries to prove that—contrary to the destructive theories of absolute freedom and of the equality of all citizens—only a structure of governance, like that of the old order, with its sharply defined division between rulers and ruled, can guarantee the peaceful existence of political institutions. He substantiates his thesis by reflecting on the fact that because the need to take care of life’s necessities does not rest equally on all, most citizens are not sufficiently free to prepare themselves for the exercise of governance. In terms of education, upbringing, and experience, as well as in the structure of their existential constitutions, most people are only fit to be ruled. Necker does not use the same method to characterize the two types of existence. The horizon of his study was still that of traditional governance, in which there was no doubt

50. Jacques Necker, Réflexions philosophiques sur l’égalité [1793] in Histoire de la Révolution Française, Nouvelle édition t. IV (Paris, 1821). [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
that the French aristocracy was, along with its prominent representative the king, the natural ruling class. An investigation into the existential constitution of the ruler was not necessary, because he was sufficiently characterized by his position in the unshaken social hierarchy. Thus the characterization of the ruler is confined to relatively external qualities like economic independence, upbringing, and experience, without raising the question of a specific spiritual qualification. By contrast the character and status of the type to be ruled, who is not distinguished by social rank and who, so to speak, has nothing but his existence, is deduced from the structure of his existential constitution.

Polemically aimed at demonstrating the impossibility of the ideas of freedom and equality, and the ability of all members of a political community to rule, this fundamental reflection is that, owing to the need to take care of life's necessities, most people cannot get away from their affairs in order to devote themselves to politics.

The professional knowledge that the ruler must possess can only be acquired through a lengthy educational process, extensive studies, and continuous effort. These requirements, though, cannot be satisfied by everyone in a world “where the slow production of the fruits of the earth and the assiduous efforts required for their cultivation forces a vast majority of people to dedicate their lives to bodily labors from the beginning, from the very first exercise of their physical powers” (146). The people are confined to the sphere of desires and interests appropriate to the narrow range of their ideas. Reflecting their situation, they still have the same morals and spirit that they had before the Revolution. When they go beyond the confines of their sphere, they do not deserve the flatteries heaped on them by demagogues and ideologues; they are neither just nor appreciative, neither gentle nor magnanimous, nor farsighted. These flaws do not reflect a nature of inferior rank, merely a lack of upbringing and education. The mass of those ruled have no time to develop intellectual capabilities and to clarify their
views; they do not have leisure to study and to think through the organization of society. The principles of government are far too intricate to be subjected to the judgment of an uneducated mass. Indeed it is in the interest of the people themselves to be prevented from influencing day-to-day affairs (180). The entire state of affairs seems to indicate “that, according to the laws of differentiation established by the supreme organizer of nature, and the public authority, such goods as education and wisdom could not belong to all classes of society” (147).

This level of classification does not yet address the actual problem of governance. The fact that governance already exists is the self-evident assumption within which these reflections on education or its lack, on the complexity of government, and on the necessity of a life of work, take place. If there is to be governance at all—we are obliged to say—then under present economic and social conditions it can only exist in the form of governance on the part of those who have education, knowledge, and economic independence over those who lack these attributes. Several remarks, approximating Weber’s distinction between obedience due to rational, private motives and obedience for its own sake, come closer to the core of governance. Necker is concerned, not with the rationality of private interests, but with the rationality of legal construction that appears to him, as it did to Weber, to be unsuitable for the foundation of governance. Governance would be too unstable were it to rest on nothing more than legal reflection on the validity of laws. “We should remember one principal truth, which is that notwithstanding all the conditions and phrases of a constitutional act, no liberty has a solid foundation if the consideration given the government and the respect for the law are constituted by reflection unsupported by habitual sentiments” (80). The legal grounds for governance must be supplemented by the bonds of sentiment and habit—the sentiments habituels—and, finally, by what Necker calls the power of imagination: “The law, in its abstraction and metaphysical nakedness, could not be imposed on the multitude, and it was to maintain its sway
by the power of imagination that so many old opinions have been employed” [162]. The term opinions refers to theories of justification, “legends,” habits of faith, and “ideologies” in the broadest sense. They must effectively encompass the prevailing order and hold the governed to obedience for its own sake. For “the great political truths, the great moral truths consist of so many elements that they are lost on the people as soon as they lose the character imprinted on them by the habit of many years” [181]. Necker still finds obedience for its own sake, the core of the relationship of governance, so unstable that it requires an ample system of guarantees. If these disappear, governance can no longer be preserved on the strength of inward validity alone. “Without a social hierarchy to accustom minds to respect and subordination, the governments of large states could not rule without the massive use of power” [186].

Force and rational reflection may contribute to the guarantee of governance; feelings, habit, and traditional respect for social forms may help it get over the difficulties that sometimes render the objective validity of the ruler’s acts unintelligible to the ruled, because of the complex nature of the acts. But the supports and the guarantees of governance are grouped around a core phenomenon that is rooted in a specific aspect of the existential constitution of the dominated. The division of a political association into rulers and ruled corresponds to an inner need of the majority to avoid a life of complete self-reliance in a field of unordered social diversity. Necker asks, “At the sight of this vast uniformity does it take any reflection at all in order to see the necessity of introducing into the result of absolute equality the ranks and gradations, with which time’s vagueness has been divided into hours?” [165], and answers the question negatively. For the division of social reality into a cosmos of ranks, the harmony of the inequalities in the state and the social gradations “facilitate our understanding of and our access to the knowledge of immensity” [159]. The individual is overcome by a kind of agoraphobia when he is not assigned a specific place in society and his relations to his fellow-human
beings are not definitively regulated in every way. This anxiety, which must be allayed, is rooted in the quality that endows the human being with foresight. The human being never lives without a relationship to the future; and when his attention is not taken up by everyday matters, he lives in it completely: “The everyday business itself consists in a continuous series of distractions that, unknown to him, link him to the future. His life in the present is perhaps never more than the appearance of such a life” (237 ff.). If, however, because of his essential nature he is always concerned with things in the future, it is his imagination that represents them to him and is “the chief architect of both his pleasure and his sorrow” (238). Thus the imagination must be carefully regulated in order that the human being may lead a life of contentment. Our imagination needs a steady, gentle movement with continually new perspectives. The human being cannot be left facing the void. As soon as one objective is attained, he must be provided with new tasks and meaningful perspectives that will absorb his attention. The imagination “needs a series of perspectives more than it requires vast spectacles or a large canvass. Our moral landscape must be painted in nuanced colors” (239). “Thus of all the results of the social arts, the gradations of social rank and wealth correspond most closely to our nature. We are moved by the respect that we show and receive. All such acts remind us of our hopes; it is in these exchanges that the game of life is played” (239).

“Foresight,” the faculty of planning for the future and for the conscious and rational carrying out of tasks, was the paradigm that served Necker as the starting point for the train of thought we have just followed. By virtue of foresight the fundamental structure of human life consists in transcending each respective present into the future. Such a life requires social stratification as a horizon for human beings seeking meaning. In another passage Necker goes beyond this external paradigm and penetrates deeper into the foundation of existence. There he finds that time itself appears to us as a kind of “hierarchy
in which the future dominates the present and where hopes continually transcend reality” (241). The generalization of foresight in plans for the future or into a law of the inner hierarchical stratification of time is based on a fundamental phenomenon of existence, the process of aging. “Owing to the effects of time, each individual differs from himself continuously. During life’s various stages, he becomes a different individual in certain respects. The child, the adult, and the old man are so many different individuals, united in the same person through the mysterious bond of memory. Their ideas, tastes, and needs change with age; life does not follow the same laws throughout its course” (231). The inherent difference of the individual human being through aging is the primeval form of inequality in the sphere of historical reality. For Necker the necessity of social inequality follows from inequality as an aspect of the history of individual human existence. Social inequality gives rise to the relatively narrow horizons we find in the socially diverse human existences, in accordance with which most human beings can find satisfaction and happiness.

We have presented a systematic exposition of Necker’s ideas and ordered them according to their depth. But the conclusions we have drawn stem from our interpretation and are not found in Necker’s work, the fundamental ideas of which are often filled with polemic against specific events of the Revolution and with details of the topical notions of his day. That Necker did not intend to develop a system, but only recorded his thoughts concerning the events of the day, is revealed in the nature of his analysis of human existence. In principle it should be valid for every kind of human existence; in fact it is only used to characterize the type of human being who is dominated, while the existential constitution of the ruler is not addressed at all. Necker interprets the fundamental phenomenon of aging and of the inner “hierarchy” of time, which of course are neutral and in no way need to be interpreted with the slant he gives them, in such a way that the human being finds himself in the nunc stans of his existence anticipating the
future, which towers hierarchically beyond the present, providing it with a protective horizon. In each respective present, the human being feels secure because he has before his eyes the narrow circumference of his hopes, plans, and desires. The same fundamental state of affairs, however, can be interpreted in the opposite way. Then the human being does not stand in a “present,” facing a future horizon, but continuously transcends the secure point of his present, rushing into the unknown; and because of the forward movement of his activities, they acquire the character of boldness, open to the dangers inherent in free decisions with uncertainty all around. Upon this second pattern of interpretation it is entirely possible to base a theory of the type of existence of the ruler. Indeed it has been attempted, and we will have more to say about it below.

Necker does not address the systematic possibilities opened up by his reflections. He remains firmly tied to the forms of governance of his time, especially by the French ideas concerning governance and their benefits for the peaceful citizen. Only with these aspects of Necker’s historical milieu clearly in mind can we understand the ever-recurring motif we have called “agoraphobia,” the deep longing for security and orientation within a narrow horizon. The phenomenon of aging and the inner stratification of time were interpreted in terms of the narrowing of the horizon. Within the bounds of this interpretation occur the further classifications of the existential constitution of the dominated, rounding out the fundamental interpretation with more detailed definitions. Concerning the great mass of human beings, the concrete classification asserts that it “must be limited in its wishes and its ambition. The boundless pretension of the masses cannot be reconciled with their limited degree of enlightenment and with the immutable laws of nature. Still, the immediate effect of absolute equality is the destruction of the countless multitude of compartments introduced into society by the distinction of class, rank, and fortune. The human being finds himself in a space open on all sides and unable to defend the various avenues along which
danger might approach” (274). Here the human being is viewed as being on the defensive. He finds himself in a place where he may be attacked from all directions and is deprived of the means to defend himself in all directions open to attack. This defensive thought reflects a fundamental idea of French political theory. Necker sees protection as the achievement of the old social order, and we find the same thought in Siéyès, who interprets the idea of the citizen’s freedom as protection against external attack. For Siéyès freedom is the sphere within which the citizen may move about carefree and undisturbed. Political freedom is supposed to produce the same thing that the lack of political freedom does: a safe haven in which the common man can go about his daily business. According to Necker, “What one should wish for in the name of true equality, and in the name of the equality of happiness, is the perfect peace that justice inspires. It stems from the certainty that one will be able to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor or preserve the inheritance of one’s fathers” (254). The idea of the citizen is the idea of the man of private means who has made his fortune through work or acquired it by inheritance and now consumes it comfortably as the bourgeois affreux [dreadful bourgeois]. The dominated person must support himself by labor, whether or not he is free and equal. We have underlined, through all the changes in political ideas, the commonly held notion of the dominated person’s closed and sheltered existence, since it shows clearly that Necker’s sketch of the type has its roots at a level far deeper than that which we normally call “political ideology.”

The need for a spiritual haven in the confusion of the social world has added an additional characteristic to the fundamental structure of the dominated person’s existential constitution. A further determination is found in the qualities of intellect and will that Necker calls “mediocre.” In a polemic against the idea of the Revolution he asserts that a society should not be established for the sake of the small number of persons who are energetic in action and in intellect, “but for the sake of the large groups and the great masses that have
existed at all times and that will continue to exist for all time. Just as we must build according to the customs of the country, we must also erect the political order in this world that fits the average man’s interests and customs” (265 ff.). Necker does not forget to add that even “gens mediocres” live at a rather high level compared to the masses who, of necessity, lack the benefit of education. On the one hand, this addition reveals that we are no longer proceeding at the level of external qualities such as upbringing, education, and economic independence, for at least education is granted to the Third Estate. On the other hand, the classification of essential features reveals that Necker’s attention is still focused on the concrete political situation; for the masses that exist below the Third Estate are not considered, just as he ignores the traditional rulers at the other end of the social scale. Necker focuses his attention on the Third Estate, which had just acquired [political] relevance.

Finally Necker singles out a type of those whose nature fits them to be dominated and identifies them as the “âmes tendres” [gentle souls]. “Also the gentle souls, if they are still thought of, the gentle and pious souls shall never be able to assimilate the principle of absolute equality; it is too indefinite for their weakness; they need gradations, they need a deadline, peace and quiet, a place to stand. They need a perspective that their emotion can cling to, they need one on this earth, one outside it, one which is in palpable harmony with this internal meditation that is always in the ascendant and has them searching in heaven for a comforter and a judge” (273).

In this manner Necker includes a motive in the classification of existence that we will encounter in Dostoevsky, where it is explained in depth.

Necker’s theory of governance contains the core of a theory of human existence but, on the whole, remains closely tied to the historically concrete forms of governance taking shape in his time. The existence of the masses, who have not yet become politically relevant, lies outside the sphere of his investigation just as the traditional ruler does. Instead the object
that motivates his investigation is that group of society which was just then attaining its share of power, the propertied and educated bourgeoisie. Even the fundamental structures of existence are one-sidedly interpreted so as to appear essential features of the exclusive object of interest, the rising bourgeoisie, which, however, remain bound to a narrow commercial horizon. The existential constitution of the ruler can only be deduced from Necker’s exposition of that of the ruled. If it is characteristic of the dominated to long for security, protection, and the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of labor, we can conclude that the ruler’s superior soul is prepared to take risks. If Necker attributes to the bourgeois only average willpower and mediocre intellectual culture, we must conclude that the ruler is strong willed and intellectually bright. Here the theory of governance, conceived as a theory of the existential constitution, begins to separate from the area of political struggle and, in some questions, such as the remarks concerning the immanent hierarchy of time and the theory of aging, attains a depth that essentially has not been superseded in the theoretical efforts that followed.

§17. In one area Necker’s theory of governance penetrates deeply, when it follows the types of the ruler and the ruled back into the stratification of time and into the aging process, but it does not address the complex systematically and leaves unanswered the other questions at the same level of reflection. Necker does not go far enough to grasp the neutral structure of time and to see that the type of the ruler is merely one possible variant within its structure. Since he takes the historically contiguous too much for granted, he fails to see the problem of the common spiritual. Although this topic is not explicitly dealt with, it becomes topical in the situation that compelled Necker to undertake his reflections in the first place. He opposes the revolutionary ideas of freedom and equality, whose meaning, if we reformulate it at the level of reflection that concerns us here, is expressed in the thesis that all human beings participate directly and equally in the objective spirit
and that no person is distinguished by a specifically dominant existential constitution, so that, next to him, all other human beings can only participate in the objective spirit through obedience. Necker’s polemical standpoint recalls the problem we touched upon briefly above. Insight into the correct and objectively valid content of government is not a matter for discursive thought to verify in accordance with specific procedural rules. Rather, it is a matter of “intuition” on the part of the persons involved in the social process. It is not the scholar who knows what is objectively valid, but those participating in social reality at concrete points in the course of history. Because of the fact that, in an act of intuition, all participants are principally capable of grasping what is objectively valid, [and because of] the impossibility of that intuition being either proven or refuted, differences of opinion over the correctness of the ruler’s action are in principle always possible. This can occur because among the dominated there are persons who insist that they know better than the rulers what is valid and right, or because there are persons who, though they themselves do not know what is right, nevertheless believe that, judging by the consequences of the rulers’ actions, they can say with certainty that the rulers do not know either. In principle the validity of every kind of governance can be doubted: 1] by persons who have their own valid insights, which do not agree with those of the rulers, 2] by persons who are in agreement with the rulers concerning the content to be realized, but who believe that it is only imperfectly or poorly realized by them, 3] by the rabble, understood as the mass of the spiritually disoriented, capable at any moment of destructive outbursts, and who can only be kept in check by the threat of force.

The acts of domination and obedience are not coordinated in preestablished harmony. Even in cases where the objective spirit is validly realized, the realization in space and time and within a specific group of persons suppresses all other possible realizations of the objective spirit that were perhaps present in these same persons at that time. In a traditionalist, hierarchical
state structure there is no possibility for a Caesar or a Pericles to emerge; in a democracy there is no chance for the type of person who might have developed optimally in the court culture of the ancien régime; Sparta is not the place where arts and sciences flourish, etc. Every concrete governance realizes one objective spirit and must, if it is to unfold in a pure and uninterrupted fashion, rigorously suppress all other possibilities that might exist in the members within its rule. From the nature of the objective spirit, which is a unique realization in space and time on the part of a plurality of human beings, follows the principle inevitability of the conflict with the other spiritual resources present among the dominated but unable to flourish. Historical realizations of the spirit are no less impenetrable than bodies in space—where one has established itself, there is no room for an other.

Thus, even a pure and perfect realization does not result in the joyful flowering of spirit that is recognized as valid. Rather, it oppressively stifles everything that bears witness to another spirit, and to those who live in this other spirit, the realization of the first appears as something evil. The evil of governance, the coercion it uses against those who resist it internally, becomes more pronounced and formidable in its massive appearance in the second and third case of disharmony referred to above. If the actions of the ruler only imperfectly realize the objective spirit, the whole of the community substance, which should be protected, ordered, and supported, suffers under the government’s weakness. Those ruled are in agreement with the dominating “spirit,” but the rulers fail in their efforts to realize it. The gap between what the mass of the members of the governmental institution consider valid and the ruler’s actual achievement can, in a concrete case, be very wide without necessarily leading to a break. Latent grounds exist, however, for a revolution, and the possibility is always present. Quantitatively, “evil” is most strongly present in the disharmony between the rulers and the ruled as it is expressed
in the suppression of the rabble, which is an essential task of every government, expressed in the threat and the use of force. Of necessity, the soul of the rabble, as the mass of the spiritually disoriented, is always in a state of rebellion against the rulers, because the spirit that rulers realize is incomprehensible to them. And since the rabble only experience governance as a coercion that confines them to a small circle of activity, it sees nothing but the external differences in the way life is led, and therefore, should it acquire the technical means it needs, is always ready to overthrow the rulers, in whom it sees nothing but evil.

It may appear strange that, quantitatively, the most powerful expression of “evil” on the part of government lies in keeping down the rabble. We might say that here we find the justification of governance and one of its essential tasks in the realization of the objective spirit. But we must bear in mind that our analysis is not conducted from the point of view of an outsider but from that of the participants in the governing structure. For those who are actively engaged [in shaping] social reality the question arises whether the governance under which they live is good or evil. In any case it will appear to them to be evil the moment they have a reason to complain about their external situation, since the notion of governance as a realization of the spirit, as an inner governance, is incomprehensible to them. For the outsider, the opinions about the “evils” of governance and power will change with the change in views concerning human nature. Greek antiquity, which drew a distinction between the free man and the slave by nature, looked upon the oppression of the subordinate masses as less of an evil than we are accustomed to, since our time entertains the absurd notion of deducing the equality of human beings from their equality before God. Nevertheless the idea of equality among human beings prevailed beyond the circle of Christianity as well. Plato’s suggestion of the “Phoenician lie” in the Republic may be understood in this context.
Hence I would try to convince, first the rulers themselves and the soldiers, then the rest of the city, that all of our education and training were things that they imagined and that happened in a dream. In reality they were underground being molded and fostered along with their weapons and all of their tools. When this was finished, mother earth delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and to watch over the other citizens as their brothers who are children of the same earth. [Republic 414 d–e]

This lie is to make the rulers and the ruled believe that their respective stations in the state are divinely willed so that they can live together in peace without doubting the justice of this arrangement. Plato wishes the rulers, as well as the workers and the farmers, to believe this tale, but at a minimum he would be content if at least the lower classes accepted it. “What has to be done so that first the rulers believe it and, if they do not, at least the people do?” [Republic 415 b–c]. For Plato the term people means the same thing as it does for us, the mass of the spiritually disoriented who are ruled by desire, the third and lowest part of the soul. This mass, who cannot grasp the Platonic conception of the state and would rise up against their rulers, must be pacified by faith in this tale, which the rulers, if necessary, can do without. “All of you in the state are brothers, this is what we, the poets of the myth, tell them. But as god made you, he made the future rulers with gold; that is why they are the most honorable. Their helpers he made with silver, the farmers and the other workers he made with iron and brass. [. . . ] An oracle declared that the state will perish, if iron and brass are put in charge” [Republic 415 b–c].

§18. In our first paradigm we focused on the issuing of orders by person A and of obedience to orders by person B. The partial realization of each in the interest of the common whole constitutes the essential level of meaning in the concept of governance. As we expanded our investigation to include the institutional paradigm [§13] we found that the essential relationships of governance are embedded in an extensive, incal-
culable variety of relationships in which governance acquires the character of “evil.” It is impossible, by exact statistical methods, to establish to what extent a modern European state has its foundation in essential relationships of governance and to what extent its stability is based on indifference, resignation, and the reciprocal pressure of the states upon one another. Nevertheless, the assumption seems warranted that the essential core of governance is extremely small. In view of this state of affairs, “the state is only an iron clamp enforcing the social process.”

Nietzsche inquires into the mystery of how, despite so many elements that threaten the state, despite its “evil,” it nevertheless manages to keep itself together and is able to dominate the masses it rules. To account for this otherwise incomprehensible phenomenon, he believes that we must assume a power of nature that humankind cannot resist. He views the state with its function of keeping down the spiritually bereft masses as an institution forced upon us by nature in the interests of culture. “Culture [. . .] rests upon a frightening foundation. [. . .] In order that a broad, deep, and productive soil for the development of art may exist, the overwhelming majority of human beings must be enslaved to work for the fulfillment of life’s necessities far beyond their own individual needs. At their expense, on the basis of the excessive amount of work that they do, the privileged class is freed from the struggle for existence, so that a new world of needs may be created and satisfied” [220]. To Nietzsche, the Platonic idea of the state, in which the wise rule, seems to be “the wonderfully great hieroglyph of a profound and secret doctrine, that must be continually reinterpreted, concerning the relationship between genius and the state” [234].

Slavery is an essential part of culture. The misery of the toiling mass of humanity must be intensified in order to secure for

51. Friedrich Nietzsche, Der griechische Staat in Nietzsches Werke, Klassiker Ausgabe, vol. 1, Schriften aus den Jahren 1869–1873 [Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1921], 228. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
a small number of people the chance to create the world of the spirit. In this imbalance we find the source of the rage against the spirit, and especially against classical antiquity, which the socialists and communists of every age have expressed. But culture does not lie in the hands of the people; it is the work of inescapable forces. Were it not so,

the contempt for culture, the glorification of the poverty of the spirit, and the iconoclastic destruction of the claims of culture would be more than a rebellion of the oppressed masses against dronelike individuals. It would be the cry of compassion that surrounds the walls of culture; the instinct for justice and for the equal sharing of the suffering that [human beings must endure], and its clamor would silence all other ideas. As a matter of fact, here and there for brief periods of time an overwhelming outburst of compassion has broken down all bulwarks of cultural life. A rainbow of compassionate love and peace appeared with the first glimmer of Christianity and brought forth its most beautiful fruit, the Gospel of Saint John. (221)

Nietzsche has gone far beyond the confines of tradition in which Necker lived. For him, no aristocracy or dynasty, legitimized beyond the shadow of a doubt by history, constitutes an unquestionable source of rule as it did for Necker. Nietzsche sees the ruler in his naked existence, [a perspective] which Necker reserved for the ruled, and consequently [Nietzsche] sees with greater clarity the “nature of power, which is always evil.” When in the name of freedom and justice a revolt overthrows a régime that has failed to meet these demands and replaces it with a new order, the same drama is reenacted. For it is not a specific régime that is evil, but every one, and when a new faith tries to end a ruling culture, it makes itself guilty of the same cruelty and evil as the old one did. The essence of power does not change, only the personnel of the rulers and the oppressed. “What wants to live in this appalling figuration, nay must live in it, is, in the core of its being, an exact representation of life’s primeval pain and contradiction. Consequently it cannot help but appear to our eyes the organ appropriate to ‘what is worldly and earthly,’ as an insatiable lust to come into
existence and as an eternal self-contradiction in the form of time, thus a *becoming*. Every moment devours the preceding one, every birth is the death of innumerable beings; procreation, life, and murder are one and the same” ([222]). In many ways, the results of the destruction that befell the tradition in which Necker was at home, in the eighty years between Necker and Nietzsche, are woven into Nietzsche’s ideas. They allow Nietzsche to more radically grasp the problem of evil in governance and the revolt against it. He no longer believes that social harmony can be reestablished by gentle persuasion and by sketching the existential constitution of those who are ruled and their peace and contentment. But the notion of the ancient polis in its artistic completeness, his interest in Heraclitean ideas, the romantic and sentimental backward glance that encompasses vast historical scenes, and his theory of the irresistible, fateful forces of nature, which use the state as an instrument to bring forth culture, keep him from fully understanding how to reconstitute governance out of the relationships between the ruler and the ruled. Although he sees both types, he fails to comprehend their nature because he views them as mere instruments of an anonymous providence that cannot be rationally understood. Admittedly, he sees the slave as a human being who does not participate in the culture his labor supports. But though he sees the slave as the man to whom culture gives nothing, yet he does not view him, as Aristotle did, as a slave by nature, nor does he view the spiritually disoriented individual, as we have used that term, as a slave by nature. In his work, the slave participates in the realization of the spirit and, as we shall see, is fascinated and personally touched by the power of the ruler who oppresses him; but he stands, however, outside every spiritual context because he is seen, not as a person, but as a tool without understanding in the service of an incomprehensible force of nature. Thus Nietzsche sketches the ruled in a manner very similar to Necker: “How sublime the medieval serf appears to us with his inherent strong yet gentle, legal and moral relationships to
those above him, in the profound all-inclusive contentment of his narrow existence” (223). The ideal of life in security characterizes the existence of those who are dominated, just as it did for Necker and, as we shall see again, it does for Dostoevsky. But for Nietzsche this security is not an essential characteristic, but the result of a historical era’s unique and propitious constellation that made a slave’s existence bearable and so rebellion unlikely. (We are not concerned here with the historical accuracy of Nietzsche’s views.) Nietzsche sees the contemporary state and culture threatened by the fact that people destined to be slaves are being inflamed by false ideas to rebel. “The contemporary widespread outcry about social misery is born out of modern man’s softness, not out of true compassion with those who are suffering. If it is true that classical Greece was destroyed by slavery, it is far more certain that we will be destroyed by our lack of it. Neither the early Christians nor the German tribes were disturbed by the existence of slavery, nor thought it morally wrong” (222). Existence as a slave is seen as a function of the anonymous cultural process that cannot be altered either by the ruled or the rulers. The social order can do no more than to make this miserable existence more bearable by developing “inherent strong yet gentle, legal and moral ties.” This is also how we are to understand the words Nietzsche adds: “How sublime the humble contentment of this existence strikes us—and how it reproaches us” (220).

The existential constitution of the ruler is no differently defined than that of the ruled. The ruler, too, is not a person, but the instrument of a higher power. It is his task to build the state in which the division of society into the mass of those engaged in misery and toil and the few engaged in spiritually creative activity can take place. “Regardless of how strong the individual’s gregarious instinct may be, it is only the state’s iron grip that forces the greater part of the masses together to the point where a chemical division of society into a new pyramidal structure becomes unavoidable” (223). Not the drives
and forces latent in man himself account for the genesis of the state, but a superhuman intention. With a “pitiless singleness of purpose” nature forges “the cruel tool of the state” in order to bring society into existence. “It is the conqueror with the iron fist who is but the objectification of instinct” and the creation of law by force. There are no parallels in Necker’s conception with the characteristics of this conqueror, since Necker did not actually describe the ruler. But we find in it anticipations of later attempts to grasp the ruler’s essence, especially of Weber’s concept of charisma. In order to characterize this gift of grace, Nietzsche uses the word magic, a term also used by Burckhardt in similar contexts. “In the indefinable magnitude and power of such conquerors the observer feels that they are but the means of a purpose that, while manifesting itself in them, also conceals itself from them. As if a magical will emanated from them, they attract weaker forces with inexplicable alacrity who are amazingly transformed by this creative core under the spell of the sudden burst of power, though unaware of the affinity until the moment in which it overcame them” [224].

A comparison of these sentences with some passages from Burckhardt’s lectures on Napoleon will help us understand the meaning and range of the concepts of “enchantment” and “magic.” “What is great and unique about him [. . . ] is the combination of an unheard-of magical willpower with a gigantic intellect, nimble in every direction, equally intent on amassing power and on unceasing combat, in the last analysis, against the whole world.” Or: “Metternich reports that conversations with him had an air of inexpressible charm, although they were not really dialogs at all, but monologs that [one] was allowed to interrupt from time to time with one’s own remarks.” Or again: “In 1802, as he assembled his new, mixed bureaucracy, he is said to have grasped with magical

53. Ibid., 144.
swiftness and skill that which was being presented to him on all sides."

Just as in the analysis of the type of the dominated, here, in the concept of the ruler and his spell, the investigative lines mix and blur. The first of the two just quoted sentences, which describes the conqueror as the means to a purpose hidden from himself, speaks explicitly of the “observer.” This is the outsider who feels in the indefinable greatness of the dominant person his instrumental character. The second sentence marks a change of standpoint: The magic of the creative core is not revealed to an observer, but attracts the partner in the relationship of governance and reshapes his soul into an affinity which up to that moment had not existed. It is only this second concept of magic and affinity that is relevant to our investigation, which proceeds from an immanent standpoint. The first concept belongs to the obscure sphere of transcendent speculation in which the ruler, as the slave discussed earlier, is the function of a mysterious force of nature that intends to realize its cultural purpose. The second concept characterizes the ruler in a way that, methodically, is closely related to Weber’s investigations concerning charisma. The meaning of the “magic will” or the “creative core” are as clear, or unclear, as the concept of the special gift of grace introduced by Weber. Because these reflections blend with the first ones made from the standpoint of the transcendent observer, the meaning of the latter are colored by the first. Something of the super-personal origin of magic enters into them, which is echoed by the concept of charisma. To be sure, it seems doubtful that within the framework of Nietzsche’s ideas the people attracted to the magic of superhuman willpower and reshaped under the influence of its creative core—i.e., are drawn into the ruler’s spiritual sphere—are the same people who have been classified as slaves. After all, the slave was not described as a person with a specific essence, but as a creature who, through nature’s unfathomable will, had

54. Ibid.

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been forced by external circumstances into the position of being dominated. On the other hand, those who are drawn to the creative force of the great ruler and enter his orbit are weaker than he is in that they lack the vital power to attract others into their own orbit. But they are not completely different from him; indeed, they are capable of becoming much like him.

Thus a number of problems come into conflict with one another in Nietzsche’s classifications. When he speaks of the ruler’s magic will and creative core that draw the weaker natures and compel them to obedience, he accurately describes the essential relationship of governance, the domination of one human being by another. When he underlines the necessity of power and the evil of all governance, he describes that rich variety of relationships of governance in which, due to the spiritual disharmony between rulers and ruled, governance must necessarily appear as evil to the ruled. Nietzsche brings these two types into a peculiarly one-sided relationship by trying to solve the problem of the government’s oppression of the slaves by reference to the magic attraction of the ruler’s will, although those attracted to the ruler’s will are not the ones who were earlier classified as slaves. It is correct that the integrity of the political body, despite the variety of relationships Spann calls “external governance,” is maintained by essential relationships in which genuine partial realizations of the spiritual whole take place. Nietzsche further distorts the problem with his use of such contemporary categories as the “state” and “civil society”—although this distortion also contributes to revealing the complicated nature of the problem. On the one hand, the term slave, the category opposite that of the spiritually creative ruler, is subsumed under [civil] society; on the other hand, the spiritually creative leader is subsumed under the category of the state where its counterpart is the weaker nature fascinated by the leader’s strength. The ambiguities in the lines of investigation reflect the problem of the institution as outlined above (§13). The problem of governance is not as simple as implied by the first paradigm of issuing and obeying
orders. It is complicated by the fact that “rulers” in the modern state do not produce the goods of human existence in their entirety; in particular they are not responsible for those of the cultural community, where they have the mere instrumental function of promoting and protecting. The rulers are not, as Plato intended, the wise, the philosophers who create, protect, and support culture themselves. The assumed identity of the philosopher and the king obscures the problem, much in need of analysis itself: the role of governance in the realization of the objective spirit when the ruler does not realize it himself, but is merely instrumental to its realization. [We will have more to say about this problem below in the chapter dealing with Wolters.]

Nietzsche has not kept the lines of the investigation rigorously separated; the following themes run together: 1) the transcendent speculation concerning nature’s purpose, 2) the immanent classification of the existential constitutions, 3) the categories of state and civil society, 4) the two pairs of the person types, 5) the direct realization of the spirit with the instrumental realization by the ruler. For Nietzsche these blend into a grandly sketched picture that we place here at the end, without again analyzing its elements.

It is astounding to see how little those who have been brought into subjection by the state are troubled by its horrifying origins so that actually we are better informed about every other kind of historical occurrence than we are about the state’s sudden and violent emergence—and at least in one point its inexplicable usurpation: The magic of the emerging state overwhelms our hearts with the intuition of a deep invisible purpose; where the understanding can see little more than the sum of forces and powers, the state is fervently greeted as the goal and height of the individual’s sacrifice and duty: all this expresses the overwhelming necessity of the state, without which nature could not succeed in attaining its salvation in society, in the radiant mirror of genius. What knowledge is not silenced by the instinctive joy felt for the state! One would imagine that a thinking being, still shivering from having looked into the origin of the state, would seek refuge in distance. Where can one not find its monuments:
countries turned into deserts, cities destroyed, human beings reduced to savages, nations divided in hate? The state, of humble origins, for most human beings a continual source of tribulation, in often recurring periods, a torch that consumes humankind! Yet it strikes a chord at the sound of which we forget ourselves, it is a call to battle that has inspired a myriad of truly heroic deeds! It is perhaps the highest object for the otherwise blind and egotistic mass of human beings whose faces, only in dreadful moments in the life of the state, have shown with the eerie expression of greatness! [225]

§19. The analysis of Nietzsche’s ideas reveals the complex of questions in their full intricacy; we shall take them up later one by one. We confine ourselves here to the principal topic, the governance of one human being over another and the identification of the source of power. Necker’s polemic clearly demonstrated that governance does not consist of a preestablished harmony between acts of command and obedience, but in principle contains within itself the possibility of being destabilized. In fact, the “evil” of governance manifests itself in the instances of disharmony between the rulers and the ruled. If, despite principle and perhaps much widespread disharmony, governing structures nevertheless hold, we may attribute this—excluding external reasons—to the presence of a core of essential, genuine relationships of governance. It is in relationship to this core that we raise the question concerning the existential constitution of the human beings who enter into relationships of command and obedience. Necker answered this question with an analysis of the type of human being who is ruled. Nietzsche classified the ruler as the human being endowed with a magic willpower that attracts weaker human beings. The approaches complement each other and are in essential agreement on the point that there are people deficient in psyche, intellect, and will whose best interests are served where they can lead their lives within the safe haven provided by the governance of others. For Necker the latter are the human beings, determined by tradition to be strong in psyche, intellect, and will, who are thus capable of bearing
the burden of governance and relieving others of it. When we penetrate deeper into the core of the existential constitutions that correlate with one another, we find two fundamental positions. One follows the problem of evil into the abyss of the ruler who takes upon himself the responsibility that the ruled is unable to shoulder, thus cutting off the latter from his own autonomous, free decision concerning good and evil. This is Dostoevsky's position in the “Grand Inquisitor.” The other position recognizes the ruler's great accomplishment and judges it “good” simply because, in direct contact with the divine spirit, the ruler incorporates the spirit and lets it shine forth into the weaker human beings, who have not been called to direct decisions and direct realization of the spirit. The ruler as the mediating instance of the divine and [other human beings] thus becomes the center of his own empire. This is the doctrine of [Friedrich] Wolters's Governance and Service, 55 which takes up the ideas of [Stefan] George.

Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor reproaches Christ for having shown too great a faith in humankind when he offered human beings the path of following him of their own free will instead of imposing obedience with the methods the tempter had shown him in the desert. Through his high expectations Christ has brought unspeakable suffering upon the all-too-weak human being. Thus, despite the labor of fifteen hundred years by men who have devoted their lives to the task of relieving the weak of their burden, the misfortune has not yet been completely overcome. Christ refused to change stones into bread, which would have changed mankind into a herd ready to follow him, even though they would have been trembling for fear that he might withdraw his hand with the proffered bread. Human beings have not been created with the strength to allay their hunger on their own. “No science will give them bread so long as they remain free. In the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us, ‘Make us your slaves,

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but feed us.' They will understand themselves, at last, that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share between them! They will be convinced, too, that they can never be free, for they are weak, vicious, base, and rebellious!” Christ had promised them heavenly bread, but

[how] can it compare with earthly bread in the eyes of the weak, ever sinful and ignoble race of man? And if for the sake of the bread of Heaven thousands shall follow Thee, what is to become of the millions and tens of thousands of millions of creatures who will not have the strength to forego the earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly? Or dost Thou care only for the tens of thousands of the great and strong, while the millions, numerous as the sands of the sea, who are weak but love Thee, must exist only for the sake of the great and strong? No, we care for the weak too. They are sinful and rebellious, but in the end they too will become obedient. They will marvel at us and look on us as gods, because we are ready to endure the freedom that they have found so dreadful and to rule over them—so awful it will seem to them to be free! [507/300–301]

These sentences express ideas very close to those we have encountered in Necker. Both Dostoevsky and Necker present the picture of peaceful contentment with one’s daily bread as the ideal of the life of those who are ruled because they are too weak to be masters themselves and bear the burden of making decisions. In both cases, the world is not to be ordered in accordance with the idea of freedom, for that would be a world made for the few, the elect and the strong. On the contrary, the world is to be so ordered that it will provide bearable living conditions for the great mass of the humble and for those who need protection. Just as Necker does, Dostoevsky realizes that a stable social structure cannot be brought about by merely satisfying material needs. Both the order that Dostoevsky sees as founded on “bread” and Necker sees secured by

the “rationality” of law need to be supplemented by attention to “considerations,” “habitual sentiments,” and “opinions.” According to the Grand Inquisitor, in rejecting “bread,” Christ saw one thing clearly, that the masses do not live by bread alone. Giving them bread does not secure the masses’ lasting obedience if, surreptitiously, someone else gains control of their conscience. “For the secret of man’s being is not only to live but to have something to live for. Without a stable conception of the object of life, man would not consent to go on living, and would rather destroy himself than remain on earth, though he had bread in abundance. That is true” (509/302). But Christ also refused to take possession of their conscience by the means made available to him in miracle, mystery, and authority, though he knew that man’s greatest torment is his anxiety about finding something he can bow down to, which he can surrender his freedom to, and which he can worship. “Instead of taking possession of men’s freedom, Thou didst increase it” (510/302). “Instead of giving a firm foundation for setting the conscience of man at rest [. . .], Thou didst choose all that is exceptional, vague, and enigmatic; Thou didst choose what was utterly beyond the strength of men, acting as though Thou didst not love them at all [. . .] they could not have been left in greater confusion [. . .], than by the demand that they should follow Thee freely, enticed and taken captive by Thee” (510/302). Christ acted as proudly and powerfully as God when he refused to cast himself down from the temple tower, “but the weak, unruly race of men, are they gods?” (511/303). He who seeks God must be a god himself, but men seek miracles. If they find no miracle, they lose God “and will worship deeds of sorcery and witchcraft” (511/303). “Thou didst crave free love and not the base raptures of the slave before the might that has overawed him” (512/304). But Christ thought “too highly of men [. . .] for they are slaves [. . .], though rebellious by nature” (512/304). Has Christ really only come to the elect who were able to bear his cross and to follow him?
And how are the other weak ones to blame, because they could not endure what the strong have endured? How is the weak soul to blame that it is unable to receive such terrible gifts? Canst Thou simply have come to the elect and for the elect? But if so, it is a mystery and we cannot understand it. And if it is a mystery, we too have a right to preach a mystery, and to teach them that it’s not the free judgment of their hearts, not love that matters, but a mystery that they must follow blindly, even against their conscience. So we have done. We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon miracle, mystery, and authority. (515/305)

Christ also rejected governance over the earth, the third and last gift the tempter offered. However, “we took from him Rome and the sword of Caesar, and proclaimed ourselves sole rulers of the earth, though hitherto we have not been able to complete our work” (516/305). Had Christ accepted this third gift, He would “have accomplished all that man seeks on earth” (516/305). Man would have known whom to worship on earth and to whom he could entrust his conscience, and how he could join together with all other human beings; “for the craving for universal unity is the third and last anguish of men” (516/306). Mankind as a whole has always striven to organize a universal state. The great conquerors are powerful symbols of the craving of mankind for a world order that could bring peace to the world.

The existential constitution of those who are ruled may be classified into three groups. First, [there is] the mass of mankind, who are so made that they cannot live in peace and share the gifts of nature. They are vice-ridden, evil creatures who, out of greed and fear for their lives, would kill each other. They need to be governed for the purely material reason, that only through the coercion of each individual to peaceful conduct can they be brought to live with one another at all. Whoever has “bread,” whoever controls life’s material necessities, is the natural ruler they will worship. Second, and more important than actual coercion for bringing about a peaceful order, is control over the conscience of those who are so weak that this is necessary. The doctrine of free decision making and of taking
responsibility is only appropriate for the few who are strong. Has Christ come only to them? Are only they to be saved and not also the weak? “Though if there were anything in the other world, it certainly would not be for such as they” [521/308]. Herein lies the “mystery,” as Dostoevsky calls it, which must remain obscure; here is the source of evil in governance that becomes evil at the very moment when it tries to do its best for the weak by giving them the happiness they are capable of receiving. Here we reach the theme at the root of the problem of governance: the ultimate fact of the closeness to or distance from God, which is ours by no action of our own; or, in our terminology, to the human being’s closeness to or distance from the spirit. It is one of the human experiences that make a theodicy necessary.

The third determinant of the existential constitution of the ruled is less relevant for us, because it is historically too strongly influenced by the ideas of the Russian religious world empire, which lie beyond the scope of our investigation.

The rulers are contrasted to the ruled; the former are “evil” because they have accepted the tempter’s gifts out of pity and compassion with the innumerable human beings who are not capable of following Christ. The strong “take the bread” in order to satisfy the hungry. “And we alone shall feed them in Thy name, declaring falsely that it is in Thy name” [506/300]. “But we shall tell them that we are Thy servants and rule them in Thy name. We shall deceive them [. . .], for we will not let Thee come to us again” [507/301]. They take the miracles, the authority, and the mystery in order to control the conscience of the people, but they also know: “We are not working with Thee, but with him—that is our mystery. It’s long—eight centuries—since we have been on his side and not on Thine. Just eight centuries ago, we took from him what Thou didst reject with scorn, that last gift he offered Thee, showing Thee all the kingdoms of the earth. We took from him Rome and the sword of Caesar, and proclaimed ourselves sole rulers of the earth, though hitherto we have not been able to complete
our work” ([515 f./305]). In the end, however, when governance has been made secure, all will be happy and will neither rebel nor destroy as they did when they lived in freedom. They will find a quiet, modest contentment, the happiness of the weak creatures they were created to be. “We shall show them that they are weak, that they are only pitiful children, but that childlike happiness is the sweetest of all.” (This passage recalls the parallel problem of Plato’s Phoenician Lie.)

We shall set them to work, but in their leisure hours we shall make their life like a child’s game [. . .] We shall tell them that every sin will be expiated. [. . .] The secrets [. . .] of their conscience [. . .] they will bring to us. [. . .] And all will be happy, all the millions of creatures except the hundred thousand who rule over them. [. . .] There will be thousands of millions of happy babes, and a hundred thousand sufferers who have taken upon themselves the curse of the knowledge of good and evil. Peacefully they will die, peacefully they will expire in Thy name, and beyond the grave they will find nothing but death. ([521/308])

The last fact mentioned, the differences between human beings in their closeness to the spirit, is the root of evil in governance. The reason is that the strong, who as the novelist presents them are called to follow Christ, become masters over the others by “correcting” Christ’s work and blocking their way to God, a way they were not strong enough to take on their own. But in order to make their life bearable, they consciously mislead them in the direction of evil. In the name of God, they pretend that the way they represent is the path to salvation. Thus the masters take the mystery upon themselves along with its unexplained horror: that not all people may participate in salvation by the free decision of their heart, that in their distance from God, they must destroy each other, and that the elect, in order to secure happiness and peace in this world for the many, become evil in order to be able to govern. The “Grand Inquisitor” concludes with this enigma: Christ approaches the old man in silence and kisses him on the lips. “That was all his answer. The old man shuddered. His
lips moved. He went to the door, opened it, and said to Him: 'Go, and come no more . . . come not at all, never, never!' And he let Him out into the dark alleys of the town. The Prisoner went away“ (527/311).

§20. We have viewed the problem of the evil of governance, where there is disharmony between the rulers and the ruled, from the standpoint of the ruled. This took two forms: principle disagreement with the ruler’s realization of spirit, and disagreement with the particular spirit the ruler chooses to realize. Dostoevsky, on the other hand, analyzes the evil aspect of governance as it is experienced by the ruler because of his knowledge of the disharmony between his actions as ruler and the communal life as intended by God. The terms Dostoevsky uses to describe the proper life, the free decision, the freely chosen *imitatio Christi* as a direct result of the spirituality emanating from Christ’s person and independence of conscience, come together in the requirement that the human being should be at one with himself and therewith at one with God. He should meditate on the essential, for, by nature, the human being is anchored in God. If all human beings lived so forthrightly before themselves and God, they would be joined together only through this one common experience of belonging to the same humankind, which Christ has come to redeem. “Know that I too have been in the wilderness, I too have lived on roots and locusts, I too prized the freedom with which Thou hast blessed men, and I too was striving to stand among Thy elect, among the strong and powerful, thirsting ‘to make up the number’“ (521/308). A *communitas sanctorum* is assumed, the membership in which is the goal of life, to the extent that life’s goal relates to community. But within this community everyone is on his own, and to subject oneself to another would—conscious of the evil one does—amounts to leading another person astray, and thus to becoming evil oneself. This notion is reminiscent of a passage in Nietzsche’s later work where Zarathustra sends his disciples away and bids them to deny him.
The reflection is [thus] limited to that spiritual content of human existence belonging to its most intimate core and is essentially solitary. The existential experience of being-with-oneself and thereby not just being-with-oneself, but with God, constitutes the primordial experiences \([jene\ originär\ geben-den]\) we mentioned earlier that take the human being radically out of all social contexts and, in leading him to a sphere that transcends the ego, open the soul. The solitary core is viewed as that which alone is spiritually essential to the human being. Compared to it all spiritual contents found in historical community fade into the nonessential, so that, in principle, out of the functions of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, a spiritual community cannot exist at all. There are historical periods in which the experience of the essential nature of the autonomous decision causes the experiences of participating in a community to pale into insignificance. The narrowing down of the spirit to the existential decision eliminates the possibility of participatory realizations. Kant’s state based on the individual’s moral autonomy creates a similar situation, and he had great difficulty defining the nature and the possibility of the ruler in a community under external laws (i.e., the state). He was compelled to supplement the theory of the state with the doctrine of the invisible church, with God as the overlord according to internal laws, in relation to which the state emerges as a sensual structure of less value. Below we will have occasion to address the problems that arise out of the conflict between freedom and governance in the secularized sphere of natural law.

Wolters’s theory of governance and service introduces us to a different spiritual realm. He also views the ruler as the spiritually stronger individual who becomes the center of his realm by virtue of his superior strength. But the essence of the spirit lies, not in the individual’s free decision, which isolates him from his environment, but in the super-personal contents that engender society, grasped by the master and passed on to those who serve. While the theory of evil explicates the extreme
differences between the existential constitutions of the rulers and the ruled, the theory of the spiritual empire attempts to explain, despite all the differences between the ruler and the ruled, their relative equality in relationship to the spirit in which, and out of which, they live. The ruler, too, is the spirit’s servant and thereby an example of how to serve to those who serve him.

The exalted mediators who, at the portals of the eternal, turn around in order to return to teach mankind the joy [they have experienced] have always made their own lives into icons of service. Whether it be Krishna or the ascetic Buddha who show the spiritual Indian the path, or the toiling Hercules, who shows the sensual Greek the way, or the suffering Jesus, who bears witness to the inner path for the soul of the Christian, the spiritual deed of these suffering redeemers is the clear separation of the highest of the human being from his lowest, and the titanic struggle to unite them again within the soul of every human being. The greatest and most beautiful—who dares to doubt it—become their god’s humblest servants in order to generate within themselves the infinite yearning and, in spite of all their torments, to let this yearning flow back into the infinite stream. And as these [suffering redeemers] are in their world-embracing circles, so is the ruler in each ring of the spiritual realm the purest primal image of the servant, who turns the divine fire burning in him into a star of his heaven. The intense fire of his own work transports that which he loves most into the sublime sphere. With the humility of a son, as the creature of the sublime creator, he takes himself back [from his creator] to again, with the full ardor of his love, hasten back to god.57

What the act and habit of service to God on the ruler’s part, and of service to the ruler on the servant’s part, have in common is embedded in the profound difference between the existential constitutions of servant and ruler. The one is in immediate proximity to God and spirit, the other distant and only joined to God through mediation. For Wolters, as for Necker, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky, the issue of governance becomes

57. Wolters, *Herrschaft und Dienst*, 58–59. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
topical with the question of freedom, the problem of our time. Wolters concludes that freedom and equality made good sense as long as the former denoted the person’s right to political self-determination and co-determination, and the latter denoted the equality of persons before the community’s acknowledged right to coerce, to equality before the law. Once the struggle for these ideas had lost its original civic significance, the concept of equality was extended to include all existential rights \([\text{Lebensrechte}]\) and the extreme foolishness of the equality of all spirits; the concept of freedom was distorted into the denial of any need for spiritual subordination and of any rights for the spiritually superior. The blood vessels of the body of humanity have been cut by exaggeration and distortion, eliminating the differences between acting and becoming, making and enjoying, and between ruling and serving. “The vessels regulating the upward and downward flow of vital fluids have been cut.” The great differences between souls were destroyed, the world leveled and made manageable for everyone; human beings became “objective,” which means soft and jellylike, permeable for everything. They became “individual” \([“\text{einzeln}”]\), which means they became the measure of their own values and shrank without noticing it. This lamentable state of affairs can only be remedied by building a new empire out of a new power in accordance with the laws and ranks of the spirit. “Governance is that power which spreads light from its living center, unconcerned about any judgment but that of its inmost God and concentrating on the task of establishing its rule. In stamping its members and powers with the imprint of its nature, it defines the form of the spiritual empire for its epoch \([\text{Kreislauf ihrer Zeit}]\) \([8]\). Very much in the manner of Dostoevsky, Wolters describes the strong and powerful person who is called to rule. He is responsible for the free decision that determines his actions and the outstanding characteristic that distinguishes him from those who serve, is his indifference to others’ judgment. He heeds only his inmost self, where it unites with God \([\text{dort wo es Gott ist}]\). But act and decision are
not confined to himself; he is not a being turned away from the surrounding world and only open to a super-ego. Instead he extends power to other human beings, giving them form and changing them as he creates the spiritual empire. This power draws everything into its train and allows no one to remain outside. It is typically “evil” in that it subjugates everyone, including those who would want something entirely different.

For spiritual leadership tolerates no other image or nature to exist on an equal footing with the empire. Though it have to contend with the resistance of a heritage and its valuable treasures, it will countenance no coat of arms but its own and do combat with the thirst of one who does not rest until all that is noble in the world has been brought under the shield of its blood. Or, it expresses its disgust for the rubble of an anarchical time and tirelessly fights destructive powers in order to create a free field for its pure grain. It takes mountain and building, works that have been sculptured, dug out of the earth, hammered in foundries, etched and painted; it takes voice and tune, gesture and dream and deed, and compels them to burn in its flame until it sees its meaning imposed on them and they are created in its spirit. Thus the empire forms itself in the image of the ruler-ship that is conceived and born by the ruler himself. (9 ff.)

The ruler creates and sustains the empire with the force of his spiritual deed and defines new contents that form the spiritual structure of the empire. This is accomplished by “inherent force,” independent of whether the ruler administers traditional goods or must create them himself and “independent of what material, used or new, is transformed in his fire—faith or clay, state or stone, language or number” (11). The essence of governance is firmly grasped in two closely related ways: as governance [Herrschaft] and as governing [Herrschen]. The inherent governance, of the “sovereignty of content,” and the charismatic human being are united in the ruler’s “inherent drive,” which contains the valid elements—the mania [Bessenheit]—and is the enchantment [Zauber] binding those who serve. “Thus the ruler is the force that performs the spiritual deed. The deeper the deed’s unity, the more sublime its
effect. And although the unity of human things is not necessarily linked to a corporeal unity, for something divine can also bind a plurality of human beings, nevertheless, the highest possibility remains that in one human being the ruler is born [in Einem Menschen der Herrscher sich gebiert]” (11). How this birth takes place, about the act of “intuition” as we analyzed it above, nothing can be said. “About the state of ultimate communion between a soul and divinity, no human tongue can speak, for the state is unlimited and cannot be expressed in an image.” The communion itself is mute; words can only describe the path that leads to it and the condition that follows upon having been shaken by God. “But words cannot touch or express the essence of the fulfillment that remains the impenetrable mystery of every intuition, conception, and creation” (53). Thus revelation can never become a secret doctrine, but only a theory of the preparation that takes place in a heart that has been transformed in a supreme experience. It creates out of its continuous love in order to draw all that is human, and what it feels to be a part of its and eternity's being, into the joy of its sacred stream and thus transforms all that is merely external into the soul’s ardor. We do not serve God as the result of mediation, however great the historical tradition, nor by dogma, nor by other mysterious sources of churches and castes. Rather it is in the outpouring of a state of the soul that we feel ourselves at one with God. (54)

If the ruler’s force and the powers that emanate from him are won in an arduous journey that leads to communion with deity, the servant takes a path no less difficult to achieve an enduring relationship of service. It begins with the initial contact with the magic of the ruler and proceeds to union with him and thence to the enduring condition of serving. Wolters defines this service as the sum of feelings and actions “which a soul inspired and filled by the nature of the ruler cannot but bring forth and overflow with in abundance” (54). The servant’s path passes through four stages before he achieves the enduring state of fulfillment. These steps are piety, veneration,
self-surrender, and communion. Piety must again become the foundation and beginning of all education in an era, when souls are closed by the obscurities of the ideas of freedom and equality to the point of being ignorant of all higher things. In order to prepare the pure inner powers of the soul for the reception of the spirit, piety must once again become “the pupil’s natural state, the teacher must feel it toward his values, it must inform the master before he contemplates divinity” (56). Great ideas can only exist in a pure heart and in the pious trembling of the soul. Only out of the humility that feels the beauty and greatness of the spirit that both is in us and transcends us springs the power for our deeds and the deed itself. The one who has grown pious in contemplation of that which is greater than he can prepare to rise to the second stage, of veneration through sublime emotion and chaste enjoyment. The moment will come when the pious soul is moved by one of the powers emanating from the ruler, and he will take hold of it, open himself and feel strength and joy “as though the soul had suddenly won its way to a secure haven. Such a soul pushes passionately forward and seeks in each of the ruler’s works a new experience of awe, a deeper knowledge of the undreamed of, which tempts and attracts as no lips can. The soul seeks a further unfolding of the promise that he has felt. Sometimes it falls, light as a blossom into his open hands; at other times it stubbornly resists the soul’s deepest desires like a granite wall” (57). One cannot achieve chaste and earnest enjoyment on one’s own. It requires constant reflection and the exercise of the receptive powers in order to understand the full richness of spiritual works. “Even if a work is only difficult because a strong spirit hurls himself with all of his might into the depths of creation, into the emptiness of the eternal in order to bring up an image, these forces dare not flag, they must intensify their acquisition of knowledge and increase their receptivity, so that, in the moment when the purest will is wed to the strongest hour, the soul is granted the clear and lucid fashioning of the image even of the darkest mystery” (58).
But this enjoyment is spiritually inadequate if it is satisfied with itself and proud of its refined capacity for receptivity so that it considers its purpose fulfilled when it understands the most difficult things. Enjoyment must dissolve in veneration, which melts pride, and experience intellectual understanding as the birth of its own forces, as an enrichment and a gift for which praise is due to the creator, with no envious sidelong glance and without hurt vanity that it is the creator who has produced such gifts and bestowed them on his servant. Only when the dangers inherent in the petty ego are overcome is the pious individual ready to undergo self-surrender, in which he learns to cherish the joy of service “that is found in the world’s dreadful scales as the eternal balance to the joy of ruling” (§8). The farther the servant is from the ruler, the greater the desire for self-surrender grows. It is not a loss of one’s own powers, nor a loss of self, but the opening of the soul to the master’s spirit; it is the “feeling of being touched to the innermost cell where germination takes place, and of release from the deadly dungeon of the smallest spiritual indivisibility, that of the individuum infecundum [the barren individual]” (§9). Only in unreserved self-sacrifice to that which is higher does the soul gain freedom to receive the ruler. Without the servant’s broad, open, receptive soul, the ruler’s spiritual deed would be released into a void and, finding no receptive soul, would die on its own. The spirit’s living cycle proceeds from master to servant and back again, beginning at the moment “when the ruler’s giving chalice senses the servant’s deep thirst, the growing desire of the inferior for that which is higher, that is the moment when the higher descends in order to fulfill [the servant’s longing]. This marks the fourth state of communion, in which the ‘equilibrium of the dreadful scales’ is attained and the servant becomes the spiritual empire’s son” (§60). In the finite communion the servant’s spirit experiences the most intense joy, even though it lasts but a fraction of a second. We can say no more about this communion than about the communion between the ruler and divinity. It fills the person who experiences it with the spiritual
essence of governance; it transforms him into a member of the empire and brings his entire internal and external being into a deep, unshakable relationship with the ruler. Thus the servant attains the highest rank, that of enduring service.

The theory of “governance and service” developed by Wolters, based on the person of [Stefan] George and on his circle, with George’s works and ideas serving as his model, is the most comprehensive of those we have analyzed. It offers an inventory of core problems that require little more than minor additions. The fundamental state of the human being, from which the powers of governance emanate, is the human being’s openness to divinity. This openness makes possible the moment of communion and, through this moment, the spiritual deed and the divinely filled life of the ruler. The analysis faithfully follows the structure of the dialectical theme of the constitution of existence that begins with the self-given-ness \( \text{[die Selbstgebung]} \) of the human being as a being open to transcendence and then, in objectifying terminology, differentiates the sphere of transcendent divinity from that of immanent existence. Any type of revelation or dogmatic secret doctrine is energetically rejected. Just as for Descartes meditation is presented as a way that leads to fundamental existential experiences, here too theory marks out the same path. Parallel to this Wolters reflects on the servant. He too needs a path that lays out in detail the steps that lead to communication, not with divinity, but with the ruler. Concerning the communion of the servant with the ruler, no more could be said than was possible concerning the communion of the ruler with divinity. “The possibilities of communion are as numerous as the differences between those who experience it, and nothing else can be said about any of them but that communion fills the one who experiences it with the essence of governance and transforms him; so that, thereafter, all internal experiences and external expressions of his life take place in an unshakable relationship to governance” (60). The moment of communion is followed by the enduring state of being moved and inspired.

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by the law of the spirit that orders one’s life. The ruler is the human being whose exceptional constitution enables him to commune with divinity and bring forth the spiritual deed. He is filled with unending love for his fellow human beings and with the desire to let others participate in the good fortune that is his lot. The extension of the ruler’s power over the servant and the creation of an empire is not achieved against the individual’s will, but is the result of loving communication and an embrace that touches the essential core of the weaker partner and wakens his powers and inspires him with a burning passion to attain the highest goals he can reach. Service is not subjection to an incomprehensible external power, but an opening of the soul and spirit in piety and understanding to the point of surrender in which the servant wins back himself, strengthened, inspired, and able to let the best in him come to fruition.

Wolters undertakes the thematic change within the dialectical field in a way exactly the opposite of Spann’s. The latter took the sovereignty of content as his starting point and found the source of government in the validity of an objective content to be realized by the rulers, exceptional people who, with the power of intuition, are capable of grasping the valid content and who are therefore society’s leaders and authorities. [Spann did not touch upon the problem of those who are ruled.] Wolters, on the other hand, views human beings primarily in their roles as rulers or servants. Those who make up the empire understand that “powers” must emanate from the ruler and, equally, that the servant must open himself to these powers in order to be able to lead the life that corresponds to his spiritual rank. From here Wolters goes on to describe the “spiritual deed,” the content of governance, that becomes reality in the “communion” (in Spann it was “intuition”) between the ruler and the ruled. A concept like the “spiritual deed” (the “means by which the blood is symbolized in the spirit” and the “creation of a world”) points to the fact that we are dealing with a work, the unity of which permits no separation or analysis.
into parts. For here the finitude of the space-time continuum, and the conditions of the blood, are joined to the spirit that transcends existence. “Here we gently touch upon the mystery that, in the unity of the creative spirit, matters at the level of the space-time continuum do not reach into the last conditions of humanity. And this mystery touches us in every work that the ruler has the courage to lift—as lift it he must—from the mothers’ creative womb” (111). Of this transcendent realm we know nothing but that which has been raised into reality by the work, i.e., that which has gone through the finitude of human existence. The power of the ruler is that of his own being as well as that of a transcendent being, whether it be the womb of the mothers or the objective spirit. Up to this point Wolters has explicitly addressed the nature of governance.

The series of problems discussed are supplemented by others at which he only hints. The ruler’s love reaches out in all directions to embrace those who serve, but is harsh and merciless and tolerates no other love at its side. It forces into its service all that comes within its purview, imposing its stamp on human beings as well as on things. It is “evil,” as all governance is, because, being powerful, it imposes its law upon the times and destroys all spirit that is not its own. Governance is not the solitary living out of a human existence that in moments of intuition has received the law of its course; it means, rather, being the center for other human beings and imparting spirit to life that on its own is too weak to receive it from divinity directly. We become conscious of the state of affairs—which so deeply troubled Dostoevsky and which cannot be further analyzed—that, for reasons unknown to us, the human beings we find in the world of experience manifest very different levels of the powers of soul and spirit. For Wolters (who follows George here), the chiliastic problem is deliberately ignored as provincial speculation that belongs outside the circle of his study. He confines himself to the state of the matter as it presents itself in our contemporary situation, in which human beings of various spiritual dignity live side by side, and asks:
What is right action, what structure should society have, what is the good life under these conditions? The place of the human being in the larger context of the world and history and the problem of death are not questions that occasion any troubled reflection in him, no more than he is concerned with the course of humanity as a whole.

For Wolters, the ruler and those who serve are united in the single unity of the body of the empire. Service is not a spiritless carrying out of orders but the condition in which the servant knows with certainty that, “by helping to bring perfection to the larger [mystical] body, he also liberates and raises his own essential nature” (60).

§21. The analysis here follows exactly the thematic pattern we sketched above in the formula of the partial realizations of the commonly held spiritual whole through acts of command and obedience. Governance is the partial realization of the spirit by the spiritual deed that springs from direct communion [with divinity]. Service is the partial realization of the spirit through the pious veneration of the ruler’s deed and the opening of one’s life to receive spiritual fulfillment. The pure realization of the pattern is materially determined by the orientation of the analysis to the person of the poet and of his mode of work, the creation of closed works and their capacity to transform the souls and spirits of spiritually related persons. In contrast to Necker, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky, who underlined the theme of the instrumentalization of governance as a part of its activity in the modern state, Wolters did not consider it at all. We want to take up this aspect here again, for it rounds out our outline of the problems of governance. With the state’s institutional character, the structure of the spiritual connection between rulers and ruled essentially becomes a mediated relationship. There is no spiritual content that affects both types of existential constitution in their entirety in the same way and reaches into the most intimate levels of the person. The typical actions of governance—protecting, leading, helping, arbitrating—are instrumental for the entire
range of existential contents of the life of the ruled, outside
the relationship of governance as such. Thus, in all three of the
thinkers just named we find the need for “security” ["Geborgenheit"]
identified as the outstanding characteristic of the
ruled. Far from any issues of governance, the subject leads his
own narrow life; he is the spirit and morals of his estate, a
happy child living under the protection of gentle and, at the
same time, strong legal and moral conditions, etc. Nietzsche,
especially, distinguishes very clearly between the social and
cultural sphere, with its slave existences and its human be-
ings of spiritual genius, from the world of power and conquest,
which is merely the instrument of the culture producing social
process. This notion of the instrumentality of power is the
starting point for all theories that find the essential and valu-
able aspects of human life in the apolitical sphere and contrast
these to the less valuable content of the political. In various
forms this theory justifies the state’s existence solely in terms
of its “service” to society, all the way up to the extreme po-
sition that limits the state to the function of a “night watch-
man.” The idea of the corporate state also takes the notion of
instrumentality as its starting point. The “state” itself is one
of the estates, that of the political leaders. Here, almost more
emphatically than in the night watchman theory, the rigorous
separation of the ruling estate’s personnel from the masses not
belonging to it more clearly identifies the nongovernmental
spheres of existence and contrasts them to the functions of
governance. These remarks foreshadow the numerous compli-
cations involved in the theory of the state, which we will have
to unravel. On the one hand, both the rulers and the ruled
belong to the state (or at least to a unity that was tradition-
ally so named). On the other hand, the nonformal content of
governance is understood to be a mere instrument, spiritually
inferior to the more extensive apolitical spheres of life. Yet, at
the same time, the sphere of governmental acts has developed
its own conceptual structure [Formsprache], namely, that of
the forms of the state in which, without any suggestion of
a mere instrumental relationship to the apolitical forms, is understood to have its own laws of equal dignity to those of any other spiritual sphere.

§ 22. Since the time of the French Revolution, from Necker to Wolters, the theory of governance, in all its variations and depths, has been consistently developed in opposition to the doctrine of freedom and equality. From the seventeenth century and the bourgeois natural law theory, down to the end of its heritage in liberal and socialist natural rights doctrines of our time, political theory has developed as part of the political struggle against traditional forms of governance, indeed against any form of governance, and it has therefore neglected to survey the full range of the problems involved. Its ideal has been the society of equal citizens without the need for rulers, a notion most purely and thoroughly worked out by Kant. Only in recent decades have attempts been made to reintroduce the theory of governance into the problem of the theory of the state, whose topics had been narrowed down to those determined by the political ideals of liberalism. Therefore we will outline here, at least in the form of a short sketch, the range of the problem of governance as it existed in the sixteenth century under the influence of classical authors, before it was destroyed by the rising bourgeoisie's opposition to governance. We will see that the essential features of the problem were very much the same then as they are now, only that they were not expressed in the terminology of an ontology of human existence; this only emerged with the emotional and spiritual person who developed under the aegis of bourgeois culture. This sketch orients itself on La Boëtie's *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude* and Elyot's *Boke named the Governour*. In

58. Étienne de La Boëtie, *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, suivi du Memoire Touchant l’edit de Janvier 1562*, ed. Bonnefon, *Collection des Chef-d’œuvres méconnus* (Paris, 1922). Probably written in 1548; a number of posthumous editions since 1574. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]

both of these treatises we find the same extremes that were themes in Dostoevsky’s “Grand Inquisitor” and in Wolters’s theory of governance—the evil of governance and the need to explain the fact that, on the one hand, although human beings are aware of this evil they voluntarily enter into servitude, and, on the other, the theme—taken from the tradition of Platonic-Aristotelian thought—of the state as a whole and the reciprocal relationships in which the rulers and the ruled need and complement each other.

The Discourse on Voluntary Servitude has been given the subtitle Against the One because it begins with [the author’s] amazement at the existence of governance, since, in a tyranny, thousands and tens of thousands of dominated stand facing one individual, the ruler, the tyrant, a man like any other, who has no other power than what his subjects give him. He could do nothing with them if they did not consent to bear it. He could do no evil if his subjects chose to resist instead of suffering it. It is amazing to see millions and millions bear the fate of servitude “not because they are constrained by a greater force, but because they are somehow enchanted and charmed by the very name of the one whose power they need not fear, since he is alone; nor have they reason to love him, since his treatment of them is inhuman and savage” (51). Here the idea of being magically controlled is mentioned briefly but is not used to cast more light on the problem. The investigation is confined to the question of how what is incomprehensible and without basis can become reality, how great masses of human beings subject themselves to the command of one individual. Were it only one or two individuals who obeyed, we could believe that they did so out of fear or cowardice; but cowardice on the part of millions and fear for one individual? “But, by their nature, all vices have a limit that they cannot overstep” (53). Especially in view of the fact that it requires no particular effort to liberate oneself from servitude, involves no dangerous struggle, no heroic deed, merely the simple act of refusing to obey, which is not resistance but only declining to cooperate any
longer in the game of domination and letting oneself be dominated. “What if, in order to gain freedom, all that is needed is to wish it, if all that is needed is to simply will it” (56). La Boétie’s questions and arguments are the eternal arguments of the radical anarchic faith in the life of the person in solitude, in the destruction of governance by the refusal to obey, in the destruction of power by passive resistance in which Tolstoy believed and which Gandhi taught. One simply refuses to serve the ruler any longer: “If they are not obeyed at all, without combat, without blows, they are left naked and defeated, and they are nothing at all” (57).

La Boétie thinks clearly, lucidly, and passionately, but not deeply. His Discourse is the work of an eighteen-year-old and not a product of actual experience; nor does it manifest the early expression of a remarkable emotional or spiritual destiny—it is an intelligent dissertation, the result of the study of the classics, sustained more by a youthful enthusiasm for freedom than by a firm understanding of it. It is an essay on a set theme and prudently avoids such difficult questions as the author’s own attitude to the realities of the French state, which he sees all around him. He does not take the idea of the destruction of governance by passive resistance to its ultimate consequences. Instead he sketches a picture of a peaceful social setting, such as God and nature intended, to replace the conditions obtaining under the evil rule of government. Equipped with the laws and lessons nature gives us, we would live in obedience to our parents, subject only to reason and servants to no one. Stemming perhaps from his own experience, obedience to father and mother appears to him to be an issue beyond doubt. Subjection to reason is a little more doubtful and an object of controversy among scholars. Completely beyond doubt is the fact that nature, “le ministre de Dieu” [“God’s cabinet minister”] has cast us all in the same mold so that we might acknowledge ourselves comrades and brothers. The earth has been given to us all as a common dwelling. We have all been created on the same pattern, and, finally, we have been
endowed with a voice and language that we may forge the most intimate ties and, through a common and mutual exchange of thoughts, we may enjoy “une communion de nos volontés” [“a communion of our wills”]. Although nature, as she distributed her bounties, did not provide equally for all but favored the one over the other in body or mind, still she did not send the stronger and more intelligent into the woods as armed bandits to prey upon the weak. Instead, she intended to provide space for the development of brotherly affection, “for some have the power to give aid, and others, the need to receive it” (61).

How is it possible that these people, whom nature has “tous mis en compagnie” [“brought together as companions”], could slip into serfdom, and how can governance maintain itself, if all that is needed to do away with it is the exercise of willpower on the part of the ruled? La Boétie seeks, and finds, the reasons for this state of affairs in motives that lie outside the sphere we identified as essential for governance, obedience for the sake of obedience. The first cause of voluntary servitude is habit—he who was born into this state and has lived with it for a certain length of time becomes so accustomed to it that he no longer resists it. But this would be primarily the condition of the common folk, because, for the rest, “there will always be some, better born than others, who will feel the weight of the yoke and who cannot but shake it off. [. . .] These, were liberty totally lost and banished from this world, would imagine it and feel it in their spirit and still taste it, and servitude would not be to their taste, regardless of how well it might be dressed up” (75). The palliatives of “bread and circuses,” richly documented by Boétie with examples from classical antiquity, are likewise aimed at the lower classes. But for both the common people and the more refined, governance relies on religion for support: “Even the tyrants found it rather strange that men would stand for a man using religion as a bodyguard and, if possible, borrow some trappings of divinity to safeguard their wicked lives” (86). But all of this would not suffice if there were not an organization of beneficiaries of tyranny, extending from
the highest circle around the ruler himself down to the lower-
most organs of governance, the palace guards and warriors, a
hierarchy built on material interests that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to uproot: “It has always been the case that five or
six men had the tyrant’s ear [. . . ] so they could be accomplices
in his cruelties, companions of his pleasures, procurers of his
voluptuous excesses, and sharers in his pillage. These six so
cleverly pander to their master that, because of this society, it
is inevitable that he be wicked, not only on account of his own
wickedness, but on account of theirs” (90). And this hierarchy
gathers momentum like an avalanche: Each of the six has six
hundred men behind him whose livelihood depends on him,
and these six hundred command another six thousand, “whom
they have raised to prominence, on whom they confer either
the government or management of provinces in order to keep
their avarice and cruelty under control and whom they will
execute at an appropriate time and that they commit moreover
so many villainies that they cannot last except under their
shadow and cannot escape laws and punishment but by their
means” (90). A large retinue brings up the rear, and he who
would make the effort to trace all the branches of the system
would find millions “qui par cette corde tiennent au tyran”
[“who are tied to the tyrant by this cord”]. The entire mass of
people is at his disposal who, driven by ambition and greed,
crowd about him in order to get their share of the booty and to
become petty tyrants under the tyrant. This is how the tyrant
subjugates his people, using one to subjugate another, and if his
creatures have to suffer under him, they put up with it, because
in turn they can heap injuries on others who stand lower than
they do.

La Boétie’s thoughts are not deep, he presents them super-
ficially one after another, letting their variety illuminate his
themes. From the ancient republics’ love of freedom, La Boétie
derives his image of the tyrant and the problem of oppression
and servitude, which he follows quite far into the technical
aspect of the organization of power. But he does not follow it
far enough to make the essence of all power clear. The tyrant is not the ruler as such, but the wicked ruler. La Boétie’s analysis avoids focusing on kingship, and especially on French kings. It therefore appears that an organization of power is possible which, at root, is not evil and which does not involve the servitude of its subjects. But neither is this idea followed far enough by La Boétie to produce a sketch of the just state. He is satisfied with a description of a state of affairs in which the foundation laid by family relationships is overlaid with a stratum of relationships that have their roots in a divinely willed inequality of men: Family and brotherly community are positive social categories (oriented here on the Aristotelian-scholastic theory of the state); the “true” community is anarchic. Finally, the sketch of the tyrant’s accomplices appears to stem from the reality of the French state. For even if La Boétie’s social structure is set forth as typically tyrannical and criminal, nevertheless the formal hierarchy of the masters, ranging from the royal pinnacle down through the expanding ranks of the nobles to the governors and their subordinates, is a simplified sketch of the feudal order. La Boétie mentions “raison,” but in his elaboration of the state structure, he carefully avoids discussing its function.

§23. Unlike La Boétie’s Discourse, which touches on peripheral themes of governance but fails to address the central problem, Elyot’s Governour attempts to describe the essence of governance and obedience and of the reciprocal corresponding need that ruler and servant have of one another. He does not discuss custom, games, and religious pretexts, nor material interests as a motive of governance. Instead he takes—beginning in the preface, addressed to Henry VIII—the Platonic ruler as the model for his investigation, and this model leads him directly to the distinction between common weale and public weale that plays such a crucially important role in the history of British political ideas. In contrast to other authors, and with an uncommon use of the term, he prefers public weale to common weale as the correct translation of res publica. He points

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out that the word public is derived from populus (the people), and populus refers to the sum total of the inhabitants of an empire or city, regardless of social rank or economic position. Commonaltie and commoners, however, are translations for plebs and plebeii, which denote the masses of the lower ranks of the people, those who enjoy no status or honor. An assembly in the countryside in which no gentlemen are present is said to be only a gathering of the commonaltie. Hence the expression common weale is a translation of the Latin term res plebeia. This term would only make sense for a community that actually consisted wholly of plebeians. On the other hand, public weale may be defined as “a body lyuyng, compacte or made of sondry astates and degrees of men, whiche is disposed by the ordre of equite, and gouerned by the rule and moderation of reason.” It is a living body made up of the various estates and ranks of human beings and ordered in accordance with merit and reason.

For Elyot, the social order based on the classification of men according to their various estates is an aspect of the hierarchy of the cosmos itself. In all of His glorious works God has established differences of rank—in inorganic nature the hierarchy of the elements (fire, air, water, earth); above this, the ordered world of plants and animals; and, finally, the realm of mankind, for whose use the entire rest of nature has been created. The classification of the realms of being is that of classical antiquity and Christianity, which we still accept today (cf., for instance, Scheler’s Man’s Place in the Cosmos), even though the details of the pattern are elaborated differently in different historical periods and by different thinkers. At the culminating point of the systematization of natural law, Kant assumed, just as Elyot had 250 years earlier, that the entire realm of nature below the human being had been given to him for his use. Kant concluded

60. Ibid., 1. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
61. Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos [Darmstadt, 1928].
further that the human being may not use another human being as a means to an end in the way the rest of nature serves humankind as means. The most important reasons for Kant’s sharp division in the hierarchy of being, which separates the human sphere from the sphere below it, are the natural science and mathematical conception of nature, which we already find fully developed by Descartes in whom it leads to a similarly sharp division, and Kant’s own peculiar legal way of thinking, which divides the world’s entities into persons and things. A hundred years before it became fashionable for physics to overstep the boundaries of its discipline and determine our view of nature as a whole, and prior to the juridical elaboration of the idea of equality, Elyot still conceives of the world as a unity subject to the same type of organization in all of its parts, i.e., subject to classification according to ranks of value. Humans, too, are subject to this law, and “therfore hit appereth that god gyueth nat to every man like gyftes of grace, or of nature, but to some more, some lesse, as it liketh his diuine maiestie” [4].

Understanding is the gift that distinguishes man from the rest of creation, and it is this faculty that essentially distinguishes human beings from one another. The human being comes closest to God through understanding. He who has more understanding than others is, therefore, closer to God and deserves a higher social rank. As soon as this point is firmly established, Elyot’s thought, which is informed by that of Plato and Aristotle, proceeds along the same structural lines of the theme we have developed. The nature of understanding is examined more closely and defined as the knowledge of beginnings and of origins. Here, expressed in the language of his time, we find the theory of intuition, which sets the ruler off from the ruled. He is near to God; his charismatic gifts grant him knowledge of what to do when action is necessary; for that reason it is his vocation to lead his fellow human beings. Elyot distinguishes meticulously between understanding in the narrower sense of the term, which is concerned with “the begynnynge or originall causes of thynges” [277], and wit, which finds the
means of execution, and *prudence*, which guides action once the decision to take it has been made. He repeatedly defines the starting point of this series in greater detail as that “wherin, before any mater taken in hande, the mynde and thought is occupied, and that a man sercheth, and doughteth whether it be to be entreprised, and by what waye, and in what tyme it is to be executed” (277). The inequality among human beings and the knowledge thereof must not lead the ruler to forget that as a being made up of body and soul he is equal to the most humble of his subjects. Body and soul constitute the absolute personal core [*Eigene*] of every human being, and just governance forbears to encroach upon either. A personal core is delimited here by means of which all human beings are equally joined to God—“of no better claye (as I mought frankly saye) is a gentilman made than a carter, and of libertie of wille, as moche is gyuen of god to the poore herdeman, as to the great and mighty emperour” (202–3). The doctrine of equality is the necessary complement to that of inequality, embracing both the structure of governance and obedience. By itself the doctrine of inequality would lead to a doctrine of pure power that could not explain how the ruler and the ruled share a common ground and how the acts of governance and obedience are partial realizations of a common whole. On the other hand, by itself, the theory of equality would be incapable of explaining the phenomenon of governance. It could only conclude that one of the equal human beings unjustly subjugates the others, and that such a power relationship would be incapable of producing a common whole. This theory of a community of simultaneously equal and unequal individuals is extraordinarily simple and goes a long way, if not the entire way, to mastering the problem of governance. In its foundations it closely resembles Wolters's theory.

Once the core of this theory has been established, the following questions arise: 1) What would happen if human beings simply lived alongside one another without governance? 2) Why do those, who are called to govern, consent actually
to do so? If the rulers, i.e., those individuals whose superior understanding raises them above other human beings, did not assume positions of leadership over their fellow human beings, all would live in a state of war and the physically stronger would force the others to obey him. Elyot very energetically argues against those well-meaning simpletons who believe that in a state of anarchy human beings would be able to live next to one another in peace.

Without gouernaunce and lawes the persones moste stronge in body shulde by violence constraigne them that be of lasse strength and weaker to labour as bondemen or slaues for their sustinaunce and other necessaries, the stronge men beinge without labour or care. Than were all our equalitie dasshed, and finally as bestes sauage the one shall desire to slee another. I omitte continuall manslaughters, rauisshementes, aduoutries and enormities horrible to reherce, whiche (gouernaunce lackynge) muste nedes of necessitie ensue, except these euangelicall persones coulde perswade god or compelle him to chaunge men in to aungels, makinge them all of one disposition and confirminge them all in one fourme of charitie. (205)

Governance, i.e. the leadership of those with less understanding by those with superior understanding, is salvation from the state of servitude and mutual destruction. It is just when it fulfills the fundamental commandments of reason, society, and knowledge. Elyot formulates the commandment of reason in a manner that we find later in English social philosophy and that expresses the essential content of the categorical imperative: The commandment to treat my fellow human being as I would wish my fellow human beings to treat me. It is a simpler version of the maxim that I should act in such a manner that the maxims of my actions might become a universal law, or—applied to the state—that the true ruler should not pass any laws that the subjects might not have legislated for themselves. There can be no doubt about the meaning of this maxim, since Elyot expressly illustrates it with an example taken from classical antiquity, that the ruler may not give laws to his subjects to which he does not consider himself equally
bound. The second commandment, that society enjoins the human being to love his neighbor as he loves himself, is based on the notion of a community held together by love. It is for the sake of love that rulers are willing to take governance upon themselves, to rule in the spirit of love and contribute their part to what is necessary for the realization of the community’s purpose. While the commandments of reason and society emphasize the aspect of equality, the third commandment, that of self-knowledge, introduces the concept of inequality within equality. Self-knowledge provides the ruler with insight into the structure of governance. As we analyzed it above, this is a community of beings who are equal in respect to body and soul but unequal in respect to their faculty of understanding and in their ability to decide what constitutes right action. The ruler realizes that the majesty and authority of his position weighs upon his shoulders like a heavy cloak that is difficult to bear. But as long as he wears it, the ruler should know that “the name of a soueraigne or ruler without actual gouernaunce is but a shadowe, that gouernaunce standeth nat by wordes onely, but principally by acte and example: that by example of gouernours men do rise or falle in vertue or vice. And, as it is said of Aristotell, rulers more greuously do sinne by example than by their acte. And the more they haue under their gouernaunce, the greater accounte haue they to rendre, that in their owne preceptes and ordenaunces they be nat founde negligent” (203). The ruler must lead by example; within the division of labor his task is to direct the affairs of governance. He must carry out the tasks allotted him, just like every other estate; and beyond that, he must adorn his person “with honourable maners and qualities, wherof very nobilitie is compacte; wherby all others shall be induced to honour hym, loue hym, and feare hym, whiche things chiefly do cause perfecte obedience” (121). The subjects render service to the ruler, in return for his service as teacher and leader, which he owes them. “Consider also that auctorite, beinge well and diligently used, is but a token of superioritie, but in very dede
The origin of the state is found in the voluntary surrender of freedom on the part of the one called to governance; the ruler presents himself as an example and norm for the life of his subjects. Of a Roman emperor Elyot writes: “As to hym was commytted the soueraigne gouernaunce of all the worlde, so wolde he be to all men the generall example of lyuinge” (263).

With this last reflection on the ruler as the center and norm of his subjects’ lives (which is the reason why the largest part of The Boke named the Governour is devoted to educating the model ruler, based on the paradigm of the Platonic state), Elyot penetrates to the core of the problem of governance, as it was not done again with equal clarity until Wolters—through Stefan George—found it again. The noble life and knowledge of the science of the state characterize the ruler. Overflowing with love he bends toward the less gifted human beings in order to give their lives purpose and meaning through his example, that they may imitate in service. With the splendor of governance he takes their burdens upon himself, he denies himself freedom in order to dedicate himself to serving those who serve. From the other side, in full knowledge of his weaker constitution, the servant strives with piety and obedience toward the center, happy in the fullness of life that he gains when he surrenders the freedom of a life without governance.

§24. After this look at the state of the problem of governance prior to the great natural-law theories, we are well advised to recall the principles guiding our investigation and the progress we have made thus far. The starting point of the theories we have analyzed is the state of affairs of commanding and obeying and the existence of the institution of the state. The questions that this state of affairs raises concern the nature of governance and obedience between persons, and that which the rulers and the ruled have in common, that binds them to one another. In order to answer these questions, we explained the structure of theories of governance, power, the personality of the ruler, the openness of human existence, the objective spirit, the nonfor-
mal validity of spiritual content, etc. As a matter of principle, the theory was able to take the acting persons for its terms. The discourse proceeded, either from the sphere transcending the person back to the person's immanent existence, from the nonformal content of the objective spirit to the authoritative actions of the leader, or it rose in the opposite direction, from the ruler as a world-immanent person toward the world of the spirit to which he is open and which he serves by realizing it in the sphere of existence; or the discourse followed the path from the ruling person to the dominated person and confronted the problem of the instrumentality of the ruler's acts and of the autonomous nature of political forms, or it sketched the type of the ruled in his protected sphere and proceeded from there toward the ruler and protector. In each case the discourse had to follow the structure of the theme and therefore to touch on the problem of what the ruler and the ruled have in common. This took the form that such common ground was disputed, in which case the problem of the rabble arose, or, to put it another way, the problem of those without spiritual orientation [Gottverlassene]. Or it took the form of affirming a common basis, and then the problem arose of degrees of spiritual proximity to God. It is not easy to connect these various aspects and to keep the theory consistent. Thus, for example with Elyot, who has so carefully characterized the aspects of equality and inequality, it is plain to see that the theory of the common ground, created by a “commandment of reason” in which the form of maxims for action must be universal, if taken to its logical conclusion, would conflict with the theory of inequality in the matter of the proximity to God, and so with the role of the ruler as example. Kant, who has followed the theory of equality to its last consequences, experiences the greatest difficulty in dealing with the problem of governance at all, and only succeeds in doing so by rendering his system logically inconsistent. These difficulties stem from the fact that the “substance” of the common ground is not given in direct observation.

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The common ground is obviously a fact that both those sharing it and those studying it cannot help but noticing. It is the starting point for speculation concerning governance, but it is not given directly in experience, rather only with the help of theoretical rationalizations, and the method of such theoretical structures alters with changes in manners and thinking. Today we would not try to grasp the common ground with a theory of reason or of the rational personality, since the differences between national types of mind are so patently obvious to us, and we describe them in terms of the psyche, of character, and of spiritual content. For Elyot, and in the centuries that followed, the unity of the nation was a fact of practical politics, but it did not become a theoretically recognized unity until the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth when the general leveling of estates gradually began to enter political theory in the form of the content of the national mind. Only in very recent times, in which the problem of governance has begun to be analyzed in terms of the existential constitution, has a conscious effort been made to understand the common whole that makes up the state, whatever it may consist of, as the source of power.

In the modern world of political states, the common whole, comprising the rulers and the ruled, whose partial realizations take place in acts of ruling and obeying, is called a “nation.” It is not our concern here to “define” what a nation is. We do not believe that we can approach the substance that creates community other than through the definitions in ideal types taken from the most varied perspectives; among these are propositions concerning the language of the groups and persons involved, their history, psychological types, spiritual products, etc. We will always find that the nation has its basis in human beings and can therefore, in principle, be described with reference to the physical and emotional features of the people who belong to it, or by the typical content of the spiritual objectifications of the group of people to be discussed as a nation, in other words, the “spirit” of the people. But the
knowledge of this procedure, which in concrete cases helps us to study the essence of a specific nation, tells us nothing about the “substance” of the nation itself (even though the numerous attempts to define what a nation is might lead us to assume that we could). For the “substance” itself is to be seen in the above phenomena—their ideal typical order and their role as history unfolds—through the investigation of which we gain insight. But it is only the phenomenal forms of the self-manifesting entity that are given to our direct perception, not the entity itself. In our thematic context too, in which we wish to demonstrate that the power in what is held in common is to be found in what joins the acts of command and obedience, it will prove impossible to point to the source of power as something given in perception. We can only point to it as manifest in the most extreme form of its expression, the power over life and death of those human beings who are joined together in the whole. Through this phenomenon, Max Weber tried to define the specific essence of the common substance of state and politics when he wrote:

The political community [. . .] is one of those communities whose action includes, at least under normal circumstances, coercion through jeopardy and destruction of life and freedom of movement applying to outsiders as well as to members themselves. The individual is expected ultimately to face death in the group interest. This gives to the political community its particular pathos and raises its enduring emotional foundations. The community of political destiny, i.e., above all, of common political struggle of life and death, has given rise to groups with joint memories which often have had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community. It is this “community of memories” which [. . .] constitutes the ultimately decisive element of “national consciousness.”

In this explanation the central theme does not entirely come into focus, but is embedded in the problem complexes that we have earlier found surrounding it. We must exclude “physical

coercion,” with which one person threatens another in order to compel him or her to behave in a specific manner, and also “the specific understanding of legitimacy which allows the exercise of coercion to influence conduct,” in order to focus on the phenomenon of existence (whether as ruler or servant), seeing it and being moved by it as a whole, free of material interests or theories of justification. It is less a matter of coercion exercised to the point of annihilation or that one individual might expect another to be willing to die, than the fact that in his own existence the individual is so deeply moved by the whole that, without need of coercion or persuasion, he is ready to fight for the whole even at the price of sacrificing his life. With this we do not mean to contest the great importance of investigations that try to illuminate the readiness to sacrifice one’s life for a nation with reference to the consciousness of a common history characterized by struggle, or the theory of a chosen nation’s mission to bring bliss to the world. Our concern here is that there are entities that bring human beings together and that express themselves in power structures, and that this unity exists, despite the differences between human beings in respect to their qualities as rulers, differences that cannot be deduced from any other element, nor further analyzed. “Violent social action is obviously something absolutely primordial. Every group, from the household to the political party, has always resorted to physical violence when it had to protect the interests of its members and was capable of doing so.”

A more consistent presentation of the whole source of power was undertaken by Carl Schmitt in his investigation into the concept of the political. Traditional attempts to describe the essence of the state as an integral unit of power fail, because they only take one of the forms of the phenomena of the substance of power as essential, be this the spiritual content, the type of human being, or the legal organization, and view the

63. Ibid., 615/904.
the theory of governance

problem as solved through reference to this one phenomenon. It is clear to Schmitt that, as a matter of principle, one must proceed in the opposite direction. The essence of the substance of power cannot be made intelligible by classifying more or less peripheral forms of power phenomena that have developed in the course of history. Quite the contrary, the integral unit that we assume to exist, which embraces the agents of the power structure, the rulers and the ruled, must be taken as the principle in order to explain the series of historical forms that have developed from it. Thus, Schmitt asserts, the political cannot be explained or brought into sharp focus by reference to the state. The state does not explain the political, rather the concept of the state assumes the concept of the political, for the “state is the political status of a people.” I find this formulation insufficiently radical, for it assumes that a “people” exist prior to the “political.” But the “people” can hardly be understood without reference to the “political,” the latter understood as the integral unity of the power substance. But the essential reversal, the assumption of a substance of power that is prior to and that transcends its phenomenal forms, is very clear. In his description of the substance of power, Schmitt, like Max Weber, focuses on the most extreme content, the defense of existence going as far as destroying another life and ready to sacrifice its own. The fundamental category of the political is the antithesis of friend-enemy, which parallels such fundamental categories as the ethical good-evil, the aesthetic beautiful-ugly, and the economic profitable-unprofitable. But who the friend is and who the enemy cannot be determined by external criteria. This must be the case if the theory is to remain strictly within the confines of its own sphere, the localization of power in the whole of the governing structure embracing all of its members. The political enemy is the other,

the stranger, “and his essence is adequately indicated by an existence that, in a particularly intensive way, is manifestly different and alien” [4]. Time and again the word *existence* is used in order to emphasize the fact that it is human existence in its entirety—in all layers of being from the vital basis up to the spiritual person—that is moved by something that binds the community together. In the case of conflict, the enemy becomes the “negation of one’s own type of existence”; he has to be fought and repelled “in order to preserve the type of being that is commensurate with one’s own” [4]. The terms *one’s own* [*Eigen*] and *existence* do not refer to the private person, the individual, but to the whole, as it is alive in all of its individuals; hostility is the expression, not of private feeling, but of the existential other-ness of the whole, of which the life of the individual is a part. “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a totality of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship” [5 [28]].

The character of the substance of power as an entity that precedes all speculation becomes manifest in Schmitt’s exposition of war. War results directly from hostility. If the latter is conceived existentially, war is merely hostility’s most extreme realization. “It does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid” [6 [33]]. War is freed of all ideological glorification and condemnation. It is nothing but the most extreme consequence of the existence of a substance of power that is ready to preserve itself against an alien threat. “From this most extreme possibility human life derives its specifically political tension” [7 [35]]. “Tension” is again an expression that belongs to the existential sphere. The readiness to kill and to face death does not originate in a command or in an “ought,” nor in a programmatic demand, but has an existential origin in the concrete
situation of a real conflict. Conceived in this manner, conflict and war therefore have no rational, legal, moral, or any other justifiable grounds. “If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified” (17 [49]). War is waged, not for the sake of ideals, but to repel an existential enemy or to destroy him. A “war to end war,” as the familiar slogan goes, is, to quote Schmitt, an “obvious fraud.”

The question concerning the specific content on which the friend-enemy distinction rests, and the existence of a power substance manifesting itself, is external to the existential fact of the distinction itself. “Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy” (9 [37]). So it is possible to name the specific states of affairs (races, languages, cultures, religions) that can manifest themselves in connection with the substance of power, without being able to formulate propositions about specific laws of classification; the substance of power itself can only be described as that which under certain circumstances manifests itself in them. When a new center of power arises, for example based on ethnic or religious content, we can still speak of the existence of the older entity as long as the new center is not strong enough to hinder the older one’s ability to defend itself in a case of conflict against an external enemy. When the new entity is strong enough to take over the leadership of the state itself, then the older entity has been “dissolved” and “ceases to exist.” In individual cases, it is not always easy for a political scientist to know if a state still exists, especially when the end of its political existence is not marked, at the same time, by the end of its legal form. (Consider, for example, the individual states within the United States.) But the principle governing our judgment is clear.

The theory of an all-encompassing power structure involves the same thematic structures as we encountered in our analysis of the existential constitution of those who govern. It
proved difficult, on the one hand, to present governance as an instrumental aspect in the life of the governed and, on the other, to understand it as something having its own sphere, with its own appropriate language forms. We run into the same difficulty with Schmitt’s theory with the concept of sovereignty. One aspect of this concept (we will deal with others, especially with the problem of decision, below) is created by the institutional, i.e., the instrumental, character of the organization of the state that, as an institution that protects and supports, etc., is set off against all the other existential contents of those who are ruled. In the theoretical context of the localization of power within a common whole, a concept of “sovereignty” is not necessary at all, not even the concept of a “sovereignty of content,” since what is involved is not governance of something valid over something invalid; the common whole is simply that which combines all of the partial acts of all participants into the ruling institution. The concept of sovereignty does not become necessary until the political sphere is considered as just one existential sphere among others, in which case the term sovereign serves to determine the political sphere’s position in relationship to the others. For Schmitt, the political entity, among other entities in society, is the “decisive entity.” It is “sovereign” in the sense “that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside there” (11 [38]). Yet the “critical situation” is the case of “conflict,” the extreme case that calls for the readiness to face death. Schmitt maintains that the terms sovereignty and entity are appropriate here, as long as they are used with circumspection. “Both do not at all imply that a political entity must necessarily determine every aspect of a person’s life or that a centralized system should destroy every other organization or corporation. It may be that economic considerations can be stronger than anything desired by a government which is ostensibly indifferent toward economics. Likewise, religious convictions can easily determine the politics of an allegedly neutral state” (11 [38–39]). Here,
without going into it deeper, Schmitt touches upon one aspect of the problem of revolution: Where is the limit of tension between the political sphere and the rest of the existential spheres? At what point does this tension become so strong that theapolitical existential contents destroy the political entity and then substantially renew it, etc.? Schmitt knows that the human being does not live by politics alone and that limits are placed on the power of “government” by the habitual forms of life of the ruling organization’s members. But it is very difficult to determine when these limits are still limits, or if the political entity has been destroyed and renewed.

Schmitt finds the criterion for determining this difference in the “case of conflict.” “What always matters is only the possibility of conflict. If, in fact, the economic, cultural, or religious counterforces are so strong that they are in a position to decide upon the extreme possibility from their viewpoint, then these forces have in actuality become the new substance of the political entity” (11 [39]). “The political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the sources from which it derives its last psychic motives. It exists or it does not exist. If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the authoritative entity” (13 [43–44]). Adjusted to fit the degree of concretization, and to the variant of the problem in which we are engaged at this point in our investigation, Schmitt’s explanations lead right into the fundamental themes of our problem. The “case of conflict” is but another term for “intuition.” Here we cannot very well employ the term intuition, because it is not persons but “integral wholes” [“Ganzheiten”] we are dealing with. Therefore we cannot so easily differentiate between the objective spirit and immanent existence, because the person who opens himself to transcendence is not present. Thus there is no inspiration from above, because it would be very difficult to denote the subject of the inspiration. Nevertheless, the “whole” is faced with the same existential problems as confront individual existence. In the fullness of its self, this whole is no more continuously given to us than
the person is. All we have are the few moments corresponding to the [individual] existential self-giving [Selbstgebung]. These are instances of the extreme case, the “case of conflict,” in which the whole must assert itself in battle [Kampf]. What lies between these moments of indubitable givenness is obscure, just as the existence of the person is. When a state endures and survives a war, we are ready to attribute to it political existence. If a state experiences a period of internal struggle, we might perhaps doubt whether it still exists and think that it has perhaps just not yet dissolved because the blow from outside has not yet been struck. We would have to suspend judgment concerning its existence until a new instance of the extreme case would test its existence, or until historical experience has demonstrated that, in spite of a dreadful weakness in threatening situations, a political entity has shown an unusual ability to renew and preserve itself, as did, for example, the Byzantine empire, so that a judgment about its end would only be warranted after radical annihilation. Here we run into the problem of the degree of existence, which we shall address in greater detail in due course. In any case, the theory of cases of the extreme leading to conflict illuminates the speculative structure of the investigation of the state’s existence. We do not know what political existence is, the existence of a power substance. We see groups of people who unite to defend against attack, we see them aggressively expand. Typically linked with such collective groups engaged in struggle we find the characteristics of consanguinity, ethical unity, common language, history, and religious conviction, ideologies justifying a community of combatants, etc. The spiritual attitude that lends equanimity to those who face death in conflict can spring from various sources. The final word on such a group was spoken by Schmitt and goes directly to the heart of the matter: “It exists or does not exist.” I truly do not know what more can be said about a substance we cannot define; we know nothing about it except that it inspires unity among men in the form of a community for which they are willing to die.
§25. Even if I do not know what more could be said in this matter, there are others who do. Let us again examine the structure of the problem in order to find the place where speculative thought can, for the last time, deepen our theme. We are dealing with the existence of the whole that binds individuals into a community. This type of existence differs radically from that of the existential constitutions of individuals. Here we cannot meditatively arrive at the point where this existence, in its original structure, is given to us in experience. For the existence of the whole is not an existence that can be given to itself in actual experience [selbst gebendes Dasein]. It cannot itself manifest the fundamental constitution of its existence as openness. We have only arrived at the whole as a necessary assumption in our attempts to understand rationally the governance relationship. Of necessity, the existence of the commonly held whole is tied to the existence of individual persons, tied to the existential constitutions of human beings. It is not one person who opens toward the objective spirit, but many, and all open, it is to be assumed, toward the same transcendent content, each according to his capacity to receive the objective spirit. It is not one body that constitutes the foundation of spiritually open existence, but many bodies constitute the foundation of existence. All of them are open to the same transcendent sphere and insofar may be viewed as a unity, as one existence, namely, the existence of the whole [ganzheitliche Existenz]. The fundamental state of affairs of existence is the same here as it is with individuals, spiritual openness. But here, because the existence of the whole is not personal existence, it does not have the structure that allows it to experience itself. Nevertheless, here, as there, openness manifests itself as a course of action, the meaning of which stems from the “beyond” of the person. In personal existence this takes place in intuition, within the existence of the whole, in all individual existences that are spiritually moved to the point of being ready to face death for it. We can neither speak about the phenomenon of intuition nor about the whole that is
spirits were spiritually moved. We can only point to the fact that they exist, but how they “exist,” concerning their being-thus [Sein] no propositions can be made.65

We are familiar with social phenomena, such as commanding and obeying and attacking and defending, which can be traced back to the existential state of affairs we call power. Thus we are well aware of what class of phenomena we are dealing with when we speak of power. But what power itself is dissolves under the rationalizing and speculative structures and recedes into the sphere of the ineffable of personal existence and the existence of the whole. The structural forms themselves, however, constitute essential forms of thought, which in principle can be applied to both types of existence of which we have spoken here. (Others, such as divine existence, which could be delimited by using the same types of structural forms, do not concern us here.) Therefore, in principle, it is possible, in analogy to the theory of intuition of personal being and to Max Weber’s and Carl Schmitt’s theory of the pathos of death and the readiness to face death in conflict, to formulate a theory of the whole as a continuum of existence.

Plessner has made such a theoretical attempt. We want to analyze it here because 1) it is one of the most important attempts to construct such a continuum, 2) because it views existence and power as synonymous, and 3) because it provides a concluding supplement to our efforts to develop the theory of our thematic field.

In our examination of Necker we encountered the strategy of tracing the essence of the constitution of the ruled back to the hierarchy of time and aging. We pointed out that one could undertake the same study, but reverse the accent, in order to determine the existential constitution of the ruler. According to Plessner, the most important paradigm of the existentially powerful continuum is the structure of time. Taking

65. A useful definition of ideology might be: Ideologies are judgments and judgmental concepts that speak of acts of conduct as though they were material matters or matters belonging to the realm of essence.
up Plessner’s thought at this point and pursuing it further, we can follow Necker’s idea to its logical conclusion. In Plessner’s view we can conceive of time “as the unity of an open present, extending out of the past into the future, and from the future back into the past.” Time is concentrated into the present as the line where past and present meet, the point that “mediates the flowing continuity of ‘time’ between past and future.” Plessner extends the notion of the concentration of the existential dimension in the immediate present [Jetztpunkt] from a paradigm of time to one for the human being’s existential constitution as a whole. In this way he gains the concept of an existential situation that becomes a situation, because the human being must “deal with it” [“erledigen”]. “The human being’s situation requires that he take decisions. This is independent of whether they present themselves to him as free, self-determining acts made at his own initiative (the Greek of classical times and the European humanist would speak of genuine decisions). For the human being there is such a thing as the right moment, the dictate of the moment, the missed opportunity, and the opportunity prudently taken. And this is not confined to temporal meaning. There is the fortunate constellation and the proper place, both in the literal and metaphorical sense.”

Human existence is made up of the continuous dealing with such situations, which are typically structured as the familiar horizon, into which break the alien, the sinister, and the unfamiliar. These must be dealt with, invested with meaning, and fit into the familiar horizon. Thus existence takes place in the psychically ambiguous mood of boldness and security: boldness in meeting what is new and alien, the need for security in incorporating it into the familiar horizon. Since in all directions of the human being’s actions “the primeval impinging urgency of what is not understood is inextricably bound up with the world of action, which understands itself as

66. Helmuth Plessner, *Macht und menschliche Natur* (Berlin, 1931), 59. [Further references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.]
directed to purpose and meaning, the human being’s situation is characterized both by *audacity* and by the state of being *threatened*. The human being’s situation requires at one and the same time the bold anticipation of the unknown and security against the threat of the unknown; with every leap over its confines, it requires the extension of its spheres beyond its previous limits. All the security one has gained in struggle leads to new uncertainty” [60]. In this expression the vulnerability of existence is emphasized; others point more to the closed horizon. Both are inextricably entwined and characterize in their interlocking nature the situation of human existence. “Secure, and at the same time exposed and threatened, the human being is that needy being [*Wesen*] who hopes, waits, anticipates, desires, worries, wills, and questions” [69].

Up to this point we find nothing in these theoretical reflections that was not essentially present in Necker as well. In finely nuanced language, the double nature of the soul’s moods is very clearly explained. It can be analyzed into components in order to classify human beings, in whom the one or the other of these mood-complexes dominate. Just as Necker maintained that security and a limited horizon are characteristic of those who are ruled, one could argue that courageous anticipation and the predominance of the drive to extend one’s horizon are typical of the ruler’s personality. But opposed to this view is Plessner’s important statement that power is of the very essence of all human beings [54]. In other words, each human being possesses a mysterious essence: “the self-manifesting power of existence” [88]. We have spoken of the substance of power in the same way, as that invisible element to which point all of the phenomena we can investigate. It is also Plessner’s view that we can say nothing about it. But he makes the attempt, through dialectical formulations, to take the investigation as far as possible beyond the rational into the dialectical sphere. He speaks of the “point” in which the “continuum” is constructed, he speaks of the horizon that is open and closed at the same time, of the bold deed that reaches into the unknown,
extending the horizon, but at the same time bringing the unknown into the horizon and making it known. He says further: “The human being finds himself in the situation of being in-between, sundered as it were between the horizon’s immanence and that which transcends it” (60). “The constituents of the human being’s finitude are found in the fact that his being in the open world’s actual infinite present is inextricably linked to the indefinite endlessness of [the being] who cannot cease from exploring. [His finitude is characterized] by his needs, longing, and search for fulfillment, by the fact that moving forward is life’s content” (60 ff.). “It is a finiteness that cannot be separated from infinity. Thus it is finiteness that, while manifesting itself naturally, requires the creation of an artificial counterweight” (61). It hardly need be said that none of these propositions are judgments about material reality or essential structures. With the help of metaphors like “horizon,” “expanding the horizon,” “anticipation,” etc., Plessner undertakes to do in the “horizontal” what was done for the theory of intuition in the “vertical,” where openness was presented in its relationship to a spirit “above.” Here we are dealing with the structure of a lineal horizontal continuum for a point of existence in which existence is presented as unfolding along a horizontal line.

This structural apparatus, which up to this point has been offered as a rationalization of the problem of personal existence, is important to us in its entirety, because Plessner, unaware of any difficulties involved, applies it to the existence of the whole. The practical structure of the power of existence manifests itself in the fact that the past, out of which existence has arisen, is itself now reshaped by the actions of the existent. “Insofar as the decisions of the actual living generations also reshape their respective pasts, this power is practical political power” (47). Here we are no longer dealing with the lives of individual human beings, but with the course of a super-personal existence through history, with existences of the whole of various sizes and extent; for Plessner, peoples
and states. In analogy to the existential point between past and present in the here and now, the historical sequence in general is viewed as open and continuing right up into the present. The spiritual world, which is given to us as a past, is “still open, right into the present day, and through our thought and action its form is dependent upon us in every moment” (46). The past is not a closed objective state of affairs, which is presented to us complete like natural phenomena, but it is a context of affairs that continues to be effective, right into the present. Past and present are not divided by an impassable line. The past continually enters the living present right up to the point of our immediate decisions and actions. “What appears, viewed from the past, to be last consequences, the living present . . . , can only see and understand in its immediacy . . . by a radical change of standpoint. In this radical change of standpoint, life turns to reflect upon itself in order to discover itself as both that which is past and that which has come into being” (47). If the past only slowly attains fixed forms and reaches into the present, existence manifests itself as the historically creative power that works retrospectively to bring the past, through the now, into the future. In thus bringing forth the continuum, existence is revealed to be that which is powerful.
Theory of Law

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The “Theory of Law,” in Eric Voegelin Papers, box 53, folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Calif. This text, marked “II,” follows immediately upon “The Theory of Governance,” designated “I.” Both texts are part of the Staatslehre, which Voegelin intended to publish in the early 1930s. For further references, see the editors’ introduction to “The Theory of Governance.”

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Modern legal theory, as a theory of positive law, sets itself the task of investigating the essence of the social phenomenon of law. Its intention is to analyze the a priori content of positive law in order to determine the form that every content must assume in order to become law. In view of this focus on legal form, the specific contents become irrelevant, and the unity of the system of law cannot be understood as a unity of content deducible from a supreme, fundamental legal principle. Rather it is an organizational unity in which every content of law is legitimized as positive when it is legitimately posited. Every law-positing act refers back to a legitimizing legal principle, which in turn refers back to another principle that legitimizes its positing, until a supreme positing act is reached, at which point the series of references comes to an end. The genesis of the positive system of law as a whole transcends law, and in order to clarify its nature we must engage in a nonlegal investi-
gation that is external to the system itself. Insofar as the theory of law is constituted as a theory of the production of legal reality, it intentionally takes a position that in the history of legal science is diametrically opposed to the classical system of natural law. The fundamental problem of the classical systems can be formulated in the question: What is lawful and what is unlawful? In the words of Fries, when we ask this question "we are not concerned with finding out what usually happens or what ought necessarily to happen in order to reach a specific goal; instead, we assume that a law exists, according to which some things are simply commanded, others allowed, others ought to happen, and still others may be permitted. In this process we invoke an internal law which, without preconditions, commands what should be done or determines what may be permitted." The question of what is legal, and its corollaries, is answered without recourse to orientation on legal experience. The question of what is lawful in terms of positive law within the setting of a concrete historical legal order is to be rigorously distinguished from the question of what is lawful as determined by a rational insight of timeless validity. Positive law can only be referred to the law originating in man's rational nature to the extent that the lawfulness of its contents can be tested by the maxims of the law of reason, and to the extent that the legislator should aim to bring positive law, as it develops in the process of history, ever closer to the rational content of law.

With this comparison of the two fundamental scientific approaches to the phenomenon of law we have merely touched upon the problem of the thematic connections between the theory of law content and the theory of acts that establish law. We have merely reached the point of departure for the investigation into this area with its multifarious complications. We can advance a step further by insisting on a more precise listing

2. [Jakob Fries, Philosophische Rechtslehre und Kritik der positiven Gesetzgebung (Jena, 1803), vi.]
of the contents of the two spheres that we have presented as being mutually exclusive. Is it really the systematic theory of natural law and the theory of positive law [which are mutually exclusive], or is it perhaps only the natural system of law as developed by natural law theorists, and the systems of positive law as they have been presented in positive legal science? The second view predominated during the golden age of natural law. The natural system confronted the positive system, the theorist of legal reason confronted the systematizers of positive law. The two areas were clearly distinguished, and Fries, whom we just quoted, leaves no doubt as to how irrelevant the system of natural law is to the jurist of positive law exclusively concerned with [positive jurisprudence].

For the person who uses the theory of law in his everyday practice, the knowledge of positive law will be his primary interest and will prove indispensable. In his technical activity of applying law to legal practice, the philosophical theory of law will not be of much use to him. [...] Anyone who would mix the concrete application of positive law with philosophical ideas concerning law would engage in a thankless task and neglect his real business. [...] Hence the judge will find little practical use for the philosophical view of law. Even in individual cases where the legislator allows the judge more discretion in determining the law in detail [for example, in criminal law where the penal code uses general language], his decisions will be guided by the spirit of the body of existing law rather than by the dictates of philosophical insight.³

Positive law and the law of reason are two systems distinguished by different content. The unity of the one is determined by legislative acts in history, while the other represents an interpretation of the insights of pure reason. Both are complete within themselves; they touch in no essential way, and therefore their doctrines cannot come into conflict. The consciousness of the closed rational system produces at the same time the consciousness of the closed positive system. The theory of natural law is a “pure” theory and calls

³. Ibid., xii.
its system “pure” because it keeps itself and its system free of positive law elements. Described in this way, the fundamental scientific positions can very well exist side by side, for the systems produced are radically different.

What brings the two systems into conflict is the legislative technique that has recourse to natural law as a supplement to positive law. This possibility is facilitated by the above-mentioned theory that sees positive law in a process of development in which it draws steadily closer to the law recognized by rational insight. “The ultimate goal of the philosophical theory of law is, first, to develop the idea of purely legal legislation as an ideal for all positive legislation and, second, to determine the criteria needed to judge both the internal consequences of positive legislation and the state of growing closer to the pure idea of law.”4 This steadily drawing closer is a demand made on the legislator to orient his activity to natural law principles. The influence of this theory manifests itself in the civil law codes of the nineteenth century that provide for the implementation of natural law in positive law. The civil code is viewed as a systematically exhaustive regulation of the state of affairs involving law. Thus every suit must be adjudicated; if a gap should open because of a technical legal oversight, the judge may not turn down the case because he lacks materials on which to base his verdict but must fill the gap in positive law with natural-law principles. Positive-law legislation is sustained by the idea of natural law, which views the relationships between people as a nonformal closed sphere that, in principle, could be systematically and completely organized. In a concrete case of regulation it is entirely possible that human error might overlook this or that human relationship that is essentially part of the system. Such a gap, which may have been left open by the legislator, must be closed by the one who applies the law by direct recourse to rational principles of law. Here, a conflict seems to be ruled out, because the

4. Ibid., x.
positively regulated relationships are to be decided on the basis of positive law, while those not properly covered by a layer of positive law are, in the event of litigation, to be decided on the basis of natural law. Nevertheless, the conflict exists; the point of friction can be indicated when we consider that in the process of supplementing the application of positive law with natural law there is no need to harmonize the two systems, nor indeed to bring together two systems that are oriented to different supreme nonformal principles. The actual conflict comes about because when applied, positive law does not have gaps in the sense described here. Gaps in positive law exist only for the legislator who, in the process of creating law, tries to lend an adequate juridical form to a system of ethical, social, and political demands. When the legislator looks back over his work he can see that it more or less does justice to the system of demands and that, under certain circumstances, he has not taken into consideration a [specific] demand; therefore the content of law has fallen short of a normative intention, in other words, there is a gap. But these gaps do not exist for the one who applies the law. For every lawsuit brought before the positive law, positive law has a clear answer. Unless there are complications that make it difficult to subsume [the case under the law at all] the claim made in the suit must be recognized as legally justified or denied: There is no third possibility. If a demand in a suit were to be denied as unfounded in terms of positive law, but acknowledged as justified in accordance with natural law, such a decision would run counter to positive law. In such a case, the acknowledgment of the legality of the demand in accordance with natural law would be to simultaneously deny the legality of the demand’s rejection under positive law. The recourse to natural law in the process of delivering a verdict in the case would amount to annulling positive law, the application of natural law cannot supplement positive law, it can only destroy it.

The conflict between natural and positive law that arose because of the technique of codification causes a further conflict,
expressed in the comparison of a theory of positive law to the object-oriented science of positive law, i.e., to law dogmatism. The confluence of the spheres of positive and natural law forces the theory of law to take a critical attitude toward natural law in the dogmatism of positive law. Historically it is fated to try to determine the essential structure of the system of positive law in order to cleanse it of extraneous natural-law elements. One of the intentions of the concept of “purity,” a term with many connotations, is to shed light on the structure of positive law and to [complete and] close off the positive-law order. The unity of its content is to function as the unity of its creation; the law-establishing acts are incorporated into the process of law creation, into the deductive context that is not to be interrupted with elements taken from other norm systems—they of the religious, ethical, or natural-law variety. The theory of positive law turns into a “pure” theory of law by introducing the postulate of a closed order of law that cannot be deduced, either as a whole or in parts, from another nonformal system of norms.

We describe the critical attitude of the theory of positive law to natural law as mediated by the conflict of natural law with positive law because it expresses the historical situation, not because the conflict is in principle unavoidable. When the historical cause of this critical attitude disappears, the conflict itself should become meaningless and it should once again become possible for the pure theory of natural law and the pure theory of positive law to exist side by side as compatible scientific spheres. Let us now examine the just classified situation to see if it in fact exhausts the range of possible conflicts between these two scientific fields.

This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no, for the classical theory of natural law (our primary orientation is Kant’s paradigm of the theory of law) embraces thematic elements that may serve both as the subject matter of scientific elaboration as well as explications of metaphysical principles that are no longer recognized as valid, partly because the gen-
eral situation of metaphysical problems has changed in the last one and a half centuries, and partly because of our own personal metaphysical attitude. The principal idea of the Kantian theory of law is the maxim postulating the coexistence of free human persons understood as ends in themselves. For Kant the metaphysical substance of the human being is the finite rational person acting freely in accordance with insight into an ethical law. The universal principle of law that regulates the external acts of these coexistent substances is: "Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with freedom of the will in each and all in action, according to a universal law." Or, expressed differently, the primal right of every man is his freedom to the extent that it can coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law. In these sentences we can distinguish—at this point only in a provisional fashion—two separate thematic layers. The first endeavors to determine the essence of the human being as an end in itself as a free, rational personality. We are in the realm of an anthropological investigation of the human being’s essential structure, which attempts to illuminate the human being’s characteristics and contrast these with the structure of such other ontic classes as the animal, plant, and inorganic.

What takes place in the second layer is less transparent and requires closer analysis. The features just identified as the essential structure of the ontic class “human being” are now called “rights.” The human being’s essence, that he is a free rational substance, is called a right. Freedom not only constitutes the essence of the human being, but it is also the human being’s right. At first glance, viewed from the perspective of the description of the first layer, this reinterpretation is meaningless. It becomes intelligible when we focus on the intermediate stages [of argument] that lead to this interpretation.

As long as we consider freedom to be the universal essence of the human being, legal considerations cannot be introduced. Only if a human individual is considered in regard to a possible restriction of the inherent freedom of his nature on the part of another human being can the expression of human freedom appear in the form of a demand. Stated more precisely, the freedom of the human being A is not a right as defined by Kant, but exists as the demand that the human being B should restrain from disturbing this sphere of freedom. In the same sentence in which Kant identifies freedom as the human being's original right, he consequently elucidates, in parentheses, freedom as “independence from another's coercive will.” It is not my freedom, which is my nature and which consequently no one can take away from me, to which I have a right, but I have a right to demand that another person refrain from interfering with it. Thus the expression “my freedom is my right” is false and points to axioms that have been surreptitiously introduced in order to build the bridge between ontology and a theory of law. These axioms are: 1) the existence of a plurality of human individuals who can reciprocally affect each other's sphere of freedom; 2) but the axiom that these several human beings are identical individuations of one substance [says further that they] constitute a field force of elements of the same kind that, through reciprocal action and reaction, reach an equilibrium among themselves along the lines of a mechanical system, so that in such a harmonized system the influence of each element is equal to that of every other element. To illustrate the context of law, Kant deliberately chose the mathematico-physical image as the pattern necessary to sensible impressions. The concept of a dynamic equilibrium, not just of essences, but of the concrete equal nonformal elements as well, is the means by which the transition from the description of the essence to that of nonformal legal axioms takes place. The theory of law becomes a system of equations that determines the movements of identical elements within a dynamic constellation. This transition is made possible by
ignoring the problem of human existence in its immanent-temporal and thus in its immanent-historical sphere. It can be ignored because Kant understands the concept of essence to be identical with the content of historical reality. The human being’s essence accounts for the whole of the concrete person. The human being’s substance is a part of the universal rational substance, equal and identical to the substance of every other human being, not merely in essence but individually. For Kant there is no problem of the person’s singularity, of his particular irreplaceable individual essence. Mankind is a fragmentation of the pure rational substance into discrete particles of concrete, equal individuals. For Kant, the concrete historical formation of law is not to be undertaken by individual human beings who create law relationships in accordance with their essence and individuality and who, in the last instance, cannot really be advised by anyone else but must take their own counsel based on their own concrete individual expression of essence. Rather it is also a task for the philosopher who deduces, from the individually structured expressions of essence, the concrete, nonformal propositions that are binding for the relationships among the various elements.

These metaphysical assumptions of natural-law theory underline the more profound content of its opposition to positive law theory. (What we have here resembles the antithesis of classical aesthetics to the more recent theory of art [Kunstwissenschaft], and of dogmatic logic to its transcendental va-

6. “Reason appears here as the fluent universal substance, as unchangeable simple thinghood which yet breaks up into many entirely independent beings, just as light bursts asunder into stars as innumerable luminous points, each giving light on its own account, and whose absolute self-existence [Fürmich-seyn] is dissolved, not merely implicitly [an sich], but explicitly for themselves [für sich], within the simple independent substance. They are conscious within themselves of being these individual independent beings through the fact that they surrender and sacrifice their particular individuality, and that this universal substance is their soul and essence—as this universal again is the action of themselves as individuals, and is the work and product of their own activity” [G. F. W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper and Row, Torchbooks Edition, 1967), 376].
riety.) In order to shed more light on the point of collision between the two theories, let us refer again to Fries, to whom a conflict between the two seems impossible: “The pure theory of law is entirely philosophical and its standpoint idealistic. It conceives rules that it would be the highest aim of positive legislation to achieve. On the other hand, the nature of every positive theory of law is wholly empirical; it is only based on real history and experience. The pure theory of law must be studied and reflected, it is entirely the product of thought; the positive theory of law must be studied and learned. However stimulating it is for thought, unguided independent reflection would likely prove more harmful than helpful.” If the law of reason and positive empirical law are opposed to one another in this way they do indeed fail to come into contact. But by changing the terminology we can bring into focus the sphere in which their conflict does in fact take place. If we replace the terms natural law or the law of reason with the more appropriate expression “concrete essential law” [wesenskonkretes Recht] and the term positive law, which conveys little meaning, with the expression “historically concrete law,” the sphere of the concrete is revealed to be the focal point of the conflict. The theory of natural law and the theory of positive law are two stages in the history of the science of law that express the change in the way concrete law is viewed. There has been a movement away from the logos understood as concrete being-in-itself, toward the logos that is concrete in historical existence.

This change of fundamental attitude becomes manifest in the change of the formulation of the problems of essence and history, themes necessary to both theories. The classical theory of natural law is a theory of law in which essence is concrete. Its subject matter is the essence of law, but not as an essence appearing in ever-new metamorphoses within historical reality, as variations on a theme and never as the theme

7. Fries, Philosophische, x ff.
itself, but as an essence that is to be nonformally grasped, both within the form of reality and at the same time as a being-in-itself that transcends historical reality. The theory of natural law is not a theory of the essence of law as it appears in history but the concrete production of this essence in the fullness of its content from the logos of the thinker whose intellectual substance is identical to the logos of his subject matter. Natural law as essential law is not historical positive law, but can be formulated in terms of content. This confronts the theorists of natural law with the task of explaining the relationship of essential law’s concretions to the concretions of historical law.

[The theorist of natural law] links the two spheres with a thesis taken from the philosophy of history (the basis of which we will not examine here). This thesis conceives world history to be the history of civil society, which, in an infinite process, approaches and eventually attains the state in which positive law and concrete essential law coincide. The logos as it is in itself and as it is concretely in the systems of natural law theorists, becomes the logos of history. Concrete essential law is the historically concrete law of the perfected final stage of mankind’s history. We shall not examine in detail the various internal difficulties of this idea but wish only to recall the fundamental problem of speculation about infinity; convergence in an infinite process is not convergence in the finite sense to a finite goal. For all finite time the historically concrete law is equally distant—namely, infinitely distant—to concrete essential law. As far as historically concrete reflection is concerned, essential being is continually present and unfolds in reality. As far as natural-law reflection is concerned, reality is permanently removed from essence, because essence is already understood in its essentiality as concrete, as a concretum in a mode different from any historical concretion. Historical concretion and essential concretion cannot converge at any point of finite time. In addition, in this peculiar speculative situation, the final stage of congruence cannot be a stage of
historical reality; it is removed from historical time because of its determination as an infinitely remote goal, and within the historically concrete sphere an infinitely remote goal is no goal at all.

We have followed this speculative image in one direction, in which the natural-law systems, which transcend reality, are conceived as concrete states of affairs at the end of all things in time. This state of affairs is indeed unreal, but its reflection in the system of natural law is very much present and historically real. The present, positive state of affairs is not the same as its ideal counterpart, but the latter can be known and, systematically formulated, may serve as the regulative idea for historical legislation. The state of affairs called for by natural law is not real, and the demand that it find expression in historical reality is unrealistic and cannot be fulfilled, but the relationship between positive law as a concretization of essential natural law is real. Natural law is not a fantasy completely unrelated to reality, but in the form of an imagined reality contains the same essential elements as historically concrete law. However, it does not have these elements in an immediate relationship to its object but in the oblique form of an imagined concrete law, which differs more or less accidentally from the historical system of law because its content is the result of a stricter coordination of the nonformal principles and concepts of law that comprise its essential structure. The common ground of essential content makes it possible to refer positive law to natural [law], to orient historical legislation to the essential core, and—as we have seen—in extreme cases, in the application of positive law, to use the dominant form of natural law as a supplementary source of law.

Through the real relationship between natural law and positive law, based on their essential commonality, its system, in its highly developed form, provides us with a guiding principle for an ontology of law. Natural law itself is such an ontology, but, as we have expressed it, in an oblique manner. An analysis
of natural law’s essential concrete nonformal elements should give us the principle points of view needed in order to develop an ontology of law.

The systems of natural law divide rights into two main classes, *jura connata et acquisita*, innate and acquired rights, and *thetica et hypothetica*, original and adventitious, primal right and the external mine and thine. These various terms cover the antitheses of rights that emanate directly from man’s essential being and are constituted directly by his being, and rights that are grounded by the intervention of an external event. We shall now address the first class of these rights called innate, absolute, original (thetic), etc.

These various terms indicate the approaches of the authors who try to identify the fundamental phenomenon of this class of rights. All of them want to uncover a core, a supposedly primeval datum of the human being, to serve as the foundation of rights and needs, without need of further justification. The human being’s essential nature should demonstrate the primeval roots of right and thus of the system of rights in general. Inherent rights belong to the human being before his essential being is realized. An inherent right is a right “which is by nature everyone’s, independent of any legal act”; an acquired right is one that “requires such an act.” Original rights “are the universal belongings of man’s nature, and coeval with his being”; acquired rights “occur to men in the course of human life.” Original rights “are acknowledged upon being mentioned”; acquired rights “are matters of discussion, and acknowledged only so far as they are proved.” The scope of this sphere varies in different systems and in the elaboration of details. Zeiler offers a comprehensive and detailed catalogue in his system of natural private law. He classifies it into rights that constitute “the human being’s own inherent

8. Kant, “General Division of Law,” §8, 44–45.
sphere,” 2) rights intended to secure the well-being of others, 3) innate rights to things. The rights that make up the human being’s inherent sphere are subdivided into the rights:
   a) to exist as a person, to preserve one’s life
   b) to actively pursue morality and happiness
   c) to develop practical and theoretical reason
   d) to preserve the natural integrity of the body (health), and to acquire the skills needed to earn a living (skill, dexterity, propriety)
   e) the right to be considered innocent, which guarantees protection from punitive measures without convincing evidence
   f) the right to gain a higher (positive) respect, beyond that of mere negative reputation [i.e., that nothing speaks against one]

This first group of rights of the inner being represents the core of the entire catalogue; it more or less coincides with Kant’s determination of the content of the primeval right to freedom as independence of the coercive will of others.\(^{11}\)

If we look at this catalogue of rights that build on inward being with the question of what they have in common, and if we try to identify the core of the law’s foundation, we run into the kinds of difficulty that, in part, we encountered earlier. As

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11. Kant, “General Division” §B, 45–46:

There is, indeed, an innate equality belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent of being bound by others to anything more than that to which he may also reciprocally bind them. It is, consequently, the inborn quality of every man in virtue of which he ought to be his own master by right (sui juris). There is, also, the natural quality of justness attributable to man as naturally of unimpeachable right (justi), because he has done no wrong to anyone prior to his own juridical actions. And, further, there is also the innate right of common action on the part of every man, so that he may do towards others what does not infringe their rights or take away anything that is theirs unless they are willing to appropriate it; such as merely to communicate thought, to narrate anything, or to promise something whether truly and honestly, or untruly and dishonestly (veriloquim aut falsiloquim), for it rests entirely upon these others whether they will believe or trust in it or not. But all of these rights or titles are already included in the principle of innate freedom, and are not really distinguished from it, even as dividing members under a higher species of right.

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we have demonstrated with the example of Kant’s maxim concerning primeval right, the theory of natural law does not address the essential fundamentals of law as something immediately given, but obliquely, transformed through legal concepts. Thus, in order to identify the essential features, we must, on the one hand, dissolve the natural law concepts into their essential anthropological content, and, on the other, into the content of law in the strict sense. But, second, the analysis of the great systems of natural law reveals that the core we are trying to reach through the catalogue of rights is not a simple object but is structurally differentiated in itself and cannot function in the same way in all the parts of a theory of law’s structure. Indeed it would be possible to classify systems of natural law in terms of which structural elements are emphasized. Since what concerns us is systematic content, however, we cannot trace in detail the various historical configurations and will confine ourselves to focusing on two systems that illustrate the principal moments of this core, the experiences of fear and freedom.

In the dedication of his work *De Cive* to William, Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes lists two claims of human nature that it is safest to assume are present: “the [one] arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest, the other proceeding from the rational, which teaches every man to fly a contre-natural Dissolution, as the greatest mischief that can arrive to Nature.” In the form of the needs of the two fundamental faculties that the metaphysics of Hobbes’s time attributed to the human being, sensuousness and reason, two elements of human nature become themes for the theory of law to investigate: the power to reach out into the world of things and men, or the human being’s essence [conceived as] a power center that operates in the external world, and the

experience of the transience of existence, the exposure to the threat of violent death. The latter predominates and causes the fear of death to become the foundation of the system of law. The origin of all great and lasting bonds among men is their mutual fear of one another, and the cause of this fear, which is the driving force of association, is the natural equality of men. All men are equal by nature, since even the weakest is able to kill the strongest, be this by assassination or with the help of others. “They are equals who can doe equall things one against the other, but they who can do the greatest things [namely, kill], can doe equall things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equall; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the Civill Law.” Hence the war of all against all is not, as it is often misunderstood, a struggle in which the weaker will be overcome, so that they have a special interest in a peaceful state of law. Rather it is a struggle in which all participants are equal, all equally vulnerable by nature, by their susceptibility to being killed. Fear is the life experience that attunes man psychologically and rationally to the possibility of his own death. Hobbes defines it as “a certain anticipation of forthcoming disaster”; it appears in the form of mistrust, suspicion, precaution, measures taken against dangers, and, finally, of defense—it is out of fear that men take up arms and have recourse to other means of defense. Fear, at this point, which is rooted in the moments Hobbes has just ascribed to it—man being at the mercy of his perishable body—joins with that other trait of human nature, powerfulness [Mächtigkeit]. In battle, defense may separate from its motivation in fear and appear under the aspect of an attack on the other. Both defense and attack are interpretations of an action that can be related to the same external state of affairs because, for the human being, the external body is equally active and passive: It is the instrument of his expansion when he operates in the world, and it is the locus of his vulnerability, suffering, and

13. Ibid., 45.
ultimate death. Thus for Hobbes the boundaries between defense against alien attack and one’s own attack blur. Where each may expect the worst from the other, the human being has the right to take preventive steps and to attack the other before he has a chance to attack, and vice versa. The result is that no one is certain of attaining “the full life span usually granted by nature.”14 Through his body, in an inescapable circle, the human being is exposed to destruction; fear, as the life experience of being vulnerable, drives him to act; but the possibility of his action causes fear in others and creates new dangers for him.

The analysis in which Hobbes reveals fear to be the root of action is also methodologically important for its analysis of how the human being’s essential sphere is separated from the layers of legal concepts that lie over it. The actions of men rooted in fear are this side of good and evil. Man’s self-defense is not blameworthy, “because he has neither the power nor the will to act otherwise.” Every man seeks the good and flees what is evil; and more than anything, “he flees from the greatest of natural evils, from death, prompted by a natural necessity no less [necessary] than that which causes a stone to fall to earth.” The flight from death has the quality of a motion to be understood in terms of a law of nature. When law is discussed in this sphere, for example, the right to defend one’s body and life, no juristic meaning is to be read into this term; it is intended as a natural equivalent to the conduct described in law. The term right means nothing other than “the freedom possessed by everyone to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason.”15 “Right” action is to be interpreted as an action of the human being’s power center in accordance with the natural law of self-preservation; everything that occurs in accordance with this law is “right” action. In this context the meaning of the term right comes close to describing an aspect of a process.

15. [Hobbes, source unidentified.]
following a law of nature, even if the ambiguity of the term eases the transition into the sphere of law.

Hobbes’s stratification of the problem of law is distinguished by a relatively subtle differentiation that accompanies the state of human existence specified as fear and the capacity for action. He distinguishes between natural right, freedom, and the law of nature. In terms of the capacity [or power] to act, natural right is the freedom everyone has “to use his power” at his own discretion in order to preserve his life and subsequently to do anything that according to his judgment is an appropriate means to this end. If we delete the ambiguous term right, the first concept designates the sphere of human power, the basis for all more complex concepts of the system. Freedom, the second concept, introduces the obstacles to the operations of the power center. Freedom is the power sphere that is left over after all manner of limitations [have been accounted for]. Freedom is “absence of externall Impediments.” The third concept, the law of nature, allows the human being to distance himself from his action and to consider it in conformity with law or obligation. The law of nature prohibits man from a) doing what would destroy his life or from doing away with the means of preserving it, and b) abstaining from what in his opinion is most conducive to self-preservation. From this fundamental principle a large number of secondary principles may be inferred, among which only the initial ones are relevant to our purpose because they reveal the structure of the problem of law. The first law of nature commands that peace be sought and life preserved; if peace cannot be attained, it commands that life be defended. The second law of nature commands us to renounce the unrestricted exercise of power and to retain only so much “freedom” to [exercise] against others as we allow them to exercise against us, in accordance with the scriptural commandment: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Finally, the third law of nature demands that covenants be kept without which the conduct of men dictated in the second law would be impossible. It is only the third law
that introduces the concepts of what is lawful and unlawful, for unlawfulness is now defined as conduct contrary to concluded covenants. Nevertheless, such legally binding covenants between men are possible only if they are purged of fear; they may be purged of fear only by the introduction of a public power that coercively enforces claims arising from covenants. If we strip away the trappings of Hobbes’s thought, the following levels of the problem become apparent:

a) Man’s being as a power center—abstract capability

b) Power seen in relationship to its restrictions; freedom as the residuum [once the restrictions have been lifted]—concrete capability

c) The sphere of freedom is subject to the law of reason [self-preservation]; as a result actions acquire the characteristic of being that which is bidden or forbidden.

d) The law of reason is further determined as a peace norm in accordance with the scriptural principle [the maxim of coexistence].

e) The specific character of the legally binding nature of action is substantiated by the establishment of an institutional apparatus for the enforcement of norms.

Hobbes’s theory, which has its point of departure in the life experience [Erlebnis] of the human being who is at the mercy of his perishable body, leads to the description of freedom of action and the problems associated with it. In this regard his theory hardly differs from the second type of system, which directly bases the theory of law on the metaphysics of freedom. For both systems the maxim of coexistence is the leading idea of the legal order, and both Kant and Hobbes view the scriptural maxim as the fundamental principle of a positive moral theory. The categorical imperative, according to which the maxim of action ought at all times to be a universal law, does not differ in content from the primitive version in Hobbes, which requires that we should treat our fellow human beings as we would wish them to treat us. The profound difference between the two types of system lies in the ultimate grounds for the theory
of right action. The basis of Hobbes’s thought is the idea of the equality of men due to their nature, due to their perishable corporeality; the systems of German idealism see the essence of man in a spirit in which all men participate equally. It seems to me that the difference between the idea of the freedom of the spirit and that of the constraint of nature has not been optimally articulated in the first great system maker, Kant (who combines this idea with various problems of epistemology and legality). Jacobi, in a little known work, writes:

Under the word *freedom* I understand that human faculty by virtue of which he exists and autonomously, both internally and externally, acts, works, and produces. To the extent that he views, feels, and considers himself to be a free being, he attributes his personal qualities, his science and art, his intellectual and moral character entirely to himself. Insofar he considers himself to be their originator and creator, he views himself as free. [Thus he is free] to the extent that he views *himself as spirit*, and intelligence, and not as nature—from which a part of him originated by necessity. This latter part of his being is tied into nature’s general mechanism. Consequently he can call himself free only to the extent that a part of his being does *not belong to nature*, does not originate in her, and has not been conceived by her. Only to the extent that this part is distinguished from nature, rises above her, uses and masters her, breaks free from her, and with its free capability subdues her mechanism and makes it into his tool, is the human being free. It is the spirit, *by itself*, not nature, that invents and produces according to plan, it is the spirit alone that *engages in poetry and action*. *By itself* nature’s generation is blind, irrational, necessary, and merely mechanical; it is void of foresight, plan, free choice, or intention. This is why reason and freedom are inseparably linked in our consciousness. But this does not mean that the faculty of freedom must be derived from reason [from the *adjectivum*], but rather that reason is derived from the free faculty [from the *substantivum*].

Jacobi already sees more clearly than Kant the enigmatic character of the link between nature and freedom in the unity of man. Kant had no feeling for the ominous presence of the human being’s demonic aspect, for that which is intimately and genuinely essential to sensuality. He never considers sensuality other than in contrast to the law of reason, as the tendency toward the immoral that must be restrained and that is ultimately to be destroyed in the infinity of the soul’s eternal life. The body as a living thing appeared to him to be so unreal that the fact of death did not appreciably affect his speculation. The struggle between desire and freedom continues after death as if nothing had happened. Jacobi, on the other hand, senses the mystery of life, whose abyss Kierkegaard first fully probed. “The unity of the necessity of nature with freedom in one and the same creature is simply an incomprehensible fact, a miracle and a mystery equal to creation. He who would comprehend creation would also comprehend this fact, and he who would comprehend this fact, would comprehend creation and God Himself.”

Freedom expressed as the antithesis between power and human nature (as it has lately been conceived by Plessner) is the foundation of the system of natural law as it appears in its purest version in Schelling’s deduction of natural law. In this deduction, the human core is being-in-itself [das Wesen an sich], that which is unconditional, underlying every existent and manifesting itself in every existence.

The quality of being-in-itself characterizes this being as absolute power; its state cannot be changed nor its freedom restricted by any other power. This absolute is not a closed datum, not a factum but a fieri in the process of becoming. The essence of the human being is something that is in the process of completing itself, which constantly reflects on its absolute-ness by continually pursuing it. “By manifesting myself as a

17. Ibid., 317.
free being, I make myself known as a being which shapes all that resists it but which itself is not determined by anything [but itself].”¹⁸ The power of being, which the “human being” is, is not in the process of shaping that which resists it, but comes into being [vollzieht sich] in that process. When Schelling declares that the entire world is man’s moral property, property does not refer to a static relationship but to the continuous process in which the autonomous ego takes possession of the world.

While in Hobbes the theory of fear progresses through the scale of mistrust, suspicion, precaution, prophylactic defensive measures, and [active] defense—ranging from passive forms of life experience [that culminate in phenomena of paralysis by fear] all the way up to activity that springs from personal power—Schelling’s analysis proceeds in the opposite direction. Following the structure of the problem, it proceeds from pure power to human nature. In order that the in-itself existing power entity may take possession of the world, it requires an instrument that is more closely akin to nature. The causality springing from freedom in the Kantian sense must “reveal” itself through a physical causality, through the causality of the body in the world of things. In order to be effective in the world of things the power entity—“human being”—must also be a natural being. However, as physical causality, human causality is subject to the laws of nature and is determined heteronomously. Human causality is both autonomous in freedom and heteronomous in nature. Power and nature meet in the mysterious unity referred to by Jacobi and called “life” by Schelling. “Life is autonomy in the phenomenon, the pattern of freedom to the extent that it reveals itself in nature. Thus

¹⁸. “If you are a being-in-itself, no other power can alter your condition, none can restrain your freedom. Hence endeavor to become a being-in-itself, to be absolutely free, endeavor to subject every heteronomous force to your autonomy, endeavor to expand through freedom your freedom into an absolute, boundless force,” Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts [1795], §6, in Werke, 1st main vol. [Munich: Oldenburg, 1927]. Cf. also §4. [Further references to paragraphs [§] of this work will appear parenthetically in the text.]
I must necessarily be a living being” (§9). With the word life meaning the unity of sensuousness and reason, of heteronomy and autonomy, of subjection to the laws of nature and an originary [originär] power being, we are given a term that Kant lacked as he addressed the same problems. [At the same time, Schiller uses it in his Anmut und Würde [On Grace and Dignity] and in the Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen [On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters] to delineate the sphere of harmony between morality and instinct.\(^{19}\) In the concept of life, the two [otherwise separate] elements of nature and power find their place as elements in an idea of unity.

In its fundamental features the subsequent stratification of the problem of law follows a perfectly parallel course to that of Hobbes’s:

a) The core of man is constituted by his limitless living power essence [Machtwesenheit], which corresponds to Hobbes’s concept of power.

b) The concept of power in relation to its limits, Hobbes’s concept of liberty as the residuum of power. Schelling analyzes this concept with greater precision than Hobbes. The dual aspect of life’s physical and moral causality provides us with the possibility of limiting it from one or the other side. Where physical power runs into resistance nature is present. “I acknowledge nature’s predominance over my physical power: Being a sensory being, I bow before it, I cannot go beyond it” (§12). “Where moral power encounters resistance, where its ‘I want’ is confronted with an ‘I do not want,’ humanity is present. I stand still, filled with trepidation. Behold humanity! is a call addressed to me; I may proceed no further” (§13).

c) The introduction of obligation into the structure of the human being who so far has only been described in pre-moral terms. Hobbes derives obligation from fear and legitimates it by an order of reason motivated by fear to pursue self-preservation. Schelling deduces obligation from action springing from the source of power and formulates the imperative: “‘Be’! in the most sublime sense of the term; cease thou to be a phenomenon; strive to become a ‘being-in-itself!’”—this is the highest demand made by all practical philosophy” (§3). This imperative demands that human action pursue the goal of the absoluteness of human existence, a demand that can only be realized in an infinite process of removing all limitations to action. Freedom is unlimited, because it pursues no particular, finite goal; “it strives for absoluteness, but does not assume it, only strives to realize it through infinite action” (§6).

d) In Hobbes the obligatory principle, according to which men are to live in a community of law, is legitimized by the imperative of self-preservation. The life of the individual is more secure if he renounces a portion of his possibilities of power in order to attain [the same concession] from others. Building on Kant, Schelling draws more subtle distinctions. Because of its striving in the empirical world, the absolute causality of moral beings becomes involved in conflict. The unconditional empirical causality of one individual cancels the empirical causality of another. “Empirically unlimited activity in one individual presupposes empirically unlimited passivity in another” (§26). In a mixture of a calculus of empirical interests and dogmatic ethics every bit as unusual as Hobbes’s, Schelling also deduces from this state of affairs the need for the reciprocal restriction of spheres of freedom. On the one hand, this restriction is necessary for the preservation of freedom in general (§28), on the other it is an ethical commandment “that presupposes a realm of ethical beings and, by the demand it makes on them, assumes the selfhood of all individuals” (§31). The motive of fear is present here as it is in Hobbes when the restriction is required in order to “save” freedom. And then, completely in-
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dependent of the problem of the human’s bond with nature, the conditions are specified that account for the [moral] demands made on the individual: 1) The “moral” obligation that I be myself (dealt with under c), which assumes the ego’s existence; 2) The “ethical” commandment of coexistence, which assumes the existence of a realm of moral beings, i.e., the Kantian realm of ends. The formula of the ethical commandment has a close affinity to the categorical imperative: “Act in such a manner that your will be absolute will; act in a manner that the entire moral world may will your action (formally and nonformally); act in a manner that, by your act (formally and nonformally), no rational being will be treated as a mere object but as a subject participating in the act” (§45).

c) The principle of ethics calls for the nonformal [der Materie nach] universality of will; the principle of right in the strict sense asserts the formal individuality of will (§52). The latter reads: “I have a right to everything that can be had in conformity with the will (without which the will would cease to be will)” (§68). Here Schelling raises the problem that Hobbes did about the guarantee of agreements through an institution of power. The moral world is not a complete being [Seiende] but a becoming [Werdende]. If the universal will required by ethics were actually identical to the individual will, there would only be one will, and therefore the absolute will. That would solve the problem of moral philosophy. Ethics, in which the individual will is subsumed under the universal will, and Schelling’s theory of law, based on the individual will as form, would cease to be sciences in opposition to one another (§72). But in the imperfect moral world [that exists], the right of my individuality is threatened, and in an extreme case, when selfhood itself is endangered by physical or mental coercion, the obligation [to others] in the moral world ceases and the individual’s freedom again becomes unlimited. It is permissible to meet coercion with coercion; against one who would suspend my will, I may take measures as I would against natural elements. Thus my right becomes a natural right in a pregnant sense, i.e., a right
I exercise in strict accordance with the laws of nature in the process of which I treat my opponent as though he were a creature of nature. “Natural law, in its consequences [to the extent that it becomes a coercive law], necessarily destroys itself, i.e., it does away with all law. For it ultimately entrusts the preservation of law to superior physical force” (§ 162). Out of the situation of the destruction of law the need arises for an institution that can assure that physical force is always on the side of justice (§ 163).

Hobbes’s and Schelling’s systems of law reveal a close structural affinity developed from a common core that the two thinkers define somewhat differently, in accordance with what each holds to be more significant. For Schelling, the reciprocal relationship between fear and freedom becomes manifest in what he calls the unity of life. We want to try to better understand the law governing this common ground and transform this oblique view of the system of natural law into a direct one.

We will begin with the deepest layer of the problem Hobbes and Schelling identified. For Hobbes, fear was a motive of action. The fear of being attacked by an other individual motivates me to set the goals of my action in self-defense: avoiding harm, concluding agreements on the mutual renunciation of the means of causing harm, and, finally, organizing public power in order to guarantee compliance with the agreements and punitive measures for those who break them. Schelling focuses on the same layer without expressly identifying the motive of fear. But we find the same conflict between empirical human beings that necessitates restrictions being placed on the scope of freedom in order to save its form. Lastly, we find the organization to guarantee ethically ordered coexistence. Fear and the goals of action form a special configuration of motives. Fear is fear of something quite specific, the invasion of my sphere by another. The setting of goals is equally specific; they constitute a direct defense or consist of prophylactic measures against the violation of my sphere. The delimitation of the problem is governed by the context of the system in which
the motive of fear is only relevant insofar as it directly leads to the coexistence, mandated by law, among the spheres of equal individuals.

When, following upon the fact that something is feared, Hobbes and Schelling analyze the question of what is feared, this specific layer of problems opens into more universal ones. A possible attack by another, or, more generally, a clash with another’s sphere of action, is the object of fear because something may happen to me in such a clash. Something can happen, because, by nature, the human being is a creature subject to suffering, which can result in destruction. Yet my capacity for suffering and my vulnerability are independent of any specific threat or attack on the part of another human being. They are fundamental aspects of the human being revealed to me through the life experiences of fear, anxiety, and despair, which themselves are of various content and depth. As Hobbes understands it, the ultimate fear is the fear of death. But it need not come to me at the hands of another human being; my situation in the world exposes me to it every day; every direction in which I am open to the world is also a direction from which death can come to me. This view is deemed obvious as long as it is thought to refer to the vulnerability of my body as an object in the world and to the various accidents that can befall it, as well as to life’s physiological phenomena, which, in the process of aging, also become signs of death. Many will question it, however, if it is thought to refer to the fact that my psychic and spiritual substance are at the mercy of superhuman powers.

When I turn away from the act of trying to reach my goal in order to consider the source of action I again find the universal layer of content revealed in my reflection about the object of fear. The passive experience of fearing something threatening me corresponds to the active experience of planning, setting goals, and finding the means to reach them. The first [experience], in which I feel that the world is impinging upon me, leads me to turn inward and withdraw into a deeper level of self. The experience of taking possession of the world and
feeling my capacity to seize and shape it brings me out of myself, makes me turn to the world and gain distance from myself. On the one hand, I experience myself as an object, as something acted upon by alien forces, as something for whose [well-being] I fear. On the other hand, I experience myself as a source of activity, an originator of action who powerfully reaches into the external world, seizes [external] things, and perhaps constitutes a threat [to others]. As the instance that determines the direction of these experiences, the ego is the point of departure, a primeval beginning and the prima causa of what takes place; it constitutes what Schelling calls the causality of life. The question concerning the source of action brings us to the same place that the question about what is to be feared led us, i.e., to the point of contact between them, which, viewed from either approach, we call life.

Within the realm that is illumined by reason, fear and freedom exist in the relationship of motive to deed. This relationship is clear but not simple. If, driven by fear of what might happen, I undertake a defensive action, the following components may be found in this experience. I see that, inescapably, an event will take place in the future if I do not do something to prevent it. This cognitive act is embedded in other experiences that, in respect to my person, color the anticipated event in a particular way. These experiences lead me to regard the anticipated event as something fearful and threatening. If I look more deeply into the experience that I find so fearful, I see through my fear to find myself a living being, to whose nature it is given to suffer loss, both of body and soul. It is from this threatened center that impulses to defensive action emerge. Rationally informed they take on the form of plans with clear goals and the knowledge of the means to attain them. Just as in the matter of motivation the cognitive experience of anticipating [an event] is embedded in other experiences whose origin and impulse are found in the nature of the individual’s existential core, equally the active response on the part of this existential core creates the substrata upon which the series
of anticipatory steps are built, and which is called a “plan” because my ego authors them. The concept of the plan brings into a unity the cognitive overview of a chain of events, in which my own actions are an element like any other relevant datum in the world’s causal nexus and the peculiar quality of this chain of events is one that emanates from my existential core. The chain of events unfolds according to a “plan,” indeed according to “my” plan, because the events that develop in the world are viewed and comprehended in a plan that is the result of my own activity. The exclusively rational discussion of motive and plan separates the cognitive elements from their existential context and operates with these isolated elements. But this renders invisible the passive and active existential substrata from whose unity the motives and goals of action split off in separate directions.

As soon as we leave the exclusive region of reason and turn to deeper levels, fear and action, the passive and active responses of the existential core, come together. In the sphere of instinctive, reactive behavior the objects of fear and action are not differentiated, not sorted according to cognitive acts that divide them into objects of fear and objects of action and fit them into the respective chain of causality. In the alarm induced by a horrible sight, the moments of cognitive foresight regarding impending danger, the life experience of the danger itself, and the reaction of fear cannot be kept apart. It is the entire human being who reacts with a shudder in body and soul and who starts back. Nor can the experience of horror be sharply distinguished from the impulses to activity intended to provide defense against the feared object. For even the passive responses—dismay, shuddering and wincing, of making one’s self small in the face of the threat—are first steps toward active defense. In shrinking before the threat and ducking, one reduces one’s existential volume and diminishes the threatened surface, thus increasing one’s chances of survival. To be knocked down in storm is also to take cover in order to escape it. A form continuum extends from the first passive responses
in the face of a horrifying threat to active defense against it. These include such acts as recoiling, ducking, starting back, throwing oneself to the ground, stepping to one side, flight, or flying into a rage, holding up one’s hands defensively, warding off a blow, engaging in self-defense, and extend all the way to the transition into acts of combat, in which defense clearly metamorphoses into attack. The unity of the human *agere* [to act] and *pati* [to suffer, to undergo] is even more intimately joined in the processes of the vital sphere. The body’s desire for food proceeds through a scale, ranging from the first impulses to eat through various degrees of hunger up to bodily cramps, and, ultimately, to the slackening of neuro-vascular irritability. In this series of responses, activity and passivity can hardly be distinguished from one another.

We departed from the sphere of rational clarity in order to look into the depths of body and soul reacting instinctively to the outside world. We also looked at the internal vital sphere in which life’s growth is, at the same time, most clearly part of its dissolution. Let us now depart in another direction, into the realm of the spirit, which Kierkegaard has described as the site of the synthesis of body and soul. In the analysis of Schelling’s theory of freedom, action emerges in the double direction of the whereto [*das Woraufhin*] of its goal and the whence [*das Woher*] of its living causality. Turning our glance back from the determination of goals, we discovered life’s ultimate depth and the point where freedom and fear touch. In a methodically identical turn away from [inadequacies of] rational reflection and choice, Kierkegaard identifies the spiritual essence of freedom in the origin of potentiality itself. “Freedom’s possibility is not the ability to choose between good and evil. Such thoughtlessness is no more in the interest of Scriptures than in the interest of thought. This possibility is to be able.”

20. Søren Kierkegaard, *Der Begriff der Angst* (1844) [Jena, [1912]], 44.
this transition is easy; in the reality of life it is more difficult. Suspended between fear and reality lies potentiality, which is neither free possibility nor fixed reality. “Anxiety is neither a category of freedom nor necessity; it is fettered freedom where freedom is not free in itself but tied up, not with necessity, but with itself.” Fear may be compared to dizziness. He who gazes into the gaping abyss becomes dizzy, and the source of dizziness is equally the abyss and the one contemplating it. “Thus fear is the dizziness of freedom. It comes about when freedom [. . . ] looks down into its own possibility and gropes for something finite to hold on to. In the grip of this dizziness freedom collapses in dizziness. Psychology cannot illuminate the matter any further, nor does it have the intention to.”

In this experience freedom’s goal has not yet been determined. The ego that can act is suspended in potentiality, but due to its finiteness and place in the world, [it] may, at any moment, have to enter into a decisive reality; anxiety is not fear of a specific threat, but fear of nothingness. “Fear and nothingness always correspond to one another.” For it is not until a specific action is decided upon that fear is lifted. I experience anxiety in the suspension between the possibility of deciding for an action in one direction or another, and the necessity of having to decide. In anxiety freedom posits “itself for itself in the anxiety of possibility, or in the nothingness of possibility, or in the nothingness of anxiety.” At life’s point of origin, which is without direction, potentiality is experienced as undetermined and groundless, completely dependent on itself, infinitely vulnerable and therefore full of anxiety. It sees no guidelines on which to base decisions, it knows nothing of good and evil and consequently lives in continual fear of losing itself. According to Kierkegaard, it is only in this region of fearful suspension between the possibility and the necessity

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 57.
23. Ibid., 93.
24. Ibid., 73.
of action that one may speak of freedom. Only the concrete ego intending action and sustained by the sources of its own existence is free. If freedom is rationally pictured as an abstract ego’s capacity to stand above all possible goals of its action, so is it in this moment of deliberation “not freedom, but meaningless reflection.” “To assert that freedom begins with the *liberum arbitrium* [free will], that it can choose good or evil equally [ . . . ] makes every explanation of it impossible. To speak of good and evil as the objects of freedom makes both the freedom and the concepts of good and evil into something finite. As a matter if fact, freedom is infinite and arises out of nothingness.”

The most precise analysis of the phenomenon of fear, which builds upon Kierkegaard’s thought, was undertaken by Heidegger. He views fear and anxiety as modes of the existential fundamental phenomenon of state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*], i.e., of mood [*Stimmung*] or of Dasein having a mood [*das Ge-stimmtsein*]. In its moods Dasein discloses itself as “factual” [*als “faktisches”*], as “thrown” [*als “geworfenes”*], as “delivered over” [*als “sich überantwortetes”*], namely, as Being-in-the-world. State-of-mind “is an existential fundamental form of *equiprimordial disclosure* [*die gleichursprüngliche Erschlossenheit*] of the world of Dasein-with, and of existence, because this disclosedness is essentially Being-in-the-world.”

Ultimately, the state of mind discloses Dasein to be that which the things of the world “approach” in a detrimental or beneficial way. Each in its particular manner, both modes of the state-of-mind, fear and anguish, disclose Dasein as Being-in-the-world and in the manner that it can be approached by that which is ready-to-hand in the world [*das Zuhandene*]. In encountering fear, “there is in every case something which

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25. Ibid., 111.
we encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness to hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being,” as something coming toward me from the world in a threatening fashion, be it of inorganic, organic, or human kind. “In fearing as such, what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us.” The fundamental layers of the entire complex of the life experience of fear is the unmediated discovery of a content of the world approaching me in its frightfulness. Thus a prospective evil is not first identified and then feared, the approaching evil is not first known in its being thus [Sosein] and then feared, but is first discovered in its fearfulness. “And in fearing, fear can then look at the fearsome explicitly, and ‘make it clear’ to itself. Circumspection sees the fearsome because it has fear as its state-of-mind. Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind [we call this possibility ‘fearfulness’ ['Furchtsamkeit']], has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close.”

That which fear fears about is that very entity that is afraid—Dasein itself. “Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals Dasein in the Being of its ‘there,’ even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness. If we fear about our house and home, this cannot be cited as an instance contrary to the above definition of what we fear about; for as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is in every case concernful Being-alongside.”

In this analysis of fearing, we are essentially within the layer identified by Hobbes and Schelling, but it is fundamentally superior to the earlier formulations, as in part Kierkegaard’s analysis was, because the phenomenon is not distorted by the interests of the natural-law deduction but comes into view directly in its self-givenness. Schelling still had the terminological difficulty, that the awkward concept of “life” was made

27. Ibid., 141 [ibid., 180].
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
the point of intersection between the traditional spheres of sensuousness and reason. Kierkegaard’s concept of existence and Heidegger’s concept of Dasein understand the human being in its unmediated unity; Heidegger further developed the terms that allow us to adequately speak of a unified entity. The expressions “existential” and “state-of-mind” make it possible for us to speak of the fundamental modes of Dasein without recourse to the logically and psychologically burdened expressions of “category” and “sensory experience.” In this sphere, the expressions “in the face of” [“Wovor”] and “about what of” [“Worum”] fear are indispensable in order to avoid the ambiguous concept “object.” At the same time, by avoiding the expression “ob-ject,” which would distort the relation into something fixed and static, our glance is made free to view fear for the dynamic of state-of-mind in its state of being afraid. In fearing about something [Sichfürchten] Dasein is free to open itself to approaching danger. Dasein does not see danger as a specific object at a fixed location, but trembles before it as something drawing near that takes our breath away, that grows constantly more constricting, etc. Dasein does not see danger as something coming closer, but experiences in its coming closer mood’s dimming and brightening, constriction and expansion.

Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety brings us into the depths that Kierkegaard identified. The term anxiety denotes a mode of the state-of-mind in which Dasein does not tremble before a world-immanent threatening Being, but before Dasein itself, as a Being-in-the-world. In the state of anxiety Dasein is not disclosed as that which is threatened by a specific content of the world, but “in-the-face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and nowhere.’ [. . . ] What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself.”\(^30\) That in-the-face-of,
of which one has anxiety, is Being-in-the-world as such. And in the same way the about-what of anguish is not a specific mode of Dasein’s Being but the sum of all of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Anxiety “throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. [. . .] Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible.” 31 Thus, the analysis of anxiety again brings us to the phenomenon of freedom. For “anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being-toward its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its being free for (propensio in) [. . .] the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over.” 32

We can examine the essence of freedom, which is so intimately connected to the fundamental state-of-mind of anxiety, if we begin with the surface phenomenon of deliberating freedom, which Kierkegaard called meaningless reflection. Bergson has produced the classical analysis of the situation of choosing in his Données immédiates. 33 He considers the situation that at a certain point in my life I have to choose one of two possible courses of action. That I stand at a point in my life before the choice of conducting myself in the manner of A, or the manner of B, may be expressed in the rational state of affairs: that in the one case I imagine the possibility of A; in the other, the possibility of B is realized. I have in view two final states of affairs, to one of which my action will lead. By considering the matter in this way, I abstract my reflecting ego so that it faces both of the possibilities of action, as well as the actual ego which must presently choose,

31. Ibid., 187–88 [ibid., 232].
32. Ibid., 188 [ibid., 232–33].
as objects separate from me. In actual fact my reflecting ego with its hesitations and uncertainties is part of the continuing real process [of choosing]. I am a living ego who, through decisions, is in a constant process of development “up to such time that free action becomes detached from the ego like an overripe fruit.”\(^{34}\) The fact that I have two possibilities before me between which I can choose like someone not involved is a metaphorical expression that partially falsifies reality. For the fact is that I do not stand before these possibilities as objects in the external world that I can alternately touch; these possibilities are immanent in my present, they come to fruition within me and I mature with them. But for the time being, it is still open which of the two will fully mature within me to become the fruit of action. Each of my deliberations is a phase of this growth, until finally, as Bergson’s striking image expresses it, action detaches itself from me. But in the moment in which I act, I no longer have a choice between two possibilities. The problem’s obscurity has its origin in the fact that deliberation is conceived as a movement in space between two possibilities, “while it actually is a dynamic progression in which the ego and the motives themselves are in a constant process of becoming as if they were real live beings.”\(^{35}\)

I have discussed Bergson’s theory first because its starting point, the concept of duration, demonstrates with a high degree of technical precision that the concept of deliberation cannot shed more light on the problem of freedom. The acts of deliberation are not transcendent to real duration [but] take place within it. The rationally reflecting ego that keeps its goals in sight and discloses the calculation of its motives is only a limited part of Dasein as a whole, and the deliberative acts themselves become further determinants of the process in which action ripens toward maturity. Several years before Bergson, Nietzsche recorded very similar deliberations, which,

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 135.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 140.
however, are not so clearly delineated but merge with further aspects of the problem of action and responsibility. Number 129 of *Dawn* analyzes the situation of deliberation under the title “The alleged conflict of motives.”

Before an act, there comes into our reflective consciousness one after another the consequences of various acts, all of which we believe we can carry out, and we compare these consequences. We believe we have resolved upon an action when we have concluded that its consequences will be more favorable than those of any other. Before reaching this conclusion we honestly agonize over the great difficulty of divining the consequences, of assessing their implications, of being certain that we see them in their entirety without omitting any; in addition our calculus must still be divided by contingency. Yes, and the most difficult of all is this: All these consequences, which are so difficult to identify individually, must be weighed against one another on the same scales. But usually, due to the different quality of each possible consequence, we do not have the scales and weights needed for this casuistry of advantage.

When successful, these deliberations produce a clear picture of the consequences of an act and thus reveal the motive for why this act and no other was posited. But introducing the term motive does not solve the problem.

In the moment when we finally act our action is often enough determined by another type of motive than that mentioned here, namely, those involved in our “picture of the consequences.” What is at work here is our customary way of expending energy, or some small impulse from a person we fear, respect, or love, or our indolence that prefers to do what is near at hand, or the excitement of our imagination, brought about, at the decisive moment, by some immediate and perhaps trivial occurrence. Also unpredictable physical influences can play a role, or our mood, or some emotion that just then leaps forth. In short, motives are at work which in part are unknown to us, in part only very poorly known and which we cannot have known before the event, or weigh against one another.

Probably a struggle takes place between these prerational motives, a battling to and fro, but the struggle takes place in an
invisible and unknowable fashion. The rational picture of consequences represents a substantial portion of the battle line of motives, but I myself do not set up the entire battle order; I do not see it, nor can I see the battle, and I do not know who wins. Ultimately, I do realize my action, but I do not know whose victory I thus achieve. “But we are accustomed to exclude these unconscious processes and to think through the preparation of an act only to the extent that it is conscious: Thus we mistake the conflict of motives for the comparison of the possible consequences of various acts, a confusion that has the direst consequences and that is most disastrous for the development of morals!”

While Bergson’s analysis is neutral in respect to the phenomenon of Dasein’s deeper layers and isolates the problem of duration, Nietzsche’s treatment of the problem argues that nothing at all is decided in the sphere of the deliberating ego. While Bergson’s analysis as presented here endeavored to dissolve the falsely conceived spatial picture of deliberation and replace it with the more appropriate one of maturation leading to action, Nietzsche eliminates all pictures and introduces the conflict of motives in the subrational sphere. Rational deliberation has a preparatory and an auxiliary function, but the final decision stems from a nonrational layer of Dasein. The theme of the deeper layers of Dasein is expressly chosen, whereas Bergson tried to avoid it. This “avoidance” is to be methodically interpreted as an aspect of the purity of the analysis, for apart from the theory we have just presented an analysis of the deeper levels is one of Bergson’s principal achievements (which we will examine below). The path to an in-depth analysis is already indicated in the selection of the topic of deliberation to serve as the investigation’s starting point. “Deliberation” does not become a relevant and personally motivated topic of ethics until the spontaneous certainty of action within a firmly established order is upset. For a wide-ranging sphere of every-

36. Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröthe, 1881, §129.
day activities, action remains largely unproblematic because conduct is undertaken in accordance with a practiced and ethically unquestioned habit of social intercourse. For the sphere of intimate and more weighty actions, “deliberation” may be excluded in most cases, if the acting persons orient their decisions to existing ethical or religious systems. As preparation for action, deliberation only acquires a central importance when the established criteria of conduct are shaken and the person [feels] thrown back [upon himself].

37. [The manuscript breaks off here.]
Political Theory as Human Science

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In principle, both the intentions of Political Science as Human Science and its position within the contemporary scientific literature are clear from the table of contents, and we can confine ourselves here to a few brief remarks. Introduction: The conscious turn to the human science approach is a general phenomenon to be found in literary science, art history, and the study of religion. [Let me remind the reader of Riegel,
Political science has only recently turned to this approach [the reasons will be explained in detail] and the introduction surveys the contemporary situation of German political science to the extent that it is concerned with adopting the human science approach. The focus here will be on essays by Smend and Schmitt.

Chapter one analyzes the reality of the state as it is given in the perspectives of the persons reciprocally involved in the acts that constitute the life of the state: the judge viewed by the legal theoretician, the legal order viewed by the judge or the criminal, the electorate viewed from the standpoint of the constitution, the parties as seen by the electorate, the citizens as the object of political theory, the justifications of the structure of domination as it is experienced by individual citizens, etc. The connex of these perspectives constitutes [applying the theories of Max Weber and Fritz Sander] what we call the “situation of domination.” In the situation of domination, attempts at self-reflection emerge with the intention of grasping [the situation] as the expression of a unit. The basic types of such attempts are the theory of the legal unity of the state and the political theory that legitimates the situation of domination. Points 2a and 2b treat the two essential possibilities of structuring the unity of the legal order: either as a unity of the institutional context, or of the norm context.

Chapter two addresses the philosophical foundation of the problems of norm and decision as the prerequisite to the solution of the aporia of law and domination.

Chapter three proceeds systematically and, I believe, completely through the realm of political theory [as far as it is the theory of the modern state and not of the city-state or empire]. It approaches it dialectically, through both the dialectical possibilities and the historical realizations, and examines the complete range of theoretical possibilities, including disillusionment with them.

Chapter four takes up the problem raised in the preceding chapter concerning the historical course as a unit of meaning
and explains under point 1 the basic constitution of a spiritual unity that is created, not by a person, like a work of art is, but by a plurality of persons. [This appears to me to be the central problem and principal difficulty of a political theory as human science, on which earlier attempts have failed—to the extent that they addressed the problem at all.] Point 2 shows that the spiritual unit of meaning called the “state” can actually be explained and classified in concepts. The possibility and the process of such a formulation will be demonstrated with the help of a French and an American example. Point 3 investigates the question of the spiritual substantiality of action in the state. Beginning with Jaspers's treatment of substantiality and exhaustion [Entleerung], examples drawn from constitutional law will show that these categories can also be applied to state units.

In my opinion, the readership and market for such a book would be, first of all, those interested in the literature on the general theory of the state; second, sociologists; and third, it would seem to me to be of importance to that circle of readers (of whose scope I have no idea) interested in the foundations of the human sciences in general (the readership of Dilthey’s, Rothacker's, and Spranger’s works). The book’s theme lies within the interests and primary lines of development of contemporary political theory. The title appears to me to be both suitable to the subject and also effective as a “slogan.” It points to a systematic foundation of political science, which to this day has not been formulated in such breadth and depth, and at the same time the direction political science has in fact taken has prepared the way for such a work, and it will therefore not appear too original and exotic. The book would have an approximate size of twelve to fifteen printed sheets.

1.

When we speak of the concept of spirit in German political theory, our discussion will inevitably cast light on an as yet dimly lit border region, and we must therefore penetrate to
questions of principle that have hitherto scarcely been raised, let alone answered. The concept of spirit has not arisen from the systematic needs of political science as a discipline, nor have political science investigations had a concept at their disposal formed with their specific problems in mind. Thus, the investigations necessary to lay the foundation for a theory of the state are conducted in the shadow of fundamental categories adapted from theoretical spheres alien to the discipline. The basic concepts, and the concept of spirit in particular, carry the accumulated burdens of the literary past that they had acquired up to the moment they were adopted by political science; thus these concepts of the spirit do not appear as the result of the discipline’s own inherent impetus. An analysis of the contemporary state of political science must therefore examine the entire richly layered horizon of meanings that have accrued to the term *spirit* in order to free it and give it the space it needs to regain its original movement.

An important direction in the definition of spirit can be found in Simmel’s last work, *Lebensanschauung*. In the pieces on the “Transcendence of Life” and the “Turn to the Idea,” Simmel develops a concept of life as that which streams and flows and is also restricted to individual limits. The process of life takes place in a series of acts of self-transcendence in which the formless stream flowing through successive generations is also dammed up in individuals, in which it is delineated and raised to a clearly defined form. Not only does life accumulate in the ego as a total existence, but in it is arrested in all experienced contents as well and lifted out of its own stream to crystallize into form. But this independent, objective form cannot be completely separated from life and remains bound to its origin. Life pours through its own limits into the beyond of objectifications but, even beyond its borders, remains life, and the same stream, which brought forth objectified form, takes it up again and washes it away.

An essential, concrete case of the immanent transcendence of life is found in the spiritual worlds that so completely break loose from the generating stream that they no longer serve it, but rather force life into their service. They are no longer yoked to life's purpose and in their autonomy confront life with their own ends, i.e., they appear to be without purpose. The turn of life to the idea marks the liberation from the automatism of the organic body's inner teleology to freer movements in formative acts, up to a level where life has completely freed itself from the bonds of its internal purposefulness to find its supreme expression in the creation of a world in accordance with the form principle of an idea. The spiritual worlds organize isolated contents into a unity; but however extensive it may be and even if we could survey it entirely, a mere collection of contents cannot constitute a world but remains an anarchic diversity of isolated pieces. Only under a principle of formation do pieces fit together into an intelligible unity. The form principle provides the formula of order, so that we recognize in it a world as such and do not have to survey the entire contents (indeed, life does not offer us the possibility for making such a survey). Instead, we recognize its character as a world in small pieces by virtue of our knowledge of the form principle. Several principles can form the same world-matter into a world, whereby matter is never given to us in itself but always as something already formed, as belonging to a particular world—be this the world of art, religion, the state, eroticism, the economy, or, finally, the so-called "real world." But this is by no means formless either: Its forms depend upon whether we understand it as the world of natural science or as the everyday world of our dynamic, nutritional, and social relationships. In any case it is subject to its own formal principles. The formless world-matter can never be an empirical datum, for a datum is always that of formed matter. It is a limiting concept in the dialectical

speculation about the world’s spiritual forms, which, despite their variety, are supposed to retain their relationship of being anchored in the stream of life’s unity—a limited individual confronting the world, indeed, the one world.

The question of what the various spiritual worlds have in common deserves particular attention because Hans Freyer, an influential theorist of the objective spirit, has taken up this theme. Following Simmel, Freyer also holds that the autonomous worlds do not come into being in such a way “that from a given whole pieces are cut out and distributed to different worlds; rather they are products formed by a particular categorical principle, correlates of a specific spontaneity. The same elements that can enter as raw material into the world of religion can also become the raw material of scientific theoretical thought or of the aesthetic sphere. [. . .] Because each area is ruled by its own logic and is a closed continuum, these worlds can be grasped as pure material contexts that never mix, disturb, or encroach upon one another.”

4 Form and matter, subjective spontaneity and the objects it grasps, are the schemata in which the nature of the spirit is described here. We do not wish to criticize this solution, but merely, provisionally, to identify it as just one answer next to others that have been influential in shaping our notion of spirit and that, more or less vaguely grasped, were present in recent attempts to reinterpret political science. It is very much an open question whether differences in religious attitudes, philosophical systems, or works of art can be traced back to the differences of formal principles, or whether so-called material differences play an important role. This question of dialectical structure must be brought to bear on the problem, and [indeed, it is with this question] that we must begin. In Simmel’s theory, the form-matter antithesis was retained as one among several structural starting points. We will see how Freyer and Theodor Litt have taken Simmel’s themes further and in an entirely different direction.

The question whether the essence of a spiritual world, the essence of the turn to the idea, should be sought in the formal structures of the newly created worlds transcends Simmel’s theory in which the essence of spirit is determined by the external schema of the opposition between teleologically bound nature and free creative acts. Spirit is what frees itself from life’s organic bonds and, without ceasing to be life, confronts life as an autonomous entity. Simmel’s ideas are not linked with systematic care; instead, the phenomenon of life transcending itself is demonstrated in a loose series of classifications—first concerning the ego as an existing totality, then concerning the problem of time, and, finally, in a series of concrete cases dealing with matters of content. Therefore, without any structural difficulties, life can signify the amorphous stream of a world-substance that dams itself up in the individual into a form and thus confronts itself, and at the same time it can signify the organism that lives within the automatism of its instincts and transcends itself in free world creating spiritual acts. Simmel has demonstrated this second image, in which dialectical transcendence expresses itself in a series of concrete examples in which life liberates itself from the purposeful forms of automatic processes and transforms particular, teleologically understood, structural elements into ideal worlds. He shows how life transforms the content of its pains and pleasures into the spiritual experiences of happiness and sorrow. He shows the transition from eroticism to love, from prescientific experience to the context of science, from empirical sight to artistic vision and form, from socially purposeful conduct to the sphere of law and morals and the turn to spiritual and religious experience. In creating all these worlds, regulated by their own internal principles, free of life’s purposes, life’s freedom is understood as the opposite of organic purpose and is not just free for some other kind of necessity. The categories of freedom and determination have no meaning in the realm of nature, which is subsumed under laws of process. The organ of life, bound to a purpose, is not free; its
processes are determined by the terminals of its origin and end, and by the stations in-between. It is equally meaningless to apply the concept of determination here, since all the elements of free opposition are missing that would make it possible to experience being forced by necessity. The internal self-sufficiency of organically bound life has nothing to do with freedom and determination and is the complete opposite of free creative acts of the spirit.

A fundamental pattern for determining the concept of spirit on the part of classical German philosophy has been to focus on spirit’s relationship to its deep vital layers. Because the classical systems are now better known, this pattern begins to play a larger role in the philosophy of our time. Beyond this, the acquaintance with Anglo-Saxon social psychology has grown—in whose system this pattern has been decisive in an unbroken tradition since the end of the eighteenth century. One contemporary contribution is Scheler’s draft of a scientific anthropology of spirit, a work that provides us with the most significant sign that this concept of spirit has been infused with new life.5

We find the classical paradigm of this pattern in Kant’s short essay on the “Probable Beginnings of the History of Humanity.” At the beginning of history, instinct, that “voice of God that all animals obey,” must have guided the human being as well. With the first stirrings of reason, the human abandoned the bonds of instinct and attempted by free action to gratify those needs which, up to that time, he had trusted instinct to satisfy. “He discovered within himself a capacity to choose a way of life and not, like other animals, to be bound to only one. [. . . ] At any rate, he stood on the edge of an abyss; for from the individual objects of his desires, which up to that time had been identified by instinct, an infinity now opened. Yet once this state of freedom was experienced, it was impossible for him to return to the state of servitude (under the rule of

5. Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos [1928].
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"This fall of the human being from instinct, which, to be sure, brought moral evil into creation, but only in order to make the moral good possible, is inarguably the greatest and happiest event in human history. Human freedom dates from this moment; here was laid the first, distant founding stone of his morality." Kant describes the steps of this liberation for the human being’s diet, for the transition from instinctive sexual satisfaction to morality, for the anticipation of the future and death, and the order of life that results from [this anticipation], for the human’s recognition of himself as the purpose of nature, and, finally, for the recognition of the equality of human beings and the just forms of social life. For Kant and Schiller the transition to the idea appeared as an elevation from instinct to reason, from nature to freedom and to true humanity that is possible only in the light of consciousness. The liberation from nature did not destroy life’s foundation but took up its material and ennobled it. For Simmel, too, the spiritual worlds operating according to their own laws free themselves from their vital foundations but remain based upon them, for they are only transformations of the life-teleological processes that have become independent. Ignoring the time-bound elements of philosophical style, we find the same structural pattern in both cases.

Certain psychic moods are connected to both the classical and the new style of philosophizing that we must not neglect if we wish to thoroughly understand the notions of spirit that are important to political theory. For Kant and Schiller, the movement to humanity was an ascent, a further development of the human being and the path to a goal that should be joyfully welcomed. For Simmel and his successors, the philosophy of life is borne by a sensitive romantic mood in which the

6. Kant, Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte [1784].
deeply moved thinker gazes at a spectacle of grave conflicts, deep tragedy, and sacrifice raised to the level of sacramental mystery. If life becomes objective in spiritual forms, it also gives itself laws and models in whose service it must act in the future. Yet in ceaselessly bringing forth new forms, it makes the old ones relative. In the infinity of the cultural process, life develops ever-higher objectifications that are continually overcome. This process does not occur without friction, for the forms have become independent and their solid structures resist transformation and destruction. Simmel sees in this process, which is both creation and destruction, spirit’s essential tragedy. “That life hurts itself on the fixed objective forms it brings forth, that, in its subjective form, it finds no access to them or to the demands that it has developed in their forms.”

These thoughts are taken up by Litt. The image of life stands before him just as it did for Simmel. From its fertile, organic depths, life wells up into ever-new forms; yet however high it raises itself into the spiritual spheres, as a psycho-physical totality it remains bound to its dark foundations. In the tension between the enlightened demands of the spiritual forms and the ground of life in which all demands and their contradictions are rooted, the unique fate and tragedy of the internal world is revealed: “that it does not find its image in the sphere of the objective and normative, but rather its opposite, and that which lives in itself as one, even in infinite tension, is, for its counterpart, only contradiction, inconsistency and self-betrayal.” The opposition between a multiplicity of spiritual laws with their contradictions and the one life that has brought them forth occasions the tragic feeling in these words. In the statement that immediately follows, these feelings are induced by the opposition between life in the form of organic ties and in the form of freedom we find paradigmatically illustrated in Kant’s and Schiller’s concept of humanity. “For this is the price that life must pay in order to become ‘spirit’: that it surrender

8. Simmel, Lebensanschauung, 98.
the inner balance and harmony that constitutes the happiness of exclusively organic existence, step out of its circle and create its own counterpart in ideal possibilities, demands, and forms, which, once they have become visible, confuse life's immanent forces, deliver instinct to doubt and choice, madden instinct with reflection, and, with all of this, hurl the ego that has awakened to 'freedom' into a world of conflict from which there is no return to the longed-for home of life."\(^9\)

Let us proceed systematically in our portrayal of the tragic mood. In all of its manifestations, especially in that of the spirit, the thinker can face the stream of life and his gaze falls upon the field of rubble that is the cultural process, on the ruins from which new life blooms only to be broken in turn, just as it broke the form that preceded it. The philosopher can also place himself within the tension between the ground of life and free form and experience, with particular poignancy, the inner raggedness and basic conflict that transcendence implies. As Litt has done in the passage just quoted, the thinker can identify with life in the pole of the freely acting ego and from there gaze with longing back to the original state of innocence and peace. Finally, he can place himself at the ground of life and look up to the worlds that life has created out of its depth. This last possibility of tragic awe has moved Hans Freyer to describe the primordial phenomenon of life as expelling pieces of itself into the world out of the force of its own tension and then taking them back again, to complete the circle in which it assimilates the world: “It captures some object, turns around and takes it home. [. . .] The intake of food is at once the most primitive and clearest case of a genuine relationship of life to its objects.” This clear self-referential closure out of which life ventures only in order to return, after it has absorbed useful pieces of the world, is abandoned in the creative process. Here, the primordial phenomenon of life is negated, for life does not absorb anything objective but only releases its tension into

the external world. “Life-tension is sacrificed to the objective world [. . .] what the tension of life surrendered in sacrifice forms its own structures and cannot be taken back from these objectifications, rather they demand more [sacrifice].” “That is the great paradox of creation, its opposition to life, its anti-nature. . . . Creation sanctifies both the object and the subjective sacrifice. The mystery of a sacrament lies in it; sacrificially it transforms subjective, living tension into immanent, objective things.” With this fourth position, we believe all the tragic possibilities of life have been covered. That, collectively, these possibilities could occasion the foregoing discussion suggests the importance of this tragic mood within the notion of spirit in general.

We return from the images of feeling to the structural schemata in which the nature of spirit is to be determined. Next to the fundamental notion of life as the substance that transcends itself in spirit, the notion of an order of being extending from organically bound life to freedom—the schema of humanitarian philosophy—led a relatively independent existence. These were followed by Simmel’s application of the idea of transcendence to the relationships of psychic reality and the logical sphere of meaning. Real psychic life brings forth spiritual structures, and in this transcendence the essence of spirit is defined as the objectivity that confronts the subjective-psychological sphere. Taking up this approach, Freyer has developed his theory of the objective spirit and used the phenomenological method in his very skillfully conducted study of the various levels of objectification. Whether what Freyer understands by the phenomenological method is identical with the conception of the thinkers who publish their works in Husserl’s “Yearbook” need not concern us here. We note only that a fundamental idea of Brentano and Husserl—the intentionality of consciousness—provides the starting point for

10. Freyer, Theorie des objektiven Geistes, 74.
11. Simmel, Lebensanschauung, 97.
Freyer’s investigations as well. By *intentionality* we understand the quality of mental processes that are the consciousness of something: “A perceiving is a perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing, a judging is a judging of a predicatively formed affair-complex, valuing of a predicatively formed value-complex, a wishing of a predicatively formed wish-complex, and so forth. Acting bears upon action. Doing bears upon the deed, loving bears upon the loved one, being glad bears upon the gladsome; and so forth. In every actional cogito a radiating ‘regard’ is directed from the pure Ego to the ‘object’ of the consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the affair-complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it.”¹² In the structure of consciousness, Freyer distinguishes between expressive movements and demonstrative gestures. Expressive movements—tears, shining eyes, rage-contorted face, clenched fist—are dependent elements of a psycho-physical process of life and remain entirely closed within it; in no way do they refer to an outside world; they are not related to objects but remain closed up within themselves. By contrast, the meaning of demonstrative gestures extends into the world, directed to objects, like a finger pointing to a thing. Besides the forms by which it expresses itself, the psychophysical unity also includes that structure of intentionality of consciousness toward the world. The demonstrative gesture, by means of which the ego extends itself into the world, is the first step of the objectivization of spirit, for the objective world splits off from the experiential totality. The meaning of the sign (a pointing finger) is an objective state of affairs (this thing here in space). If we abandon the standpoint of the ego that enacts the demonstrative gestures and instead observe the ego from outside, we can distinguish those aspects

of the ego that are its expression from those that have objective meaning. The interpretation of the gestures can proceed physionomically and concentrate on the psychic subjectivity of that which expresses itself, or it can proceed objectively and grasp the objective meaning that has freed itself of all subjectivity. Freyer calls the detachment of the objective meaning from the physionomic meaning the second step of objectification. In the third step, the spirit becomes fully objective and extracts itself from the psychophysical context and objective meaning makes itself independent in a so-called form of pointing gestures, for example, a signpost. But the final objectification should not be misunderstood to be materialization. Of course, spiritual forms exist in which the spirit’s objectification is accompanied by material symbolization [Versinnlichung]—works of visual art, for example. Yet the forms that are most important to us, the social forms of the spirit, are not reflected in material. Also the forms of community life, common law, and faith in God are not exclusively real in the psychic acts that realize them but are independent of these acts and latently present for realization in them. A context of objective-psychic elements is an ideal sketch that transcends the concrete course of experience and takes the real experience into its form. Thus, for the question of the transcendent existence of objective spirit, it is a matter of indifference whether it forces actual experience into its train through its sensual reality (as, for example, the acts of re-creative understanding of a work of art) or whether it emerges “in the more sublime form of a regularity.” In this context, Freyer speaks of the “character of validity with which the forms confront the realizations.”

According to Freyer, compared to the forms of the structures, instruments, and signs, or to the form of culture, the social form is unique. “The simple social rule, which marks the formalization of one single relationship, is the basic element of this world of forms.”

14. Ibid., 53.
higher forms of community are built from this basic element, up to the most complicated organizations that exist independently of the particular individuals who enter into and leave them again. It would not suffice, a form of society, for example, a state\textsuperscript{15}.
Lecture One

To discuss the problem of national types of mind puts the student who attempts it in an unfavorable position, for he speaks, first, on a subject that is already familiar to his audience in their everyday lives. Every one of you moves without much reflection in a world surrounded by individuals whom you classify, perhaps subconsciously, into national groups and whom you treat in daily intercourse according to this subconscious classification. All of us know, without splitting hairs, that Asians are not of the same mental type as Europeans or Americans, that the mental type of an American differs from that of a European, that the types of civilization and culture reveal differences when going from Western Europe to Central Europe, from Central Europe to the eastern parts, or to the south; we recognize as self-evident the differences between a Frenchman and a German, a Frenchman and an Englishman, and even, in spite of the frequently asserted Anglo-Saxon racial unity, the differences between an Englishman and an American. All of these, and other differences, are plain facts for every one of us; nobody would doubt them; and perhaps none of us

Eric Voegelin, “National Types of Mind and the Limits to Interstate Relations,” in Voegelin Papers, box 51, folder 10, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Calif.
would see any problem in them that would justify the collection of well-known materials I intend to present to you.

Second, the student's task is made difficult by having to go into rather complicated questions of a theoretical nature, the value of which for treating empirical facts concerning international law can only become clear at the end of the discourse.

If we try to trace back the scientific treatment of our problem to its beginnings, we shall have to make the same distinctions that we have to make in going back to the origins of sociology as a science. We have to distinguish between the current state of the science as an independent discipline and the treatment of its problems in a larger context of general philosophy. Social questions have been the object of human thought as early as, and even earlier than, the philosophy of Herakleitos. Society, however, became an independent subject only in the course of the nineteenth century, when so-called bourgeois society, with the ordering of property and family relations of the educated and well-to-do bourgeois classes, had come to be the dominant factor in politics. Comte in France, Spencer in England, Hegel and Lorenz von Stein in Germany, created the concept of bourgeois society, together with the concept of the science of sociology.

In the same way we may trace the problem of national types of mind back to antiquity, and especially to Plato. In the *Politieia* Plato states that the human soul is made up of three parts: one part, the lowest in rank, has a desire for the useful, it is chiefly interested in commercial activities, it drives man to business and to seek profit; the next in rank is the courageous part, which makes a man fit for service as a warrior; the highest in rank is the part that makes a man wise and able to make rules for other men and to govern them according to his insight. The application of this analysis of mind to the order of society is well known; little known, however, is the very important application of the analysis to the problem of national types. Plato was of the opinion that the peoples known to him could be classified according to the tripartite
structure of the soul. The Phoenicians, he says, are a group dominated by the lowest part of the soul; they are a commercial people, particularly gifted at business affairs and making money. On the other hand there are certain barbarian nations—he mentions the Scythian population in the northeast of the Pontus Euxinus—who are brilliant beyond all others in military virtue; Plato has a certain sympathy for these warrior nations. And third, there is the one nation that is dominated by the governing part of the soul, and therefore chosen to be master over all the other nations, and this is, of course, Greece.

The Platonic tentative typology of national mental structures exhibits all the characteristics we find in modern attempts in this direction, and we are therefore justified in dwelling on it at some length. The types of mind are found by varying the intensity of one element of the mental unit; every type contains the whole unit, the whole of the human soul, and the single types differ one from the other according to the dominance of one or the other factor in the whole make-up. A fundamental aspect of the problem is revealed in this scheme: The types have to be units of substantial similarity, and at the same time they have to be different in every little detail because they are shaped in the most profound way by some dominant principle that gives a uniform and unique style to the type in question. Up to this day, the outline of the problem given by Plato is all important because the possibility of interpreting mental types rests on the assumption that the type to be interpreted is intelligible to the interpreter; and it is intelligible, of course, only when it is substantially homogeneous with the interpreting mind. An existence entirely unrelated to our own will be entirely unintelligible to us.

Another feature of the Platonic view is equally characteristic of our modern approach to the problem, the belief that the interpreter’s national type of mind, in Plato’s case the Greek, is superior to all the others. I shall have to deal with this feature later on more extensively, and I wish to remind you here of the fact that every great nation in our day sincerely believes
that it is the flower of spiritual development, that God has
ingled it out as his most beloved and most valuable, and that
it is destined by the will of God to save the world from evil by
forming all men in its likeness. This imperialism of the mind
expresses itself among today’s nations in a more sublimated
and milder form than in antiquity when mankind was divided
into Greeks and Barbarians; but the idea of barbarism is not
dead, and the belief of every nation that the others are more
or less barbarous is still very much alive. We shall have to
trace this belief back to its roots, since it is one of the chief
factors that imposes quite definite limits on the development
of interstate relations.

For the beginning of the modern enquiry into the subject of
national types I cannot give as precise a date as I can for the
beginning of sociology as a science. A science of national types
of mind has not yet been formally established; it is still in the
state of growing out of the larger context of cultural types in
general. Thus, research into cultural types has only come about
within the last ten years, establishing definitions and results
that at least have their own contours and do not crumble at
the first attack.

The phenomenon of cultural types has become evident with
the enlargement of the historical horizon. If we confine our-
selves to the nineteenth century, we may see how the growth
of the new mass of historical material first destroys the tradi-
tional forms of historical speculation and then leads on to the
reorganization of the ever-growing masses. Comte was able to
successfully arrange his material under three types: the theo-
logical, the metaphysical, and the positivistic state of mind and
culture. The three types were supposed to form a chronological
order and to lead up from the theological state to the culmina-
tion of the present positivist age. When we read Comte’s essay
carefully we easily discover the historical models on which he
has based his abstract types. For him, the theological age is
equivalent to the Middle Ages and its religious culture; the
metaphysical age is the period of protestant natural law, and he identifies the age of positivism with the present and with the evolution of science. The amount of material on which he bases his typology is comparatively small. It does not go further back than the Middle Ages, and his conception of history seems to be chiefly influenced by the change from natural-law speculation to the period of initial scientific research. Everything that lies before this change is denounced as theological; his relatively clear horizon does not stretch farther back than perhaps the Renaissance, and all previous history disappears in one undifferentiated mass of theology.

Hegel’s conception of history already has a larger horizon. It takes the whole of the Christian period as a unit and puts it on one level with the units of classical and of oriental antiquity. Oriental antiquity marks the beginning of history; it is the age of despotism, where nobody is free in the state but one: the despot. There follows the classic period of the Greek polis, where not yet everyone, but at least a greater number—more than one—is free; the third period is the present era, which ends in a state form in which all men are free. The dialectical development of liberty (liberty of one, of a greater number, of all) serves as the principle of type-construction, just as the development toward rationality was Comte’s principle for organizing the historical material. The mass of material, however, has grown considerably and almost reaches the limits of our own horizon.

After Hegel the material was increased substantially only once more, and the increased material was once again organized into types within the old scheme of the linear development of mankind. The new wealth of anthropological knowledge has entered since the middle of the century, and the new science of primitive society was arranged into a system by Lewis Morgan in his famous book on Ancient Society. The new influx and Morgan’s book have helped in the creation of the last great and original evolutionary conception of history, that of Marx and Engels. According to the theories of these two men
the history of mankind begins with a primitive unreflected communist period, it goes on in a dialectical development to a state of things where one class of the population rules over the others, and it will end, after an intermediate period, in an anarchic community of free men. This conception of history is on the one hand wider than the earlier ones, as it includes the facts of primitive social life; it is rather narrower on the other hand, because the idea of a class-state is based on the model of industrial society in the period of 1830 to 1845; the third period of a free community has not been formed on any model at all but is the result of utopian imagination—Marx never tried to give even the slightest institutional description of this future period. As compared with the historic wealth of the earlier systems the Marxist view of history is, in spite of the newly organized anthropological material, rather poor.

All these type-studies use the same fundamental scheme of construction: The single types are well characterized and held together by an evolutionary principle, which gives a chronological order to the types and, at the same time, makes them intelligible by marking their place in evolution. This fundamental scheme is rather important, because it is frequently made use of even today in the construction of historical aspects, and because the respect it still enjoys is a rather awkward obstacle to the successful and free development of the new methods of type-construction. In this old scheme the single type does not designate a structural unit, the types of mind are not closed in themselves as self-sufficient entities, they are not independent of one another. On the contrary: Their intelligibility, and therewith the possibility of their being interpreted, is the result of their interrelatedness. Hegel’s epochs of liberty can only be understood as genetic types; they have to take their place in the evolutionary sequence, or else they will be of no importance at all. And the same holds true for Comte’s evolutionary law: In themselves the types have no meaning, they are only steps in the rational evolution of the human mind to positivism. In these cases, the single type is
not the structural unit, but the whole evolution of mind is the unit under consideration; the single types have only the function of parts in the overriding context. The concept of evolution in a straight line, of an evolutionary unit, containing the types as subdivisions in it, does not fit in with the Platonic position as set forth above. Plato’s types are intelligible because of their substantial homogeneity with the interpreter’s mind—I shall call this relation from now on the Platonic postulate. When the realm of historical phenomena is conceived to be the embodiment of an evolving principle, intelligible types and interpreting minds in the Platonic sense are impossible—there is no room for contemporaneous, independent units. Either all the contemporaneous nations have to be imagined as having reached the same point in their evolution—then the whole theory of national types is finished at the outset—or the existing differences have to be interpreted as lags in evolution: Then one nation will be the most advanced, and the others follow at lesser or greater distances. Indeed, this alternative has been frequently chosen under the rule of the old scheme—for instance, in the case of Comte, who was of the opinion that mankind, on its way toward rationality, had in general reached the state of positivism, but that the French led the world in this race.

As this older scheme did not employ a multitude of structural units for the construction of types, but practically only the one evolutionary unit with subdivisions, the aim of the construction was not yet that of understanding other contemporaneous existences. These speculative philosophers certainly wanted to understand something, only the something was not someone else, but themselves. I have taken care, in setting forth their doctrines, always to point out what I call the models of their theories. They take certain pieces of historical material, according to their respective horizons, and transfer them under the guise of abstract concepts into their system of ideas. The dominating factor is, not the historical material, but the idea that selects certain fragments of the material
and assimilates them to the world of abstract thought. This idea, now, serves the quite distinct purpose of explanation and justification of the philosopher’s historical environment and of the action to be taken in it. The constructions of Comte and Hegel may easily be recognized as the glorification of the time they live in, with a little extra glorification of France and Prussia, respectively, on the side. This element of the scheme corresponds to the Barbaroi-problem of Plato; the imperialism of the mind has changed its form somewhat, but it is ever-present as the speculative philosopher’s desire, when speaking of history and his nation’s place in it, to justify its existence in the realm of spirit. The philosophical discourse has a vital function in the life of a person as well as in that of a nation or an age of mankind; it is, if we take it unreflected, a mode of self-assertion, as self-defense or war is a mode of self-assertion in the physical world; if we take it as reflected, it is the self-assurance of one’s right to exist, and in this function [it is] of the utmost importance for the moral life of a person or a group such as a nation; it is, I should say, the very center and backbone of existence. The problem of existence, as far as it concerns the existence of a body politic, will be addressed explicitly in the third of these lectures.

I have taken the theories of Comte and Hegel as examples because they are the simplest ones. A definite law of the mind explains the history of mankind as a whole. In a rather tyrannical way it selects a number of materials, sometimes a ridiculously small quantity, and uses them as proofs that historical experience shows indeed the same mental development as the idea in its own realm. The self-evolution of the idea according to a dialectical law, or in the direction of ever-growing intelligibility, gives a rule for the interpretation of history. The grandeur of these conceptions does not lie at all in the material interpreted but exclusively in the greatness of the law of the mind, which is used as a means of interpretation. When it is not a law of the mind as envisaged by a great philosopher, the whole interpretation business becomes a farce. I know of

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an interpretation of the political history of the world in an anonymous booklet published in America, where history is divided up into three periods. The first period is that before the foundation of the American republic—this period is the dark age of political history; then follows the beautiful classical period from the foundation of the republic up to the year 1900; and then follows—I have forgotten for what reason—the period of decay of state-life. Of course, the gentleman who wrote this book was able to give excellent examples of depravity before the American republic, and he could give equally excellent examples of greatness afterward, e.g., the glorious persons of Washington and Lincoln; and he could present a nice collection of corrupt practices after 1900—to demonstrate the correctness of his view. And, indeed, you could not say that he was wrong in his interpretations—the only argument against it is its utter stupidity, when we take into consideration the materials he selected and particularly those he neglected. From this example may be seen the importance of the constructive side of the whole problem of interpretation and the utter nonsense that might be the outcome of type-studies if the scheme employed and the material used are incongruous. As a consequence of the ultimate incongruity between the constructive side and the materials to be construed, the old scheme has gradually become obsolete and is now on the verge of being given up entirely.

The Comte-Hegel type of constructive scheme is of special interest for us because the underlying intention of self-justification and glorification of a nation are plainly visible in them. The evolution of mankind leads up to its culmination in the historic present, and the philosopher’s own nation is shown to be the flower of the respective age—with the self-evident connotation that any action taken by the said flower of the age is just in itself, and any action directed against it a crime before God and man. In giving the history of the theory of national types we have thus already given a study of national types of mind themselves and a preliminary outline of the laws
that govern the formation of such types. The Marxist scheme is similarly highly interesting for reasons I shall explain in the second lecture. At this point, however, I have to complete the historical study of the problem by drawing your attention to the fact that other evolutionary schemes are possible besides the one that lets evolution culminate in the present. Marx’s purpose in construing history was to determine the worker’s place in it. He is able to mark the stage the present age has reached in the course of dialectical evolution, but he construes not with a side-glance to a nation, be it his own or a foreign one, but to the destiny of the working class.

The more or less secret intention of Comte and Hegel was the formation of national consciousness; the quite open and outspoken intention of Marx was the formation of class-consciousness. The militant qualities of a class may be strengthened quite as well by a belief in their existential right and their mission in history, as the fighting and imperialistic qualities of nations. There is, however, a remarkable difference between the two types of construction: The Comte-Hegel scheme seems to indicate a certain degree of saturation of the group that justifies its existence, while the Marxist scheme is revolutionary in the sense that the working class is supposed, in the long run, to take the place of the present governing class. The national unit that produces philosophical systems in order to perceive with perfect clarity its place and rank in the surrounding and preceding society has apparently reached a point of saturation where it may be interested in the illusion of holding the first place in the society of nations and may think it perhaps quite nice to rub it in a little, but where it would not seriously think of waging perhaps a war of extinction on any one of the others. The existing world, with a multitude of organized nations and the system of more and occasionally less peaceful relations between them, is taken for granted and not doubted in the least by these schemes. It is unnecessary to bring out this point because a superficial look at things might lead to the erroneous assumption that a number of units are thrown together
in the present world that do not think of anything else but their mutual annihilation. In critical, war-threatening times beliefs of this sort spring up and are successfully employed by war-propaganda to get the nations into a proper fighting spirit. There have been systems of interstate relations in history that have come pretty near to this picture, for example, the relations between some of the Greek poleis had this form: They frequently ended in the complete destruction of the enemy polis and with the slaughtering of the population to the last man, woman, and child. In our universe of states, however, the right of existence is granted to all political units, and the speculations on the national virtues and advantages show a strong rivalry and an energetic and vital self-assertion, but nothing that could be understood as a tendency toward world domination. This relatively mild sort of imperialism of the mind may be seen clearly when we compare the Hegel-Comte type of construction with the Marxist type. There we do not find any saturation. The present social situation is nothing to be proud of and is at best a necessary phase in the movement toward the rule of the working class and the complete dissolution of state organization. The philosophy of the nation leaves the world as it is; the philosophy of the working class wants to change it fundamentally, either by slow evolution or sudden revolution. In spite of all imperialistic appearances, the theory of the national mind in the older scheme already implies the society of political units as given and unchangeable, and the modern theory has nothing else to do but formulate explicitly the possibilities of interstate relations with regard to the particular character of the units related.

I began this train of thought with reflections on the enlargement of the historical horizon in the course of the nineteenth century. With the accumulation of historical material, the incongruity between the material and the laws of the mind employed to organize it grew, too, until a rupture ensued and, the material becoming relatively independent, new techniques for
organizing it had to be found. We no longer attempt to organize the history of mankind as a whole in one unit of speculation, but apply a new technique to work out a multitude of coordinate structural units, which are not connected by an evolutionary principle. In Germany this new science has been named sociology of culture, or more specifically morphology of culture, because the object to be investigated is a single morphé (we call it a structural unit) and the laws of its growth and decay. Serious mistakes have been made in the first applications of this technique—very instructive mistakes, however.

I can present here only one example. You all remember Spengler's famous work *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, which in spite of its dilettantism is a respectable achievement. He assumed a number of units of culture (he calls them *Kulturseelen*)—the Greek, the Arabian, the modern occidental (he calls it the Faustian), the Chinese, etc.—and works out the styles of these cultures. Spengler believed that the cultures were strictly isolated, that every one developed its own unique style in a plantlike manner, with periods of youth, maturity, senescence, and decay, out of nothing a type of culture would spring up and into nothing it would disappear. The single types were not related to one another, there was no principle linking them, perhaps into a chain, or evolving higher forms of humanity as they followed one another in the course of time. Spengler went so far in his tendency to work out the strict isolation as to say that a type of culture could not be understood by someone who did not belong to it. He went too far in this direction, as critics of his work have demonstrated, because a cultural unit that cannot be understood by anybody outside of it, of course, can never become an object of a morphology of culture as, for example, Spengler's itself. He had not paid due attention, as we shall formulate this argument, to the Platonic postulate of substantial homogeneity of object and investigating subject. In his endeavor to make clear the vegetative sort of existence of a culture and its irrational uniqueness, in his ardent fight against the superficial arrangement of historic phenomena into
a single series of advancement without regard to the morphological factor in history, he neglected the problem of intelligibility, even so far as to create a dogma of the fundamental nonintelligibility of a culture, and thereby destroyed the basis of his science.

However wrong and unfortunate Spengler’s formulations may have been in the details of his work, through it the idea of morphology has become an essential and indestructible part of our modern view of the world of history. After long preparation, the time was now ripe for his idea, and in the last decade the subject-matter has cleared up considerably. Valuable distinctions have been made between the social process, the process of rational technique and science, and the process of culture proper. Every one of these processes forms part of the growth of a cultural unit, but only the last one, the process of culture, is supposed to be the morphological element in the unit. Also a new science has set itself the task of inquiring into the interdependence of the three processes. The rational process is supposed to go on through time and not end with the decay of a unit of culture; it may continue into the next unit. Brilliant examples have been advanced to demonstrate the continuity of this process. In the Renaissance the modern heliocentric aspect of the universe was regained out of the growing knowledge of classical natural science and the heliocentric system of antiquity. Differential calculus has been developed in a magnificent way, starting from the point where Archimedes left it, etc. The chief argument against Spengler’s idea of the watertight isolation of cultures has been continuities of this sort that he had neglected or perhaps not fully realized, for he had attributed to differential calculus the Faustian soul’s yearning search for the infinite as one of its main characteristics and asserted that the Euclidean soul of the Greeks would not have been able to grasp the concept of an infinite progress in ever smaller quantities. The reaction against Spengler, in my opinion, however, has gone a little too far in the other direction now, if the rational process with its all pervading style is to
be taken out of the cultural unit altogether. Excellent studies have been carried out to show the influence of national types of mind on mathematics and physical theory, and I always take particular pleasure in mentioning them, because here, in a field that at first sight everybody would believe to be governed by objective laws to the exclusion of all others—one that you would believe to be quite inaccessible to any subjectivity of the mind and long before Spengler and morphology became fashionable—the real influence of the national type mind was demonstrated: I mean the studies of Pierre Duhem in his book on *La théorie physique: Son objet et sa structure*. In a not very systematic but very graphic manner, he lays before the reader a collection of examples illustrating the differences between German and French mathematics and physics on the one hand, and the English theories on the other. As an instrument for his type-construction he employs some of Pascal’s ideas on the geometric mind and its opposite, [this procedure is] somewhat primitive, because the Pascalian concepts, developed for other purposes, are not sufficiently adequate to the English and French types of mind as they are embodied in the material. The examples in themselves, however, are clear enough to be convincing and make clear, even to the skeptical, that not the results but the forms of theories, even in this field of knowledge, are conceived in the national style of mind.

After the swing of the pendulum in the direction of morphology so far as to lose sight of the Platonic postulate, and the swing back so far as to take certain mental phenomena out of the morphological units altogether, the science of types of mind comes to rest in the middle, where it acknowledges the substantial homogeneity of all the cultural units to be investigated as well as the fundamental differences between them according to the principle of mind that is embodied in every one and gives them their morphé, their unique style from the innermost and essential phenomenon to the last and almost negligible detail.
This is the epistemological content of our problem. There is still the other side to it, the activist ethical content. We have seen that the theory of national types of mind has assumed at first, in the speculations of the philosophy of history, the form of national self-justification. The study of mental structures was on principle confined to the study of the present, and the mental structure of the age was identified with the national mind, however, in such a way that the multitude of surrounding nations was recognized by self-evident implication in this theory. Today we have arrived at a clearer, more reflected view of the problem: We see the group of coordinated morphological units, the society of nations, and with more thorough knowledge of one's own mind and the minds of others the problem of the relations between the coordinated cultural units has to be considered explicitly.

Lecture Two

In the first lecture we developed the fundamental epistemological and ethical aspects of the problem of national types, and we shall now deal with the technique of describing a type of mind. I have indicated already that national types are unreflected data in our social environment; it is not necessary to prove their existence—they are certainly there—and we have only to make the effort to describe them adequately. We all have a more or less clear picture of the typical Frenchman, Englishman, German, or American, and if you do not believe that you yourself have such pictures, you need only turn to the pages of a funny paper and look at the caricatures of national types in order to see that a broad mass of people have such pictures. I do not say that caricatures are particularly exact, ideal, or profitable type studies; however, what they lack in scientific exactness they counterbalance by their precision. For as soon as we attempt exactness in the description, the more we go into detail, the more a firm outline of the type vanishes, and the study becomes just as problematic as it progresses in
complication. We may distinguish a sequence of spheres surrounding the morphological center of a unit and try to interpret the type beginning from the outer spheres. If our theory is sound we must come to some result, for according to our morphological postulate every detail in the structural unit is dyed in the specific colors of this unit; if the unit has a style of its own it must become visible in all the little things of everyday life. The validity of the postulate will probably not be doubted: Just think of national peculiarities of dress, of food and drink, of the interiors of homes, of colors and materials preferred in erecting and painting buildings, coffeehouse tables, and steamboats, the ceremonies of greeting, of calls, of letters, etc. When the American legion arrived at Paris a few years ago, the French papers unanimously were deeply impressed by the light suits—the *complets clair*—worn by the Americans; to the average Frenchman an American is probably a large, well-nourished, clean, amiable individual wearing a *complet clair*. When you come to New York your attention is attracted by the unusual, bloodthirsty, brownish-red of the ferry boats and tugs in the harbor. We experience the culture of beautiful lawns in England and the French parc-architecture as expressions of a distinct national character, as somehow characteristic of this nation and no other. Examples of this sort may be multiplied indefinitely. They show that the whole instrumentarium of everyday life, and not only tools, garments, buildings, but also the landscape, is impregnated with a style of living that is probably the same as the one expressed in more important spheres. In principle this peripheral sphere of a nation’s life may be used legitimately as [a source of] material for interpretation; practically, however, [though] pleasant cultural articles and little essays, charming impressions and unexpected symbolic features may be drawn from it, it is of no use for scientific work because the data of this sphere may be interpreted in so many ways that no definite result can be reached. Consider, for example, that France is the classic country of family culture. Everywhere else in the world family
relations have weakened and loosened in the course of the last fifty years; in France, belief in the family is still so strong that women in public opinion have not yet won their independence as individuals, and for this reason, I believe, have not yet achieved voting rights. And now think, for example, of the custom of *Reveillon*; while in Germany Christmas is the most intimate family festival, in France it is about the most public affair of the year. If of the class of family customs only this one were to be known to a scientist in future ages he might be induced to rather erroneous inferences concerning French home life and family cohesion. Because the inferences possible from this class of material are manifold, we had therefore best exclude it altogether as a basis for our enterprise.

Not much better as a basis is the class of material Duhem has used in his analysis of French and English mathematics and physics. Typical forms of theories may be derived quite precisely from it, but even if I know, for example, that the English physicists like to construe their theories on mechanical models, this typical fact needs interpretation itself in terms of a more central mental phenomenon. And the same holds true for a class of material that in general is believed to render excellent examples of characteristic features—that is, the organization of the state. Institutional types like presidential republic, parliamentary republic, absolute and constitutional monarchy, *Rechtsstaat*, constitutional democracy, etc., cannot be used to characterize a national type, because none of them is peculiar to any one nation. Only a few of these types are characteristic of larger cultural units: for example, the border states of the medieval German empire, that is, England, the Scandinavian countries, Poland, and Hungary, developed a type of government where the state itself (lords and commons) plays a considerable role, while the empire itself developed within its borders, and government by an absolute prince developed in France and the German states, particularly in Prussia. These facts are rather important for a sociology of culture that takes
larger units as its object, but they do not help us much in our problem of national types.

All these materials, for one decisive reason, are of secondary importance for type construction: The typical features to be abstracted from them are formed by the national style, but this element has to be translated into scientific language. Works of art and literature may impress with their great symbolic value for the respective nation’s mind; a folksong heard in the evening, a little gesture of the man in the street, may give us fundamental insights into, and sudden revelations of, things we did not understand or see before, but experiences of this sort are irrational. They appeal to our eyes and ears and to our heart but not to our power of rational discourse. The sight of the minutest detail may in a moment of intuition open up to us the way to the core of a nation’s mind—but we cannot translate such intuitions into precise concepts. What I call the central sphere of material is therefore the realm where the mind expresses itself in speculations on the meaning of life, the place of man in society and the universe, etc. It is in this realm that we best get hold of the mind of a nation: first, for the technical reason that the material already has the same form of rational discourse as our scientific investigation; the distance between object and subject is smallest in this sphere. The type study has to do practically nothing but reformulate the speculative formulas with a view to showing substantial similarity between the national speculations and set off the differences attributable to the national style from this background of similarity. Second, this sphere is of central importance for us because it contains the explicit self-expression of a nation’s mind either in reflected or unreflected form. After all, what is it we want to know when we look into a national mind and try to understand it? We want to know the nation’s attitude toward the essential questions of life as I have briefly enumerated them. We want to know what it considers a valuable aim to pursue in life, its attitude toward death and God, its ideal of humanity, its ideas about social relations within the
body politic, about relations to other national units, its belief in its mission in history, what it thinks of itself. A scientifically worked out concept of a national mind has to answer these questions, and we find the answers already prepared in the sphere of philosophical speculation.

The whole structural unit of a national mind is made up of two factors that, however, do not appear as separate-yet-coordinate entities but are only distinguishable as two aspects of the one inseparable unit. The substantial similarity of two minds means that both have the same fundamental structure; and style means that the fundamental structure is informed in every detail by a morphological principle. Now, as a historical phenomenon, fundamental structures are never given in themselves: A national mind is not a structural skeleton covered with some morphological flesh to be neatly cut off the bone by an anatomist, but is a complete entity without rupture or parts. This science has to struggle therefore with its own peculiar difficulty in order to get at its subject matter at all. Mind as an object is not given objectively like a piece of external nature because there is no system of coordinates beyond it. In physical theory, events in the realm of being are conceived in the categories of time, space, and mass; categories do not belong to the realm of being but to that of transcendental a priori forms. The external world is a datum in the precise meaning of the word, it is objectively given to experience. Mind is the only object that is not given as a datum to a knower of substance other than its own; it is identical in substance with the knowing subject. In the science of national types of mind, a type may either know itself in a self-reflecting act, or be known by another national mind. In the first case, as there is no material for comparison it will not be able to see the morphological problem at all, but believe its own type to be pure objective mind; this is approximately the credulous position of the Comte-Hegel period. In the second case, when my own type of mind is used as a system of objective coordinates, the other nation’s type of mind will be taken as an unproblematical unit; since as a consequence of
having its own character it differs in every part and detail from the investigating subject’s type of mind, the whole unit will appear as a strange entity, and the fundamental structure that must be, according to the Platonic postulate, identical with my own will not be seen at all. The scientist in this field has therefore the difficult task, in spite of being rooted, educated, and with all his active powers inescapably caught up in his own national mind, of transcending it intellectually in order to have the same distance to his own as he has to foreign ones. When he has come to this point, however, he will perhaps not be able to separate the fundamental structure common to all units from the morphological element and by this separation single out the national features; that is essentially impossible because all mind, the scientist’s mind as well, is morphological. Only by comparison can he render the differences visible as morphological differences of an identical structure.

I need not expend many words on the difficulty of such an undertaking. Anybody who has ever devoted time to making himself master of the mental achievement of just his own nation knows how many years of labor are necessary to arrive at a comparatively competent view of its cultural history. The scientist in this field is now supposed to master not only one but at least two national minds in their historical development. I have made inquiries into the forms of the American and the French minds, and from the experience gathered in these modest attempts I may say that I do not know of any scholar living who would be able to produce a completely satisfactory study of this kind. All a student in this field can do is necessarily of a fragmentary nature; but already the little that can be done today will perhaps help nations better understand one another, and thus remove an enormous amount of suspicion from their mutual relations; people are not afraid or suspicious of a person if they understand him.

I shall now give some fragmentary examples of an analysis of national minds, the material being taken from English, American, French, and German sociological theory. Of course,
in the short time accorded to this lecture I cannot spread out before you the results of comprehensive research; I can do no more than touch here and there on some interesting points, and I am perfectly aware that the multitude of questions raised by my brief remarks cannot be answered in half an hour. A sociologist who has even only a superficial knowledge of the sociological literature outside his own nation may find his attention attracted to the interesting circumstance that another nation’s results in sociological theory are of negligible value for his own work when he takes them as objective science. There is no *Internationale* of social theory as there is of mathematical or physical theory. I have picked out from the Anglo-Saxon achievements in this field a basic set of concepts pervading English, and later American, sociological theory from the end of the eighteenth century—the three concepts of instinct, habit, and intelligence. Frequently this set is interwoven with other concepts, for example, when instinct is divided into instinct proper and reflex, or when instinct is defined more in the sense of reflexes, and on top of these more mechanical instinctive reactions the so-called animal principles of action [appetites, desire, passions, etc.] are placed; or when intelligence is subdivided into intelligence and reason. The fundamental scheme, remaining unchanged within the variations, has been developed in the form employed even today in English and particularly American social psychology, as far as I know, by Thomas Reid in his *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind*. By *instincts* he means a natural, blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without any deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we are doing. Habit differs from instinct, not in its nature as a mechanical principle of action, but in its origin: the instinctive pattern of action being natural and innate, the habitual pattern acquired. The third principle of action is reason. Only human beings are endowed with this power; moved by rational principles, they are able to act after deliberation on their judgment. I shall not now review the history of social psychology in order
to demonstrate that this set of concepts has been operative all through the nineteenth century up to the present. Just open any modern American textbook, for example, that of [Gordon] Allport, and glance over the table of contents: You will find the same scheme as the backbone of the system. This set of concepts has an important function in the English and American national minds. Typically under the term *instinct* [I am speaking now typically, and not of any particular author’s ideas] the whole vital basis of human life is classified; nutrition, reproduction, gregariousness, and imitation are some of the more or less indispensable elements of any system of instincts. Over this vital basis habits may be formed by education. Plasticity of instincts is the axiom that links the sphere of habit to that of instinct, making possible all educational endeavor. Modern science has worked out beautiful biological and neurological theories of reflex arches, and conditioned reflexes, and of the trial and error method, but all these things, valuable as they are in themselves, are not essential and do not touch the fundamental idea of the creation of habits as the aim of education. This is an English idea going as far back as Bacon’s essay *On Education*, where he sets forth his thought on the formation of the customs of young gentlemen by habit and educational influences. Reid fills his chapter on habits with wise observations of the following kind:

> It is owing to the force of habits, early acquired by imitation, that a man who has grown up to manhood in the lowest rank of life, if fortune raise him to a higher rank, very rarely acquires the air and manners of a gentleman.

> When to that instinctive imitation, which I spoke of before, we join the force of habit, it is easy to see, that these mechanical principles have no small share in forming the manners and characters of most men.

> The difficulty of overcoming vicious habits has, in all ages, been a common topic of Theologians and Moralists; and we see too many sad examples to permit us to doubt of it.
Character formation and educating young men according to the ideals of a gentleman are the reasons for the concern with the problem of habit for Bacon and Reid and in England up to this day. There is an ideal set of habits a man has to live up to, according to English public opinion, and public, not to say national, interest is concerned with the knowledge of the mechanism of habit formation. Perhaps even more distinct is the national interest in the research concerning the problem of habits in the ardent modern American inquiries in this field. The particular interest American scientists take in this problem may be explained by the gigantic educational task the American people faces in assimilating the masses of immigrants into the national type, by means of Americanization schools, literature, newspapers, and all sorts of community work. This really overwhelming problem of assimilation that no other nation has had to grapple with seems to absorb all the powers of the scientists in this field and to forcibly fix their attention on this one scheme of concepts; they are turned over and over, always in the same rather primitive fashion [I may remind you of the crudeness of Watson’s behaviorism that has roused the wrath of a sociologist with English training like McDougall], while English psychology produces highly differentiated and complicated studies like Alexander Shand’s The Foundations of Character; but even in such a clever and skeptical book as Russell’s Analysis of Mind the three fundamental concepts are preserved as the main topics.

Instincts serve purposes in the life of the individual who has them; animals lead their lives by following their instincts and the acquired habits that have proved, by the method of trial and error, to be helpful in the process of life. The specifically human problem is the control of action and the acquisition of habits by deliberation and rational judgment. All depends on what the controlling factor, reason, is actually supposed to contain. Bacon finished his argument by asking that men “by all means endeavor to obtain good custom.” He did not seem to doubt that everybody knew what good custom was
and that everybody had the same opinion on this point as he himself. Reid goes into more detail and divides the rational principles of action into, first, the regard to our good as a whole, and, second, the sense of duty. The first of these principles is described as an opposite to action by animal desire directed to immediate purposes only. In the first part of life, he says, we have many enjoyments of various kinds, but [they are] very similar to those of brute animals:

They consist in the exercise of our senses and powers of motion, the gratification of our appetites, and the exertions of our kind affections. These are chequered with many evils of pain and fear, and disappointment, and sympathy with the suffering of others.

But the goods and evils of this period of life are of a short duration, and soon forgot. The mind being regardless of the past, and unconcerned about the future, we then have not other measure of evil but the present aversion.

Every animal desire has some particular and present object, and looks not beyond that object to its consequences, or to the connections it may have with other things.

As man comes to years of understanding, however, he learns to observe:

the connection of things, and the consequences of our actions; and, taking an extended view of our existence, past, present, and future, we correct our first notions of good and ill, and form the conception of what is good or ill upon the whole; which must be estimated, not from the present feeling, or from the present animal desire or aversion, but from a due consideration of its consequences, certain or probable, during the whole of our existence.

That which, taken with all its discoverable connections and consequences, brings more good than ill, I call good upon the whole.

The presupposition of this calculus of happiness is that we know after all what is good for us on the whole. According to Reid it is of the first importance, in the conduct of life, to have just opinions with respect to good and evil; and he believes that reason is able by its powers to correct wrong opinions and to
lead us to those that are just and true. Morals is a science with first or self-evident principles on which all moral reasoning is grounded. From such self-evident principles, conclusions may be drawn with regard to the moral conduct of life; and particular duties and virtues may be traced back to such principles. Without such principles, morals cannot be established. Reid, then, gives very interesting examples of indisputable axioms, for example:

It is a first principle in morals, that we ought not to do to another, what we should think wrong to be done to us in the like circumstances. If a man is not capable of perceiving this in his cool moments, when he reflects seriously, he is not a moral agent, nor is he capable of being convinced of it by reasoning.

From what topic can you reason with such a man? You may possibly convince him by reasoning, that it is his interest to observe this rule; but this is not to convince him that it is his duty. To reason about justice with a man who sees nothing to be just or unjust; or about benevolence with a man who sees nothing in benevolence preferable to malice, is like reasoning with a blind man about colour, or with a deaf man about sound.

From this passage we see that his axioms (I can analyze here only one of them) imply a conception of the nature of man. The idea that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in the like circumstances rests on the premise that all men are equal. Imagine that they are not equal, that, for example, they are made of substances differing in value, then, of course, likeness of circumstances would not justify equal treatment of men. The rights of man and the fundamental Christian idea of equality of all men before God are at the back of Reid's axioms and principles as an unquestioned and quite unproblematical set of beliefs. His beliefs are so firm and so far beyond doubt that he would not admit any discussion; and anybody who disagrees with him he would consider morally insane. Without this unquestioning belief his idea of a science of morals would be unthinkable, and equally incomprehensible would be, as in the American case, the importance attached to the whole question of the mechanism of education.
To bring out the typical English idea of what is reasonable, we should have to go farther into the details of Reid's and other philosophers' views, but the example given here will show sufficiently the various approaches to our problem. We follow the analysis of Reid just as far as it goes, and practically have to do nothing but reformulate it, and then we define the point at which the analysis stops and the unquestioned beliefs come in as the last motives of philosophizing. For the dogma that all men are equal is by no means self-evident. Great cultural units like the Greek were not of this opinion when they flourished, and the creeping in of the idea of equality was the decisive mark of decay of morality. Aristotle maintained that men were born unequal, some as slaves some as free men, and in our time this ancient conviction is shared by a considerable number of men; and what we call, for example, irrational in fascism or any form of dictatorship appears to us in that light because the ratio of personal leadership, the ratio of a rule of a gifted statesman by personal authority and, if necessary, by brute force, is essentially pagan and incompatible with our dogmas of democracy nourished on Christian ideas.

The essentially Christian form of the content of reason is more visible in the very interesting, unquestioned beliefs current among American sociologists. The fundamental concept of the sociology of Giddings is that of “consciousness of kind.” “The original and elementary subjective fact in society is the consciousness of kind. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself. . . . It acts on conduct in many ways, and all the conduct that we can properly call social is determined by it.” So far the concept only means that men are men and that I choose to speak of social relations only when they are relations between men. It is an expression of our Platonic postulate: To enter into a relationship of mutual understanding with someone I must be of a substance similar to his. On this first stratum of meaning of his concept, Giddings now builds a second. He
says: “Our conduct toward those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct toward others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves.” The first meaning sets off human relations from relations between human beings and beings of another kind. This second meaning already touches on the morphological question; for feeling that one man is more like myself than another does not concern his being a man, but a man of special sort, of a style more or less like my own. This problem becomes quite clear in the examples Giddings gives: “The workingman who, in pursuing his economic interest, would take the best wages that he could get, joins in a strike which he does not understand, or of which he does not approve, rather than cut himself off from his fellows to be a scab among scabs. For a similar reason, the manufacturer who questions the value of protection to his own industry, yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund.” Everything is all right, so long as Giddings only employs his concept to characterize the social phenomenon that men, to be interrelated and to understand one another in a more intimate degree than animals of one kind and to cooperate in any walk of life, must have similar attitudes toward life in general or at least to that side of it that concerns their relation. Giddings is quite right in saying “to trace the operation of the consciousness of kind through all its social manifestations is to work out a complete subjective interpretation of history.” His principle, indeed, is applicable to all types of social relations, be it a love affair, a workers’ union, the French nation, or occidental culture. Giddings, however, endows his concept with a third meaning, decisive for the interpretation of history. The sociology of Giddings belongs to the Comte-Hegel type of construction; like them, he believes in the progress of mankind, and progress for him is identical with the expansion of consciousness of kind.

In human society, that special consciousness of kind which marks off the subdivisions of races was at first limited to the family and the horde. Presently it expanded sufficiently to in-
clude the adopted members of a semi-artificial clan. Then it became comprehensive enough to include many related clans in the conception of a tribe, and at last broad enough to include many related tribes in the conception of a folk. This conception introduced the final development of ethnogenic evolution, and the evolution of the consciousness of kind assumed a new phase. The contact of heterogeneous elements in the population and their struggle with one another for social supremacy suggested the thought of an ideal and future unity of kind, to be realized through the gradual assimilation of heterogeneous elements by means of a common speech, a common civic interest, and a common aspiration. Demogenic evolution began.

That is the Americanization program.

The demogenic evolution and with it the sociology of Giddings ends in the victory of the Christian idea of a brotherhood of mankind:

The successive world-empires of Persia, Macedonia, and Rome prepared the way for the Christian conception of universal brotherhood. So long as this conception was nothing more than an esoteric affirmation that all men are brothers, because they are children of one Father, it made but little impression upon the social mind, but when by the genius of St. Paul it was converted into an ideal, into the doctrine that all men through a spiritual renewing may become brothers, the new faith underwent a transformation like that which converted the ethnic into the civic conception of the state, and Christianity became the most tremendous power in history. Gradually it has been realizing its ideal, until today a Christian philanthropy and a Christian missionary enterprise, rapidly outgrowing the esoteric sentimentalism of their youth, and devoting themselves to the diffusion of knowledge, to the improvement of their conditions, and to the building of character, are uniting the classes and the races of men in a spiritual humanity.

In my book on the Form des amerikanischen Geistes and in later pamphlets I have shown this ideal to be a conceptual transformation, as regards its empirical side, of the social situation of the American pioneer period; the ideal of a community of equals with an overwhelming force of the consciousness of kind was reality at that period and remained reality
in diminishing degrees until the western expansion had come to a stop. This date may be fixed in the 1880s. At that time began the spiritualization of that form of community life in America. We find conceptual transformations of it, however, at a much earlier time in England. Locke developed the fundamental concepts of his ideas on the rights of man, property, and liberty on the model of American pioneer communities, and he closes a decisive section of his *Essay on Government* with the sentence “In the beginning all the world was America.” The community of equals as realized by the pioneer farmers seems to be to him an eternal natural form of human coexistence. In America, Josiah Warren has given a similar ideal picture of social relations, with a view, however, to realizing it in small settlements as an antidote to the beginning industrialization of America. I have to confine myself to these few remarks indicating clearly the sort of model the American ideal of brotherhood of mankind is taken from. A social situation at a certain point of history has been transformed into the realm of spirit. This model now is blended with the ideas of a Christian brotherhood; a national and a Christian ideal mingle indistinguishably into one social ideal. The evangelical roots of the doctrine of brotherhood are already quite clear from the passages quoted from Giddings’s principles; they become even more convincing when we take a concept of Dewey’s for comparison.

Dewey has an elementary concept of sociology just as Giddings, only he prefers to call it likemindedness. Its function remains the same. Giddings measured the progress of society objectively by the increase in social intercourse, a multiplication of relationships, an advance in material well-being, and an evolution of rational conduct. The evolution toward rational conduct is already familiar to us from Reid’s theories. The other points, however, are the consequence of taking the idea of equality of all men to its conclusion. When you fall back on the first meaning of consciousness of kind, the same meaning Dewey attaches to his concept of likemindedness, then, indeed, the only social ideal you can arrive at is that of a
maximum number of relations between a maximum number of people, as Giddings and Dewey postulate it; Dewey’s with the little hitch that the community of mankind has to be a working community—beggars and lazy folk not admitted. He concedes that some people still admire a life of luxury and leisure, but a “better moral sentiment” will not approve of it. I should recommend that Professor Dewey occasionally look into Balzac’s *Traité de la vie élégante* and think about what he finds there on the problem of leisure.

This concept of likemindedness, lying at the basis of the argument, is taken from Saint Paul’s epistle to the Romans: “Be of the same mind one toward another. Mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate. Be not wise in your own conceits” (Rom. 12:16); “Now the God of patience and consolation grant you to be likeminded one toward another according to Christ Jesus: That ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ also received us to the glory of God” (Rom. 15:5–7).

Lecture Three

The topic of our inquiry has hitherto been the national mind in the realm of spirit. We have demonstrated that the mental unit consists of a fundamental structure that always appears in the form it has taken from a particular morphological principle that endows it with a style. As a consequence of this double aspect we have developed the Platonic and morphological postulates of the theory of mental units, and have pointed to the ensuing technical difficulties that confront a science of national minds. If thus the questions of the laws of the mind and the national types were exhausted, the whole matter would be interesting enough but, after all, a question of purely philosophical concern and without any influence on the social sciences. In the history of our problem, however, as far as I have recounted it, and in the materials analyzed, the
so-called problem of existence has run parallel with it. Speculations of the Comte-Hegel type on the meaning of history, on the place of the age in it, and the place of the philosopher’s nation in the age, of course, always contained a nucleus of the search for truth, and sometimes even achieved a considerable amount of its scientific purpose. The great function in national life, however, was not the attainment of an aim in the realm of spirit, but the strengthening and the justification of the nation’s existence. The most superficial observer cannot pass by the rather amusing coincidence that in the course of the nineteenth century, or a little earlier or later, each nation of the Western world discovered respectively that it was God’s own and chosen before all others. In some countries the surprising discovery may be located precisely in some distinguished work: in Germany, for example, Fichte made the discovery in his Reden an die deutsche Nation; for Russia the doctrine was embodied in Dostoevsky’s beautiful novel The Demons; in France we already know Comte and his philosophy of positivism as the apostle of French intellectual glory. For the British nation her superiority is a matter of course; as far as I know, it has never been considered necessary to make a special point of this self-evident situation and to erect a philosophical system to demonstrate it. America is a nation just beginning to gain self-consciousness, and there has not been much occasion to make its superiority a national dogma with all the array of rational speculation; there is, however, in the work of Dewey a recognizably marked tendency toward the assertion in all modesty that the United States is the leader of the world in morality and spiritual achievement. When we arrange these doctrines in a series and look them over without regard to their existential implications, as mere products of the mind, they are more or less a joke—whoever has played it: man on God, or God on man. Together with the existential consequences, however, they take on a formidable seriousness.

We have come to the core of a national attitude toward life in general, and society in particular, by following a sociological
theory as far as its analysis goes and then coming to a set of unquestioned beliefs nobody is permitted to criticize; anybody who doubts them is a moral leper and will be excluded from the community of nice people. The rational discourse has a center that is not rational in substance but in reality is will, and brutal as will always is. And the will at the center of the national unit has to act on a body just as the will of the individual functions as the mover of the individual's body; the national will acts, in its attitude toward social life, on the body politic of the nation. The nation as a sum of individual bodies, as a territory, with its wealth in agriculture and industry, its institutions of families, schools, associations of all kinds, the organization of the state and fighting machinery as a whole is the material basis to be moved by, and according to, the will as we find it in the national mind. The concept of "existence" means the whole unit of the nation, including the material basis as well as the immaterial products of art, literature, religion, science, philosophy, and political theories. It is not desirable, for reasons immediately to be set forth, to call existence the vital, material basis of economic and political forces only, as is done occasionally in German sociology, and to oppose the sphere of mind to that of existence. The recent attempts in this direction are made with the intention of reestablishing in a more refined form the long-discarded crudities of economic materialism.

The outcome of such theories is either to deny the realm of mind as a realm of being altogether and to regard mental phenomena as so-called "superstructures"—reflexes of the economic sphere without any structure of their own. This is a rather naïve attempt to discredit a phenomenon, the phenomenality of which cannot be denied; we all have experiences of political theories, works of art, etc., whatever their substance may be according to metaphysical theories. Marx as a metaphysician is a rather awkward phenomenon; and the Marxists are considerably worse. The other possible outcome is that mental phenomena are accepted at face value, that their existence, however, is supposed to be exhausted by their social
function to further or to hinder the development of the existential basis. The structure of mind consists exclusively of its social function and is relative to the existence it refers to. This view neglects the Platonic postulate that mind in all its forms of appearance has to contain an absolute structure varied only by the style of its morphé. If the substance of mind is absorbed by its social function, and mental forms are phenomena of relative historical standing, they will be unintelligible as such to any onlooking mind outside of them because the onlooking mind itself has only relative historical standing, just as the mind being looked upon. There is no relation in the sphere of mind between them, they are chained to their respective existences, and any belief of the one that he knows the other is an illusion. We shall therefore define existence to comprise the material sphere and the mental together as an inseparable unit, existence coming in the sphere of mind to self-consciousness.

This meaning of existence necessitates a few remarks on the problem of political ideas and political science, generally thrown together under the title of political thought. A national existence is a national will and body in action; rational discourse forms a part of it and serves the purpose of attaining clarity about the nation’s own situation in the universe and the surrounding society as well as justifying and explaining its existence. Political ideas have an instrumental function of one kind or another in the life of a nation: They take stock, they justify, they make plans for the future. Curiously enough, the business of producing political ideas is in the hands, if not of professional scholars, at least of such men who believe themselves to be searching for truth and who demand for the products of their reasoning the rank and the respect due to scientific achievements. I think a student in the field of political science would become rather angry if someone told him that he was just a politician with a smattering of historical knowledge. Here we come to the heart of our problem: We have to state in all clarity, after the inquiries made and the examples given,
that political science is not a science of the objective type of, perhaps, physics; on principle it does not transcend its object as physical science does but, standing beyond it, is at the same time part of it. We have seen that, for example, the views of Giddings contained valuable contributions to the science of sociology; consciousness of kind or likemindedness is, indeed, an essential element in social relations, and it is the same thing if you express the problem in terms of consciousness of kind, of \textit{solidarité}, or of \textit{Gezweiung}. But every one of these terms gives the problem a particular nuance conditioned by the national mind to which the respective sociologist belongs. Political science is, therefore, rational discourse, directed objectively toward the phenomena of politics in an attempt to classify them, but always under the more or less conscious control of national beliefs.

I should not therefore admit as justified the reproaches directed against students in this field when their theories show the influence of the political motives that have gone into their formulation. On the contrary, I should say it is a matter of course and quite inevitable that a scholar is urged by some interest to concern himself with his subject matter, and the best you could say about political science is that it helps you to understand the actual problems of everyday politics. The only reservation I should insist upon is that the scholar who sets forth his theories with a view to applying them to an actual situation has to point out with extreme care the sort of belief at the back of his statements. Against this postulate, however, political science sins quite generally, and I do not know of any representative scholar in this field who does not. It is the first duty of a scholar to be the perfect master of his own thought and to know in all clarity what parts of his thought may be regarded as rational, and where the irrational belief comes in. To live up to this demand is not a private affair of the scholar, perhaps regarding his intellectual honesty, and it is not only a matter of scientific standards: it is both of these, but in addition it is a matter of concern in interstate relations.
To understand this decisive point we have to consider again the meaning of political existence. According to our existential conception of the state there is not a realm of politics an sich, and beyond it the sphere of science, but political science itself is a part of political existence. The most important element in the existence of a state is the belief of the people in it. There is an anecdote told of Frederick the Great: In some exercise of his troops he attended, accompanied by a foreign potentate, the foreign prince admired the wonderful firing discipline of the king’s soldiers, and Frederick had to admit that they were excellent indeed—and, he added, the most astonishing thing about them is that they do not turn round and shoot at us. The essential element in the operation of any set of rules, of commands, or of constitutions of states, is the metaphysical belief of the people ruled, commanded, or organized in the reality of the social entity, for example, the nation, or the state, to be organized by rules and norms. Tolstoi grasped this basis of all social organization very well when he said that a state would cease to exist, and war be ended, in spite of all armaments, if soldiers, supposed to use their guns, simply did not. The life of a state is suffused in all ranks of action with beliefs. The man in the street has a concept of the state and the law probably rather different from that of a policeman, the criminal’s is different from the judge’s, a member of parliament has a different one than a plain citizen, a minister a different one than a businessman. But all of them have some sort of belief concerning the reality of the state they live in, and govern their actions by those beliefs. There is a clear nucleus in every such belief and then a gradual fading toward the outer limits. Speaking first only of the clear nucleus: A criminal is governed by his belief in the state when he hides his evil action, the reality of the state impresses itself upon him in the persons of policemen, judges, and jailers. The honest merchant bases his business on contracts because he has a firm belief in the reality of the state in the form of commercial tribunals and administrators who will obtain what is due to him by force if he cannot get it
by goodwill. For a judge a state appears in the form of a legal order demanding obedience by its authority. For a politician political existence presents itself as a series of agreements with other politicians, taking into account certain constitutional rules, the politician’s personal interest, and the opinion of the voters on the said agreements. Examples might be multiplied. A sociology of the state should consist, in my opinion, of a typology of beliefs of the typical actors in the political life of a nation, and it ought to explain how this vast number of beliefs interact in such a way as to have as its result the so-called unity of the state.

The highest rank in the multitude of beliefs is now occupied by political science, which creates the idea of the unity of the state and thus is the chief integrating agent of political existence. The unity of the state is the product of free imagination; nothing in experience corresponds to it, if not the fact that a considerable number of people, supposed to be a nation, believe in this unity. Whenever we come to analyze social reality we shall find single individuals to be classified under types as we have done here in a casual manner, with typical beliefs. The clear nuclei of these beliefs in everyday life are rather different, but around the center there lies a sphere of ill-defined belief where the unity of the nation is presupposed as a background for the more precise relations every citizen finds himself involved in. This background, as I have said, is usually rather ill-defined; in times of national crisis, however, or whenever national consciousness has a reason to become aware of itself, it may become clearer, and then, as far as the nation becomes a clear belief, it becomes so in terms of political ideas furnished by political thought. Political science has the enormous and responsible task of transforming the vague belief in national existence, distributed in various forms in all walks of life, into precise concepts for debate, propaganda, and all sorts of uplift, as well as for serious discussion. In speaking of the unity of a state, science does not refer to a clearly circumscribed fact of the external world, but creates unity out of its own speculative
will ready to be used by everybody for more or less dangerous purposes. Understanding this vital function, you will see now how important it is for political science to distinguish carefully between the rational parts of its discourse and irrational beliefs. When theory conceives political phenomena in terms of a national belief without knowing it, in the unreflected candid conviction that the belief is not a belief at all but that the results of the theory are the work of the unbiased search for truth, then, of necessity, the other national units being based on different beliefs must appear to be not quite living up to the supposedly scientifically true standard found by the scientist of the nation in question. They must inevitably see one another—as they actually do today in most cases when opinions are expressed frankly, as, for example, during the last war—as rather strange phenomena and something to be dreaded in a metaphysical way. Since each threatens the values the other represents, each nation thinks it would be better if the other were abolished altogether. Interstate relations are seriously hampered by the distrust created by every nation that believes itself to be chosen by God and conceives political problems in its own terms, in splendid ignorance of other possibilities. [On the hypothesis: Conceiving political existence in terms of a belief is an essential part of political existence.]

The type of political existence that is the unit in our Western world has a peculiar form, wholly different from the other types known in history. The modern nation-state has grown, as a political entity, out of the medieval empire. It has grown out of it in the political sense too, in that the new nation-states have established themselves on the ruins of the decaying empire, as well as in the spiritual meaning that the empire idea has faded and been replaced by that of the national state. The empire, speaking generally, and not having in mind now the medieval empire, is a type of political existence with a type of theory of its own, just as the modern state has a type of theory of its own. This is a matter of course if political theory is supposed to form part of political existence. When we think of the
Indian, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, and medieval empires, they are always supposed to comprise in one political organization the whole of the world worth organizing politically at the time. It need not comprise the whole of the known world; the distribution of the population and the means of communication at a particular time may permit the coexistence of a number of empires, because for all political purposes they do not come sufficiently into contact with one another. Thus we know all through history the coexisting empires of the Far East and the Occident. The typical empire is a huge administrative unit, defending its borders against troublesome barbarian hordes and never coming into serious conflict with a unit of similar size. The political theory of empire has, therefore, a peculiar feature: It does not develop a theory of sovereignty as the states have because, having no society of equally powerful units to live with, there was no need of it; the typical empire-theory is that of imperial peace. Indian empires developed a theory of the pax sarva-baumica, the Roman empire the pax Romana, the German empire had its Gottesfrieden, and today, with the United States becoming the strongest economic and military power in the world, the slogan of a pax Americana has sprung up.

The characteristic feature of our political existence is—or perhaps I should say has been—the theory of sovereignty. All through its history the concept of sovereign power has been a fighting concept. It has been used in politics for the two purposes it might possibly be used for: to justify the government in its power, and to justify the control of government by the people ruled. The first fighting position was directed against the spiritual and temporal imperial powers of the time, against the pope and the German emperor, and furthermore against seditious groups of the population, to ensure the prince’s exclusive right to make laws. The sovereignty of the prince as developed by Bodin marks the beginning of the modern nation-state as an independent political existence; the prince is supposed to be limited in the exercise of his power only by divine
and natural law, not by any personal authority. The other fighting position reaches back considerably further: The theory of the sovereignty of the people is an essentially Christian idea, and quite impossible in any other spiritual milieu, for example, in that of the Greek polis. The Christian concept of the people goes back to the first Christian communities, where mankind was considered as the *corpus mysticum Christi* and all Christians believed themselves brothers, all equal before God. Here is the decisive rupture with the spirit of antiquity in the classical period, when men were not believed to be equal; equality did not go beyond the governing class of a polis; the slaves in their own and the full citizens in any other polis were not considered equals in the brotherhood of mankind, but were thought to belong to a different sort of political existence. Man was absorbed completely by belonging to a polis; nothing was left of him as a man besides being a citizen. The rights of the vast mass of equal humanity were asserted all through the Middle Ages, first against the *plenitude potestatis* of the pope, then by the pope against the emperor, and after the decay of the empire they became the ferment of political evolution within the nation-state through all its periods down to the Marxist doctrine. Even the theory of Marx, in spite of its fight against established Christian churches, is essentially Christian because it insists on all men being equal and having, therefore, an equal right to their share in the social product, the so-called right to the full product of their labor.

It is instructive to follow the positions conquered by the sovereignty of the people since the French Revolution. In the National Assembly, when the Rights of Man were to be declared, the deputies ardently debated the question of what ought to be understood by *Man*. They were unanimous that *Man* meant the educated and well-to-do bourgeois; but there were politicians in the assembly who saw the dangers of this terminology and were afraid that *le peuple* not belonging to the * tiers état* might get the absurd idea that they were perhaps men, too. And they implored the assembly not to declare the
Rights of Man because this idea would necessarily lead to the materialistic interpretation that all men should have an equal position in political affairs and, even worse, that they should all own the same amount of property. In short: They were afraid of Communism, and history has proved that their fears were well founded. Already in 1796 there was the Conjuration des Égaux of Baboeuf and his friends; it was easily suppressed, but the danger of Communism has been a real factor in political history since that time. However, the generally accepted idea of Man then was the bourgeois, and the nineteenth century shows how the number of people accepted as men gradually increased. The census of property and education was diminished by successive parliamentary reforms until the franchise was extended to all men over a certain age. Women, however, were not admitted as men, and only the postwar period has seen a general extension of the right to vote to women; France is the only important exception in this matter.

The fighting value of the sovereignty of the people, of the democratic idea, has become exhausted in this gradual evolution. It has gotten everything it wanted and there is no need for it any more. We have to be quite clear, however, that the democratic idea has fought against something, and this something was the old political order and rank of successive governing classes. A governing class has authority to govern just as long as it is felt to be representative of the nation and to use its power in the service of the political unit as a whole. When power is abused and the actions of the governing class are at variance with the interests of the masses of the people, authority diminishes rapidly, and sooner or later, in a peaceful or revolutionary way, the governing class will have to disappear. This is what happened to the different sets of aristocracy one after the other, and it is what happened to the liberal bourgeois governing class of the Rights of Man period. After being exposed to the effects of the democratic idea over several hundred years, the traditional forms of government have been dissolved and today no longer exist. We have arrived at a situation rather
erroneously styled the “Crisis of Democracy.” There is no such crisis because, as yet, democracy has not existed at all. Democracy up to this time, at least in Europe, has been a dissolvent of traditional forms, the last of which is the bourgeois parliament; it has had a purely negative function. And now having performed this function, democracy faces the problem of what to do, and how to organize a thoroughly democratic nation. Nobody knows as yet exactly what is to be done in this case, and the few attempts, for example, the fascist solution, have not yet had the opportunity to show their value over a longer period of time. If there is any crisis at all, then it is of helpless statesmen seeking the proper organization for a mass of people without traditional governmental forms.

The new political problem is reflected in the sphere of political thought. In Germany political science (Schmitt) tries to analyze the type of constitution we have lived under up to now, and separates the so-called *rechtsstaatliche Bestandteil* [rule of law component] from the so-called *politischen Bestandteil* [political component]. The *rechtsstaatliche* element, the liberal control of power, is carefully set apart under the topic of liberalism, while the political element refers to the positive type of relations between the ruler and the ruled, and one of these positive forms may then be democracy. Behind Schmitt’s concepts there may be the desire to discredit the checks of power by associating them with liberalism as an antiquated political idea, and to open the way, under the title of democracy, to dictatorial experiments. Schmitt is a very careful man and does not go too far into the consequences of his theory. The rather significant attempt, however, to form a new concept of democracy, now that the fighting value of the old one has been exhausted, is undeniable; Schmitt even coins the very useful concept of constitutional democracy by analogy with constitutional monarchy, meaning a democracy with a liberal section in its constitution, the Bill of the Rights of Man. And again this union of words—constitutional democracy—leaves open the possibility that they may eventually be dissociated,
and one day we shall have democracy without any limits to governmental power. If we should go on in the direction of Schmitt’s attempt and try to define what democracy is more precisely than he does, we might perhaps arrive at a political order where, not going into details of organization, masses of people follow one or more political leaders because of his or their personal authority. The organization may be rather similar to that of absolute monarchy, the decisive difference being that the belief in the sacrosanct person of the monarch, the belief in a dynasty, in legitimate succession to power, etc., are gone and replaced by an immediate attachment to the personal qualities of the statesman in power. The Italy of Mussolini, for example, would be a model democracy—the application of force to keep the government in power would not be an argument to the contrary, just as it would not be an argument against absolute monarchy that a king keeps himself in his position by force.

German political science has gone a bit further than the rest of the Western world in creating concepts to meet the new problems of political existence because there is no resistance to be overcome in the form of deep-rooted political beliefs of any sort. The problem, however, has attracted attention in the West of Europe, too. To prove this point I shall analyze a few of the opinions advanced by Professor Laski on this matter. In his Grammar of Politics he explains, just as we have done here (only his interpretation of history differs somewhat), that the theory of sovereignty would best be abandoned because it has lost its significance: “in fact, [that] with which we are dealing is power; and what is important in the nature of power is the end it seeks to serve and the way in which it serves that end.” The first part of this sentence acknowledges that the illusions of the concept of sovereignty have been quite thoroughly destroyed, and what remains, after discounting the beliefs of old political science, is the fact of power, the relation between a ruler and the ruled. Thus far, there is no difference between the German and the English attempt. However, the
second half of the sentence already opens the view into the sphere of morals, while the German idea intends to construe the sphere of politics as an independent one, following its own laws only. The German concept at the basis of the new type of thought, now evolving, is that of action, or decision, while Laski goes on into speculations of moral philosophy and looks for the ends for which power is used. About the legitimate ends Laski is quite explicit; he says: “Each individual . . . is entitled to expect from the performance of the State an environment in which, at least potentially, he can hope to realize the best of himself.” I do not think any German writer would disagree on this point, only he would not make a point of it because it is a matter of course that, after the destruction of traditional beliefs and ranks, the interests to be taken account of are those of all the people as an undifferentiated mass. Laski’s postulate is implicit in the problem of democracy as we have formulated it; in order to maintain their authority, the statesman, or statesmen, would have to do exactly what Laski postulates. But the German interest is centered in the problem of political action and less in the problem of formulating in rules the ends of government.

The trend of Laski’s theory is seen quite distinctly in the explanations of his postulate. He says: “If power is exercised in any given state so as to differentiate for this purpose, between its members, we have a denial of the condition which legitimises governments. It thus becomes necessary that the conditions of legitimacy be postulated as the primary limitation upon governmental power. We postulate them by translating them into a system of rights: by which is meant a set of demands which, if unrealised, prevent the fulfilment of the State purpose.” Again [we find] the inclination to transform the limits of governmental power into explicit rules, and even into a declaration of rights, not leaving the matter of limitation to practical politics and assuming that after all no government can do what it likes, not even the most absolute king. The interest of the whole must be considered. “Every government
is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation," he adds, and this again is true, and a fundamental law of politics, because if the government does not live up to its obligations, in the long run the ruled masses will not do so either.

Behind this ardent desire to set rules for future political existences is the candid belief that such rules can be found and agreed upon by all, and what is the principle of these rules? "For the community, the interest of each citizen is of equal importance. No claim of mine, at least at the minimum level of right, can be recognized by the State which involves the surrender by some other person of rights without which he, also, cannot be his best self. The mutual claims of the State and of its citizens must be claims clearly justifiable by reference to a common good which includes the goods of all." This rule now, of the equal importance of all citizens, is identical with the ideas of Thomas Reid and his rule that we should not do to anybody what we should consider wrong if done to us in the same circumstances. Here we find also the calculus of happiness, that nobody can ask for himself advantages that would deprive someone else in the community of the same class of advantages. It is the calculus of natural law as we find it not only in Reid but in the German natural-law speculation of the outgoing eighteenth century as, for example, in the system of Kant or Fichte. In this point the political thought of Laski has not advanced one inch. There is, however, a very interesting implication in Laski. While in German philosophy this calculus of happiness and the rule of mutual acknowledgment of one's sphere of right is an ideal Leitfaden [guide] for politics and not believed to be capable of realization before the end of the world, Laski considers his idea a rule for practical politics and implies in his calculus the possibility of realizing a state in which everyone can be his best self. I personally do not believe in such a possibility because in every society there are certainly people who cannot be their best in a democracy, but would develop beautifully, for example, in aristocratic culture as members of the governing class, or as theologians in the
Middle Ages, or as an Alcibiades in Athens. Now, of course, I do not wish back the Middle Ages, or antiquity, or the reign of Louis XIV, but I should like to make it clear that talk about everybody in a given state being his best self or developing all the possibilities of his personality is absolutely vain and not a practical ideal for democracy or for any other sort of political existence. My personal opinion is that since a vast number of personality types are suppressed altogether in a democracy, it does not matter very much if any number of specimens of the one type permitted to exist are suppressed just a little.

Laski’s theories gain some appearance of truth when it is taken as self-evident that only one ideal of personal happiness is correct. “The plane upon which men meet with identical claims upon the common good is that of which the State fixes the horizon.” The plane of identical claims of mankind, where according to Laski the state has to fix its horizon, is that of material interests; all men are equal in that they want to eat, and to have a family, and to gain enough money to satisfy these two principal wants. “In any adequate view of citizenship a State which refuses to me the thing it declares essential to the well-being of another is making me less than a citizen.” Everybody must be in such a position to attain the so-called standard of living. Laski is a Christian with a touch of English liberalism, living entirely in the English national type of belief, as demonstrated by the comparison with Reid. He admires Christ and Buddha and does not particularly like Caesar and Napoleon. His social ideal is directed by mercy, and by mercy exclusively; he seems to be rather blind to the fact that a considerable number of people, Caesar and Napoleon being only the greatest of their kind, are men of action, destined to rule over people, and that there are others who are equally destined not to rule; and that from these fundamental types of personality spring the problems of politics and not from the standard of living or an equal share in the goods of the commonwealth. Of course, Professor Laski has a right to his personal beliefs in ethics, and he may even have them printed if he thinks mankind will be
the better for it; but I do not think he has a right to advance them under the guise of scientific truth, and simply not to speak of the other types of ethics. First, it is not quite fair; second, it results in false opinions concerning the nature of politics and the fundamental fact that a state can never solve the problem of happiness of mankind and that its tasks are of a different nature. Living in a sphere of utopian ethical wants, however respectable and even venerable these sentiments may be, eventually might even prove positively damaging for the political problems to be solved.

In spite of all these misgivings I have advanced against Professor Laski's theory, he has excellently achieved the very important purification of the realms of politics from the illusions of sovereignty, and after the destruction of the ideologies the way is open for constructive investigation into the relations possible between political existences. That Laski still lives in the same sort of belief as Reid did, just as the German writers with their problems of action and decision live in the traditional German belief, proves my point that national types of mind are rather stable and long-living entities, and that their existence is a real factor to be reckoned with in interstate relations. That he clings to his belief, however, in an unreflected manner, so as not to permit the possibility of any other, is deeply regrettable, because mutual understanding between nations, their having a clear picture of each other's peculiar beliefs, is a first condition for relations free from distrust. And who after all should bring about such a mutual understanding if not those professionally occupied with the subject matter? Laski himself speaks of the external reflexes of the inner relations of a political existence, and says: External policy is, in the end, always a reflection of, and an adjustment to, internal policy; and adds: “That is why the realisation of what is implied in democracy is the necessary prelude to the achievement of an ordered civilisation.” I agree with him—but democracy is a concept produced by the mind and, therefore, necessarily tinged with some national belief. There are as many concepts
of democracy as there are nations in the world with distinct beliefs of their own, and if each should insist that its idea of democracy ought to be the basis of an ordered civilization, that poor civilization will be pretty far from being an ordered one. Well-considered national beliefs are but a limit to interstate relations; unreflected ones, as they are current today in Germany, England, France, the United States, Italy, and wherever you want, will put an end to them sooner or later, as they did in 1914.

Lecture Four

During the course of these lectures you will have noticed that I insist on calling relations between national political existences interstate relations, and not international as is usually done. I do so because I want to assign a separate meaning to the word *international* that I cannot dispense with. This procedure is necessary in spite of the excellent work of Max Huber, and the definition of *international* in his famous book *Die soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts*. He defines *international* as a relation between social groups organized as states; and *internationalism* is the endeavor to make international relations more frequent, and thereby to further the importance of internationality in political, economic, and cultural life. In a few remarks of commentary he says expressly that *nation* is to mean a nation organized as a state, and not perhaps an ethic or cultural unit. You see immediately that even if we adopted Huber’s terminology, we could not accept the meaning of his concept because it is purely legal, a concept of law, while we operate with a sociological concept of political existence. We cannot differentiate between the state and the cultural unit of a nation because political existence is essentially characterized by the type of belief penetrating it, and the whole problem of interstate relations consists precisely in finding out what sort of relations are possible between political existences, and where limits are drawn by beliefs. The line
between interstate and international has hitherto been drawn best, as far as I can see, by Carl Schmitt in his *Verfassungslehre*. For Schmitt, *interstate* means, in contrast to *international*, that states, i.e., political units, closed within their borders and impermeable, stand one against the other and make decisions on their own existence. *International*, on the other side, means the abolition of national differences, a sort of likemindedness, I should say, going beyond the borders of the national units. The Roman Catholic Church is an international and not an interstate community and organization; international trade unions and the communist movement are phenomena of the international order, just because and insofar as they are not interstate.

If we translate these distinctions into our terms of beliefs and political existences, and thereby try to give more precision to them, we should say: A political existence is conceived as a unit in terms of the type of mind found in its belief; the special sort of political existence we have to deal with is the nation-state with all its consequences for interstate relations. However, other types of political existence are possible, as we have seen, for example, the Greek polis, or the empire type. Internationalism, now, seems to me to be a new phenomenon of the same order as the others just mentioned, the only but very important difference being that phenomena of the international type are as yet beliefs hanging in the air, not yet having come to constitute political existence. If any sort of an international belief should reach embodiment in a political existence this would mean that the present political existences with their national beliefs were sufficiently dissolved so as not to be able to resist any more. As long as we have interstate relations, internationalism is a belief not yet in existence; when it comes into existence the states, and with them interstate relations, will be gone. I prefer these formulations to those of Schmitt because he conceives the problem in terms of his theory of decision; he does not go into the matter of beliefs because he himself lives so perfectly and unreflected in his own type of belief that he does not see it at all. The state for him is given by its
decision on its own existence; *sovereign* means that no foreign authority is permitted to decide in the question of existence. After the dissolution of the theories of sovereignty, as we have set them forth, the problem of statehood has come down to a pure sphere of politics to be dealt with in terms of power, and of relations between the ruler and the ruled. Schmitt realized this change just as Laski did, but as Germany has not developed a particular faith in moral rules governing relations between citizens, he did not have the possibility that Laski had, to take a foundation of power beyond its own sphere into the realm of morals; he had to remain in the realm of politics, and the substance of politics is action. Therefore, for him, the only reason for [the state's] political existence is that it decides to be one. His attempt to approach the problem of existence by way of decision corresponds to Laski's attempt to formulate the moral conditions of power. But just as I cannot accept Laski's essay in morals as a sufficient explanation of the facts of politics, I cannot accept Schmitt's decision. For who decides? Schmitt does not tell us; he says the state bears the decision within itself, thus avoiding naming the subject. There is no difference between decision and existence; and of the unity of a nation and the constitution of unity by the ranks of beliefs and their coordination I said in the preceding lecture what had to be said. The essence of the nation-state, as of any other type of political existence, is belief, not morals and not decision.

The relations between states are, in principle, of the same type as those between individuals. We cannot work out here a complete typology of social behavior, but have to confine ourselves to a number of particularly relevant types. There is first what I shall call rational action, that is, action based on experience. We have a certain insight into the laws of nature and into the psychological mechanism of man, and make use of this experience in our actions by choosing the right means to obtain the ends we desire. This type of action is not an eminently social one; we behave rationally in the same way when we construct a machine or light a cigarette, by making use of
our experience and our habits based on it. In social intercourse men and their behavior are simply taken as elements in the plan of our action; we use them either as means to an end, or want them as an end to our actions themselves. This type of action is the basic one; without a world of experience and its rules we could not do anything intelligently, and our relations would be chaotic.

Rational action comprises an important quantity of our active life, but the ratio is no guide to action. If we know what we want, we can reach our aim by rational steps; but first we have to want something. Quite a comprehensive sphere of what we want, conditioning social relations, is that of the vital needs, which concern all degrees of nutrition and comfort. For the interstate sphere Laski has given a very nice list of needs that have ceased to be national in nature (p. 228):

a) Problems of communication
b) Problems of territorial limits
c) Problems of racial or national minorities
d) Problems of public health
e) Problems of industry and commerce
f) Problems of international migration
g) Problems concerning the direct prevention of war

When you divest these problems of their conventional titles and arrange them in terms of the vital sphere, you will see that they regard safety of life (war), health, liberty (minorities), and property and contract. World economics, indeed, have become so complicated that every national event of any respectable size will be felt somewhere else in the world, and affect the life, liberty, and property of somebody belonging to another nation. And the whole area of the habitable world is so completely occupied and organized by political existences that migration has become a burning issue between states. This vast realm of needs presents therefore a multitude of intricate problems.
to be organized between states, and the rules governing these relations constitute the great bulk of international law.

I do not want to go into detail about these things because everything that possibly can be said about the network of interwoven interests has been said. My task is to put the problem into precise terms. When we speak of the sphere of material interest we have to ask whose interest is in question. Let us assume the interest of the individual citizen, and let us construct a type of citizen equal to all other citizens (say, in the Western world) with an equal right to make use of natural opportunities, be they of an external nature or of his own. This type of citizen would demand an international community as the corresponding form of political organization; nation-states would have to be dissolved for all practical purposes. Tariff lines, different freight rates, reservation of certain positions for citizens of one’s own nation, immigration laws, etc., would have to be abolished. To foster ideals of democracy based on the brotherhood of mankind and at the same time, for example, to resist immigration is perhaps not immoral, and certainly it is very clever, but it is inconsistent. The world we live in is not modeled on this concept of the citizen, it is not an international world. Thus, we have to construct a second type of citizenship, making a selection of men according to their being organized in a national existence. Under this assumption the talk of interest becomes a rather questionable value; the maintenance of national existence at all cost, even at the cost of the lives of the citizens, being the leading principle controlling interstate relations, puts quite definite limits on free intercourse in the sphere of material interest. Relations might be very much in the interest of citizens taken singly, but they are not admitted when they endanger the national existence. This limit was not so visible at the beginning of the nineteenth century because the individual existences were comparatively self-sufficient. As the division of labor progressed, the danger grew in the same degree and was quite marked in the world war. The postwar period is therefore quite decidedly character-
ized by a renaissance of mercantilism and the striving for self-sufficiency. [Examples.] The ultimate motive of this situation, however, is not material interest itself, but the faith around which, of necessity, political existence crystallizes.

Insight into these rather simple relations is, however, in a deplorable state; let me quote a leading authority in the field of international law, the late Oppenheim (The League of Nations and Its Problems). The question, "What is internationalism?"; he answers:

Internationalism is the conviction that all the civilized States form one community throughout the world in spite of the various factors which separate the nations from one another, the conviction that the interests of all the nations and States are indissolubly inter-knitted, and that, therefore, the Family of Nations must establish international institutions for the purpose of guaranteeing a more general and a more lasting peace than existed in former times. Internationalism had made great strides during the second part of the nineteenth century on account of the enormous development of international communication favoured by railways, the steamship, the telegraph, and a great many scientific discoveries and technical inventions. But what a disturbing and destroying factor war really is, had not become fully apparent till the present war, because this is a world war which interferes almost as much with the welfare of the neutral as with the welfare of the belligerents.

And on another page:

Progress will be slow, and perfect unanimity among the Powers will in any and every case only be possible where the international interests of all the Powers compel them to put aside their real or imaginary particular national interest.

It is an almost hopeless task to disentangle a passage like this. There flow together: the idea of common beliefs in the civilized Western world; the material interest of citizens, the material interest of nations; the interest of nations in their existence; a blind belief in the value of peace as such, etc.

The ultima ratio in defense of a belief that has found embodiment in existence is war and my readiness to die for it.
The average so-called internationalism wants to maintain national existence and at the same time abolish war, that is, to make existence and its maintenance a matter of historical accident. If history develops so as to let existence live, all right; if it turns out otherwise the respective existence will have to die without a word. National faith is to be replaced by a new faith in welfare, stable economics, security of life, abolition of violence. The antithesis of the two faiths is never put in all clarity; for no pacifist is so stupid as to say that life is a value in itself and to be maintained at all costs even if nothing remains that makes life worth living. On the contrary they are quite militant about their ideal of peace, and perfectly ready to make wars to end war, or wars to make peace. Oppenheim, too, admits the possibility of wars in his international scheme, but he says, it has to be “an exceptional phase and must be only for the purpose of re-establishing peace.” I do not know of any wars that have been made for fun; all of them have been made to reestablish peace—depends only what the peace will be like. And no better than a brutal nationalist, Oppenheim keeps military force at the back of the peaceful state of society as an “ultima ratio.”
Notes on Augustine

Time and Memory

I. Book XI, Chapters x–xiii

For Saint Augustine the question concerning the essence of time is raised by the question of God's creation of the world. How are we to understand the terms creator and the act of creatio (creation) in order to avoid the trifling activity of posing such idle questions as: What did God do before he made the world? Why did He create it in the first place, and at a specific time, rather than abstain from creating it? How can God be eternally and unchangeably the same, if decisions mature in Him such as the one to create the world? In this text segment Augustine's thought is not conducted with clarified concepts with stable meanings; instead it lives in concrete images overflowing with reality. Here time does not appear as a commodious dimension in which there is a place for things and events, but is filled with historical and natural content. The created things (creatura) are understood to be heaven and earth and, along with them, time, conceived as filled space. The saecula and tempora, the ages of the world created by God, are referred to in the plural (the meaning of aon may be assumed to be included) in order to demonstrate that He could not have existed in such ages before he created the tempora et saecula:

“antequam faceret deus caelum et terram, non faciebat aliquid; si enim faciebat, quid nisi creaturam faciebat?” [Before God made heaven and earth, he made not anything. For if he did, what did he make unless the creature? (Confessions, bk. XI, chap. xii, 14, p. 283)].1 “Si autem ante caelum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid tunc faciebas? non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus” [But if before heaven and earth there was no time, why is it asked, What didst Thou then? For there was no “then” when time was not (ibid., chap. xiii, 15, p. 284)]. There was no then when time was not. Time is viewed as absolutely thoroughly thing-like [dinghaft], created with and part and parcel of the entire creatura of heaven and earth, and contrasted as a whole to God’s creative will. The substantial will of God does not precede time in some kind of time, but in the celsitudo semper praesentis aeternitatis [eminence of the always present eternity].

God’s eternal substance is understood as the opposite pole to time but referring directly to it [i.e., the tempora et saecula] through the act of creation, as “quomodo fiant, quae per te atque in te fiunt” [how these things be made which are made by and in Thee (bk. XI, chap. xi, 13, p. 282)]. God is eternal becoming, without, however, assuming temporal form; consequently, He is characterized in the temporal terminology in a way that negates all positive temporal determinations with additional explanation that empty them of experiential content: In eternity nothing passes away (praeterire), everything is simultaneously present; nevertheless “nullum vero tempus totum esse praesens” [but no time is wholly present (ibid., p. 283)]. The present, which makes sense only in reference to the past and the future, as a flow from the former to the latter, is lifted from this context and presented as everlasting, with the additional comment that no time can be wholly present. God’s

years do not come and go like human years, they stand still [sie stehen]; and because they stand still, they all stand still at the same time. God’s years are one day, but his day is not the single day of each day, but a today that is forever, for this today does not yield to any morning, nor follow any yesterday. Your today is eternity (“hodiernus tuus aeternitas” [bk. XI, chap. xiii, 16, p. 285]). “Omnia tempora tu fecisti et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus” [Thou hast made all time; and before all times Thou art, nor in any time was there not time {ibid.}].

We should focus, in these passages, on the change of meaning in the words praecedere and ante, which in Saint Augustine’s analysis lose all reference to a process in space and time; nor do they refer to an order or rank of value and only preserve their sensory flavor through the course of the confessional monologue with its dialectical turn of expression that directs the reader toward the beyond in the ego’s act of intentio, which is differentiated from distentio {distention} and attentio {a stretching toward}, which we will discuss below.

The God-world relationship, as Saint Augustine conceives it in his consideration of the problem of time, has the same formal structure as Kant’s relationship between the empirical and the intelligible ego. Kant encountered the same difficulties as Saint Augustine when he tried to elucidate the transcendental ego by descriptions taken from the operations of the empirical ego; in fact, Kant ran into several more difficulties, because he addressed in greater detail than Saint Augustine the question of how the entire course of the transcendental ego is to be traced in its process parallel to the empirical ego, without, however, being able to apply categories of temporal extension to the transcendental ego. In the question of this parallel, Saint Augustine finds the following statement sufficient: “et nulla tempora tibi coeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; et illa si permanerent non essent tempora” [and no times are coeternal with Thee, because Thou remainest for ever; but should these continue, they would not be times {bk. XI, chap. xiv, 17, p. 285}]. He
responds to the question that follows this statement: “What then is time?” with the well-known explanation: “si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio” [If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not (ibid.)]. Saint Augustine only needs to concern himself with the pure dialectics of the parallel course [of the two egos]; for Kant the case is complicated by the need to explain transformations that take place in the transcendental ego itself [from the evil of original sin to the good], at which point Kant has recourse to the mysteries.

II. (Book XI, Chapter xiv, to the End of the Book)

We must bear in mind that Saint Augustine did not write his Confessions in order to solve philosophical problems. Strictly speaking, he was not concerned with philosophical problems. He writes, using reason to illuminate and interpret holy matters. Furthermore, the Confessions are informed by faith, but not by a naïve faith. The work is carefully crafted; and even as the author was writing the first word of a book like number XI, he knew how he would structure and conclude it. The Confessions are interspersed with prayers and, before the solutions to difficult problems, with invocations to God; consciously employed rhetorical devices intended to involve the reader in the spirit’s movement and, if the reader cannot be won by argument, to win his assent by allowing him to participate in the confession of faith to God. The concept of confession is used in contrast to contradictio [contradiction] as, for instance, in the passage in book XII, chapter xvi, paragraph 23: “tu esto, deus noster, arbiter inter confessiones meas et contradictiones eorum” [Be Thou, O our God, judge between my confessions and their contradictions]. It is not primarily the confession of a soul, nor a story of oneself, but first and foremost the confession of faith in God. The famous passage “si explicare velim, nescio” [if I wish to explain, I do not know] is not, as one might suppose if quoted out of context, a confession rising from the
depth of the inadequacy in the face of such a sublime matter, but a rhetorical device which, in the eleventh book, draws the line separating the discussion of the creature's fall (distentio animi) [spiritual distraction] and the return to God (intentio). Rational examinations are only undertaken with reference to theological questions; the context of thought is exclusively theological; the rational excurses are relatively isolated and are not intended to be building blocks in the construction of a system. The explanations concerning human beings and time cannot be unambiguously subsumed under any of our familiar categories. They are not epistemological—although they accurately describe in detail the possibility of experience as an experience of a world with the dimension of time; nor are they psychological or transcendental investigations into the inner consciousness of time—although they have something to say in this matter. The original intuition, from which the confession wells up so truthfully and credibly, is that of the Sabbath of eternal life: “Etiam tunc enim sic requiesces in nobis, quemadmodum nunc operaris in nobis, et ita erit illa requies tua per nos, quemadmodum sunt ista opera tua per nos. Tu autem, domine, semper operaris et semper requiscis; nec vides ad tempus, nec moveris ad tempus, nec quiescis ad tempus; et tamen facis et visiones temporales et ipsa tempora et quietem ex tempore” [For even then shalt Thou so rest in us, as now Thou dost work in us; and thus shall that be Thy rest through us, as these are Thy works through us. But Thou, O Lord, ever workest, and are ever at rest. Nor sees Thou in time, nor movest Thou in time; and yet Thou makest the scenes of time, and the times themselves, and rest which results from time (bk. XIII, chap. xxxvii, 52, p. 382)]. In order to take form, this fundamental experience must operate on theological and, especially, on biblical materials by which it is so thoroughly absorbed that constructing a system along rational principles is not even intended.

The tempora and saecula are further understood to be substance, but the clear and distinct contrast between an eternal
creator and a temporal creation is thus lost, because the begin-
ing of Genesis requires a construction of a caelum caeli [a heaven of heavens [bk. XII, chap. xv, 18–22, pp. 316–19]] and of a chaos, both of which may be creatura but predate time [ibid., chap. xii, 15, pp. 314–15]; between God and the tempora a timeless creatura is inserted; hence time is only possible as a phenomenon accompanying the creatura, but the converse does not hold true. But, aside from this theological fragment, the question concerning the essence of time at this point, following the explanation of the relationship of God to the world, is particularly important because it has been answered convincingly: Time is the form of the world’s being, of the creatura, eternity is the form of the being of God, i.e., creatoris; according to this dialectical analysis time is an objective quality of the world, of the world as something created.

At this point, the question can only be understood in terms of the goal of Saint Augustine’s investigation. Ultimately, time is defined as a distentio animi (spiritual distraction) and contrasted to intentio (tension tending toward); spiritual distraction is the lapse [Verfallenheit] of the soul into the world, from which state it must find its way back to God. As a result, the construction of the second part of book XI that starts with the “nescio,” in chapter xiv, paragraph 17, is distorted. The preceding part [of the book] addressed the antithesis of God and creature (the latter conceived as the sum total of creation). In accordance with its theological purpose, the second part deals with the return movement to God as a motion in contrast to creatio (creation). Nevertheless, in the [book’s] first part the term creatura has the meaning of the entire creation, while in the second it has the meaning of the soul as a part of this entire creatura. Saint Augustine, however, does not recognize an object-subject split; i.e., the opposition between the ego and the world in which the concepts of creation and of the soul would have a systematically foundational function. The ego is a component of the sum total of creation, and its attributes vacillate between the whole and the part. [Perhaps this passage
most clearly demonstrates that the task of investigating the constitution of the ego as opposed to the structure of the world could never have been addressed independently by Saint Augustine. The opposition of spirit and the world of experience, which could serve as the basis for a further development of the problem of time, therefore lacks the aspect of a clearly intended epistemological or psychological examination of time. It is almost by accident that so much rational analysis has been incorporated into the complex different theological intentions of his investigation.

The discussion of time originates in the doctrine of the schools that time has three dimensions: past, present, and future. In order for time to be, there must be something that passes (praeteriret), something that will come (adveniret), and something that is (esset), so that time might come about; but what is the past’s and the future’s mode of being, if their distinctive mark is nonbeing, either belonging already to the past or to the future still to come? And if the present were always present (semper esset praesens), it would not be present, but eternity; the present is something that passes, and how can we say that something is, if its being is constituted by what will not be, since it tendit non esse (tends not to be)? And yet we speak of a long and a short time and actually of long and short time [segments] that are past or in the future; but how can anything be long or short that actually is not at all? Hence it would be more accurate, not to say that the past is long, but that the elapsed time was long as it was present; for when it elapsed, it was no longer at all, and hence could not be long.

Thus Saint Augustine turns from objective temporal occurrences to the spirit’s subjective experience of time (naturally, the “objective” discussion also includes a relationship to the subject—not intentionally, but only because the doctrine of time and the three modes of time are very naively brought together with the creatura). The author turns to the soul: “videamus ergo, anima humana, utrum praesens tempus possit esse
longum: datum enim tibi est sentire moras atque metiri” [Let us therefore see, O human soul, whether present time can be long, for to thee it is given to perceive and to measure periods of time (bk. XI, chap. xv, 19, p. 286)]. How can the soul experience the present as enduring and measure its duration? A lengthy argument follows in which Saint Augustine demonstrates that no present time can be experienced as long, because what has elapsed is past and what is yet to come belongs to the future. It is only a segment of time which in the process of infinite division can no longer be subdivided that fills the present moment, but this segment of time is infinitely short and has no extension. Where then is the time that is measured as long, since it cannot be found in the present or in the past or in the future? It is only at this point, after reaching this almost hopeless conclusion, that with the “et tamen, domine” [and yet, O Lord (ibid., chap. xvi, 21, p. 288)] the reflection is completely transferred to the sphere of subjectivity. Chapters xvi through xx develop the investigation to the formulation: “tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de paesentibus, praesens de futuris: sunt enim haec in anima tria quaedam, et alibi ea non video: praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de paesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris expectatio” [There are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future. For these three do somehow exist in the soul, and otherwise I see them not: present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation (bk. XI, chap. xx, 26, p. 291)]. Chapters xxi through xxiii produce the formula of time as an extension, quendam esse distensionem [time . . . is a certain distention (ibid., chap. xiii, 30, p. 295)]. Chapters xxiv through xxvi cleanse time of all content and represent it as a void in which events occur, and, finally, in the experience of reciting a poem and through its inner extension in syllables, metric feet, and stanzas the formula is developed: “inde mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cuius rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi” [Whence it appeared
to me that time is nothing else than distention, but of what
I know not. It is wonderful to me, if it be not of the mind
itself [ibid., chap. xxvi, 33, p. 297]. Chapter xxviii introduces
an attentive turning-to as the characteristic of the experience
of the present; this attentio [attention] perdurat [endures]. The
long future dissolves into a longa expectatio futuri [long expec-
tation of the future]; the long past turns into a “longa memoria
praeteriti” [long memory of the past [ibid., chap. xviii, 37, p.
301]]. This is explained by the example of reciting a psalm;
before I start the recitation, I grasp the psalm only through
the expectatio; but when I have begun, it passes piece by piece
into memory: “atque distenditur vita huius actionis meae, in
memoriam propter quod dixi, et in expectationem propter quod
dicturus sum: praesens tamen adest attentio mea, per quam
traicitur quod erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum” [and the life of
this action of mine is divided between my memory, on account
of what I have repeated, and my expectation, on account of
what I am about to repeat; yet my consideration is present with
me, through which that which was future may be carried over
so that it may become past [ibid.]]. Thus the entire transaction
passes through the attentio [consideration] of the present into
memory. The same applies to all of the parts of the recitation,
as well as to longer transactions; it applies to the entire course
of life of the individual, whose parts are all his actions; it also
applies to the entire age of humankind, whose parts are indi-
vidual lives.

The core element of these statements is the contraction of
the entire phenomenon of time into the present-time [stand]
point of the experiencing ego. Past and future are not objective
realities, but images of the present in which appear, by means
of memoria and expectatio, things and events as past and forth-
coming. This formulation of the subjective phenomenon of
time is roughly equivalent to the theories of Thomas Reid, i.e.,
in the development of the problem of time it marks the initial
beginning of a decisive turn toward subjectivity. In Saint Au-
gustine's case other materials, such as the difference between
duration and measurable time, cluster around this core element. This contrast is not elaborated, since a genuine interest in the split between subject and object would be a prerequisite for an intensive treatment of the problem, while for Saint Augustine the antithesis of God-creation is of primary importance. In this matter, the Augustinian theory has not achieved even the modest degree of clarity we find in Locke’s discussion of time; nor is the problem of subjectivity pursued intensively, but results in a series of analogies embracing the full extent of the history of mankind in which concepts like memoria, expectatio, and attentio lose their proper meaning and remain intelligible only in the context of subjectivity. For Saint Augustine’s thought the lack of distinction and the analogies that follow are thoroughly consistent and true to his intention, for in the last three chapters of book XI (chaps. xxix through xxxi), after a more or less consistent excursus into subjectivity, the examination of the problem of time returns to the primary theological problem of creation’s return to God.

Following a brief flicker of its transcendental meaning, distortio [distraction], (which Husserl analyzes into retentio [retention, backward tension] and protentio [a stretching forward]), clearly regains its redemptive significance. An invocation of God rings out: ecce distortio est vita mea [behold, my life is but a distraction]—i.e., a slackening [ein Ausspannen], a disintegration, a dissipation; may God reintegrate it (coligere), so that the past may be henceforward forgotten, but not for the sake of striving [to grasp] what lies in the future, i.e., what is fleeting, but in order to pursue, “in ea quae ante sunt non distentus, sed extentus, non secundum distentionem, sed secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis” [those things which are before, not distractedly, but intently, I follow on for the prize of my heavenly calling (chap. xxix, 39, p. 302)]. “Extendantur etiam in ea, quae ante sunt, et intellegant te ante omnia tempora aeternum creatorem omnium temporum, neque ulla tempora tibi esse coaeeterna, nec ullam
NOTES ON AUGUSTINE

creaturam, etiamsi est aliqua supra tempora”

[Let them also be extended unto those things which are before, and understand that Thou { . . . } art before all times, and that no times are coeternal with Thee, nor any creature, even if there be any creature beyond all times (chap. xxx, 40, p. 303)].

III.

The conviction that governs Saint Augustine’s philosophizing is that of faithful devotion, a yearning for peace in a supra-personal being, the psychic tension of the time in which his philosophizing takes place is the worldly decay of creation and of the soul within it. The cultural heritage and language in which philosophy finds form is dominated by Christian dogma and the Bible. Only after all these circumstances are considered can we speak of an independent movement of reason that permeates his philosophizing. We cannot emphasize too strongly the multilayered nature of the philosophizing spirit, because, as a prevalent opinion has it, philosophy is a progressive science, the progress of which may be found in the fact that it becomes more and more a purely intellectual activity that makes itself independent of such irrational presuppositions as we have mentioned. According to this view, a progressive rational development runs from the still inadequate beginnings in Saint Augustine to the more successful efforts of Descartes and Kant and all the way to the most recent attempts to grasp the phenomenon of time. We, on the other hand, believe that at all times, even today, all layers of the spirit participate simultaneously in structuring the philosophical object and in

2. The following should be of interest to the studies of style: The distinction of duration and measurable time antedates Locke; [the concept of] subjective time approximates Reid’s formula. What follows in the new development of the problem of time in temporal sequence (and with good reason) with some distance in between can be found in its entirety in Saint Augustine, the reason being that he does not view such studies as central to his meaning [sinnzentral] and hence not as elements that shape style [stilbildend].
each instance structure it completely; thus not only does it not need to be further developed, but in fact it cannot be. So-called progressive development is not a neutral modification of an identical substance, but a substantially new creation, born out of a new, personal philosophical conviction that may very well take up the earlier subject matter—not in the sense of carrying new bricks to an already existing construction site, but by using old materials, which have lost their substantial meaning, in an entirely new structure. Saint Augustine's *Confessions* and Rousseau's *Confessions* are worlds apart; they are born out of very different convictions and are so rooted in the diverse psychic tensions of their respective times that we cannot speak of an identity of subject matter, even though they bear the same name. The prerequisite for the modern notion of the problem of time is the development of the personality since the Renaissance and of the individual through the Reformation. When we speak of time today, we refer to a tradition of many centuries concerned with the problem of the human being’s internal time, a problem of the ego and its structure. When we philosophize about time, our primary interest is not in time as an objective entity that exists in itself, but in time to the extent that it is constitutive of the ego, to the extent that it appears to be part of the substance of the ego. Saint Augustine was not primarily interested in the individual as an independent substance; his rational reflections were subordinate to other leading ideas; thus we should consider carefully whether his reflections upon time had the same crucial meaning for him for the inner constitution of the ego that is so important to us, or whether he treats the issue of the constitution of the ego in a completely different context from that of time.

Primarily, two dialectical forms are used for organizing the material of the investigations in book XI. For the first, I will use the term *parallel guidance* [*Parallelführung*]. It was discussed earlier in the explanation of the relationship between *creator* and *creatura*, between time and eternity. The second dialectical form must be further clarified. The tension between
creator and creatura is the theme of the entire investigation: through the act of creatio [creation] the creatura comes into being; through the act of intentio the creature returns to God. If considered to be a determination of time, the second part of the clause, following nescio [I do not know], is, as I have indicated earlier, incomprehensible, since the first part has already adequately explained that, in contrast to God, time is an attribute of the creatura. Thus it seems to me the subject matter of the second part may be more accurately described as an attempt to determine the position of the soul in relationship to time and eternity. This attempt is not very successful, since Saint Augustine must bypass some other problems that are of no interest to him in order to get to the soul, which is his exclusive interest, and does so with a great deal of clumsiness. The problem that he bypasses is that of the temporal dimension of the external world, the problem of measurable time. It is not until he has rid himself of the external world and, especially, of the astronomical measurement of time, that he arrives at the distentio animi [the distention/distraction of the mind]; this definition of time is not intended to negate the reality of the tempora and saecula. In addition, this distentio animi is achieved only to immediately make room for the statement “at ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem nescio [. . . ], donec in te confluem purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui” [but I have been divided amid times, the order of which I know not (. . .) until I flow together unto Thee, purged and molten in the fire of Thy love (chap. xxix, 39, p. 302)]. Thus Saint Augustine’s conception of time is not so much the constituens [constituent] of the soul, but rather its dissolvens [dissolvent], as seen from the standpoint of God, from which everything is viewed by Saint Augustine. The consequence of the constitution of the past and the future in the present attentio, which we found so important for us, is here more contingent, for as soon as it is achieved, it is so broadened that, for the structure of the ego, it loses all meaning. That which applied in the recitation of the psalm “holds true for the entire age of the sons of men”
IV. {On the Discussions of Memory in Book X}

Nevertheless, Saint Augustine elsewhere addresses in greater detail the issue of the ego and attempts to clarify its inner structure; he does this in his investigations of memory, which make up the tenth book of his Confessions. But we cannot expect to find this problem examined for its own sake or as the focus of the investigation. Just as in the segment dealing with time the relationship between time and spirit was almost accidentally brought into an important definition, so is the much more thorough analysis of memory embedded in a theological context. The tenth book asks: Where does the soul find God in its quest for Him in order to find repose in Him? After a lengthy and vain quest, Saint Augustine is forced to admit: “neque in his omnibus, que percurro consulens te, invenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea nec a te quicquam recedat ex me” [Nor in all these which I review consulting Thee, find I a secure place for my soul, save in Thee, into whom my scattered members may be gathered together, and nothing of me depart from Thee [bk. X, chap. xl, 65, p. 268]]. I find passages like these especially important because they reveal that his thinking in no way begins with a given concept of God, but that ultimately God refers to a specific point in the movement of his soul toward repose; Saint Augustine seeks, not God, but a tutum locum animae suae [a secure place for his soul]. After speculation has taken its course through all possible places, it arrives at a place that is conceptually defined as not being any of the other places; what it is in a positive sense can only be seen by the person who has participated in the entire movement of the confessio
(confession). Also, in book XI, time has become the distentio animi [and not, for instance, a multiple of the revolution of a heavenly body], because the distentio in praeterita et futura [distraction/distention into the past and future] was a dialectical antithesis to the intentio in ea quae ante [intention/tension toward those things that are before]; the distentio animi is the last springboard [Sprungbrett] to God.

The analysis of memory demonstrates this dialectical movement with even greater clarity. In chapter vi the question is asked:

Quid autem amo, cum te amo? non speciem corporis nec decus temporis, non candorem lucis ecce istum amicum oculis, non dulces melodias cantilenarum omnimodarum, non florum et ungentorum et aromatum suaveolentiam, non manna et mella, non membra acceptabilia carnis amplexibus: non haec amo, cum amo deum meum.—et tamen amo quandam lucem et quandam vocem et quandam odorem et quandam cibum et quandam amplexum, cum amo deum meum, lucem, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, ubi fulget animae meae, quod non capit locus, et ubi sonat, quod non rapit tempus, et ubi olet, quod non spargit flatus, et ubi sapit, quod non minuit edacitas, et ubi haeret, quod non divellit satietas. hoc est quod amo, cum deum meum amo [But what is it that I love in loving Thee? Not corporeal beauty, nor the splendor of time, nor the radiance of the light, so pleasant to our eyes, nor the sweet melodies of songs of all kinds, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs pleasant to the embraces of flesh. I love not these things when I love my God; and yet I love a certain kind of light, and sound, and fragrance, and food, and embracement in loving my God, who is the light, sound, fragrance, food, and embracement of my inner man—where that light shineth unto my soul which no place can contain, where that soundeth which time snatcheth not away, where there is a fragrance which no breeze disperseth, where there is a food which no eating can diminish, and where that clingeth which no satiety can sunder. This is what I love, when I love my God (chap. vi, 8., pp. 223–24)].

In search of this place of the soul’s repose Saint Augustine traverses the sensory world as well as the soul in order to
finally rise above the soul to God. “Quaeram te, ut vivat anima mea. vivit enim corpus meum de anima mea, et vivit anima mea de te” [I will seek Thee, that my soul may live. For my body liveth by my soul, and my soul liveth by Thee (chap. xx, 29, p. 241)]. Elsewhere, this graded elevation is formulated as follows: “iam tu melior es, tibi dico, anima, quoniam tu vegetas molem corporis tui praebens ei vitam, quod nullum corpus praestat corpori. deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae est” [Now, O my soul, thou art my better part, unto thee I speak; for thou animatest the mass of thy body, giving it life, which no body furnishes to a body; but thy God is even unto thee the Life of life (chap. vi, 10, p. 225)]. Saint Augustine’s terminology is, however, not entirely transparent, since he is unable to assign new names to the individual stages of his thought. First, the anima designates the soul or spirit as a whole, then only one of its layers. The spheres within which God is sought, all the way up to His truth, are approximately classified as follows: (1) corpus, sensus (body, sense), doubtlessly meaning the corporeal world; (2) the anima signifies a pure and simple vivifying principle of the corporeal world, including the animal world. Chapter vii distinguishes between intellectus (intellect) as a higher faculty, and anima as the vegetative soul; God cannot be found in the anima: “non ea vi reperio deum meum” [Not by that power do I find my God (chap. vii, 11, p. 226)]; (3) the next layer is at first called quite generally memoria (memory) and not as one might think intellectus (intellect); nevertheless, one passage identifies this layer clearly as situated above the anima to which the animals belong: “transibo vim meam, qua haereo corpori et vitaliter compagem eius repleo” [I will soar beyond that power of mine whereby I cling to the body, and fill the whole structure of it with life (ibid.)], and: “transibo ergo et istam naturae meae, gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, et venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae” [I will soar, then, beyond this power of my nature also, ascending by degrees unto Him who made me. And I enter the fields and the roomy chambers of memory
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[chap. viii, 12, p. 226]]. However, a later passage states: “transibo ergo et memoriam [. . . ] habent enim memoriam et pecora et aves, alioquin non cubilia nidosve repeterent, non alia multa quibus assuescunt; neque enim et assuescere valerent ullis rebus nisi per memoriam” [I will also pass beyond [this power of mine which is called] memory [. . . ] for even beasts and birds possess memory, else could they never find their lairs and nests again, nor many other things to which they are used; neither indeed could they become used to anything, but by their memory [chap. xvii, 26, pp. 238–39]]. Within the faculty of memory several degrees are identified: (a) remembrance of sensory perceptions, (b) remembrance of objects at hand, such as mathematical principles [Platonic anamnesis [recollection of things past]] (c) remembrance of affections. And once I have passed through all these degrees I arrive at the remembrance of remembrance: “et meminisse me memini, sicut postea, quod haec reminisci nunc potui, si recordabor, utique per vim memoriae recordabor” [also I remember that I have remembered, so that if afterwards I shall call to mind that I have been able to remember these things, it will be through the power of memory that I shall call it to mind [chap. xiii, 20, p. 233]]. Thereafter memoria and animus are identified, and because of the reiterative faculty of recollection, he says: “ergo memoria quasi venter est animi” [The memory is, so to say, the belly of the mind [chap. xiv, 21, p. 234]]. “Magna vis est memoriae [. . . ]; et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse sum” [Great is the power of memory [. . . ] and this thing is the mind, and this I myself am [chap. xvii, 26, p. 238]]. However, the main passage is found in chapter xvi, where we find a turn of phrase reminiscent of Descartes: “ego sum, qui memini, ego animus” [It is I myself—I, the mind—who remembers [chap. xvi, 25, p. 237]], and: “ipsum me non dicam praeter illam [sc. memoria]” [I cannot name myself without it (i.e., memory) (ibid.)]. Here the ego is defined in terms of the reiterative memory; the “ego ipse” [I myself] is constituted in reciprocally related acts of recollection.

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All the levels of memory are to be transcended to attain the Super-Ego [das Über-Ich]: “transibo et hanc vim meam [. . . ] ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen” [I will pass even beyond this power of mine [. . .] that I may proceed to Thee, O Thou sweet Light (chap. xvii, 26, p. 238)]. Chapter xxv lists once more the traversed levels of memory: [1] “partes eius, quas habent et bestiae” [parts which the beasts also possess (chap. xxv, 36, p. 246)] (remembrance of sensory perceptions); [2] “affectiones animi mei” [affections of my mind (ibid.)]; [3] “et intravi ad ipsius animi mei sedem [quae illi est in memoria mea, quoniam sui quoque meminit animus]” [And I entered into the very seat of my mind, which it has in my memory, since the mind remembers itself also (ibid., pp. 246–47)]. However, all of these things are subject to change, while God, being unchangeable, endures above them all, remaining always the same (permanet). Finally, the question concerning the place where God is to be found is answered in chapter xxvi: “et nusquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et nusquam locus. veritas, ubique praesides omnibus consulentibus te simulque respondes omnibus diversa consulentibus” [Place there is none; we go both “backward” and “forward,” and there is no place. Everywhere, O Truth, dost Thou direct all who consult Thee, and dost at once answer all, though they consult Thee on diverse things (chap. xxvi, 37, p. 247)].

The dialectical form in which thought moves toward its goal in God would be appropriately defined as exhaustion through negation. One after the other, the author enumerates the places where God is not to be found in order, by this exhaustive negation, to outline the place where the soul finds repose, this place that is no place. The exhaustion is not thoroughly graphic, because the individual levels [of being] traversed are not clearly differentiated; anima, intellectus, animus, and memoria are intricately interlaced, from which we may infer that they did not engage Saint Augustine’s primary interest, at any rate not to the extent that the very clearly defined grades of body-soul and soul-God did. These are the same graduations that provide
the framework for the exhaustive analysis of time as the ascent to God through the *intentio* in book XI. The other gradations of this process are determined with even less clarity. In both cases, the result of the investigation is thorough in its application of the exhaustive form of negation: In the analysis of memory, God is nowhere and everywhere; in the analysis of time he is the *actio* [action] without *tempus* [time], the *voluntas* [will] without change, the present without the past and the future.
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